U.S. President Donald Trump makes frequent use of his X account to tell the world what it's supposed to look like and which fateful decisions he has made against his European allies, Canada and Mexico. It is also widely assumed that he knows how to use email.
To convey an important message to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, however, he decided to embrace an ancient diplomatic channel: a letter. As is common with postal services, the presidential missive tarried for several days before being handed over to the courier, and another two days passed before it was delivered to Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who then gave it to Khamenei.
Trump summarized the main points of his letter in a few words for his global listeners. As the "master of the deal" he explained that his preference was to negotiate with Iran, which better accept his plan, or else face a military response.
Khamenei was quick to respond to the threat, even before reading the missive. He said that he would not negotiate with a "thug government," and that Iran was also capable of responding to US threats with blows of its own.
Two days prior, the Iranian mission to the UN announced on X, "if the objective of negotiations is to address concerns vis-à-vis any potential militarization of Iran's nuclear program, such discussions may be subject to consideration. However, should the aim be the dismantlement of Iran's peaceful nuclear program to claim that what Obama failed to achieve has now been accomplished, such negotiations will never take place."
As is customary: one step forward and two steps back. This was the nature of the preliminary dialogue, in which no official response to Trump's letter was received.
U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington on Thursday.Credit: Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters
On Tuesday, it was Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian who set the diplomatic tone of the political discourse. Addressing Trump in a speech, he said, "It is unacceptable for us that [the U.S.] give orders and make threats. I won't even negotiate with you. Do whatever the hell you want."
Pezeshkian, who since assuming office has pushed for holding a dialogue with the U.S. to get the sanctions on Iran lifted, is a frustrated president not authorized to make decisions on policy issues. After seven months in office, which began with the full backing of Khamenei, he finds himself facing a hostile parliament that has deposed the minister of economic affairs, accusing him of neglecting Iran's economy.
Pezeshkian's deputy for strategic affairs, Javad Zarif, was forced to resign at the "recommendation" of the head of the judiciary – according to the law, a person with personal ties to the West cannot serve in senior positions, and Zarif's children were born in the U.S. and carry dual citizenship.
Pezeshkian is contending almost on his own with the scathing criticism of conservatives and reformists alike, and with a deep economic crisis which is only worsening, evoking concerns in Iran about a renewed outbreak of protests and demonstrations.
Like any other country in the world, Iran is faced with the difficulty of understanding where Trump is headed.
Should Iran fear becoming a victim of a reconciliation between Trump and Putin, as Iranian media warned last month? Do the meetings between American and Russian delegations in Saudi Arabia, and the subsequent visit by Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Riyadh signal a strategic shift that will require Iran to re-examine the strength of the Russian and Chinese-provided political defense wall surrounding it?
How should it reconcile Trump's declared preference of a nuclear agreement with Iran over "blowing it to hell", with his statement that he will strike it if it does not sit at the negotiating table?
The first response from Moscow came on Thursday, from Putin's aide Yuri Ushakov, who took part in the talks in Saudi Arabia. It should have ostensibly placated Iran.
The cease-fire will give Ukraine an opportunity to reorganize and does not help Russia, said Ushakov, in what sounded like an end to Trump's initiative. A few hours later, however, at a press conference held in the Kremlin with Belarus' President Alexander Lukashenko, Putin gave reason to hope for a cease-fire, saying that he agrees with proposals to stop hostilities.
"But we continue on the basis of the fact that the cease-fire should lead to a long-term peace which will remove the original reasons that caused this crisis," said Putin. The interpretation of the term "original reasons" will have to wait until a cease-fire is achieved – if at all – and for the negotiation mechanism that is established in its wake.
An Iranian man writes on a portrait of Trump in Tehran, in February.Credit: Vahid Salemi/AP
Iran cannot afford to wait on the sidelines until negotiations between Russia and Ukraine are completed or shattered. It will have to respond to Trump's "invitation" to negotiate or prepare for war. The cards left in Iran's hands to take such a strategic decision are ostensibly not very impressive. Not much remains of the "ring of fire" it established in order to protect itself from Israeli and American attacks.
Hezbollah, the most significant military force in that ring, could still hurt Israel. But the "new" Lebanon, decimated, trying to recover while starting to negotiate with Israel over the demarcation of its land border, may turn out to be an effective block against the group's renewed military activity.
Syria, which did not participate in the "unity of fronts" but served Iran as a vital logistical conduit and as a front base for its forces, has become its enemy under new leader Ahmad al-Sharaa. Iran's ability to generate another civil war or to initiate a counter-coup led by remnants of the Assad regime, is very limited.
The Shi'ite militias in Iraq are under heavy pressure from their government, which wants them to disarm and blend into Iraq's army. The Houthis still pose a threat, but not one which will be a obstacle against attacking Iran.
Examining the deterrent force remaining in the "ring of fire" only provides a partial picture of the Iranian threat. It does not take its ability to threaten its Arab neighbors into account, its capacity to hit their oil and gas fields, and to block shipping through the Persian Gulf which would cause an energy crisis on an international scale. It appears that precisely this threat is the one giving Gulf states significant leverage for preventing a war against Iran, thus serving as a protective cordon.
The Gulf states are all part of the "pro-American" camp while having full diplomatic relations with Iran (two of them, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are also signatories of a peace accord with Israel). They have a declared policy of opposing a war with Iran due to the harsh ramifications such a war could cause them, and their relations to Teheran are informed by this conception.
UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a meeting in Abu Dhabi, in February.Credit: Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters
The United Arab Emirates started restoring its ties with Iran in 2019. In August 2022, they renewed diplomatic relations with Tehran, eight months after being attacked by Houthi missiles and drones. Saudi Arabia resumed its relations with Iran exactly two years ago, with Bahrain following suit a year later.
The countries planned to be part of a regional defense alliance against Iran, which Israel was expected to join as well. At the same time, they have so far rejected invitations to join a military coalition led by the U.S. in the Red Sea, with their leaders repeating that they will not turn their territory into launching pads for attacks on Iran.
This strategy relies on a tangled web of economic interests. The UAE is Iran's most important trading partner in the Middle East, with annual trade amounting to $25 billion, striving to reach $30 billion. Half a million Iranians live in the UAE, which has a population of 11 million, of which only 1.1 million are native citizens. More than 7,000 Iranian companies of various sizes operate in Abu Dhabi, with Iranian investments in the country estimated to have amounted to tens of billions of dollars over the years.
It's no coincidence that Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the country's leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, was the one chosen to deliver Trump's letter to Iran. Gargash, who led negotiations over the renewal of relations between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, visited Iran earlier this month and met its foreign minister for talks which revolved around the possibility of promoting talks between Iran and the U.S.
The extent of UAE's trade with Saudi Arabia is significantly smaller, but the two countries have been holding ongoing discussions on increasing trade and on security cooperation after the Saudi army's chief of staff, Fayyad al-Ruwaili, met his Iranian counterpart last November.
Saudi Arabia's choice to be the host for American and Russian delegations, followed by the talks with a Ukrainian delegation, and to act as Trump's courier to Iran may indicate the role the U.S. president is planning to give the Gulf state in negotiations with Iran. This role is based ostensibly on his recognition of their ability to impact Iran's policies.
Trump has already demonstrated his flexibility in response to pressure by Arab countries, particularly the wealthy ones, which channel billions of dollars into the American economy. Saudi Arabia, for instance, committed to investing $600 billion into the U.S. during Trump's term.
His retreat from the idea of transferring Gaza's population, for example, did not come after his difficult talks with Jordan's king and Egypt's president as Trump brushed the Arab League's resolution aside.
It required the mobilization of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in order to complete his turnaround. These two countries could now be the ones shaping the "carrots" Trump plans to offere to Iran so that it agrees to negotiate over its nuclear program.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia will also shape the channel that will bypass Israel, forming a direct link between Washington and Tehran.