China’s African port interests are expanding. Is the PLA Navy next on deck?
Beijing’s trade bets on African ports are paying off, but protecting those investments could mean repurposing facilities for military use, analysts say
Chinese state-owned firms have built, financed or currently operate more than one-quarter of Africa’s ports, according to a new study that has detailed the scope of Beijing’s investment in the continent’s port developments.
Of a total of 231 ports in 32 African countries, China is invested in 78 facilities, with the heaviest concentrations in West Africa, underscoring the region’s strategic importance to China’s global trade ambitions, according to a report by Paul Nantulya of the National Defence University’s Africa Centre for Strategic Studies.
Three of the six trade corridors outlined in the Chinese plan run through Africa, landing in East Africa, Egypt and the Suez region, and Tunisia, according to the report.
“This reinforces the central role that the continent plays in China’s global ambitions,” Nantulya said in the report published by the centre on March 10.
China gains as much as US$13 in trade revenues for every dollar invested in African ports, according to the study.
Isaac Kardon, a senior fellow for the Asia programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said China’s presence in Africa’s ports is multifaceted – driven by access to African natural resources, especially critical minerals and hydrocarbons, while opening the continent’s rapidly growing markets to Chinese products, such as tech and telecoms.
At the same time, China is building a diplomatic coalition in developing countries that will provide legitimacy, votes and political support for China, Kardon said.
“Military access is a distant third priority, focused mainly on providing security for China’s overseas interests,” said Kardon, who has studied Chinese port activity in Africa.
John Calabrese, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, said China’s involvement in West African ports is driven primarily by economic interests – encompassing everything from financing and building to managing operations.
“Its financial leverage facilitates ‘resource-led diplomacy’ for raw material and mineral access,” Calabrese said, adding that the ports themselves serve as entry points or gateways to African markets for Chinese companies seeking export destinations.
“Each new or expanded port in Africa adds to the track record of leading Chinese shipping firms like Cosco Shipping, reinforcing their status as world leaders in maritime operations,” Calabrese said.
Sub-Saharan geoeconomic analyst Aly-Khan Satchu stressed that in addition to financing, China has been the single biggest provider of infrastructure on the continent, including railways, roads and ports, for more than two decades.
“The Chinese understood that investing in Africa’s infrastructure preferably under a ‘build and operate’ premise provided seriously above trend returns,” Satchu said.
China’s presence in Africa’s ports has grown alongside its return on investment – the result of Beijing’s outsize bet on Africa and its 1.4 billion consumers, and a conviction that the average revenue per user would improve significantly over time.
Satchu was not surprised. “China, like any other country, is seeking to protect its economic interests,” he said.
Some of Africa’s Chinese-invested ports can accommodate the country’s navy vessels. Since 2000, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has made 55 port calls and conducted 19 bilateral and multilateral military exercises in Africa, according to the study.
Namibia’s press first reported on the possibility in 2015, triggering a denial from the Chinese embassy.
“Given that similar denials were made when stories began circulating about a potential Chinese base in Djibouti prior to the development of Doraleh, those disavowals have failed to tamp down speculation of similar outcomes in other locations,” Nantulya said.
“Although primarily commercial, these ports might be repurposed for military applications,” Calabrese said.
He said the move would be consistent with the PLA Navy’s “two oceans” approach.
“The dual-use features of some of these ports could be seen to serve as discreet, non-provocative steps toward an eventual expansion of Chinese maritime power projection,” Calabrese added.
Kardon, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the Djibouti base transition showed Chinese naval forces already utilised Chinese-owned-and-operated commercial facilities in Africa.
“The potential for more intensive utilisation of these dual-use facilities is clear, as is the possibility of establishment of another base, perhaps on the Gulf of Guinea where counter piracy would provide a parallel rationale to the earlier move to set up basing in the Gulf of Aden,” Kardon said.
However, it would likely take a major security challenge to China that exceeded the capacity of its African partners to respond for Beijing to significantly expand its military footprint on the continent, he added.
The South China Morning Post has contacted the Chinese foreign ministry for comment.