The West Will Need the Global South to Build the Post-American Order
NEW DELHI, India—The growing convergence between the U.S. under President Donald Trump and Russia under President Vladimir Putin on the war in Ukraine is catalyzing two opposite views among policymakers and analysts about the emerging world (dis)order and how to navigate it. Both were on prominent display among participants at last week’s Raisina Dialogue, a global conference hosted by the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.
One reaction is that Washington’s about-face on Ukraine vindicates the strategy of multi-alignment adopted by middle and regional powers in the Global South, including large countries like India but also small ones like the United Arab Emirates. Anwar Gargash, the influential foreign policy adviser to the UAE’s president, said as much during his appearance at the Raisina Dialogue. Referring to Trump’s reversal of U.S. policy on Ukraine specifically, Gargash argued that countries like the UAE, but also Saudi Arabia, India, Turkey and others, were right to resist siding unconditionally with one camp or the other in the conflict, despite pressure from the administration of former U.S. President Joe Biden to do so.
To be sure, these countries criticized Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but this did not prevent them from talking to Moscow and continuing to buy Russian weapons, oil and gas. In their view, the fact that Washington has now U-turned proves that they made the right call all along. In fact, they argue, now that Washington is pursuing direct talks with Moscow over the war as well as the broader U.S.-Russia relationship, it’s no surprise that these negotiations are being hosted by Saudi Arabia, rather than by “aligned” countries in Europe or East Asia. After all, Riyadh resisted being pushed into taking sides, instead leveraging its ties with both Russia and Ukraine, as well as Kyiv’s Western backers, to safeguard the country’s autonomy. As a result, it is now perceived as neutral ground and an honest broker in the talks.
Countries like these in the so-called Power South now feel vindicated in their belief that hedging, pursuing strategic autonomy, rejecting permanent alliances and engaging in transactional cooperation is the best way to secure their national interests.
A second approach suggests that, to the contrary, the shift in U.S. foreign policy more broadly under Trump invalidates multi-alignment as a strategy. Speaking at the Raisina gathering, Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barthe Eide compellingly argued that a country can only be multi-aligned in a world in which there are alignments. But what is happening now suggests that alignments will soon be a thing of the past.
There is no doubt that if they collectively get their act together, the “Rest of the West” would be no pushover, as it still includes among the richest countries in the world. But it would be a major mistake for this group to seek to act alone.
According to this argument, the Trump administration appears to genuinely believe that the postwar international order that the U.S. built and led since 1945 does not serve U.S. interests. The U.S. not only no longer wants to be the hegemon of that order, but is intent on smashing it and the alignments that came with it. What Washington would like instead is empire, pursuing territorial expansion and predatory relations with former allies and partners, unshackled by international rules, norms and institutions. The Trump administration seems fine with the idea that other major powers, particularly China and Russia, may also have their spheres of influence, so long as the U.S. remains first among imperial equals.
Whether or not the U.S.-led liberal international order actually promoted or hindered U.S. interests is beside the point, as is whether the pursuit of empire will become a reality or remain an aspiration. To the extent that Trump believes the former order did not advance U.S. interests, that order, which was already being threatened externally, is unlikely to survive its creator’s death blow from within. And the end of that order will also mean the end of alignments altogether.
This raises the question of how other countries should react. In particular, where does this leave the “Rest of the West” as well as the “Global Rest”? The Rest of the West is scrambling to regroup, rearm and reduce its dangerous dependencies. The challenge is massive, materially but above all psychologically. Europe is on the frontline of this challenge, squeezed by Russia’s threat and the United States’ betrayal. But Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Mexico and others won’t fare much better. The fact that the Canadians, Japanese and South Koreans are participating in the “coalition of the willing” preparing to secure any eventual peace deal in Ukraine points to the unifying effect that Trump is having on the Rest of the West. And there is no doubt that if they collectively get their act together, the Rest of the West would be no pushover, as it still includes among the richest countries in the world.
But it would be a major mistake for this group to seek to act alone. The goal should rather be to join forces with countries in the Global South, both the poor and the powerful, that also see a world of empires, in which “might makes right” is the only law, as a threat. The norms of a future world order they aspire to and could agree on may not be as “thick” and intrusive as those of the liberal international order. But they would at least cling to the basics laid out in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, including non-aggression, no changing of borders through the use of force, no territorial expansion and respect for sovereignty.
The Global Rest, notably countries in the Global South, are absolutely right when they accuse the West of double standards and hypocrisy, as well as having committed or been complicit in large-scale violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. But the scale of human suffering unleashed as the current international order unravels—from Gaza and Ukraine to Lebanon and Sudan—will only be amplified should it be entirely undone.
Yes, the old order is broken, perhaps beyond repair, but this is no reason to give up on order altogether. It is up to the Rest of the West to join with the Global Rest to salvage what is worth keeping and rebuild a new order together.
Nathalie Tocci is director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, part-time professor at the School of Transnational Governance (European University Institute) and honorary professor at the University of Tubingen. She has been special adviser to the EU high representative. Her WPR column appears monthly.