MBS controls all aspects of governance, security, and the economy in
the Kingdom so if he dies or is incapacitated a power struggle could
ensue
When considering potential future scenarios, a description of
possibilities is useful. The following possibilities are not mutually
exclusive. The main threats to the regime’s stability are:
- Succession Crisis & Internal Power Struggles
With no clear successor, MBS’s unexpected death could lead to a power
struggle within the royal family. Power would then most likely pass to
one of MBS’s full brothers, who have a firm grip on the security
services, presumably Khaled the current Minister of Defence. Should they
also be incapacitated, an internal royal family power struggle would
ensue which Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, King Salman’s only surviving
full brother, is likely to win. He would also garner the support of much
of the security apparatus as well as Western powers, who regard him as
the continuity candidate and a safe pair of hands. He has been under
house arrest for the last five years. Likelihood 15%.
- An assassination or coup, most likely from within the royal family.
In Saudi culture every relative of every prince MBS has humiliated is
honour-bound to take revenge against him and MBS has made countless
enemies within the royal family and powerful business elites. This means
a fate similar to King Faisal’s who was shot dead in 1975 in a revenge killing by a close family member is a possibility. Likelihood 25%
- Economic Collapse & Oil Dependency
Despite the launch of Vision 2030 in 2016, the Kingdom remains dependent on oil for 40 percent of its GDP and 75 percent of fiscal revenues. Furthermore, to balance its budget the Kingdom needs the price of Brent crude to be at around US$96 per barrel (pb) when it currently stands at around US$74. The Kingdom is already running a budget deficit and long-term oil revenues are increasingly vulnerable to a decline in demand. Yet the Saudi population
is growing at 1.62 percent a year, and around 250,000 young Saudis
enter the job market annually. Only around 30-40 percent of working age
Saudis are either in work or actively seeking it. Taxation increases
without economic benefits could lead to public discontent and unrest.
With no history of mass political mobilisation the likelihood of
economic collapse leading to a widespread popular revolt remains
relatively low at 10%.
- Foreign Military Threats
The Huthis have targeted Saudi oil facilities and cities across the
Kingdom with drones and missiles and they continue to pose a military
threat to the regime. Last summer
fear of Huthi military attacks compelled the Saudis to order Yemen’s
Internationally Recognised Government to reverse its attempt to take
full control of the Yemeni banking system. A Huthi offensive could
destabilise the southern region and threaten infrastructure and
mega-tourism projects. Earlier this month Donald Trump launched fresh strikes against the Huthis upending Saudi efforts to bring the conflict to a close.
Normalisation with Israel could trigger a domestic backlash or
regional conflict with groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, or other
Iran-backed militias in the region. Risk 15%.
- Islamist Extremism & Radicalisation
Widespread social reforms have diminished the risk of a Salafi-led
uprising, but pockets of extremism remain and the removal of religious
elites and the crackdown on clerics by MBS has angered
ultra-conservative factions. A renewed Islamist uprising, similar to the
1979 Grand Mosque seizure, is a potential risk. Al-Qaeda and ISIS still
have underground networks in Saudi Arabia and could attempt a terrorist
campaign against the government as they have done in the past.
Likelihood. 20%
- Regional Separatism & Tribal Discontent
The oil-rich region Eastern Province has historically been
marginalised. Its population could seek greater autonomy or
independence. The Hijaz, home to Mecca and Medina, has long felt distant
from Riyadh’s rule and elites there may also push for more regional
autonomy, especially if economic disparities grow. The southern
provinces of Najran, Asir and Jizan have historically had strong ties to
Yemen, and in a worst-case scenario Huthi forces could attempt to seize
these areas. Unlike Libya or Syria however, Saudi Arabia is not highly
militarised among its civilian population making a prolonged civil war
unlikely. 10%
- International Isolation & Western Pressure
The US continues to give Saudi Arabia full military and political
support because MBS has repeatedly shown that he is ready to do whatever
he can to support Israel, far more
than any previous Saudi ruler. Yet at the same time in recent years the
regime has been shifting its international alliances in the direction
of Russia and China, while emerging as a key player in a multipolar
world order. If tensions were to emerge between Saudi Arabia and its
Western backers that led to concerted diplomatic pressure and arms sales
restrictions, MBS’s regime would soon be over and he would be replaced
by a more pliant dictator ready to implement the Western/Zionist agenda
in the land of the Two Holy Mosques. 5%
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