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Author(s): Larry Eugene Jones
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Edgar Julius Jung: The Conservative Revolution in Theory and Practice

LARRY EUGENE JONES

OF the conservative theorists who rose to prominence during the last years of the Weimar Republic, none stood more directly in the eye of the storm that descended upon Germany in 1933–34 than Edgar Julius Jung (1894–1934). His *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen*, first published in 1927 and then again in a revised and expanded edition in 1930, has been called the bible of German neo-conservatism[1] and played a major role in crystallizing antidemocratic sentiment against the Weimar Republic. But Jung was more than a theorist; he was also a political activist deeply committed to a conservative regeneration (*Erneuerung*) of the German state. In 1930–31, for example, Jung was actively involved in the efforts of the People's Conservative Association (*Volkskonservative Vereinigung* or VKV) to create a new conservative movement to the left of the German National People's Party (*Deutschnationale Volkspartei* or DNVP) after its takeover by film and press magnate Alfred Hugenberg. Following the collapse of these efforts in early 1931, Jung continued to support the "national opposition" in its crusade against the so-called Weimar system. It was only with the formation of the Hitler-Papen government in January 1933, however, that Jung moved to the center

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1. Walter Struve, *Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933* (Princeton, 1973), 321.

of the political stage, this time as the unofficial secretary of Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen and as the author of most of the speeches which von Papen delivered as a member of the Hitler cabinet from February 1933 to June 1934. Jung's greatest claim to fame stemmed from his authorship of the sensational speech which von Papen delivered in Marburg on 17 June 1934. It was this speech, after all, that brought the crisis that had been brewing in Germany for the better part of a year to a dramatic head and set in motion the series of events that eventually cost Jung his own life in Hitler's "Night of the Long Knives."[2]

The purpose of this paper will be to examine the connection between the theory and practice of the conservative revolution with reference to Jung's political career from the mid–1920s to 1934. In this respect, it will focus not only upon Jung's efforts in 1930–31 to organize a political movement based upon the general postulates he had enunciated in his *Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* and other writings from the late Weimar period but also upon his struggle as the driving intellectual force in the Papen vice chancery to transform the Nazi revolution into what he and his associates called a "conservative revolution."[3] In doing this, the paper will explore the nature and origins of the conservative opposition to the Third Reich and analyze the way in which Jung and his confederates were able to mount a challenge to the NSDAP's political hegemony that actually came much closer to toppling the Nazi regime than the ease with which Hitler succeeded in disposing of his opponents in the Röhm purge in the summer of 1934 might suggest. This analysis will be based not only upon Jung's essays in the *Deutsche Rundschau* and other conservative organs, but also upon unpublished papers which have been in the possession of Jung's family and friends ever since his murder in 1934. While it is unfortunate that these papers contain little in the way of correspondence or other mate-

2. On Jung's involvement in practical politics, see above all else the excellent dissertation by Karl-Martin Grass, "Edgar Jung, Papenkreis und Röhmkrise 1933/34" (unpub. diss., Heidelberg, 1966), as well as the extremely informative personal retrospective by Edmund Forschbach, *Edgar J. Jung: Ein konservativer Revolutionär 30. Juni 1934* (Pfullingen, 1984).

3. The expression "conservative revolution" was first used by the Austrian poet and playwright Hugo von Hofmannstahl in a speech at the University of Munich on 10 Jan. 1927. See Hugo von Hofmannstahl, *Das Schriftum als geister Raum der Nation* (n.p. [Munich], n.d. [1927]). For further information on the concept, see the more recent contributions by Keith Bullivant, "The Conservative Revolution," in *The Weimar Dilemma: Intellectuals in the Weimar Republic*, ed. Anthony Phelan (Manchester, 1985), 47–70, and Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge, 1984), 18–48.

rials on his efforts to organize a conservative opposition to the Nazi regime—these were either confiscated by the Gestapo or destroyed by Jung's wife following his arrest—they do provide an excellent record of Jung's political activity before the Nazi seizure of power and help illuminate his relationship to Ruhr heavy industry and other elements of Germany's conservative elite before 1933. Moreover, these papers also contain the manuscripts of the speeches that Jung either delivered himself or wrote for Papen in the period from January 1933 through the spring of 1934 as he tried to steer the revolution that had begun to sweep Germany in a more conservative direction.[4]

Jung's hostility to the Weimar Republic stemmed in large part from his experiences during World War I. Born into comfortable middle-class circumstances a little more than twenty years before the outbreak of the great war, Jung was a proud and in many respects typical representative of that generation that had responded to the call to arms in August 1914 with an enthusiasm and a sense of self-sacrifice that was to prove suicidal.[5] For Jung, however, the most memorable aspect of his wartime experience was not the sense of solidarity and common national purpose he had shared with his comrades at the front, but the bitter disillusionment he had felt when he realized that the war had not transformed the home front in the same way that it had transformed him and those who were dying at his side in the trenches.[6] The estrangement that Jung felt upon his return from the front made him increasingly receptive to the influence of literary as well as political romanticism and led him to develop a deeper appreciation for the ideas and values of the German youth movement. At the same time, Jung became interested in the corporatist theories of Othmar Spann and had an opportunity to attend the lectures of Vilfredo Pareto while spending

4. The Jung Nachlass (hereafter cited as NL Jung) is currently in the possession of Karl-Martin Grass. The author would like to express his gratitude to Dr. Grass for having granted him access to the Jung Nachlass. On the organization and labelling of the Jung Nachlass, see Grass, "Jung, Papenkreis und Röhmkrise," 2: 92.

5. On World War I as a generational experience, see Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge, 1979), esp. 203–37. For the best source of biographical information on Jung, see Friedrich Grass, "Edgar Julius Jung (1894–1934)," *Pfälzischer Lebensbilder*, 1 (1964): 320–48. See also the biographical sketch in Bernhard Jenschke, *Zur Kritik der konservativ-revolutionären Ideologie in der Weimarer Republik: Weltanschauung und Politik bei Edgar Julius Jung* (Munich, 1971), 9–29.

6. Jung's disillusionment was a fairly typical experience for those Germans who had fought at the front in World War I. In this respect, see the fascinating study by Modris Eksteins, *The Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Boston, 1989), esp. 254–61, 292–98.

a year at the University of Lausanne.[7] By far the most important influence on Jung's intellectual development, however, was neither Spann nor Pareto but Leopold Ziegler, a philosopher of religion who, like Nietzsche, decried the effect that the triumph of science and rationalism had had upon man's capacity to appreciate the mythic and religious dimensions of human existence but who, unlike Nietzsche, sought to bring man back to his lost religious heritage. A Calvinist by birth and conviction, Jung not only shared Ziegler's longing for the religious renewal of western man but came to regard this as a necessary precondition for Germany's political revival after World War I.[8]

Jung's entry into national politics was both tumultuous and frustrating. In January 1924 Jung achieved a measure of notoriety through his involvement in the assassination of a prominent Palatine separatist, Franz Josef Heinz-Orbis.[9] Jung then proceeded to stand for election as a candidate for the German People's Party (*Deutsche Volkspartei* or DVP) in each of the 1924 Reichstag elections, but went down to defeat on both occasions.[10] As his frustration with partisan political activity mounted, Jung gravitated more and more to the various intellectual clubs that had surfaced on the German Right in the early 1920s and even founded one of his own, the Young Academic Club (*Jungakademischer Klub*), in Munich in February 1926. In outlining the new organization's ideological goals, Jung implored the younger generation to become more actively involved in the struggle for Germany's political future and to take the lead in forging a new sense of national unity so powerful that it could override the social, confessional, and generational cleavages that had become so deeply embedded in Germany's parliamentary system.[11] This was a theme to which Jung was to return time and time again throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. In a particularly revealing essay which he wrote on the tragedy of the front generation for the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* at the beginning of

7. On the intellectual roots of Jung's political thought, see his letter to Pareto, 16 Jan. 1930, NL Jung, IXa.

8. On Jung's relationship with Ziegler, see Leopold Ziegler, "Edgar Jung: Denkmal und Vermächtnis," *Berliner Hefte für Geistiges Leben* 4 (1949): 1–12, 115–35.

9. For further details, see F. Grass, "Jung," 325–28.

10. On Jung's activities on behalf of the DVP organization in the Palatinate, ibid., 323–24, 331–32.

11. Edgar Jung, *Die geistige Krise des jungen Deutschland: Rede vor der Studentenschaft der Universität München* (Berlin, n.d. [1926]).

1930, Jung contrasted the selflessness and high spirituality of those who had chosen to risk their lives in service of their nation with the banality and empty phrases of those who had remained at home to preach the virtues of a war whose true meaning they were incapable of grasping. The tragedy of the front generation was that the idealism of those who had served in the trenches had no place in a society where egoism and self-aggrandizement had become the order of the day. To rebaptize Germany in the spirit of what they had experienced at the front, that was the task to which Jung dedicated himself and his generation.[12]

As a self-styled apostle of the new Germany that was to emerge from the ashes of the Weimar Republic, Jung published the first edition of his *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* in the summer of 1927 as a memorial to all of those who had sacrificed themselves for the ideals of the great war. Informed by the corporatism of Spann, the elitism of Pareto, and the organicism of the German romantics, Jung's book was a sustained assault against the political tradition whose revolutionary motto of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* had shaped the course of European history since 1789. To Jung the spirit of 1789 was a corrosive force that threatened to dissolve the fabric of European society into an amorphous mass of competing economic interests. Nowhere could the fragmented character of modern public life be seen with greater clarity than in the plethora of parties that had sprung up with the introduction of mass democracy in Germany and the rest of western Europe. It was only through the creation of a massive state bureaucracy that the bitter conflict that had accompanied the dissolution of traditional European society could be regulated, though not so much in the interest of the common good as in that of *the* special interest or coalition of special interests that had most recently seized control of the state apparatus. Jung, on the other hand, offered a vision of state and society that was essentially medieval in inspiration. Not only did Jung call for a restoration of the corporations that had played such an important role in medieval economic life, but he placed renewed emphasis on the role of religion and constantly juxtaposed the fragmented character of modern life to the organic character of life in the Middle Ages. If there was anything revolutionary about Jung's particular

12. Jung, "Die Tragik der Kriegsgeneration," *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* 27, no. 8 (May 1930): 511–34. In a similar vein, see Jung, "Vom werdenden Deutschland," *Schweizersche Monatshefte* 7, no. 1 (Apr. 1927): 11–22, and no. 2 (May 1927): 76–88.

brand of conservatism, therefore, it was not so much the goals he espoused as the means by which he proposed to realize them. For the only way that any of this could ever be achieved was through a revolution that, unlike the Marxist revolution that simply sought to improve the material conditions of life, would not stop until it had touched the deepest resources of the human spirit.[13]

Jung's book attracted the immediate attention of influential elements within the German industrial elite. With active encouragement and financial support from the Gutehoffnungshütte's Paul Reusch, a prominent Ruhr industrialist who is better known for his friendship with Oswald Spengler, Jung was able to publish a revised and considerably expanded second edition of *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* at the end of 1929. What is so interesting about the second edition of Jung's book, however, is not so much the fact that its publication was financed by subsidies from Reusch and the Ruhr industrial establishment but, more importantly, that many of the revisions and elaborations which Jung undertook in the second edition resulted directly from suggestions by Reusch himself.[14] Properly speaking, therefore, Jung's *Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* may be seen not only as the "bible of German young conservatism" but also as the political manifesto of a significant sector of Ruhr heavy industry. In the meantime, the favorable response that his book had elicited from Reusch and Ruhr heavy industry did much to excite Jung's own political ambitions. A further catalyst was the secession of the young conservatives from the

13. Edgar J. Jung, *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen: Ihr Zerfall und ihre Ablösung* (Berlin, 1927), esp. 60–70, 99–156. To supplement this admittedly brief summary of Jung's political philosophy, see the relevant sections in Struve, *Elites against Democracy*, 317–52, and Joachim Petzold, *Wegbereiter des deutschen Faschismus: Die Jungkonservativen in der Weimarer Republik* (Cologne, 1978), 310–19, as well as the more extended treatment in Jenschke, *Zur Kritik der konservativ-revolutionären Ideologie*, 30–152. It is curious, however, that Jung received only cursory treatment in Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1967), 121–24, 201–14.

14. In this respect, see Jung to Pechel, 12 Nov. 1927, and 21 Feb. 1928, both in the unpublished papers of Rudolf Pechel, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, vol. 76 (hereafter cited as BA: NL Pechel, 76). For a further indication of Jung's ties to the German industrial elite, see his letters to Luther, Springorum, and Reusch, 21 Dec. 1929, as well as Reusch to Jung, 25 Dec. 1929, and 20 Mar. 1930, all in NL Jung, IXa. For the second edition of Jung's book, see Edgar J. Jung, *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen: Ihr Zerfall und ihre Ablösung durch ein Neues Reich* (Berlin, 1929). The second edition of the book went through two printings of five thousand each and was more than twice as long as the edition published in 1927. Of the various sections that made up the book, those on nation, society, state, and law, ibid., 129–369, and on economics, ibid., 421–513, seem to have undergone the most extensive and fundamental revision.

DNVP at the end of December 1929 and the obvious implications which this held for the future of the German Right. It was against the background of these developments that Jung began to harbor hopes of a new movement that would finally put an end to the "wretched party domination [*unselige Parteiherrschaft*]" of German political life.[15]

Although Jung was prepared to support the more progressive elements within the DNVP in their struggle against Hugenberg's leadership of the party,[16] his immediate objective was not to facilitate an accommodation between the moderate Right and the Weimar Republic, but to make certain that this did not occur under conditions that compromised the prospects for a genuine renewal of German political life. What Jung ultimately had in mind emerged most clearly from a letter that Jung wrote to Eugen Mündler, editor-in-chief of the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, at the beginning of September 1929:

> With respect to my position on fascism, I can confidentially tell you that the goal of my entire political life has been the creation of a dictatorship. I warn only against the creation of a dictatorship without content, which would be unbearable for the German people. Thus my desperate efforts to highlight by means of ideological education [*geistig weltanschauliche Vertiefung*] the meaning of the organic state, the realization of which serves as the only justification for dictatorship. If I warn against the overestimation of fascism, then that is only to dampen the mindless support for a politics of force that has once again become popular in nationalist circles and that has led to one failure after another. That is the reason why I have undertaken such a careful study of the intellectual foundations of fascism.[17]

Under these circumstances it was only natural that Jung should also develop an interest in the newly emergent Nazi movement. Jung's own contacts with the Nazi party leadership dated from the spring of 1928 when he had met with a contingent from the *Völkischer Beobachter*,[18] but he had shown little interest in the movement until it began to score an impressive string of electoral victories at the state and local

15. Jung to Grossmann, 13 Feb. 1930, NL Jung, IXa. For a further elaboration of Jung's political objectives, see the position paper which he prepared at the beginning of 1928 under the title "Über die Bildung der 'neuen' Front," n.d., BA: NL Pechel, 76.

16. For example, see Jung, "Zu neuen Ufern," *Das Staatsschiff* 1, no. 3 (17 Dec. 1929): 97–99.

17. Jung to the editor-in-chief of the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, 5 Sept. 1929, NL Jung, IXa.

18. Jung to Pechel, 21 Feb. 1928, BA: NL Pechel, 76.

level in the second half of 1929. Even then, Jung's assessment of the Nazi party and its leadership was characteristically cool. For although Jung readily recognized "the healthy activism and positive energies of National Socialism," he regarded it as little more than another manifestation of the materialistic liberalism that he had singled out for such biting criticism in *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen*. Writing to a friend of his in early February 1930, Jung observed:

> Seen historically we have three great forms of irreligious, secular, materialistic liberalism: Manchesterism, which ends in bourgeois democracy; then Marxism, which is nothing but the negative reflection of bourgeois democracy; and finally as the third counter-movement—this time directed against the Left—National Socialism. In its own way it is a mixture of the other two. It can be shown not only historically, but also from the intellectual orientation of National Socialism that it is a form of liberalism carried to extremes, even if I include the small group within it that is religiously motivated and is committed to the organic concept of the state. If I make a careful study of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, negation predominates. Moreover, it is impossible to build up [a movement] when the national honor of anyone who is not a National Socialist is immediately suspect.

Yet for all of his reservations about the substance and intellectual content of the Nazi movement, Jung continued to value those who made up its rank-and-file membership and hoped that they could be incorporated into his own movement. Such magnanimity, however, did not extend to Hitler and the Nazi party leadership. Arguing that it was wrong to assume that Hitler would be content with merely beating the drum for the Nazi movement, Jung added: "Whoever like myself has closely observed the movement for years certainly knows the aspirations of Adolf Hitler. Aside from his disappointing intellectual format, however, it is hard to imagine that the German people will ever entrust itself to a man who has failed as dismally as Adolf Hitler failed in the November days of 1923."[19]

It was sentiments like these that led Jung to join forces with the twelve Reichstag deputies who had seceded from the DNVP in December 1929 in founding the People's Conservative Association at the end of January 1930. Not only did Jung sign the appeal with which the secessionists announced the founding of the new organization, but he agreed to speak at its founding ceremonies in the former Prussian

19. Jung to Wiessner, 3 Feb. 1930, NL Jung, O.

House of Lords (*Herrenhaus*) on 28 January.[20] From the outset, however, Jung reassured his associates that he had no intention of compromising his long-range political objectives by taking part in the founding of a new political party.[21] Such reservations notwithstanding, Jung was coopted into the VKV's advisory council (*Beirat*) at its first meeting on 13 February[22] and subsequently assumed responsibility for the movement's organizational development in his home state of Bavaria.[23] Even then Jung remained deeply ambivalent about the sort of work he was being asked to do. At the heart of his ambivalence lay the fear that this would eventually lead to the founding of a new political party and to the dissipation of the movement's revolutionary élan if it was forced to compete for political power on the basis of the existing system of government.[24] Jung's uncertainty was only aggravated by the decision of G. R. Treviranus, the VKV's nominal leader, to enter the new government which Heinrich Brüning had formed on the authority of Reich President Paul von Hindenburg at the end of March 1930. For although Jung applauded the decision to base the new government on presidential rather than parliamentary sanction, he deeply resented the carelessness with which the VKV had allowed itself to become so closely identified with the Brüning cabinet.[25]

Jung's uneasiness over his increasing involvement in the People's Conservative movement was complemented by his continuing infatuation with Italian fascism. In July 1930, for example, financial assistance from Ruhr heavy industry had enabled Jung to visit Italy, where he met with Mussolini on two separate occasions as well as with other representatives of the fascist regime.[26] But before Jung had had an

20. *Volkskonservative Stimmen: Zeitschrift der Volkskonservativen Vereinigung* 1, no. 1 (1 Feb. 1930). On the founding of the VKV, see the entry in the diary of Karl Passarge, 30 Jan. 1930, in Passarge's unpublished papers, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, vol. 2/23–26, as well as the standard, though somewhat dated, secondary account in Erasmus Jonas, *Die Volkskonservativen 1928–1933: Entwicklung, Struktur, Standort und staatspolitische Zielsetzung* (Düsseldorf, 1965), 57–60.

21. In this respect, see Jung to Pechel, 13 Jan. 1930, BA: NL Pechel, 77, and Jung to Grossmann, 13 Feb. 1930, NL Jung, IXa.

22. Treviranus to Jung, 18 Feb. 1930, NL Jung, O.

23. Jung to Pechel, 24 Mar. and 2 May 1930, both in BA: NL Pechel, 77.

24. Jung to Pechel, 27 Mar. 1930, BA: NL Pechel, 77.

25. Jung to Luther, 13 June 1930, NL Jung, IXa. On the relationship between the People's Conservatives and the Brüning government, see Ulrich Roeske, "Brüning und die Volkskonservativen (1930)," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 19 (1971): 94–15.

26. Jung to Brandi, 24 July 1930, NL Jung, O. For Jung's views on fascism, see his article, "Die Bedeutung des Faschismus für Europa," *Deutsche Rundschau* 227, no. 3 (June 1931): 178–87, as well as his somewhat broader treatment of the fascist phenomenon in "Die deutsche Staatskrise

opportunity to appreciate the full meaning of his Italian sojourn, he and his associates in the VKV were overtaken by the pace of events in Berlin, where the dissolution of the Reichstag on 18 July 1930 had been accompanied by a second secession on the DNVP's left wing, this time led by the venerable former party chairman Count Kuno von Westarp. Five days later Westarp and the leaders of the VKV announced the founding of the Conservative People's Party (*Konservative Volkspartei* or KVP) as the basis upon which all of those moderate conservative elements that had broken away from the DNVP over the course of the previous eight months could hopefully reunite.[27] Jung followed these developments with great interest from Munich, where he promptly formed a bipartisan conservative committee to support the Reichstag candidacy of the East African World War I hero, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, in hopes that this would serve as a prototype for the party as a whole and lead to a reconstitution of the anti-Hugenberg Right on the broadest possible basis.[28] Frustrated by the reluctance and in some cases outright refusal of the other parties on Germany's moderate Right to participate in a joint national campaign, Jung came to pin his hopes of salvaging something from the shambles in which Hugenberg's policies as DNVP national chairman had left the German Right on financial pressure from Reusch and his associates in the Ruhr industrial establishment.[29] In the final analysis, however, not even this could overcome the self-perpetuating stasis of existing party bureaucracies, with the result that the German Right went to the polls on 14 September 1930 more divided than ever. Not even the massive financial and organizational support which the KVP received from the leaders of Germany's largest and most influential white-collar union, the German National Union of Commercial Employees (*Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfen-Verband* or DHV), could keep it

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als Ausdruck der abendländischen Kulturkrise," in *Deutschlands Weg in der Zeitenwende*, ed. Karl Haushofer and Kurt Trampler (Munich, 1931), 109–24.

27. *Volkskonservative Stimmen*, 26 July 1930, no. 26. On the negotiations that led to the founding of the KVP, see the reports from Blank to Reusch, 21, 23, and 24 July 1930, all in the unpublished papers of Paul Reusch, Haniel-Archiv, Duisburg-Ruhrort, vol. 400101202 4/7 (hereafter cited as Haniel-Archiv, NL Reusch, 400101202 4/7). For its initial objectives, see Westarp, "Das Ziel konservativen Zusammenschlusses," *Neue Preussische (Kreuz-)Zeitung*, 23 July 1930, no. 208.

28. For further details, see Jung to Pechel, 25 July 1930, BA: NL Pechel, 77, and Jung to Treviranus, 25 and 28 July 1930, NL Jung, IXa.

29. Jung to Pechel, 11 Aug. 1930, BA: NL Pechel, 77.

from going down to a devastating defeat in which it polled less than 320,000 votes and elected only four deputies to the Reichstag.[30]

With the KVP's demoralizing defeat in the 1930 Reichstag elections, the tension between the young conservatism of Treviranus and his associates and Jung's own brand of revolutionary conservatism became increasingly unbearable. At the height of the campaign, for example, Jung had challenged the negativism of the "national opposition" with the argument that it was essential to transform the sense of national resentment, the hostility to Marxism, and the contempt for bourgeois weakness that had become trademarks of the radical Right into a more constructive and positive program for national renewal. Then and only then would a conservative regeneration of German public life be possible.[31] In the aftermath of the September elections, however, Jung began to have increasingly powerful doubts as to whether or not this could be achieved by working within the framework of the KVP. In this respect, Jung and his associates in the leadership of the Bavarian KVP were particularly disgruntled over the way in which the party's national leadership had denied Lettow-Vorbeck a seat in the Reichstag in spite of the fact that his candidacy had attracted over 50,000 votes, or nearly a sixth of the party's total popular vote.[32] Not only did this leave the Bavarian KVP in a virtually untenable situation, but in Jung's own mind it only underscored the difficulties inherent in working for the broader goal of conservative renewal on the basis of the existing party system. Frustrated by this turn of events, Jung decided to challenge Treviranus and the KVP's parliamentary leadership for control of the party in hopes of using it as the foundation upon which a revolutionary conservative movement capable of transcending existing party lines could be established.[33]

The struggle for control of the People's Conservative movement

30. On the outcome of the 1930 election, see Jonas, *Volkskonservativen*, 87–88. On the DHV's involvement in the KVP's founding and in its 1930 campaign, see Iris Hamel, *Völkischer Verband und nationale Gewerkschaft: Der Deutschnationale Handlungsgehilfen-Verband 1893–1933* (Frankfurt a.M., 1967), 233–38, and Larry Eugene Jones, "Between the Fronts: The German National Union of Commercial Employees from 1928 to 1933," *Journal of Modern History* 48 (1976): 471–74.

31. Jung, "Konservative Erneuerung," *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, 14 Sept. 1930, no. 250.

32. For further details, see Treviranus to Lettow-Vorbeck, 24 Sept. 1930, and Dreising (Bavarian KVP) to Lettow-Vorbeck, 29 Sept. 1930, both in the unpublished papers of Paul Lettow-Vorbeck (Bestand N103), Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg, vol. 59.

33. In this respect, see Jung to Mündler, 6 Oct. 1930, and Jung to Treviranus, 7 Oct. 1930, both in NL Jung, IXa.

lasted from October 1930 to March 1931 and ended in Jung's withdrawal from any role in its future political development. At the heart of Jung's estrangement lay his conviction that "a compromise with the majority of the former Nationalist deputies" would be both "hopeless and fatal" to his brand of revolutionary conservatism.[34] In September 1930 Jung had placed his services at the disposal of Treviranus and his associates on the three-fold condition that the KVP be liquidated at the earliest possible opportunity, that the conservative movement be reorganized and expanded on a nonpartisan basis, and that this be done in accordance with what Jung called the conservative revolutionary line.[35] Although Treviranus stepped down as the movement's nominal leader in early October, Jung's hopes that he might be called upon to assume a prominent position in the leadership of the movement remained unfulfilled.[36] When Paul Lejeune-Jung, his namesake and a former DNVP parliamentarian, was chosen in December 1930 to head both the People's Conservative Association and the Conservative People's Party,[37] Jung protested the KVP's refusal to liquidate itself according to the agreement he had reached with Treviranus following the September elections by boycotting a crucial meeting of the movement's leadership that had been scheduled for 17 December.[38] Efforts to effect a reconciliation between Jung and the movement's national leadership foundered on Jung's categorical refusal to cooperate in a party that lived from the money and good graces of the DHV,[39] and in January 1931 he and a handful of Bavarian young conservatives announced the creation of the People's Conservative Movement for German Renewal (*Volkskonservative Bewegung zu deutscher Erneuerung*) as a "political home for all of those who, untouched by the slogans and magic formulae of partisan political life,

34. Jung to Hüter, 25 Oct. 1930, NL Jung, IXa.

35. Jung to Treviranus, 5 Jan. 1931, BA: NL Pechel, 102.

36. For an indication of Jung's frustration over the direction in which the People's Conservative movement seemed to be heading, see Jung, Rundschreiben 1, n.d. [Dec. 1930], BA: NL Pechel, 77. The strain that had developed in Jung's relations with the movement's national leadership can also be seen in the letter from Dähnhardt to Jung, 13 Dec. 1930, NL Jung, O.

37. Treviranus to Lejeune-Jung, 9 Dec. 1930, in the unpublished papers of Kuno Graf von Westarp in the possession of his grandson, Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen (hereafter cited as NL Westarp).

38. Jung to Treviranus, 13 Dec. 1930, NL Jung, O.

39. In this respect, see Lindeiner-Wildau to Pechel, 18 Dec. 1930, BA: NL Pechel, 85, and Jung to Pechel, 23 Dec. 1930, ibid., 77.

were prepared to look at contemporary political problems from the sole perspective of the historical mission of the German people."[40]

Jung tried to compensate for his increasing estrangement from the national leadership of the People's Conservative movement by cultivating increasingly close ties to the Ruhr industrial elite. In late December 1930 Jung wrote to Pechel that his influence with the leaders of the Ruhr industrial establishment had never been greater and that he was one of the few counterweights that were still effective in the west against Hitler and the National Socialist psychosis.[41] At the same time, Jung was able to interest the Ruhr industrial magnates in his plans for a concentration of the German Right above and beyond existing party lines[42] and apparently even modified the wording of his appeal for the creation of the People's Conservative Movement for German Renewal to accommodate Reusch's objections.[43] But as promising as the prospect of support from Reusch and his associates must have been, Jung was unable to translate it into active support for his project, for two reasons. In the first place, Jung's plans for the creation of the People's Conservative Movement for German Renewal cut across a similar project by Friedrich Glum, a self-styled young conservative with close ties to the German industrial community,[44] and the Ruhr industrial leaders were reluctant to commit themselves to two basically similar undertakings if an accommodation between Glum and Jung could not be worked out.[45] More importantly, however, Jung suffered a sharp rebuff at the hands of the VKV's national leadership on the occasion of its first national convention on 14–15 February 1931. For although Jung was elected—though most likely without his own con-

40. Vorbreitender Ausschuss der Volkskonservativen Bewegung zu deutscher Erneuerung, "Aufruf!" n.d. [Jan. 1931], BA: ZSg 1–275/1. The founding of this organization can be dated from Pechel's letter to the state headquarters of the Bavarian KVP, 28 Jan. 1931, BA: NL Pechel, 78.

41. Jung to Pechel, 23 Dec. 1930, BA: NL Pechel, 77.

42. For example, see Gattineau (I. G. Farben) to Jung, 15 Nov. and 20 Dec. 1930, both in NL Jung, O.

43. Reusch to Jung, 2 Jan. 1931, Haniel-Archiv, NL Reusch, 400101293/11. See also Reusch to Jung, 27 and 29 Dec. 1930, ibid. Unfortunately, neither the original draft of Jung's appeal nor Jung's letters to Reusch have survived in either the Jung or Reusch Nachlass.

44. On Glum's activities, see his letter to Krupp, 28 Dec. 1930, in the Historisches Archiv der Friedrich Krupp GmbH, vol. FA IV E 153 (hereafter cited as HA Krupp, FA IV E 152), as well as the transcript of his lecture, "Das geheime Deutschland: Vortrag vor dem politischen Ausschuss der ASTAG in Bonn," 20 Feb. 1931, ibid., IV E 776.

45. On efforts to bring the two men together, see Reusch to Krupp, 25 Dec. 1930, and 5 Jan. 1931, HA Krupp, FA IV E 152.

sent since he had chosen to boycott this meeting as well—to the VKV's newly-constituted leadership ring (*Führerring*),[46] his brand of revolutionary conservatism came under sharp attack from Westarp for its patronizing, if not contemptuous, attitude towards the realm of practical politics.[47] By the same token, the manifesto which the VKV published at the conclusion of the convention struck Jung as little more than a feeble compromise that sought to conceal the cleavage that existed within the movement and reflected none of the revolutionary élan that lay at the heart of his conservatism.[48]

Jung's involvement in the People's Conservative movement was hardly one of the more admirable episodes in his brief political career. While it would be absurd to suggest that the movement's prospects of success were ever particularly good, there can be little doubt that Jung's incessant agitation for his own brand of revolutionary conservatism did much to subvert the position of those more moderate conservatives like Heinrich Brüning and G. R. Treviranus who, for all of their shortcomings, were prepared to work for a conservative regeneration of the German state on the basis of the existing system of government. The People's Conservative movement, after all, was an extremely attractive option to conservatives who were both repelled by Hugenberg's reactionary social vision and distrustful of Nazi obscurantism. Jung's ideological inflexibility and his constant intrigues against the movement's national leadership only helped rob the People's Conservatives of whatever appeal they might have held for those conservative-minded young men and women who had not yet defected to the radical Right. For all intents and purposes, People's Conservatism was a dead issue by the spring of 1931, and Jung himself must bear a measure of responsibility for its eclipse as a viable political option at the beginning of the 1930s.

For Jung, his own experiences with the People's Conservative movement were a source of considerable disappointment and frustra-

46. Lejeune-Jung to the members of the VKV leadership ring, 16 Feb. 1931, NL Westarp.

47. Westarp to Wallraf, 24 Feb. 1931, NL Westarp.

48. Volkskonservative Vereinigung, ed., *Konservatives Manifest*, Volkskonservative Flugschriften, no. 4 (Berlin, 1931). For Jung's response to this document, see the declaration which he and Walther Otto, the leader of the Bavarian VKV, read into the minutes of the meeting of the VKV leadership ring, 18 Mar. 1931, NL Westarp. On the convention itself, see the report of Treviranus's speech, "Wohin geht unser Weg," 15 Feb. 1931, in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 Feb. 1931, nos. 77–78, as well as the article by Lejeune-Jung, "Reichstagung der Konservativen," *Volkskonservative Stimmen*, 21 Feb. 1931, no. 7.

tion. Following his separation from the movement in the spring of 1931 Jung continued to hope for some sort of "extraparliamentary" conservative movement that would free the conduct of national affairs from its dependence upon the Reichstag and the vicissitudes of German party politics. In August 1931, for example, Jung drafted an open letter to Brüning—there is, however, no evidence to indicate that he ever sent it, particularly in light of the criticism that it encountered from circles close to him[49]—in which he praised the chancellor for his "will to lead" and his "willingness to accept responsibility for the difficult task of the present crisis" at the same time that he chastised him for hesitating to take the radical steps that were necessary to put Germany's fiscal and economic house back in order. And this, in turn, presupposed a radical break with the existing political system and the way in which the affairs of state had been conducted under the Weimar Constitution.

> The internal political system lacks the necessary relaxation of tensions. The failure to mobilize all national and civic forces for the great task of German self-help cannot continue. Only when the government is well on its way to returning to the concept of authority and to freeing itself from the sterility of German parliamentarism can these forces be placed in the service of the nation as a whole. In reorganizing the cabinet the goal should be the complete abandonment of its party basis. Not the approval of parties, but professional and practical competence should determine the selection of those whom you, respected chancellor, will need to help you in the mastery of these difficult tasks.[50]

Jung's conviction that a complete break with the Reichstag and the establishment of a strictly authoritarian form of government were essential if Germany was ever to solve the myriad problems with which she found herself confronted did much to strengthen his interest in an extraparliamentary concentration of all right-wing forces that could eventually overthrow the hated and impotent Weimar system. It was with this in mind that Jung not only attended, but wrote an essentially favorable review of the demonstration which the forces of the "national opposition" held against the Brüning government in Bad Harzburg on 10–11 October 1931. Only lingering doubts about the

49. For example, see the copy of an unsigned letter to Jung, 19 Aug. 1931, BA: NL Pechel, 78.

50. Draft of a letter to Brüning, n.d., appended to Jung to Pechel, 14 Aug. 1931, BA: NL Pechel, 78. For further information on this undertaking, see Jung to Klein, 14 Aug. 1931, NL Jung, M.

implicitly liberal character of the "national opposition" and the narrowness of its political vision seemed to dampen his public enthusiasm for what had happened at Harzburg.[51] By no means, however, had Jung modified his essentially negative opinion of Hitler and the Nazi party leadership.[52] Jung was still in frequent demand as a speaker who, it was hoped, might be effective in combating the increasingly virulent outbreaks of "Hitlerosis" in the Ruhr and other parts of western Germany,[53] and he actively supported the reelection of Reich President von Hindenburg until it became clear that he was the candidate of precisely those forces that were most closely identified with the existing political system.[54] Yet for all of his disdain for Hitler and his associates, Jung could hardly avoid the conclusion after the NSDAP's massive gains in the state and regional elections that had taken place throughout much of Germany on 24 April 1932, that it was imperative to bring the Nazis into the government while conditions for controlling them in the exercise of that power still existed. As Jung explained in a letter to Mündler in early May:

> In my opinion, the sooner the National Socialists come into power [*ans Ruder kommen*], so much the better. Then the debacle will not be so immeasurably great or fatal as it certainly would be if the Nazis should take over the government by themselves. What I am therefore suggesting is that one must see to it that the Nazis are spoken to firmly [*den Nazi gut anzureden*] and that the problems that reside in allowing the strongest opposition party in Germany to come to power at a time when we are still diplomatically constrained are made abundantly clear.[55]

The dilemma in which Jung had found himself at the beginning of the 1930s became increasingly acute in the late spring of 1932. For although Jung could rejoice at the death-throes of the Weimar system, he remained deeply apprehensive over what might take its place. To be sure, Jung tried to reassure himself that behind all the liberal and democratic trappings of the Nazi movement lay a profoundly conservative impulse that, he hoped, would begin to reassert itself now that

51. Jung, "Aufstand der Rechten," *Deutsche Rundschau* 58, no. 2 (Nov. 1931): 81–88.

52. For example, see the remark by Jung on the occasion of the Harzburg demonstration recorded by F. Grass, "Jung," 338.

53. Forschbach to Jung, 27 Nov. 1931, NL Jung, X.

54. Jung to the business manager of the East Prussian Hindenburg Committee, 4 Apr. 1932, quoted in F. Grass, "Jung," 337–38.

55. Jung to Mündler, 7 May 1932, NL Jung, N.

the last remnants of Germany's liberal order were in the process of being liquidated.[56] Yet for all of the confidence that Jung exuded about the eventual triumph of the conservative revolution,[57] he was concerned that Germany's conservative leadership lacked the moral and intellectual resources necessary to regain control of the revolutionary process they had done so much to set in motion. At no point did Jung's fears seem more firmly grounded than when Franz von Papen was summoned as Brüning's successor to the chancellorship in the first week of June 1932. For while the transitory character of the Papen government was immediately apparent, it was by no means clear to Jung or his associates what might follow in its place.[58] The invitation which Jung received from Papen's close associate and advisor, Hans Humann, to join the unofficial team of bright, young men the chancellor had begun to assemble around him to assist in the formulation and articulation of his political program, therefore, came as a welcome opportunity for Jung to expand the scope of his political activities and to have more direct influence over the course of events in Berlin.[59] Jung thus became part of a small coterie of right-wing intellectuals who tried to legitimate Papen's political program by infusing it with their own brand of conservatism.[60]

As a propagandist and apologist for the Papen government, Jung continually stressed the revolutionary character of Papen's political leadership in an attempt to counter Nazi charges, particularly after the

56. NL, "Neubelebung von Weimar?" *Deutsche Rundschau* 58, no. 1 (June 1932): 153–62.

57. For example, see Jung, "Deutschland und die konservative Revolution," in *Deutsche über Deutschland: Die Stimme des unbekannten Politikers* (Munich, 1932), 369–83.

58. For Jung's initial reaction to Papen's appointment and the composition of his cabinet, see the recollection in Forschbach, *Jung*, 44–45.

59. In this respect, see Rudolf Pechel, *Deutscher Widerstand* (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1947), 76, and Franz von Papen, *Der Wahrheit eine Gasse* (Munich, 1952), 353–54. Papen's subsequent contention in Franz von Papen, *Vom Scheitern einer Demokratie 1930–1933* (Mainz, 1968), 401 n. 135, that his relationship with Jung did not begin until after his appointment as vice-chancellor in the Hitler cabinet has been more than adequately demonstrated to be inaccurate. For example, see F. Grass, "Jung," 339–40, and K.-M. Grass, "Jung, Papenkreis und Röhmkrise," 34–47, as well as Jung's own account of his collaboration with the Papen government in Jung to Mündler, 2 Aug. and 17 Oct. 1932, both in NL Jung, IXa.

60. On the ideological underpinnings of the Papen government, see Joachim H. Knoll, "Der autoritäre Staat: Konservative Ideologie und Stattstheorie am Ende der Weimarer Republik," in *Lebendiger Geist: Hans-Joachim Schoeps zum 50. Geburtstag von Schülern dargebracht*, ed. Hellmut Diwald (Leiden and Cologne, 1959), 200–24, and Werner Braatz, "Two Neo-Conservative Myths in Germany 1919–32: The 'Third Reich' and the 'New State,'" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32 (1971): 569–84.

collapse of Papen's negotiations with Hitler in August 1932, that the new cabinet embodied the essence of social and political reaction.[61] Jung's defense of Papen was almost invariably accompanied by a sharp attack against the inadequacies of Hitler and the Nazi party leadership. For while Jung conceded that Hitler had mastered the language of revolution, he also argued that the Nazi party leader lacked the moral and intellectual qualities that were necessary to lead to victory the revolutionary forces that had assembled beneath his banner.[62] Nor did Jung's attacks abate with Papen's resignation as chancellor at the end of November 1932. For if the essence of Papen's revolution had been "to emancipate the state from the forces of society," then it was the short-sightedness, vanity, and timidity of Hitler that had kept that revolution from realizing its full potential. In this respect, Jung was particularly caustic in attacking the "pseudo-democratic" arguments which the Nazi party leadership had used to defend its role in bringing about the dissolution of the Reichstag in September. Hailing Papen as "the great chance" to unite the younger generation in the struggle for the emancipation of the state, Jung bemoaned the impending collapse of the national front and offered an assessment of its future that left little room for hope:

> In its present form the national camp is incapable of action. There is no German Right capable of governing. There are two large groups that will hardly ever come together again in honest cooperation. In one lives an intellectually outmoded leadership, in the other a lack of spiritual substance. That is the balance sheet which, as things stand today, closes with a deficit.[63]

Given this assessment of the political situation in January 1933, Jung could hardly have been more surprised than when at the end of the month Hitler and Papen joined forces in a government of national concentration consisting of representatives from both the Nazis and Germany's conservative elite. The government that took office on 30 January 1933 was a coalition government predicated upon the assumption that the conservatives around Papen could restrain Hitler in the pursuit of his more radical impulses and thereby domesticate the Nazi movement. Although Jung had had no hand whatsoever in the formation of the new government, he nevertheless felt a strong sense of

61. Jung, "Revolutionäre Staatsführung," *Deutsche Rundschau* 59, no. 1 (Oct. 1932): 1–8.
62. Jung, "Deutsche Unzulänglichkeiten," *Deutsche Rundschau* 59, no. 2 (Nov. 1932): 81–86.
63. Jung, "Verlustbilanz der Rechten," *Deutsche Rundschau* 59, no. 4 (Jan. 1933): 1–5.

responsibility for having helped create a situation where Hitler could come to power and recognized a moral obligation to work for his removal from office. Watching the torchlight parade that greeted the new chancellor on his first night in office, Jung remarked to his close friend and associate Rudolf Pechel: "We are responsible that this guy [*Kerl*] came to power; now we have to get rid of him."[64] But whereas most conservative critics of the new government attacked Papen and the DNVP's Alfred Hugenberg for having betrayed the conservative cause, Jung proudly identified Papen as the architect of the governmental coalition and hailed the unification of the entire national movement as Papen's great, if not historic, achievement. At the same time, Jung continued to remind his followers that in the final analysis the success or failure of the new government—and of the revolutionary brand of conservatism with which he identified himself—depended upon the extent to which the forces around Papen would be able to sustain themselves in the face of Hitler's demagogy. The immediate task, therefore, was to strengthen the forces that had aligned themselves behind the new vice-chancellor in hopes that they would eventually prevail over their Nazi allies in the struggle for control of the German state.[65]

Once again Jung placed his talents as a speech-writer and propagandist at Papen's disposal. With the dissolution of the Reichstag on 1 February and the call for new elections at the beginning of March, the conservative forces in the Hitler cabinet coalesced under the leadership of Papen, Hugenberg, and the Stahlhelm's Franz Seldte to form the Combat Front Black-White-Red (*Kampffront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot*) as a rallying point for all of those who hoped to see the conservative element in the governmental coalition emerge from the elections greatly strengthened.[66] Papen campaigned vigorously on behalf of the Combat Front and quickly eclipsed Hugenberg as the most popular

64. See Jung's remarks to Pechel, 30 Jan. 1933, quoted by K.-M. Grass, "Jung, Papenkreis und Röhmkrise," 47.

65. Jung, "Einsatz der Nation," *Deutsche Rundschau* 59, no. 6 (Mar. 1933): 155–60.

66. See the speeches by Papen, Hugenberg, and Seldte at the opening demonstration of the Combat Front in the Berlin Sport Palace on 11 Feb. 1933, in the *Neue Preussische (Kreuz-)Zeitung*, 13 Feb. 1933, no. 44. For further details, see Klaus-Peter Hoepke, "Die Kampffront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot: Zum Scheitern des national konservativen 'Zähmungs'-Konzept an den Nationalsozialisten im Frühjahr 1933," *Fridericiana: Zeitschrift der Universität Karlsruhe*, no. 36 (1984): 34–52.

conservative within the government.[67] Much of this, however, may very well have stemmed from the fact that in early February 1933 Jung had been engaged as Papen's principal speech writer. The first speech that bore the clear imprint of Jung's distinctive touch was the address Papen delivered before students at the University of Berlin on 21 February. Here, in an appeal replete with obligatory attacks against liberalism and Marxism, Papen defined the goals of the revolution that had just begun to sweep through Germany in tones that echoed Jung's own lament at the increasing mechanization of modern life and his longing for a spiritual regeneration of human energies. Then, speaking directly to the situation that had existed in Germany since the formation of the new government, Papen exclaimed that it was now time "to arouse all the forces of the conservative revolution" so that "the three great pillars of the national movement"—the Nazi party, the Stahlhelm, and the Christian-conservative forces on the German Right—could be spiritually fused into a phalanx capable of opening the state up to the cooperation of those who for the last fifteen years had struggled for a better future.[68]

Jung's collaboration with Papen in the campaign for the Reichstag elections of 5 March 1933 marked the high point of his political career and thrust the aspiring young politician into the eye of the storm that had just descended upon Germany. Virtually all of the major speeches that Papen delivered during the course of the campaign had been written by Jung, and they were all inspired by the desire to place a conservative imprint upon the revolutionary energies that had been unleashed by the formation of the Hitler government.[69] It must, therefore, have come as a bitter disappointment to Jung when the alliance between Papen, Hugenberg, and Seldte failed to improve upon the DNVP's performance in the November 1932 Reichstag elections while the NSDAP, on the other hand, recorded a stunning electoral triumph in which it polled over 17 million votes—or 44 percent of the

67. See, for example, the lament in the diary of the DNVP's Reinhold Quaatz, 1–4 Mar. 1933, in Quaatz's unpublished papers, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, vol. 17.

68. Franz von Papen, *An die deutschen Studenten: Rede, gehalten 21. Februar 1933 im Auditorium Maximum der Universität Berlin* (Berlin, n.d. [1933]), reprinted as "Der Sinn der Zeitwende," in Franz von Papen, *Appell an das deutsche Gewissen: Reden zur nationalen Revolution*, Schriften an die Nation, nos. 32/33 (Oldenburg, 1933), 12–24.

69. In particular, see the text of Papen's speech, "Wesen und Ziel der deutschen Revolution," 24 Mar. 1933, in Papen, *Appell an das deutsche Gewissen*, 25–42.

total vote—and increased its representation in the Reichstag from 196 to 288 seats.[70] An even more devastating blow came less than three weeks later when the Reichstag passed the Enabling Act, thereby giving the Hitler cabinet virtually unlimited authority to do whatever it deemed necessary for Germany's political and economic recovery. Jung's opposition to the Enabling Act, however, stemmed far less from his concern over its implications for the future of the Reichstag—by now he had come to regard the Reichstag as totally superfluous—than from his indignation over the way in which it arrogated the prerogatives of the Reich President to the cabinet. Jung realized that this arrangement completely nullified whatever influence Papen had been able to exercise within the cabinet by virtue of his special relationship with Hindenburg. Jung had hoped that Papen could be mobilized to oppose the bill in cabinet, but neither this nor efforts on the part of ex-chancellor Brüning to introduce an amendment that would have eliminated its more odious features produced the desired results. Even after the passage of the bill on 23 March, Jung refused to recognize the finality of Papen's defeat and continued to insist that the conservative element within the national front still possessed the potential for victory.[71]

The next three months were not happy times for Hitler's conservative allies. Not only did they lose important bases of support with Hugenberg's resignation from the cabinet on 26 July, the dissolution of the German National Front (*Deutschnationale Front*) and other bourgeois parties shortly thereafter, and the Stahlhelm's absorption into the power structure of the Third Reich,[72] but throughout the country they found themselves the targets of the sort of organized

70. For Jung's reaction to these developments, see his letter to Gritzbach, 7 Mar. 1933, in the unpublished records of the vice chancery, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Bestand R 53, vol. 74/131 (hereafter cited as BA: R 53/74/131).

71. For further details, see the aide-mémoire by Forschbach, "Vier Tage, die Deutschland zum Verhängnis wurden: Meine Erlebnisse und Beobachtungen in Berlin und Potsdam vom 20. bis 23. März 1933," in the unpublished papers of Edmund Forschbach (Bestand I-199), Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik at the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, vol. 041/1 (hereafter cited as ACDP: NL Forschbach, I-199/041/1), reprinted in Konrad Repgen, "Ungedrückte Nachkriegsquellen zum Reichskonkordat: Eine Dokumentation," *Historisches Jahrbuch* 99 (1979): 407–13.

72. For further details on these developments, see Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen, "Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei," in *Das Ende der Parteien 1933*, ed. Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (Düsseldorf, 1960), 599–616, and Volker R. Berghahn, *Der Stahlhelm—Bund der Frontsoldaten 1918–1935* (Düsseldorf, 1966), 263–74.

state terror that had previously been reserved for leaders and organizations of the German Left.[73] In an attempt to compensate for the devastating impact which the collapse of the traditional German Right had had upon his position within the cabinet, Papen began to build up the staff of the vice chancery so that it might serve as a more effective counterpoise to Hitler and the leaders of the Nazi state. With the participation of dedicated young conservatives like Herbert von Bose and Fritz Günther von Tschirschky, the Papen vice chancery quickly developed into a major focal point of conservative opposition to the Third Reich that sought, though normally without great success, to monitor and mitigate the more heinous abuses of state power.[74] Though not a member of the staff himself, Jung continued to work in an unofficial capacity as Papen's private secretary through the summer and fall of 1933. In this respect, Jung not only edited two collections of the vice chancellor's speeches for publication,[75] but he also composed a book of his own entitled *Sinndeutung der deutschen Revolution* in which he addressed himself to the implications of what had been happening in Germany since the beginning of the year. This book, which he wrote in the spring and early summer of 1933, represented a fundamental critique of National Socialism from the conservative point of view and an attempt to define the revolutionary events of the past six months in essentially conservative terms.[76]

At no point in the *Sinndeutung der deutschen Revolution* did Jung abandon the revolutionary principles that informed his distinctive form of conservatism. From the outset, Jung disputed Nazi claims that it was the sole embodiment of the national revolution by arguing that the national revolution drew its impetus from two impulses, one conservative and the other nationalistic. National Socialism, on the other hand, was simply another manifestation of the liberal, individualistic, and secular tradition that had emerged from the French Revolution. At the same time, Jung chastised the Nazis for having taken the national revolution down a democratic path, whereas the

73. For example, see Hugenberg to Hitler, 19 Apr. 1933, in the unpublished papers of Alfred Hugenberg, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, vol. 89/94–96.

74. For the most detailed account of this undertaking, see Fritz Günther von Tschirschky, *Erinnerungen eines Hochverräters* (Stuttgart, 1972), 99–105.

75. In addition to the collection cited above, n. 68, a second volume under the same title was published in the fall of 1933. See Franz von Papen, *Appell an das deutsche Gewissen: Reden zur nationalen Revolution*, Schriften an die Nation, nos. 51/52 (Oldenburg, 1933).

76. Edgar L. Jung, *Sinndeutung der deutschen Revolution* (Oldenburg, 1933).

true "aim of the national revolution must be the depoliticization of the masses and their exclusion from the leadership of the state." Claiming that the revolution "must lead to an antidemocratic principle of governance or it is lost," Jung called for a new state founded in religion and a universalist view of the world. Only then would it be possible for Germany to overcome the spirit of 1789. But under Nazi leadership the national revolution had been thoroughly secular, concerned with the things of this world such as nation, state, economics, law, and organization. Now the time had come for the conservatives to assume leadership of the revolution, not to stop it as Hitler had done with his recent declaration that the revolution was over, but to push it further in the direction of an ever more spiritual and religious transformation of man and society. To accomplish this, it was necessary to turn not to the masses as National Socialism had done but to a new nobility, to a self-conscious elite that possessed the moral and spiritual resources to give the German people a Christian state. All National Socialism had to offer, Jung intimated in one of his less cautious moments, was *Weltanschauung* as a surrogate for genuine religious faith. Now that the German revolution had accomplished its historic mission with the destruction of the Weimar state, it must be transformed into a Christian revolution.[77]

In so far as Jung had come to define the ultimate goals of the German revolution in essentially religious terms, he could hardly have been more bitterly disappointed than by the lukewarm response of Catholic conservatives to his appeal for a Christian regeneration of German political life. A source of particular frustration was his experience at the third sociological congress of the Catholics Academics' Association (*Katholischer Akademikerverband*) in the Benedictine abbey at Maria Laach on 21–23 July 1933. The object of this conference, which followed the dissolution of the Center Party by two weeks, was to facilitate an accommodation between German Catholicism and the Nazi state. Before an audience that included a number of high-ranking Nazi functionaries, one speaker after another underscored the extent to which the values of German Catholicism had found their ultimate expression in the new Reich.[78] But when Hermann Freiherr von

77. Ibid., 10–24, 46–50, 78–92, 98–103. See also Jung, "Die christliche Revolution," *Deutsche Rundschau* 59, no. 11 (Sept. 1933): 142–47.

78. For the most detailed contemporary report on the Maria Laach conference, see the long article by Wilhelm Spael, "Die dritte soziologische Sondertagung des Katholischen Akademiker-

Lüninck, a prominent Catholic conservative who had recently been appointed head of the provincial government in the Rhineland, announced his unconditional acceptance of National Socialism and called upon Germany's Catholic leaders to do penance for their sins against the movement, it was more than Jung could take. Throwing caution to the winds, Jung characterized National Socialism as a political religion, argued that a totalitarian state was an impossibility in a nation with two religions, and called for the creation of a Christian state on a corporatist basis. Then, with direct reference to the argument of the prominent conservative theorist Carl Schmitt in support of the totalitarian state, Jung had the audacity to suggest that now that the party state had been liquidated it was only logical that the NSDAP should dissolve itself as well.[79] The impact of Jung's remarks, however, was immediately lost in the excitement that greeted Papen's announcement upon his return from Rome on the second day of the congress that the Vatican had just signed a concordat with the Nazi state.[80] In spite of the apprehension that many Catholics continued to feel with respect to the Nazi state, there was little that Jung could do in the wake of Papen's declaration to interest them in joining an opposition movement to Hitler and the Third Reich.

The events at Maria Laach left Jung deeply discouraged about the prospects of an effective and broadly based conservative opposition to Hitler. Shortly thereafter Jung was stricken by a severe case of jaundice that kept him confined to his bed for much of the next four months and that made it impossible for him to assume an active role in efforts to organize the anti-Hitler resistance. Jung, however, did not let his illness keep him from agreeing to run for a seat in the Reichstag on a special slate for non-Nazi supporters of the government that officials in the vice chancery were trying to put together for the new national elections that had been scheduled for 12 November 1933. In agreeing to stand for election, Jung hoped that it would be possible to force the NSDAP into officially recognizing the legal status of a group that, in

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verbandes in Maria Laach: Die nationale Aufgabe im Katholizismus—Idee und Aufbau des Reiches," *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 30 July 1933. For further information, see Wilhelm Spael, *Das katholische Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert: Seine Pioniere- und Krisenzeiten 1890–1945* (Würzburg, 1964), 308–10, and Klaus Breuning, *Die Vision des Reiches: Deutscher Katholizismus zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur (1929–1934)* (Munich, 1969), 207–11.

79. On Jung's appearance at the Maria Laach conference, see Forschbach, *Jung*, 80–81.

80. For the text of Papen's remarks, see Papen, "Zum Reichskondordat," *Der katholische Gedanke: Eine Vierteljahrsschrift* 6 (1933): 331–35.

his own words, conceived of itself as "the majesty's most loyal opposition."[81] Although the Reich chancery was quick to thwart this tactic by blocking the candidacy of Jung and a number of other conservatives whose loyalty to the regime was suspect,[82] the elements around Papen remained hopeful of recapturing at least some of the terrain they had surrendered to the NSDAP since the formation of the Hitler cabinet.

By the end of 1933 Jung had sufficiently recovered from the illness that had stricken him earlier in the year to reassume leadership of efforts to organize and broaden the base of the conservative opposition to Hitler. Writing to Reusch shortly after the beginning of the new year, Jung placed himself and his not inconsiderable talents once again in the service of the conservative revolution:

> Now as in the past I am of the opinion that an intellectual and political presence like mine has never been more needed than at the present. A long conversation with P[apen] about which I cannot comment in writing has confirmed this once again. It is a mistake on the part of broad business circles to believe that the fulfillment of the German revolution will bring its speedy end. The struggle over final principles, however, will go on, and every struggle must have its leaders and standard-bearers. Whoever now stands tall and shows character qualifies himself for this struggle. For this reason I would complete my withdrawal from active political life only with great inner reluctance—and then only in the hope of becoming involved once again when the hour for the conservative element has come.[83]

Jung's letter struck a responsive chord among the leaders of the Ruhr industrial establishment, and in February 1934 they decided to support his efforts with a monthly stipend of five hundred marks.[84] In the meantime, an invitation from the University of Zurich provided Jung with an opportunity to expound upon the principles of the conservative revolution in a freer atmosphere than the one that existed back in Germany.[85] Although Jung was careful to avoid any explicit reference to the situation in his homeland, he stressed that neither Italian Fascism nor National Socialism had succeeded in resolving a fundamental, if not ultimately fatal, contradiction between a political

81. Jung to Tschirschky, 20 Oct. 1933, BA: R 53/93/31.

82. Forschbach, *Jung*, 89.

83. Undated excerpt from a letter from Jung to Reusch, appended to a letter from Reusch to Springorum, 12 Jan. 1934, Haniel-Archiv, NL Reusch, 400101290/36b.

84. Springorum to Reusch, 22 Feb. 1934, Haniel-Archiv, NL Reusch, 400101290/36b.

85. Jung to Hässig, 6 Oct. 1933, NL Jung, P.

rhetoric that was ostensibly antidemocratic and a political praxis that employed all the techniques of modern mass democracy. As a result, Fascism and National Socialism had become transitional stages in the emergence of a new political order whose moral ethos was to be shaped above all else by a return to the basic Christian values of western culture.

> For Fascism [as Jung observed towards the end of his speech] is on the one hand the culmination of the liberal era, on the other the precondition and will for its supersession. It is now a matter of translating the great conservative ideas into practical reality. Fascism and National Socialism are political phenomena behind which great ideological forces are slumbering. The course which the dialectic of history has assigned to these revolutionary currents, however, leads past the present to the overcoming of the masses, the creation of a new hierarchy, the transcendence of nationalism, the establishment of an indestructible *völkisch* foundation from which the *völkisch* struggle can take form.[86]

By far the most revealing statement of Jung's political credo following his return to active political life at the beginning of 1934, however, was the lengthy memorandum that he drafted for Papen in early April as an elaboration of the goals that lay behind the conservative opposition to Hitler. To lend his ideas an even greater sense of urgency, Jung went beyond reciting the by now all too familiar litany of neoconservative complaints against the liberal, democratic, and Marxist legacies of the French Revolution to pose the issue in distinctly racist terms that made it seem as if the very future of white supremacy throughout the world depended upon the outcome of the struggle for a Christian-conservative regeneration of European culture. The most astonishing feature of Jung's memorandum, however, was not his argument that "the replacement of the party system by the dictatorial rule of a single party" was "nothing more than a transitional measure that was perfectly consistent with liberalism's historical legacy." For as daring as this might have been for someone writing in the spring of 1934, it was eclipsed by the plans which Jung outlined for an end to the European national state and for the emergence of a new European order characterized by the dispersal of centralized power more or less along the lines of the medieval German Empire. For Jung, the future of Euro-

86. Jung, manuscript of a lecture entitled "Sinndeutung der konservativen Revolution in Deutschland" at the University of Zurich, 7 Feb. 1934, NL Jung, VIII. See also the report of his lecture in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 8 Feb. 1934, no. 228.

pean culture lay not merely in overcoming the spirit of 1789 in all its political, cultural, and economic manifestations but, more importantly, in transcending the various forms of nationalism that had grown up hand in hand with liberalism throughout the course of the nineteenth century. Jung's proposal for the creation of a European federation was conceived of as an attempt to break out of the diplomatic isolation in which Germany currently found herself and as such struck directly at the heart of Nazi nationalism. No less radical in their conception and implications were Jung's plans for the creation of an elective monarchy (*Wahlmonarchie*) and the appointment of an imperial regent who, he stipulated, could not belong to the NSDAP. The dynastic crown, Jung maintained, would serve as a symbol of central European unity, and the sovereignty of the new monarch, still conceived of in essentially medieval terms, would embrace not only Germany but the territories of the former Hapsburg Empire as well.[87]

Jung's memorandum for Papen from April 1934 was a truly remarkable document. What was most astonishing about the document, however, was neither its idealized concept of the Middle Ages nor its proposal for the federal reorganization of the European state system—both of these motifs had already appeared in Jung's earlier writings—but the fact that it served as a program of action for Jung and his confederates in Papen's vice chancery. For at the same time that Jung was trying to articulate the theoretical assumptions upon which the conservative opposition to Hitler was based, he was also at the center of efforts to pull the different components of that opposition together into an alliance of conservative forces that could dispose of the Nazi regime and seize the reins of power itself. In this respect, Jung and his associates hoped to turn the dissatisfaction with the Nazi regime that had become increasingly widespread throughout Germany since the summer of 1933 to their own political advantage. The most significant manifestations of this dissatisfaction were the agitation on the part of Ernst Röhm and the leaders of the Storm Troopers for a "second revolution," the uneasiness which the prospect of a second wave of S.A. terror caused throughout the ranks of Germany's conservative elite, the apprehension of Germany's military leadership over Röhm's plans for the Reichswehr's absorption into a "people's army" with

87. "Denkschrift Edg. Jungs an Papen, verfasst im April 1934," ACDP: NL Forschbach, I-199/014/2. A copy of this memorandum has also been deposited in the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, FA 98, 2375/59.

himself at its head, and growing Catholic disillusionment with the fruits of the concordat. Whether or not Jung and his associates could galvanize all of these manifestations of discontent into an opposition movement capable of toppling Hitler and seizing power itself remained to be seen.[88]

In the first part of 1934 Jung travelled extensively throughout Germany in an attempt to develop a network of conservative supporters who would assist, if not in the overthrow of the Nazi regime, then at least in the subsequent transfer of power to the conservative revolutionaries who had placed themselves in the vanguard of the anti-Hitler resistance. In this respect, it is fairly certain that Papen was completely unaware of what Jung and his associates in the vice chancery—here his principal co-conspirators were the indefatigable Bose, Fritz Günther von Tschirschky, and Wilhelm von Ketteler—were trying to do. Operating very much on their own and without official sanction from the vice-chancellor, Jung and his collaborators were able to establish contact with a broad cross section of Germany's conservative elite that included prominent lay Catholics as well as leaders of the Catholic clergy, spokesmen for what had once been the Christian trade-union movement, elements of the Catholic aristocracy in Bavaria, former conservative politicians like Brüning and Treviranus, and disgruntled army officers around generals Werner von Fritsch, Gerd von Rundstedt, and Erwin von Witzleben.[89] Jung even met with

88. For an excellent source of information on the growing unrest in Germany in the spring of 1934, see the reports from the spring and early summer of 1934 in *Deutschland-Bericht der SOPADE* 1, no. 1 (17 May 1934): 9–22, and no. 2 (26 June 1934): 99–122, 164–74. On the background to the political crisis in the summer of 1934, see Hermann Mau, "Die 'zweite Revolution'—Der 30. Juni 1934," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1953): 119–37, and Helmut Krausnick, "Der 30. Juni 1934: Bedeutung—Hintergründe—Verlauf," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung "Das Parlament"* 3, no. 25 (30 June 1954), 317–24, as well as the classic study by Wolfgang Sauer, "Die Mobilmachung der Gewalt," in Karl Deitrich Bracher, Gerhard Schulz, and Wolfgang Sauer, *Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung: Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933/34* (Cologne and Opladen, 1960), 897–966. See also the excellent dissertation by K.-M. Grass, "Jung, Papenkreis und Röhmkrise," 171–98. The 1963 Marxist dissertation by Kurt Gossweiler, *Die Röhm Affäre: Hintergründe—Zusammenhänge—Auswirkungen* (Cologne, 1983), is a serious misreading of the nature of the conservative opposition to the Nazi regime and fails to take the efforts of Jung and his confederates at all seriously.

89. It is extremely difficult to reconstruct the full range of contacts which Jung and other members of the vice chancery developed in the second half of 1933 and first half of 1934. For the most reliable account of Jung's activities during this period, see K.-M. Grass, "Jung, Papenkreis und Röhmkrise," 199–212. See also F. Grass, "Jung," 343–44; Tschirschky, *Erinnerungen*,

ex-chancellor Kurt von Schleicher on at least one occasion in the spring of 1934 and conveyed to him the contents of the memorandum he had drafted for Papen.[90] By the same token, Jung was able to enlist the support of Reusch and several of his associates in the Ruhr industrial establishment, although the exact extent of their support is far from clear.[91] In any event, there can be little doubt that by June 1934 Jung and his associates in the vice chancery had succeeded in developing a broad base of support in influential sectors of Germany's conservative elite for their efforts to reestablish control over the situation in Germany. The problem now was to devise a strategy for bringing about the overthrow of the Nazi regime.

The problems of strategy and tactics preoccupied Jung and his confederates throughout the spring of 1934. At one point Jung had come to the conclusion that the only way he and his associates could accomplish their objectives was to assassinate Hitler, a task that he was fully prepared to undertake himself. Not only did Jung have frequent access to Hitler, but, as a Calvinist who had fully assimilated the classical arguments for tyrannicide into his political ethos, he was not constrained by the same religious scruple against assassination that those of a Catholic or Lutheran background might have felt. Jung, however, was eventually dissuaded from this tactic by the argument that any involvement on his part in Hitler's murder would almost certainly disqualify him from assuming a leading role in the new Germany that was to emerge from the shambles of the Nazi dictatorship.[92] At this point, Jung and his confederates hit upon another plan, namely, to mobilize the conservative opposition to Hitler by means of a speech which Papen would hold at some point in the near future

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102–5, 154–55; Forschbach, *Jung*, 83–104; and Pechel, *Widerstand*, 76–77. For an indication of the speculation that existed in conservative circles at this time, see Martin Sommerfeldt, *Ich war dabei: Die Verschwörung der Dämonen 1933–1939: Ein Augenzeugenbericht* (Darmstadt, 1949), 56–62, 65–70.

90. Schleicher to Moysischewitz, 16 Apr. 1934, quoted in its entirety in Forschbach, *Jung*, 105. The original of this letter is in the possession of Karl-Martin Grass.

91. Tschirschky, *Erinnerungen*, 103. A further indication of Reusch's close association with Jung in the summer of 1934 is the letter which he had his representative in Berlin, Martin Blank, deliver to Jung by hand in mid-June 1934. See Reusch to Blank, 15 June 1934, Haniel-Archiv, NL Reusch, 400101292 4/12. No copy of Reusch's letter has survived, most likely because Reusch apparently had all of his correspondence with Jung destroyed after the latter's arrest and murder.

92. On Jung's plans to assassinate Hitler, see Leopold Ziegler's account of his conversation with Jung on 21 May 1934, in Ziegler, "Edgar Jung," 125–35. See also Forschbach, *Jung*, 110–13.

before an appropriate forum, presumably in Berlin. This speech, Jung hoped, would provide Fritsch and the Reichswehr leadership with the pretext they needed for impressing upon Reich President von Hindenburg, by now in rapidly failing health, the need for quick, decisive action if the descent into total anarchy was to be avoided. Assured of Hindenburg's support, the Reichswehr would then take action not only to suppress the S.A. mutiny before it had begun to materialize but also to put an end to Nazi rule in Germany.[93]

It was with this goal in mind that Jung set himself to the task of drafting a speech that Papen had been invited to deliver on 17 June 1934, before the faculty and student body at the University of Marburg. That Jung was indeed the author of Papen's Marburg speech is now beyond question. For not only did Jung incorporate significant elements of his April memorandum into the text of the speech,[94] but he read it in its entirety to Rudolf Pechel and other members of his circle before ever giving it to Papen.[95] Moreover, it is likely that the vice-chancellor never saw the actual text of the speech until after he had boarded the train that was to take him to Marburg. As it was, Papen tried to make some last-minute changes in the wording of the speech, but was kept from doing so on the grounds that it had already been released to the international press and that any deviation from the text which it had received would almost certainly attract immediate attention.[96] Papen's concern was certainly well-founded. For although Jung had been careful to omit any reference to his plans for the restoration of the monarchy or for the creation of a European federation, more than enough remained from the tone and substance of the April memorandum to give the leaders of the Nazi regime ample cause for alarm and indignation. Its occasional panegyrics to Hitler and the great work of German regeneration he had begun notwithstanding, the speech represented nothing less than a frontal assault upon the legitimacy of the Nazi regime and drew attention time and time again to the discrepancies between the promise and practice of the German revolution. Particularly irksome must have been the way in which Jung had Papen remind his audience that with the disappearance of the

93. Tschirschky, *Erinnerungen*, 172–79.

94. Ibid., 164–72.

95. Forschbach, *Jung*, 114–15.

96. Tschirschky, *Erinnerungen*, 172. For Papen's totally inaccurate, if not self-congratulatory, account of the speech and its origins, see Papen, *Wahrheit*, 345–49.

Weimar party system the NSDAP had itself become superfluous.[97] Of far greater consequence, however, were those passages in the speech where Papen repeated what had become a common refrain in Jung's recent writings, namely, that the new Reich must be based not upon the secular materialism of the antiquated liberal era, but upon a return to those Christian values that lay at the heart of man's noblest aspirations.[98] But not even this could compare with the way in which Papen's speech played upon the uncertainty which rumors of an impending "second revolution" had caused throughout broad segments of the German populace.

> If I have sketched the problems of the German revolution and my attitude towards it so sharply, then that is because there has been no end to the talk of a second wave that will complete the revolution. Whoever plays so irresponsibly with such ideas should not forget that a second wave can easily be followed by a third, that whoever threatens to use the guillotine is most likely to come under its blade. Much is being said about the coming socialization. . . . No people can tolerate a permanent rebellion from below if it wants to stand before the bar of history. At some point the movement must come to an end; at some point a firm social structure together with an unimpeachable trust in law must emerge. . . . If therefore a second wave of new life is to pass through the German revolution, then [it will be] not as a social revolution, but as the creative consummation of the work already begun. . . . The success of the German revolution and the future of our people depends upon whether or not it will be possible to find a satisfactory solution to the dualism of party and state.[99]

Papen's speech had an electrifying effect on those who had an opportunity to hear it and immediately thrust him back into the limelight of Germany's political stage. Efforts on the part of the propaganda ministry to prevent its circulation had been effectively circumvented by Bose, who not only managed to have it broadcast in certain parts of the country but also saw to it that copies of it had been distributed at home and abroad in advance of the actual speech.[100] Hitler, on the other hand, first learned of the speech during his return from a particularly embarrassing state visit to Italy, where Mussolini had treated him

97. Franz von Papen, *Rede des Vizekanzlers von Papen vor dem Universitätsbund Marburg, am 17. Juni 1934* (Berlin, n.d. [1934]), 9.

98. Ibid., 10–11.

99. Ibid., 14–15.

100. Tschirschky, *Erinnerungen*, 171.

with scarcely concealed contempt. Hitler's immediate response was to demand a meeting with Papen, who offered to resign from the government in order to spare it further embarrassment and immediately ordered that circulation of the speech be halted.[101] Papen's obsequiousness vis-à-vis Hitler combined with Hindenburg's inaccessibility and the Reichswehr's indecisiveness to deprive Jung and his confederates of whatever momentary advantage they had gained from the excitement over Papen's Marburg speech. Under increasingly heavy pressure from Göring, Himmler, and Heydrich to clean up the nest of reactionaries who had found refuge in the vice chancery, Hitler had decided that the situation had indeed gotten out of hand and ordered Jung's arrest on 25 June.[102] In the meantime, Göring and Himmler continued to finalize their own preparations for a strike against those S.A. leaders, including S.A. chief of staff Ernst Röhm, who had been behind the agitation for a "second revolution." Jung, who had been alerted about the government's impending action but had postponed his departure until he could pick up some money he was expecting in the mail, managed to scribble the word "Gestapo" on the door to the medicine chest in his bathroom as he was being taken into custody at his Berlin apartment later that evening. Five days later he was shot in a small forest in the outskirts of Berlin, one of a half-dozen or so conservative opponents of the regime to perish in Hitler's "Night of the Long Knives.[103]

The Röhm purge of 30 June 1934 represented a critical turning point in the history of the Third Reich and did much to define the terms of collaboration between the Nazi regime and Germany's conservative

101. Papen, "Befehl an das Haus!" 18 June 1934, BA: R 53/49/28. On Papen's meetings with Hitler on 18 and 19 June 1934, see his letter to Hitler, 27 June 1934, in the records of the adjutant to the Reich chancery (Bestand NS 10), vol. 50/15–16. Again, see the misleading account of these developments in Papen, *Wahrheit*, 349–50.

102. It is clear from the entry for 28 June 1934, in *Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs aus den Jahren 1934/35 und 1939/40*, ed. Hans-Günther Seraphim (Göttingen, 1964), 31, that Hitler had ordered Jung's arrest three days earlier and that he had decided no later than 27 June 1934 to take action against the vice chancery. In this connection, see the increasingly vehement public attacks that Rudolf Hess, "Von der Revolution zum Aufbau," 25 June 1934, in *Reden* (Munich, 1934), 15–32, and other Nazi leaders began to make against the forces of social and political reaction in the last week of June 1934.

103. On Jung's arrest and death, see F. Grass, "Jung," 346–47. On the events in the vice chancery, see Papen, *Wahrheit*, 351–58, and more reliably Tschirschky, *Erinnerungen*, 181–89. For a list of those killed in connection with the purge see Heinrich Bennecke, *Reichswehr und der "Röhm-Putsch"* (Munich and Vienna, 1962), 87–88.

elite until the next major crisis in the Fritsch-Blomberg affair at the beginning of 1938. Not only did the removal of Röhm and other S.A. leaders reassure those conservatives who feared that the destruction of the Weimar state was soon to be followed by a social revolution and a radical reorganization of property relations, but the murder of Jung, Bose, Schleicher, and other prominent conservatives had a chilling effect upon those who were critical of the Nazi regime and put a definitive end to their hopes for some sort of conservative restoration. As the driving intellect behind the conservative opposition to Hitler, Jung stood at the heart of a conspiracy that in many essential respects anticipated what an older generation of generals, ex-politicians, and disaffected aristocrats would try with no greater success some ten years later. Yet for all of his personal heroism—Jung was, after all, fully conscious of the dangers that existed at every stage of the conspiracy and willingly risked his life to rectify a situation he had helped create—one is left with the question of whether or not Jung's particular brand of revolutionary conservatism could serve as the basis for effective political action, either during the last years of the Weimar Republic or in the first eighteen months of the Third Reich. Could, in other words, the disunity between the theory and practice of the conservative revolution ever be bridged? And here the answer is far from clear. For, as Jung's own fate so amply demonstrated, the notion of a conservative revolution with its incipient elitism and unabashed contempt for modern mass democracy was particularly ill-suited as a program for political action in an age dominated by what José Ortega y Gasset has so trenchantly called "the revolt of the masses." As it was, Jung's political program had a curiously anachronistic quality to it that effectively militated against its translation into practice. His bitter and unrelenting opposition to National Socialism notwithstanding, Jung remained a voice in the wilderness whose ultimate defeat stemmed in no small way from the tragic disjuncture between his ideas and the times in which he lived.