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Abstract
This article argues that the history of the Austrian state from 1933 to 1938 needs to be placed outside the constraints of Austrian historiography and located within transnational histories of European fascism. It challenges the consensus view in Austrian historiography that the state was authoritarian, rather than fascist, and argues that the connection between Austrian pan-German identity and the state's fascistizing policies in the media, education and population politics can shed light on the trajectory of Austrofascism in the 1930s.

Keywords: Austrofascism, authoritarianism, Italy, pan-Germanism, population policy, press, schools

In the inaugural edition of the *Journal of Contemporary History* in 1966, the British historian Hugh Seton-Watson described the state ruled by Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg from 1933 to 1938 as 'without doubt reactionary, but it is hard to say whether it was fascist'.[1] Prophetically perhaps, Seton-Watson recognized the difficulty future scholars would face in defining any one regime as 'fascist', but he also believed that historians were duty bound to pursue this line of enquiry. He was an early advocate of comparative approaches, and sought to distinguish between 'fascist', 'conservative' and 'reactionary': in his view, reactionary regimes were those most closely associated with Catholic and Orthodox countries where visions of the past assumed mythical proportions, while conservatism was linked to efforts to preserve traditions of the past, rather than to recreate the past as reactionaries were wont to do. Fascists, on the other hand, took reactionary ideologies and modernized them for mass consumption by appealing to conservative values. Fascists might have appeared to be nostalgic for a distant past, but at their core they were driven

1 Hugh Seton-Watson, 'Fascism, Right and Left', *Journal of Contemporary History* 1(1) (1966), 191.

by modern aims to rebuild society from the bottom up, repackaging and re-
presenting an old-world view for a new era. Dollfuss's (and Schuschnigg's)
Austria was reactionary, because its leaders had the will to recreate a vision of
German-speaking Christendom, but lacked the modern mass movement below
them to qualify as a fascist case.[2]

The term 'authoritarian' has come to replace 'reactionary' in Austrian histori-
ography since 1966, but little else has changed in writings on this period. In
1980 the American historian John Rath, a contemporary of Seton-Watson
(Rath was older by six years, and both men served in the second world
war before embarking on academic careers), cited his British counterpart
in an essay on the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg state, and his more recent study
of Dollfuss renders a seemingly fixed image of the 'authoritarian' Austrian
state.[3] Seton-Watson, following on from his father Robert, and along with his
brother, Christopher, were men whose careers were intertwined with the his-
tory of Central and Eastern Europe, while Rath's impressive *oeuvre* spanned
Napoleonic and Restoration Italy, the 1848 Revolutions and the Dollfuss state.
Rath and Seton-Watson were the forerunners of an early school of historiog-
raphy on fascism that established a consensus position on the interwar states
of Central and Eastern Europe, including Austria. Despite a few modifications
to this position since 1966, the consensus still maintains that the Austrian
state shared some external features of the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany
but did not constitute authentic fascism in its own right.[4] Yet the claim that
nazi Germany and fascist Italy were more authentically fascist is based on
superficial comparisons that ignore the deeper workings of the Austrian state.
Questions about coercion and consent, collaboration and resistance, and the
nuanced contributions of social and cultural history of 'everyday life', which
have enriched and refined German, French and Italian historiographies of fas-
cism, have made no inroads into research on interwar Austria. Nor have more
recent attempts in German and Italian historiography to study transnational
contacts, transfers and exchanges between regimes so far engaged historians
of interwar Austria.[5] Austrian historians and those outside Austria whose
research covers this period have not moved far, or at all, past Seton-Watson's
original assessment.

The consensus position is built on another orthodoxy in Austrian historiog-
raphy, the so-called *Lager* or 'camp' theory, which holds that there were three

2   Ibid., 183–5, 191.
3   See John Rath and Carolyn W. Schum, 'The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or
Authoritarian?', in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds), *Who Were
the Fascists?: Social Roots of European Fascism* (Bergen 1980), 253. See also Rath's essays in
volumes 27–30 and 32 of *Austrian History Yearbook* (1996–1999, 2001), the journal which Rath
himself founded. The 2001 article was published posthumously.
4   For example, Seton-Watson described Austria as a copy of Mussolini's fascist state: Seton-
Watson, 'Fascism', op. cit., 191.
5   For an attempt to place the German and Italian regimes within a transnational approach,
see Sven Reichardt and Armin Nolzen (eds), *Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland: Studien zu
Transfer und Vergleich* (Göttingen 2005).

distinct political camps in Austria: Catholic-conservative, socialist and German-nationalist. The majority of Austrian historians, including Anglophones, have accepted the theory uncritically despite its dubious origins: first expounded by Adam Wandruszka in 1954, when Austria was still under four-power occupation by the Allies, the *Lager* theory gave historical legitimacy to the postwar party of rehabilitated Austrian nazis, the League of Independents (VdU), and later the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), who had appeared on Austria's postwar political scene in 1949, following the relaxation of de-nazification laws in 1948.[6] It also blurred distinctions between socialists and communists in the socialist 'camp', and overlooked the German-nationalist orientation of the socialist leader, Karl Renner, on the one hand, while on the other hand it drew a line between Christian Socials and German-nationalists, in spite of their mutual ideological sympathies in many cases and the fact that they were in a coalition government during much of the 1920s.[7] Historians might acknowledge the broader nazi sympathies of conservatives and a few socialists, but in effect the *Lager* theory has established an exclusive relationship between the nationalist camp and 'pan-Germanism', a nationalist ideology that espoused unity with Germany and the legitimate right of Austria's German-speakers to rule over non-Germans in Central Europe.[8] The term's association with

6   Detlef Lehnert, 'Politisch-kulturelle Integrationsmilieus und Orientierungslager in einer polarisierten Massengesellschaft', in Emmerich Tálos et al. (eds), *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918–1933* (Vienna 1995), 431. On the impact of the VdU on labour and party politics in occupied Austria, see Jill Lewis, *Workers and Politics in Occupied Austria, 1945–55* (Manchester 2007). Adam Wandruszka's 1954 essay, 'Österreichs politische Struktur — die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen', first appeared in Heinrich Benedikt (ed.), *Geschichte der Republik Österreich* (Vienna 1954). His work on the '*nationale Lager*' in interwar Austria also appeared in Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (eds), *Österreich 1918–1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, vol. 1 (Graz 1983), 277–315.

7   Lehnert, 'Politisch-kulturelle Integrationsmilieus', op. cit., 431. Lehnert does not dispense with the notion of camps altogether, but he reconfigures their meaning in terms of 'orientation': that is, the party to which an individual gravitated because of political convictions, family tradition, or by association — through membership in a union, for example. However, this 'orientation camp' could include multiple social and cultural 'integrative milieux' that socialized individuals or groups into a particular worldview. Evan Burr Bukey has shown a similar pattern for Upper Austria during the 1920s, where a close network of co-operation existed between Social Democratic, Christian Social and German-nationalist politicians, based on shared *Anschluss* sympathies and an informal system of 'consociational democracy' aimed at containing the political ambitions of the *Heimwehr* and NSDAP in the early 1920s: see Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler's Hometown: Linz, Austria, 1908–1945* (Bloomington, IN, 1986), 39–74.

8   For example, Andrew Whiteside takes the term 'pan-Germans' from the translation of *Alldeutsche* (All-Germans). He sees pan-Germans as the representatives of a German-nationalist camp in the Empire. See Andrew G. Whiteside, 'The Germans as an Integrative Force in Imperial Austria: The Dilemma of Dominance', *Austrian History Yearbook* 3(1) (1967), 157–200. For this usage, see also Carl E. Schorske, 'Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Triptych', *Journal of Modern History* 39(4) (1967), 343–86; Roger Fletcher, 'Karl Leuthner's Greater Germany: The Pre-1914 Pan-Germanism of an Austrian Socialist', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 9(1) (1982), 57–79; K. Tweraser, 'Carl Beurle and the Triumph of German Nationalism in Austria', *German Studies Review* 4(3) (1981), 403–26; Robert S. Wistrich, *Hitler and the Holocaust* (New York 2001), 35. William T. Bluhm refers to pan-Germanism in connection with Schönerer, the Social

Viennese historian Heinrich von Srbik's pan-German school of history, which during the interwar period gave intellectual credence to the National Socialist idea of a thousand-year German empire, lends weight to this perception of pan-Germanism's association with German-nationalists. Although each of the major parties in interwar Austria — the Greater Germans, the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats — used the term 'pan-German' to describe the national identification of Austrian Germans with other Germans in Central Europe, and the special identity of Austria as a German state, historians repeatedly represent pan-Germanism as the ideology of nationalists.[9] However, in overlooking the relationship between pan-German identity and fascism, historians have manufactured a popular myth that the 'nationalist' camp supported fascism (read National Socialism), while the 'conservative' camp under Dollfuss and Schuschnigg acted as a bulwark against fascist movements in Austria.

If we are to dismantle, or at least modify, the *Lager* theory to assess the relationship between nationalism and fascism in interwar Austria, we need to distinguish between Austrian pan-Germanism and the racial idea of pan-Germanism that was at the core of nazi ideology. The focus on National Socialism in theories of generic fascism has worked against an understanding of Austria by overlooking the nuances of Austrian pan-Germanism. As this article argues, pan-German identity was a state-based nationalism that combined civic features (citizenship, state borders and assimilation of minorities to the state language) with ethnic features (language, religion and ancestry), whereas National Socialism was an ideology built on racial characteristics of the national community. To be sure, racial ideas were present in the Austrian

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Democrats and the National Socialists, which is typical of the ambiguity of this term in historiography: see William T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State* (New Haven, CT, 1973), 12–45.

9   For example, Gerald Stourzh has argued that Social Democrats as well as the Austrofascist state helped propagate the idea of Austria as the 'better German state', in opposition to the nazi concept of German nationhood. See his essay 'Erschütterung und Konsolidierung des Österreichbewusstseins — vom Zusammenbruch der Monarchie zur Zweiten Republik', in Richard G. Plaschka, Gerald Stourzh and Jan Paul Niederkorn (eds), *Was heisst Österreich? Inhalt und Umfang des Österreichbegriffs vom 10. Jahrhundert bis heute* (Vienna 1995). It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the debate on interwar Austrian identity, but see the summary of some of the debate in a review article by Laura Gellott, 'Recent Writings on the Ständestaat, 1934–1938', *Austrian History Yearbook* 26 (1995), 207–38. I would add that much of the debate lacks any rigorous definition of the term 'pan-German', and that to date Anton Staudinger and Michael Steinberg have given the most extensive consideration to the pan-German idea within Austrofascist ideology. See Anton Staudinger, 'Austrofaschistische "Österreich"-Ideologie', in Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (eds), *'Austrofaschismus': Politik–Ökonomie–Kultur 1933–1938*, 5th edn (Vienna 2005), 28–52; and Michael Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival: Austria as Theatre and Ideology, 1890–1938* (Ithaca, NY, 1990). Steinberg, for example, argues that through their mission to preserve religious belief, German universalism and cosmopolitanism, the Festival organizers and patrons invoked this Austrian pan-German identity as a counterpoint to nazism specifically, and to Protestant Prussian German identity more generally. He also makes a crucial and much under-recognized point: that the Austrofascist state's attempt to define Austrian identity against nazism was thwarted by the state's own manufacturing of a pan-German identity.

state (especially among German-nationalists), but these ideas were not the crux of pan-German identity. Austrian proponents of a pan-German identity claimed that the Austrian state was the fullest expression of German hegemony over non-German nationalities and of a German historical mission in Central Europe. Consequently, my definition of 'Austrofascism' emphasizes the agency of the state in imposing a top-down nationalist ideology on its citizens, rather than the revolutionary aspect inherent to many definitions of fascism, including Seton-Watson's. The construction of an Austrian pan-German identity, under the guise of an apparent conservatism, was at the core of Austrofascism.

My article challenges the assumptions of the consensus position and points to further research that might undo the perennial image of the 'authoritarian' state. It seeks to redress a gap in the historiography of fascism and nationalism in Austria by first exposing the flaws of the 'authoritarian' school of Austrian historians, and then by showing examples of how a fascistizing national identity — pan-Germanism — was constructed in the public organs and institutions of the Austrian state after 1933. The evidence that I draw on here from the press and from school textbooks demonstrates that 'conservatives' and 'nationalists' were co-architects of a pan-German identity in Austria, which refutes the claim that pan-Germanism was the domain of a single camp. Finally, I offer an example of how the Austrian case might be placed within a more transnational context of European fascism by comparing Austria's population policies in the mid-1930s with those of fascist Italy in the late 1920s.

Historians who have argued that Italy and Germany spawned the only fascist regimes in Europe traditionally compare the Dollfuss/Schuschnigg state with the regimes in Hungary, Spain, Yugoslavia and Romania.[10] Stanley Payne's synthesis of fascism in Europe was one of the first comparative studies to appear during the 1990s in what became a decade of revived interest in generic fascism. His typology of the 'three faces of authoritarian nationalism' classifies Austria's Christian Social Party and its successor in 1934, the Fatherland Front, as 'conservative right', alongside Hungary's National Union Party and supporters of Romania's King Carol. The Austrian *Heimwehr* (Home Guard), a loosely unified body made up of several provincial militia groups that formally entered the ranks of government in 1934, is defined as 'radical right', as are the National Christians in Romania. The only 'fascist' face in Austria, according to Payne, was the Nazi Party.[11] Another later attempt at a comparative definition of fascism, Robert Paxton's *Anatomy of Fascism*, reaches a similar conclusion to Payne's: that Dollfuss and Schuschnigg created a 'Catholic authoritarian regime', which repressed both socialists and nazis.[12] Paxton's definition of fascism will be outlined further below, but of relevance here is that his assessment of the Austrian state, drawn from a very old and very thin

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10   The most recent exponent of this view is Philip Morgan, *Fascism in Europe, 1919–1945* (London 2003).
11   See 'Table I.2: Three Faces of Authoritarian Nationalism', in Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (London 1995), 15, and his more general account of Austria in ch. 8.
12   Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York 2004), 115.

bibliography on Austria, introduces nothing new to the debate on fascism and authoritarianism. He does not unpack the term 'authoritarian' or elaborate on what the 'Catholic' interests of the state were, and his claim that the regime acted defensively against the manoeuvres of nazis follows the logic of the *Lager* theory. (For instance, he refers to pan-Germanism only in connection with the German-nationalists.) He merely reiterates the consensus position that the state was more authoritarian than fascist.

The consensus position is partly based on an assumption that the intention of the ruling Christian Socials was to widen the influence of the Catholic Church in Austria, not to create a fascist state. According to this view, the 'Christ-King' idea in Austrian Catholic thought towards the end of the 1920s sought the negation of democratic pluralism and, in its place, the institution of the Church as Christ's temporal representative.[13] Thus, even before Dollfuss prorogued the parliament and authorized his personal rule by emergency decree in March 1933, and well before the May 1934 constitution that formally established the new Austrian state, political Catholicism had begun to mobilize support for a new authoritarian society that would stamp out the single threat to the Church: social democracy. Proponents of this view reject the term 'clerical-fascism', which was coined by the leader of the *Partito Popolare Italiano* (PPI), Luigi Sturzo, and appeared in Charles Gulick's two-volume *Austria from the Habsburgs to Hitler*, first published in German in 1948.[14] Ernst Hanisch sees 'clerical-fascism' as a political label, not a type of fascism, arguing that while the Vatican and the Austrian bishops formally supported the regime, they did not help to establish it. He concludes that the Church's presence within and support for the state prevented it from becoming fully fascist.[15] Laura Gellott has also argued for a decoupling of the terms 'clerical' and 'fascist', and demonstrates that on such issues as youth, the Austrian bishops dissented from the government's policies and successfully widened the influence of Catholic Action in opposition to the state, so that the Catholic youth groups had three times as many members as the state youth organization.[16] Similarly, Gellott and Irene Bandhauer-Schöffmann have shown that Catholic women's activism was sometimes at odds with the state's position on working women.[17] But, notwith-

13   Ernst Hanisch, 'Der Politische Katholizismus als Ideologischer Träger des "Austrofaschismus"', in Tálos and Neugebauer (eds), *'Austrofaschismus'*, op. cit., 68–86.
14   John Pollard, 'Conservative Catholics and Italian Fascism: the Clerico-Fascists', in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), *Fascists and Conservatives* (London 1990), 31.
15   Hanisch, 'Politische Katholizismus', op. cit.
16   Laura Gellott, *The Catholic Church and the Authoritarian Regime in Austria, 1933–1938* (New York 1987).
17   Laura Gellott, 'Defending Catholic Interests in the Christian State: The Role of Catholic Action in Austria, 1933–1938', *The Catholic Historical Review* 74(4) (1988), 571–89; Gellott and Michael Phayer, 'Dissenting Voices: Catholic Women in Opposition to Fascism', *Journal of Contemporary History* 22(1) (1987), 91–114; Irene Bandhauer-Schöffmann, 'Der "Christliche Ständestaat" als Männerstaat? Frauen- und Geschlechterpolitik im Austrofaschismus', in Tálos and Neugebauer, *'Austrofaschismus'*, op. cit., 254–80; and idem, 'Gottgewollte Geschlechterd ifferenzen', in Brigitte Lehmann (ed.), *Dass die Frau zur Frau erzogen wird: Frauenpolitik und Ständestaat* (Vienna 2008), 15–61. Gellott also includes a useful summary of the debate on the

standing these valuable contributions on gender and other works on eugenics, studies of Catholicism in the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg state have not branched out from studies of the Christian Social Party and the political careers of priests to broader social and cultural histories of religion, as has been the case elsewhere in Germany and France.[18] A Catholic renaissance in art and architecture during the 1930s was one example of the role religion played in the cultural life of the Austrian state, but it does not follow that Catholicism was the principal influence during this period. Many artists experimented with religious art and architecture, but not always out of personal belief: if they had financial obligations, church-building provided a ready source of income.[19] Similarly in education, as we will see below, the state used religion as a prop for inculcating patriotic and civic values in pupils, but its primary objective was not to bolster the position of the Church.[20] Whatever influence the Church wielded over political, social and cultural life did not make it the ruling authority in the state. Moreover, the Catholic Church's position in and relationship with the governments of Italy and Germany do not have any bearing on the question of whether those regimes were fascist. Therefore, to conclude that the Austrian state was authoritarian because it had the formal support of the Church is a distorted and insular argument.

Historians have also tried to draw a distinction between fascist and Catholic corporatism to show that the Austrian state was authoritarian. Officially, the regime in Austria was known as the *Ständestaat* (Corporate State) and the preamble of its constitution defined Austria as a 'Christian, German, federal state, on a corporative basis'. Austrian corporatism is traditionally held to be based on the 1931 papal encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*.[21] However, corporatist thought in Austria pre-dated the 1931 encyclical and was heavily influenced by the professor of economics and sociology at the University of Vienna, Othmar Spann (1878–1950). Spann's corporatism rejected democracy and promoted self-administrating occupational guilds in place of political parties. Although he argued for limited decentralization in the autonomy of the guilds, all authority in his model of 'the true state' rested exclusively on the government.

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role of the Church in the state in her review article, 'Recent Writings on the Ständestaat'. Although I disagree with her conclusion that the Austrian state was authoritarian not fascist, her points on the need for more social analysis of the state's policies and its identity politics in particular are a correction to the narrowly political approach of the *Lager* school of history.

18 On Catholicism and eugenics in the 1930s, see Monika Löscher, 'Eugenics and Catholicism in Interwar Austria', in Marius Turda and Paul J. Weindling (eds), *'Blood and Homeland': Eugenics and Racial Nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe, 1900–1940* (Budapest 2007), 299–316.

19 See Elisabeth Klamper, 'Die Mühen der Wiederverchristlichung: Die Sakralkunst und die Rolle der Kirche während des Austrofaschismus', in Jan Tabor (ed.), *Kunst und Diktatur: Architektur, Bildhauerei und Malerei in Österreich, Deutschland, Italien und der Sowjetunion 1922–1956* (Baden 1994), 148–56.

20 See Carla Esden-Tempska, 'Civic Education in Authoritarian Austria, 1934–38', *History of Education Quarterly* 30(2) (1990), 198.

21 Morgan, *Fascism*, op. cit., 73, 170.

Spann's theories attracted a wide circle of German-nationalist and Catholic students in Vienna, including the future chancellor, Dollfuss, and a number of younger *Heimwehr* leaders.[22] The 1926 programme of the Christian Social Party reflected these corporatist ideas and, in 1931, party leaders boasted that there was no need to adapt the 1926 programme to incorporate the papal teachings in *Quadragesimo Anno*. In fact, the encyclical stated that individuals should be able to choose freely the type of government they wanted and it criticized those who exploited corporatist ideas for political purposes, ignoring the social reform for which it was intended. Although these criticisms were primarily directed at Italian fascists in 1931, they were also applicable to Austria's Christian Social leaders.[23] In spurning the social teaching of the Church, the Austrian state was no less fascist than the regime in Italy.

Other proponents of an 'authoritarian' state emphasize the absence of both a grassroots fascist party and a leadership cult in Austria. With regard to the first point, it is true that Dollfuss did not envisage the Fatherland Front as a mass movement, but intended only to replace the various bourgeois parties with a supra-party structure that would counteract more effectively the dominance of the Social Democrats. But if we compare the Fatherland Front with the prototypical fascist party, the *Partito Nazionale Fascista* (PNF), we see that the Fatherland Front was numerically stronger: the PNF had 300,000 members when it emerged at the end of 1921, while the Fatherland Front had 500,000 by the end of 1933. Although the modes of recruitment varied — the PNF coerced factory workers and farm labourers to join as a condition of keeping their jobs, while entire organizations joined the Fatherland Front on a collective basis — both organizations held a monopoly and thus neither can accurately be regarded as a populist party.[24] The absence of a *Führer* or *Duce* figure is often cited as evidence that Austria did not embody fascism's cult of one leader. Bruce Pauley, for example, has argued that Austria was too divided by regional and class loyalties for a strong leader to emerge from either the *Heimwehr* or the nazis. Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were no more than 'semi-fascist dictators' because they saw themselves only as a temporary buffer against socialism and nazism and held no plans to transform society into a new community of fascists.[25] Yet Pauley contradicts himself when he argues elsewhere that the Fatherland Front was organized according to the *Führerprinzip*, with Dollfuss and then Schuschnigg having complete authority and demanding

22 John Haag, 'Othmar Spann and the Quest for a "True State"', *Austrian History Yearbook* 12–13 (1976–7), 233–47. *Der Wahre Staat* (The True State) was the title of Spann's acclaimed book, published in Germany in 1921, which was based on his earlier lectures in Vienna.
23 Jill Lewis, 'Conservatives and Fascists in Austria, 1918–34', in Blinkhorn, *Fascists*, op. cit., 105–6.
24 Emmerich Tálos and Walter Manoschek, 'Aspekte der politischen Struktur des Austrofaschismus', in Tálos and Neugebauer, *'Austrofaschismus'*, op. cit., 145–6; Morgan, *Fascism*, op. cit., 48.
25 Bruce F. Pauley, 'Fascism and the *Führerprinzip*: The Austrian Example', *Central European History* 12(3) (1979), 285–6.

absolute obedience.[26] On this point, Pauley differs from Rath, who argues that Schuschnigg lacked the charisma of Dollfuss and never came close to winning the popular support that his predecessor had.[27]

Finally, critics of the 'fascist' label for Austria emphasize the state's intention to create a patriotic, rather than a totalitarian society. They claim that the Austrian state sought to instil patriotism through its 'fascist-style capillary organisations' and that it had neither the intent nor the ability to create a truly fascist society.[28] In contrast to fascist regimes, they argue, Austria did not try to breed a new fascist man or woman.[29] Pauley describes this notion of authoritarianism-with-fascist-trappings as 'positive fascism', which he claims intensified after 1936 in an attempt to stave off growing sympathies with nazi Germany. He points to the Fatherland Front's leisure organization, *Neues Leben* (New Life), which was modelled on Germany's *Kraft durch Freude* and Italy's *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*. Established in 1936, *Neues Leben* had grown to over 500,000 members by early 1938. Like its German and Italian counterparts, *Neues Leben* offered discounted theatre tickets, rail fares and ski holiday packages; it held sporting events, sponsored cultural prizes for art, photography, film, music and plays, and established travelling theatre companies to keep actors in full-time employment. The Fatherland Front also developed a patriarchal welfare system through its *Mütterschutzwerk* (Mothers' Defence Action), which had been founded in March 1934 to promote motherhood as a patriotic duty. Among its many programmes, the *Mütterschutzwerk* offered summer retreats for mothers, infant-care courses and financial payments to families with more than three children. Another striking similarity with fascist regimes was the Fatherland Front's storm troopers' brigade, the *Sturmkorps*, which was established in 1937 and was styled on the SS as an élite military body. Its slogan, 'Our Wish Shall Be Law' (*Unser Wille werde Gesetz*), was a staccato variation of the SS slogan, 'Honour For Us Means Loyalty' (*Unsere Ehre heisst Treue*).[30] A propaganda photograph shows the *Sturmkorps* standing under a portrait of Schuschnigg with a familiar-sounding motto, 'His Will is our Command, His Goal is our Victory' (*Sein Wille ist uns Befehl, Sein Ziel unser Sieg*).[31] 'Positive fascism' has also been dubbed 'imitation fascism' for its apparent tendency to borrow from other fascist regimes.[32] Yet the claim that the Austrian state merely copied fascist regimes is rarely substantiated with reference to the limits of fascistization in Italy and Germany, where mothercare

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26   Bruce F. Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1981), 161.
27   Rath and Schum, 'Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime', op. cit., 252.
28   See, for example, Morgan, *Fascism*, op. cit., 73.
29   Rath and Schum, 'Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime', op. cit., 251.
30   Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis*, op. cit., 162. On the *Mütterschutzwerk*, see Gellott and Phayer, 'Dissenting Voices', op. cit., 105–6.
31   Ernst Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna 1994), 313.
32   Ernst Hanisch, 'Die Salzburger Presse in der Ersten Republik 1918–1938', *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde* 128 (1988), 362.

and leisure programmes were equally aimed at inculcating patriotic values and keeping the consumers happy.[33] As Emmerich Tálos has argued, the failure of the Austrian regime to create a fully-fledged fascist state is not sufficient reason to dismiss or play down its intention to become fascist. Nor can the breadth of the Austrofascist project be underestimated: Tálos points to the imitative elements of fascism — the monopoly of the Fatherland Front, the creation of a state leisure organization and a state youth group (*Österreichisches Jungvolk* or ÖJV), and the 'co-ordination' of the press and schools — as evidence that the regime made no distinction between its own goals of transforming Austria and the transformations that had already occurred in Italy and Germany.[34] Moreover, recent transnational studies of the Italian and German regimes have made the 'imitation fascism' argument redundant, with the evidence that the German *Kraft durch Freude* was itself a copy of the OND in Italy.[35]

Perhaps the most stubborn claim in defence of the 'authoritarian' state, however, is that the Christian Social Party was the conservative partner of the fascist *Heimwehr*. As we have seen in Payne's typology, not all historians agree that the *Heimwehr* was truly fascist, but it has become the standard interpretation, almost a concession, on the part of those who argue that the regime was authoritarian.[36] Francis Carsten, for example, regards both the *Heimwehr* and the Nazi Party as two distinct fascist movements, and argues that the *Heimwehr* became fascist as a result of the ideological patronage, weapons and financial support given to it by Mussolini after 1928.[37] More recently, Gerhard Botz has also defined the nazis and the *Heimwehr* as two 'brands' of fascism in Austria: the nazis, representing 'national fascism' akin to German nazism, and the *Heimwehr*, along with its close sibling, the *Frontkämpfervereinigung* (Front Veterans' Association), representing '*Heimwehr* fascism'. The Christian Social Party and the Fatherland Front fall outside the Austrian family of fascism in Botz's assessment and, after the *Heimwehr* was absorbed into the Fatherland

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33   Victoria de Grazia, in *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge 1981); and idem, *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945* (Berkeley, CA, 1992); and more recently R.J.B. Bosworth, in *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Dictatorship* (London 2005), have questioned the limits of consensus in daily life under the Italian dictatorship. For most Italians, as Bosworth writes, 'everyday Mussolinism' did not equate with 'Fascist totalitarianism'.
34   See his summary of the arguments by the volume's other contributors in Emmerich Tálos, 'Das austrofaschistische Herrschaftssystem', in Tálos and Neugebauer, *'Austrofaschismus'*, op. cit., 394–420.
35   See Daniela Liebscher, 'Faschismus als Modell: Die faschistische *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro* und die NS-Gemeinschaft "Kraft durch Freude" in der Zwischenkriegszeit', in Reichardt and Nolzen (eds), *Faschismus in Italien*, op. cit., 94–118.
36   For an early exposition of this view, see Ludwig Jedlicka, 'The Austrian Heimwehr', *Journal of Contemporary History* 1(1) (1966), 127–44.
37   F.L. Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria: from Schönerer to Hitler* (London 1977); F.L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism*, 2nd edn (London 1980), 223–9. On Mussolini's support for fascist movements in Hungary and Austria, see Lájos Kerekes, *Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini, Gömbös und die Heimwehr* (Vienna 1966).

Front in 1936, he concludes that the *Heimwehr* also ceased to be fascist.[38]
However, Jill Lewis has argued that the Christian Socials were not the 'reluc-
tant allies' of the fascist *Heimwehr*, but were already on a trajectory towards
fascism well before the *Heimwehr* entered a bloc coalition with the Christian
Socials in 1930. She points out that the Christian Socials were the driving
force behind the steady repression of socialism in the provinces throughout the
1920s, especially in the industrial areas of Upper Styria, and it was the party's
supporters — industry and banks — who actively encouraged the *Heimwehr* to
broaden its political support base beyond the ruffians of its early days. In some
provinces, the *Heimwehr* had actually originated as the paramilitary arm of the
Christian Social Party. In Tyrol, the *Heimwehr* was founded by the leader of
the Tyrolean Christian Social Party, Richard Steidle, it was partly financed by
the party and most of its members were also loyal party voters. In Upper Styria,
the government specifically recruited the *Heimwehr* as a counter-force to the
socialist trade unions. While members of the *Heimwehr* in Styria and Carinthia
aligned themselves with the Nazi Party after 1932, the political and ideologi-
cal loyalties of the majority of *Heimwehr* groups remained with the Christian
Social Party. Thus in February 1934 it was the Christian Social government,
not the *Heimwehr* acting independently, which brutally defeated the Social
Democrats in a brief civil war and formally established the *Ständestaat*.[39]

The consensus position is built on a flawed determinism that seeks retrospec-
tively to explain Austria's path to National Socialism, as if there might have
been another less painful road that Austria might have taken. This problem of
determinism might be solved by defining fascism not as a 'type' of regime or
ideology but as a process, much as constructivists define national identity as a
process of imagining the national community. Paxton's attempt to reconfigure
our understanding of fascism as a process is instructive here. He charts the five
stages of fascism: from the creation of fascist movements, to their 'rooting'
in the political system, to their seizure of power, to the exercise of power, to
the final stage, when fascist regimes undergo either radicalization or entropy.
However, a major shortcoming of Paxton's work is that he never applies the
same processual categories to conservatives that he applies to fascists: they
remain 'in essence' conservative, and we are left to draw the conclusion that
there is an invisible line over which conservatives can never cross.[40] A fur-
ther problem with his definition is that it works only for Germany and Italy.
Consequently, only successful fascism that completes the full five stages of

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38   Gerhard Botz, 'Varieties of Fascism in Austria: Introduction', in Larsen, Hagtvet and
Myklebust, *Who Were the Fascists?* op. cit., 194. For a more recent exposition of his argument,
see his chapter, 'The Short- and Long-term Effects of the Authoritarian Regime and of Nazism
in Austria: The Burden of a "Second Dictatorship"', in Jerzy Borejsza and Klaus Ziemer (eds),
*Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons from the Twentieth
Century* (New York 2006), 188–208.
39   Lewis, 'Conservatives and Fascists', op. cit. On Tyrol, see also Morgan, *Fascism*, op. cit., 33.
40   Robert Soucy pointed out this criticism of Paxton in an essay in Brian Jenkins's edited vol-
ume, *France in the Era of Fascism: Essays on the French Authoritarian Right* (New York 2005),
65–104.

development counts as genuine fascism, which becomes a reductionist argu-
ment that measures processes by their outcomes.[41] Newer scholars of fascism
have begun to develop a more fluid process-oriented approach to fascism.
Aristotle Kallis has attempted to overcome the distinction between the regime
models of fascism and all other interwar and wartime regimes that adopted
fascist structures and organizations, which he terms 'para-fascism'. He sug-
gests that the difference between 'fascism' and 'para-fascism' is a difference of
degree rather than substance, and argues that fascism should be seen as a proc-
essual category (fascistization) that was unique in every regime because of the
circumstances under which traditional élites co-opted fascist groups or fascist
'commodities'. In some cases, notably in Italy and Germany, this process led to
fascism coming to power as the élites handed over leadership to fascist groups:
Kallis describes this as 'fascistization as last resort'. In other cases, fascistiza-
tion was designed to fortify conservative rule without necessarily forming an
alliance with fascist groups, a phenomenon Kallis calls 'voluntary fascism'. A
third category, 'preventive fascism', describes those regimes that fascistized in
order to ward off potentially more radical groups, as occurred in Austria under
Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, as firstly, the Social Democrats and later the Nazi
Party. While Kallis still seems to be making a distinction between the regimes in
Italy and Germany and everywhere else in the latter two categories, his typol-
ogy does not reduce the definition of fascism to the Italian and German cases
only. Rather, he sees all regimes as a 'distortion' of fascist ideology, because
each regime adapted it to the perceived needs and conditions in that society. It
is more fruitful, according to Kallis, to focus on the trajectory of fascistization
in each country in order to assess the nature of the regime.[42]

Another scholar who adopts a process-oriented approach, Michael Mann,
sees fascism as the 'pursuit' of a form of nationalism that seeks radical 'cleans-
ing' solutions, employs paramilitary force and seeks to 'transcend' social divi-
sions through coercion and control.[43] Mann's definition of fascism is novel,
despite his sometimes superficial treatment of the case studies.[44] While he
makes all the usual observations of the Austrian regime — that it borrowed
from fascist structures and ideology but lacked a grass-roots fascist party — he
also presents Austria as a special case of fascism, arguing that Austrian fascists
were disproportionately greater in numbers than in Germany or Italy, although
they did not come to power until after Austria's annexation to Germany.[45] His
conclusion is based on analysis of former *Heimwehr* men who became nazis
before 1938, suggesting that Mann has simply substituted 'fascists' for 'nazis'.
However, his definition of fascism as 'organic' and 'cleansing' nationalism,
which refers both to ethnic and political enemies, and his emphasis on 'anti-

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41   See Robert Jenkins' conclusion in ibid., 200–18.
42   Aristotle A. Kallis, '"Fascism", "Para-fascism" and "Fascistization": On the Similarities of
Three Conceptual Categories', *European History Quarterly* 33(2) (2003), 219–49.
43   Michael Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge 2004), 13.
44   See also Bruce Campbell's review in *Central European History* 39(2) (2006), 322–5.
45   Mann, *Fascists*, op. cit., 43–8.

Semitic fascism', widens considerably the ranks of fascists in Austria and high-lights the role nationalism played in the creation of an Austrofascist state.

The absence of an integrated approach to nationalism and fascism in inter-war East-Central Europe is largely responsible for the enduring appeal of the fascist-authoritarian dichotomy. This gap in the historiography has not resulted from sheer ignorance of the region; after all, men like Seton-Watson and Rath came into direct contact with these countries during their military years. The tendency of historians of fascism to focus on regime models and sociological theories to explain why some groups were more attracted to fascism than others has meant that our understanding of nation-building in the Habsburg successor states is divorced from our understanding of those political and social movements that gained popular currency in the interwar years. Paxton is a case in point: his approach suffers from an overly Western European approach to fascism, and he essentializes the Austrian case by drawing a linear connection between the pan-Germanism of Schönerer in the 1880s and the Austrian nazis in the interwar period.[46] Paxton is not alone in this, however. Historians of Western Europe have tended to draw on the examples from Central and Eastern Europe only when it suits their theoretical juxtapositioning of fascism and authoritarianism, despite the best efforts of historians of the region to revise persistent West–East dichotomies for nation-alism and fascism in the successor states.[47] The boom in nationalism studies since the fall of communism and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has so far remained in the shadows of studies of fascism. In Austria, the only one of the successor states not to fall under Soviet control, historians have been less receptive to new scholarship on nationalism than in the post-communist countries, thus impeding any real progress in the histori-ography of either nationalism or fascism in the interwar Austrian state. This is all the more short-sighted given that fascism in Austria has received greater attention from historians than the other East-Central European states, partly due to National Socialism's genesis in the German-Czech borderlands of Austria-Hungary, and partly due to historians' fascination with Hitler's youth. Yet, as I have already shown, this attention has produced only superficial com-parisons with fascism elsewhere and has glossed over questions about national identity, thanks mainly to the received wisdom of the *Lager* theory in Austrian historiography. Attitudes towards minorities, for example, or definitions of citizenship receive no attention in anatomical explanations of the 'rooting' of fascism in Austria.

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46 Paxton's bibliographical essay has two and a half pages of references on France, for exam-ple, and only six books on Austria. For a rebuttal of the claim that the nazis were the offspring of Schönerer's followers, see Robert Hoffmann, 'Gab es ein "Schönerianisches Milieu?" Versuch einer Kollektivbiographie von Mitgliedern des "Vereins der Salzburger Studenten in Wien"', in Ernst Bruckmüller, Ulrike Döcker, Hannes Stekl and Peter Urbanitsch (eds), *Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie* (Vienna 1990), 275–98.
47 On Czechoslovakia, for example, see the collection of essays edited by Mark Cornwall and R.J.W. Evans, *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918–1948* (Oxford 2007).

My own brief analysis of the relationship between fascism and national-
ism in Austria in the following sections is not intended to be exhaustive, but
rather stands for a larger body of primary source material that awaits further
analysis in the light of my claims about pan-Germanism and Austrofascism.
The examples of education, the press and population policies examined here
demonstrate that while 'conservatives' might have quibbled with their 'nation-
alist' counterparts over the finer points of religion and the historical mis-
sion of Central Europe's German-speakers, they found much to agree on
when it came to defining the boundaries of 'German Austria'. Non-German
minorities, including Jews, were left outside of those boundaries and Austria's
multinational past became a homogenized picture of German influence in the
region. If the state's construction of the boundaries of 'German Austria' can
be described as pan-Germanism, then the process of forging a community of
citizens who conformed to the official pan-German identity can be defined as
Austrofascism.

The Ministry of Education's curriculum plan for 1935 set out its aim of train-
ing Austrian youth 'to feel, think and conduct themselves in a religious-moral,
national, social and patriotic manner'.[48] The process of reforming Austria's
school system had already begun in February 1934, when the government
replaced teachers and school principals belonging to the Social Democratic
Party's teachers' unions with members of the Fatherland Front, following
the ban on that party and its organs. Teachers from the Christian Social and
German-nationalist unions remained in their posts, but were obliged to join the
Fatherland Front. The printing of new textbooks for history and German was
delayed, to save costs, but official pedagogical journals instructed teachers in
the interim to refer only to sections in the old textbooks that discussed religious
and imperial themes, and to set their pupils straight about the more deviant
passages on the foundations of the Austrian republic and the Social Democratic
Party.[49] The new textbooks, published after 1935, emphasized the national and
patriotic core values of the Education Ministry's curriculum plan. Religious
instruction was left to the Church's jurisdiction under the terms of the 1934
concordat, which made religion classes compulsory for all baptized Catholics,
and ensured that curricula taught in other subjects did not contradict Church
teaching. But instruction in other subjects, though stipulated not to offend
religious sensibilities, was only interested in religion in so far as it promoted
Austria's 'German Christian' heritage and mission in Europe. For example,
elementary and middle-school history curricula included as one of the core
topics Austria's role as a 'bulwark' against the Turks. Textbooks emphasized
Austria's 'German' history and left out the history of the empire's other nation-

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48   R. John Rath, 'History and Citizenship Training: An Austrian Example', *Journal of Modern
History* 21(3) (1949), 230. See also his earlier article, based on more extensive research on the
period 1933–8, 'Training for Citizenship, "Authoritarian" Austrian Style', *Journal of Central
European Affairs* 3(2) (1943), 121–46.
49   Ibid. See also Herbert Dachs, '"Austrofaschismus" und Schule — Ein Instrumentalisierungsv
ersuch', in Tálos and Neugebauer, *'Austrofaschismus'*, op. cit., 286.

alities; one middle-school textbook stated that 'Austria was a German land from time immemorial and is inhabited almost exclusively by Germans.'[50]

The problem for curriculum planners, and for teachers and students using the textbooks, was the difficulty in combining Austria's German heritage and language with a patriotic focus on Austrian history and literature. Study plans and pedagogical journals issued by the Ministry of Education instructed teachers to emphasize Austria's place in German history, and its special merits in literature and music. Students were to gain 'a love of the German language and German, *particularly Austrian*, literature', according to one middle-school study plan, and Viennese musical achievements were to be included alongside the great texts of Weimar German literature. In geography, the new curriculum introduced in 1935 treated Austria separately from Germany, and lessons were designed to draw similarities between Austria and other parts of the world. Austrian children reading their first words learnt an 'Austrian ABC', in which each letter of the alphabet corresponded to a patriotic symbol and word: for example, 'C' for *Christentum* (Christianity), 'D' for *Deutschtum* (Germanism) and 'V' for *Vaterland* (Fatherland). Each term also corresponded with a saying: '*Deutschtum*', for instance, would prompt pupils to remember that 'a good Austrian is at the same time a good German.' They were encouraged to identify with the words of the late Chancellor Dollfuss, 'who died for our Fatherland', so that they would, like him, 'joyfully acknowledge our Germanism'.[51]

The ambiguity of much of this rhetoric allowed teachers to interpret it loosely. Thus while Catholic teachers instructed pupils that Austrian Germandom was the heir of the Holy Roman Empire, charged with the historical mission of bringing peace to the nations of Europe, their German-nationalist counterparts taught that Austria's historical roots in the German nation demanded its inclusion in a greater-German state. And where the official pedagogical journals stressed religious and patriotic duty to the Austrian fatherland, German-nationalist journals asserted that 'true religiosity' was the identification with the German people.[52] In fact, as I have already mentioned, the belief that Austria had a special Germanizing mission in Central Europe and that it was 'from time immemorial' a German land was at the very core of an Austrian pan-German identity, which each of the interwar Austrian parties defined according to its political viewpoint. Pan-Germanism could, therefore, be appropriated by both the state apparatus and any number of groups operating officially within the public sphere. German-nationalist groups were able to exploit pan-Germanism towards their own end of broadening public sympathies for *Anschluss*, but that did not mean pan-German identity was linked only to the beliefs and organs of the 'nationalist' camp.

Historians who draw attention to divisions between a 'conservative' and a 'nationalist' camp claim that the Austrian state was ultimately unsuccess-

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50   Esden-Tempska, 'Civic Education', op. cit., 194, 204.
51   Ibid., 203–4 (Italics in quote given in original). See also Rath, 'Training for Citizenship', op. cit., which Esden-Tempska draws on in her article.
52   Dachs, '"Austrofaschismus" und Schule', op. cit., 290.

ful in its attempt to inculcate patriotic values in schools. They point to the evidence that most students and their teachers, especially those in the larger towns where German-nationalist associations were strongest, remained scepti-cal towards the idea of an Austrian fatherland and embraced Germany more enthusiastically.[53] However, this is only partially true. Students and teachers (or indeed many Fatherland Front functionaries who switched allegiance to the nazis when they did take over the country in 1938) might have questioned the legitimacy of an Austrian fatherland, but they held no objections to iden-tification with the German nation. The state simply manipulated this popular identification with the German nation for its own purpose of manufacturing loyalty to an independent Austria. Rath's formulation (in 1943!) of 'citizenship training' in the 'authoritarian' Austrian state might better be interpreted as training for dual citizenship as members of an Austrian state and members of a German-speaking national community.

That the principal duty of education was to teach Austrian youth to feel and think and to act as 'Germans', and the focus of their emotions, beliefs and actions was to be the Austrian state, are grounds on which to claim that a fascistizing national identity had taken root in Austrian schools after 1933. Evidence that this process of fascistization in Austrian schools was proceed-ing apace can be seen from correspondence in 1937 in the Croatian-language newspaper *Hrvatske Novine*, in which a young Croatian speaker reported that the state curriculum and compulsory extra-curricular classes run by leaders of the Fatherland Front's youth group, the ÖJV, were planting a foreign spirit in the hearts of young Austrian Croats. Croatian children should learn songs in their native Burgenlander dialect, instead of Tyrolean yodelling, he claimed, and Croat-speaking members of the ÖJV should be allowed to produce their own translations of the official curricula, rather than the 'mush' that belongs 'neither to us nor to them': 'We, too, want to work with the ÖJV towards its goals, but in our ways and traditions!'[54] This young patriot did not require citizenship training in the Austrian state, but he was facing the possibility of exclusion from that state because his linguistic training had not sufficiently qualified him to belong to the German-speaking national community.

As in education, fascistization of the Austrian press occurred gradually and was still not complete before 1938. Press laws were introduced on 7 March 1933, three days after Dollfuss began to rule by emergency decree, and required newspapers to be inspected two hours prior to circulation for any information that might have caused 'injury to the patriotic, religious or cultural sensibility'.[55] If copy was found to contain offending material, it was

53   See Ibid. Rath also makes this argument in 'Training for Citizenship', op. cit.
54   Österreichische Staatsarchiv (ÖStA)/Archiv der Republik (AdR), Bundeskanzleramt (BKA)/ Heimatdienst (HD), Carton 11, *Hrvatske Novine*, 24 April 1937. The article and others from the newspaper in 1937 were translated into German by the Austrian Propaganda Ministry, or Heimatdienst.
55   Wolfgang Duchowitsch, 'Umgang mit "Schädlingen" und "schädlichen Auswüchsen": Zur Auslöschung der freien Medienstruktur im "Ständestaat"', in Tálos and Neugebauer, *'Austrofaschismus'*, op. cit., 359.

either blanked out or that day's edition of the newspaper was simply banned from circulation. Additional press laws in April 1933 made it illegal to criticize domestic and foreign governments and heads of state. Communist and National Socialist newspapers were banned in May and June, respectively, and the Social Democratic press was banned in February 1934. From July 1933, newspapers that were known to be sympathetic to National Socialism, including the German-nationalist press, were required to publish official correspondence from the federal press agency. Foreign newspapers that supported any of the illegal parties were banned in October that year. *Gleichschaltung* or *fascistizzazione* (to borrow the German and Italian vocabulary) continued with the formation of a press chamber in July 1936.[56] In theory, the purpose of a press chamber was to harmonize the interests of the newspaper publishers, editors and journalists, but in practice it was intended to harmonize those interests with the government's. The new press chamber began operation in November 1936 and it had exclusive voting power over the licences of newspaper publishers, which meant that known detractors or disloyal newspapers could easily be shut down.[57] In a move consciously modelled on nazi Germany and fascist Italy, the government also merged its federal press agency with its propaganda office, the Home Bureau (*Heimatdienst*), into a single ministry for propaganda in early 1937.[58]

One important feature of the Austrian state's control of the press was the appointment of government commissioners to the editorship of German-nationalist newspapers. These appointments were significant because the German-nationalist press, unlike the Christian Social and liberal newspapers that also remained in circulation after 1934, represented the most significant threat to the state's goal of maintaining Austrian independence. The German-nationalist press also had a much higher circulation than the Christian Social newspapers in the provinces; in Vienna, which traditionally was dominated by

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56 Stefania Galassi has argued for a broader definition of the Italian term *'fascistizzazione'*, which was used both by contemporaries of the regime and in the literature on Italy. In the Italian press, officials themselves very often were confused by whether the word referred to the laws and reforms of the press, or to the supposed end result of the legislative process, the creation of a fascist press (*stampa fascistizzato*). Galassi's contention is that precisely because regime officials and even Mussolini himself did not always know where the process would lead, *fascistizzazione* cannot be reduced to a set of laws, censorship decrees and bans on the oppositional press, but also includes the appointments of fascist functionaries to editorial positions, the creation of a fascist syndicate for journalists, state training colleges and degrees for journalists, and the creation of state organs to represent the government domestically and abroad. See Stefania Galassi, *Pressepolitik im Faschismus: Das Verhältnis von Herrschaft und Presseordnung in Italien zwischen 1922 und 1940* (Stuttgart 2008). A similar case to Italy can be made for Austrofascism in every respect, except that Austria's syndical organization only included publishers and editors, not journalists. However, the creation of the press chamber in 1936 was the first step towards the regulation of journalist training and education by the state, as in the Italian case. See Duchowitsch, 'Umgang mit "Schädlingen"', op. cit., 362–3.

57 Kurt Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse, 1848–1959*, vol. 1 (Vienna 1960), 47–9, 54.

58 Elisabeth El Refaie, 'Keeping the Truce? Austrian Press Politics between the "July Agreement" (1936) and the *Anschluss* (1938)', *German History* 20(1) (2002), 56.

the liberal and socialist press, the Christian Social flagship, the *Reichspost*, and
the German-nationalist *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* were on a par in 1935,
with around 30,000 weekday copies sold.[59] The government commissioners
were usually local representatives of the *Heimwehr*, but the *Wiener Neueste
Nachrichten* was allowed to keep its previous chief editor, Hans Mauthe, as the
appointed government commissioner because of his links with Schuschnigg.[60]
In spite of their sympathies with National Socialists, German-nationalist edi-
tors and publishers were pragmatic when it came to their careers under the
Austrofascist state. They complied with the laws on censorship, surveillance
and the obligation to publish Fatherland Front propaganda, and in some cases
even joined the Fatherland Front. The owner of the *Salzburger Volksblatt*,
Hans Glaser, joined the Front in September 1934 and was appointed chair of
the Association of Daily Newspaper Publishers (*Verband der Herausgeber der
Tageszeitungen*), meeting regularly with the head of the federal press bureau,
Eduard Ludwig, in Vienna and participating in the meetings of the new press
chamber after 1936.[61] The German-nationalist press was thus a legitimate
'co-ordinated' body within the public sphere of the state and its views often
overlapped with those of the official organs of the state.

The *Reichspost* and the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* serve as examples
of the overlapping belief in an Austrian pan-German identity in the govern-
ment and German-nationalist press. In a study of the *Reichspost*'s coverage of
church politics in nazi Germany, Peter Malina has shown how the newspaper's
editors blurred the official anti-nazi line and an unofficial admiration for what
National Socialism had achieved in Germany in stamping out the Church's
twin enemies of bolshevism and liberalism.[62] This blurring can be seen in an
editorial on 1 October 1934 by the newspaper's co-editor and former Christian
Social politician, Heinrich Mataja, who wrote that the Austrian state would
'promote and support whatever is good and noble and pan-German in National
Socialism', but fight against 'intolerant party politics and an un-German des-
potism'. 'While we welcome every move towards a common understanding,
and further beyond that to pan-German brotherhood, as steadfast Austrians
we shall oppose all force, all brutality. Long live the German people, Austria

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59   Circulation figures are only approximate. The *Reichspost* had around 30,000 in 1935, while
the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* had 25,000 in 1935 and 50,000 by 1938: see Paupié, *Handbuch*,
op. cit., 97, 111.
60   On the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, see ibid., 111–12. See also Milan Dubrovic, *Veruntreute
Geschichte: Die Wiener Salons und Literatencafes* (Berlin 2001), 229–30. Mauthe was one of the
representatives of the 'National Action' group, which met with Schuschnigg in October 1934 to
discuss the integration of nazis and German-nationalists into the Fatherland Front. See Gerhard
Jagschitz, 'Zwischen Befriedung und Konfrontation: Zur Lage der NSDAP in Österreich 1934 bis
1936', in Ludwig Jedlicka and Rudolf Neck (eds), *Das Juliabkommen von 1936: Vorgeschichte,
Hintergründe und Folgen* (Vienna 1977), 163–7.
61   I have discussed Glaser's participation in Austrofascist press circles in my article 'Provincials
Imagining the Nation: Pan-German Identity in Salzburg, 1933–1938', *Zeitgeschichte* 33(4) (2006),
179–98.
62   Peter Malina, 'Berichte aus einem fernen Land? Die Berichterstattung der *Reichspost* über die
Lage der Kirchen in Deutchland 1933', *Medien & Zeit* 5(4) (1990), 11–17.

for the Austrians!'⁶³ Published just over two months after Dollfuss's assassination by nazi putschists, Mataja's editorial expressed the tension in pan-Germanism's claim to a dual sphere of influence within the Austrian state and within the German nation, a claim not significantly altered in the light of the nazi threat.

Similarly, the editors of the *Wiener Neuesten Nachrichten* declared their commitment 'to the pan-German idea, to the German people' in an editorial on 27 October 1935 commemorating the newspaper's tenth anniversary edition. Echoing the official sentiments, the newspaper outlined its commitment as 'an Austrian paper' to the Austrian 'homeland' (*Heimat*). However, the newspaper rejected the state's tendencies to see Austrians as a separate nationality.

> We do not see . . . cultivating love for our Austrian homeland as the opposite of cultivating the pan-German idea, but rather, the one as an extension of the other. The Austrian is a German, and Germany — we differentiate the term Germany from German Empire — is not possible without Austria.

Apparently thinking they had been commissioned to author the new school textbooks for the Austrofascist education ministry, the editors wrote that Austria is

> a German land, and has been from the beginning, according to which, by virtue of its geographical position, its thousand-year history and the particular character of its culture and the nature of its inhabitants, it is allotted its own task within the framework of the German cultural mission in Europe.

But where the *Reichspost* editors believed Austria's national duty was to fight against the ignoble and 'un-German' tenets of National Socialism that undermined Austria's 'German Christian' heritage and destiny as mediator among the nations of Central Europe, the editors of the *Wiener Neuesten Nachrichten* stressed Austria's 'tribal particularity' within the German nation and declared it a 'national duty' to 'cultivate these links with our native soil' by actively pursuing the goal of *Anschluss* with Germany.⁶⁴ 'Conservatives' and 'nationalists' might have disagreed over nazi designs for Austro-German unity, but they were of one mind that Austria's pan-German identity carried with it the goal of Germanizing the Austrian state and its citizens. That this goal was affirmed in both the government and the German-nationalist press shows the breadth of public efforts under Austrofascism to forge a new community of German Austrian citizens.

Such a lofty goal required a firm commitment to Germanizing the non-German minorities in the Austrian state. While complaints by the 'good Croats' about offensive German-language school books might have been irritating, state functionaries and German-nationalists were more troubled by the irredentist aims of Carinthia's Slovenian-speaking minority and their Slovene

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63   Cited in Staudinger, 'Austrofaschistische "Österreich"-Ideologie', op. cit., 47.
64   *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 27 October 1935, 2.

counterparts in Yugoslavia.[65] In September 1935, a month before the fif-
teenth anniversary of the October 1920 plebiscite that had awarded southern
Carinthia to Yugoslavia, a ceremony unveiling a commemorative prince's stone
in the Yugoslavian town of Prävali (Prevalje), close to the border with Austria,
provoked swift accusations of irrendentism in the German-nationalist press.
The Maria Saaler Prince's Stone, named after the church in Klagenfurt where
the coronation of the dukes of Carinthia took place from the fourteenth cen-
tury, had remained in Klagenfurt after the partition of Carinthia in 1920.[66] The
original Prince's Stone, and the unveiling of a replica stone on the other side of
the border 15 years later, incensed German-nationalists, who referred to it as
the 'irredentist stone' in the headline of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*.[67] The
staging of an event that traced its origins to a pre-Habsburg rite of royal suc-
cession smacked of Slovenian nationalist attempts to reclaim Lower Carinthia
for the south Slavs. An anonymous 'Carinthian freedom fighter', writing for
readers of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, quoted a Slovenian member of
the parliament in Belgrade, Karl Dobersek, who had apparently addressed
Slovenes on the Austrian side of the border during the unveiling ceremony:
'To our brothers still living in hell, we declare our loyalty to our king and our
people and the firmness of our borders.' The author of the article scoffed at
Dobersek's claim that his fellow Slovenes living in a foreign land had been
consigned to a fate worse than death. But what apparently went over the head
of the 'freedom fighter' and the Vienna editors who published the article was
Dobersek's alleged profession of loyalty to King Alexander of Yugoslavia,
who had declared a dictatorship in 1929 and clearly was not the focus of the
Slovenian nationalist commemoration of the Prince's Stone. Placing a written
charter inside the stone, as in a time capsule, which blamed the result of the
1920 plebiscite on the hostility of the British and Italian representatives of
the Allied commission, the Slovenes at Prevalje vowed to commemorate the
ceremony of the Prince's Stone annually until the 'old right' of the Slovenian
people was again restored.[68] German-nationalist editors and their readers may
well have read this as an irredentist threat, but they also missed the subtext of
the Slovenian declaration that was as much a provocation towards the Serbian
parliament and the Serbian king, whose British connections had paved the
way for the creation of the kingdom in 1918, as towards Carinthian German-
nationalists on the other side of the border.

65 Dollfuss praised Austria's 'good Croats' in a speech for the 400-year celebrations of
'Burgenlander Croatdom' in March 1934: see Gerald Schlag, 'Die Kroaten im Burgenland 1918
bis 1945', in Stefan Geosits (ed.), *Die burgenländischen Kroaten im Wandel der Zeiten* (Vienna
1986), 202.
66 Slovenian nationalists traced the Prince's Stone even further back, to the early middle ages,
when the ceremonial installation of the princes of Carantania took place in the Slovenian language,
or rather the Slavic patois of the Carantanian population: Claudia Fräss-Ehrfeld, *Geschichte
Kärntens*, vol. 2, *Kärnten 1918–1920* (Klagenfurt 2000), 35–8.
67 *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 21 September 1935.
68 Ibid.

Fatherland Front leaders were also nervously watching the border in the weeks leading up to the plebsicite's anniversary in 1935. In June Chancellor Schuschnigg had paid an official visit to Carinthia to attend a rally in Villach and to reassure the 7000 members of youth organizations of the *Heimatschutz* and *Österreichische Sturmscharen* who attended that the state was still committed to a German path. At the same time he also offered cautionary words that the new Austrian state had to be built up according to a new 'ethos', and not a 'myth' of national rebirth. Although Schuschnigg did not mention the Carinthian Slovenes directly, his call for a new ethos of state-building appeared to affirm their loyalty to Austria.[69] Schuschnigg's own grandfather had been a Slovenian-speaker, and Slovenian nationalists saw in Schuschnigg an advocate in their struggle against German nationalists in Carinthia. But on another occasion the chancellor's office adopted a more ambivalent position, rejecting an official Slovenian translation of Austria's national anthem, allegedly on the grounds that it was a mistranslation of the original German version. However, a more chauvinistic objection to the Slovenian version can be detected in the lyrics of one verse in the original German: 'earnest and honest German work, tender and warm German love' (*deutsche Arbeit, ernst und erhrlich — deutsche Liebe, zart und weich*), which was translated into Slovenian as 'a strong people lives here, honesty is at home here' (*Ljudstovo krepko tu trebiva, tu postenost je doma*).[70] Affirming on the one hand the patriotism of the Slovenes, while forcing them to sing about German labour and German love in the new Austrian state, probably seemed more mythical than ethical to Slovenian-speakers. The larger point here is that not only the German-nationalist press but also state functionaries saw the borderlands as a symbolic 'cradle' into which the new German Austria would be rebirthed.[71]

Pieter Judson has argued that where nationalist activists before the war constructed the frontier myth in order to legitimize their nationalizing projects in the empire, in the interwar period they sought to remake the state and its entire population writ large into a borderland.[72] This was also true in the Austrofascist state. Public monuments and schools were still the sites of frontier battles for both German-nationalists and state functionaries, as we have seen here.[73] The battle for German Austria in the 1930s merely re-appropriated the old national discourses and projects, and legitimized them for a new era of palingenetic state-building. The rebirthing of the Austrian state in the borderlands would happen through ethnic dissimilation, whereby non-German-speakers would have to detach themselves from their non-German identities in

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69   *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 11 June 1935.
70   Staudinger, 'Austrofaschistische "Österreich"-Ideologie', op. cit., 44.
71   The leader of the Carinthian *Sturmscharen* called Austria the 'cradle of Germany' in 1934. He also declared Carinthia to be 'purely German according to blood and race alone': see ibid., 43–4.
72   Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 253–4.
73   Hanns Haas and Karl Stuhlpfarrer have also uncovered much evidence on the issue of schools in bilingual areas for the interwar period and the Austrofascist state: see their *Österreich und seine Slowenen* (Vienna 1977), 67–70.

order to participate in the state-building process, leaving them without even a song to sing in the new Austria.

A third area of fascistization in Austria — unresearched to date — can be seen in the legislative proposal for a population index and new immigration act, which were modelled on laws introduced in Italy. Although the legislation in Austria was eventually rejected because of a lack of finances, it points firstly to a shift towards greater state control over the population and secondly to the relationship between Austrofascist functionaries and their counterparts in Italy, as we have already seen for the press. It also highlights the Austrofascist state's intent to curb 'undesirable' immigration, specifically of Jews. Official debates about the proposed population index reveal the dual aims of Austrian policy-makers: to facilitate greater surveillance of the population and to reduce the number of Jews in Austria, either through restricting immigration or by precluding Jews already residing in Austria from being naturalized.

While studies of population management in fascist regimes and so-called liberal democracies have examined eugenics and pronatalism, migration and citizenship policies have so far received less attention for the interwar period.[74] In the case of fascist Italy, Carl Ipsen has argued that population politics were characterized by a range of measures spanning nuptiality, fertility, mortality, emigration and internal migration; the fascist Deputy Gaetano Zingali explicitly referred to 'this famous demographic quintet' in a 1929 speech to parliament.[75] By exploring these multiple fronts of Mussolini's 'demographic battle', Ipsen extends the debate beyond Mussolini's 'battle for births' to include a spectrum of policies that the regime itself saw as part of a larger battle to create 'a new Fascist society'.[76] Similarly in Austria, although the legislation was aimed at controlling immigration into the country, unlike Italy, where the focus was on restricting emigration and controlling internal migration, the convergence of different strands of population management under fascist governments, including racism, illustrates the value of transnational studies of fascism.[77]

Work on the legislation for a population index began in Austria in 1935, six years after the Italian state had introduced its own population index in 1929. A

74   Studies of European population policies have mostly focused on Western Europe: see, for example, Maria Sophia Quine, *Population Politics in Twentieth Century Europe: Fascist Dictatorships and Liberal Democracies* (London 1996). More recently, scholarship has also branched out to include Central and Eastern European regimes: see Turda and Weindling (eds), *'Blood and Homeland'*, op. cit.

75   Cited in Carl Ipsen, *Dictating Demography* (Cambridge 1996), 88.

76   See Ipsen's review of his own book in 'Population Policy in the Age of Fascism: Observations on Recent Literature', *Population and Development Review* 24(3) (1998), 591.

77   Transnational studies have shown recently that the Italian state institutionalized racial theories and practices after 1935 not only in Italian colonies in Africa, but also later in Italian-occupied Slovenia, Dalmatia and the Ionic islands, including the establishment of a concentration camp for 7000 Slovenes. These state policies followed the 'punitive expeditions' that fascist militia had already carried out in Jewish quarters in Tripoli, Florence and Padua in the early phase of fascist rule before 1926, and again in 1934 and 1936. See Reichardt and Nolzen (eds), *Faschismus in Italien*, op. cit., 20–2.

series of measures aimed at halting emigration in Italy (in contrast to previous Liberal policies) had already begun following the introduction of the Public Security Law in November 1926, which made all Italian passports invalid. Less than a year later, strict eligibility criteria for new passports were introduced, and in 1930 fines and penalties were introduced for assisting or engaging in clandestine emigration. Repatriation taxes were removed to encourage return migration of Italians working abroad and terminology was changed to reflect the regime's new priority of bringing Italian workers home. The formerly named General Emigration Commission (CGE), the government department responsible for Italian emigration, was renamed the General Directorship of Italians Abroad (DGIE) after Mussolini declared the word 'emigrant' defunct. The regime also sought to discourage migration to cities by providing housing and transport for rural workers to work on state projects and subsidizing charities that assisted state programmes of internal migration.[78]

Dovetailing with these measures in migration, the Italian state also sought to create centralized systems of demographic data through its Central Statistics Institute of the Kingdom of Italy (ISTAT) and, as in the press, through specialist university courses to train the next generation of statisticians. Zingali declared in his 1929 speech that in fascist Italy 'not only men, but also statistical data, have become dynamic, almost as if following with the same insistent rhythm the course of these glorious times'.[79] Upon its creation in 1926, ISTAT gained control over all demographic statistics except for migration, which came under the jurisdiction of the government migration agencies — the CGE/DGIE for emigration from Italy, and the Commission for Migration and Colonization (CMC), and a Permanent Committee for Internal Migration (CPMI) for migration within Italy. Until 1929 municipal population registers, which had collated and stored data on internal migration since 1862, were also used as an official agency for migration statistics. When individuals arrived in a new municipality or *commune* they would be registered, and their record was cancelled when they left the commune. In addition to arrivals and cancellations, the population registers also recorded births, deaths and marriages. However, legislation introduced in Italy in 1929 brought these population registers under the authority of ISTAT: municipalities were required to hand over their annual population registers to ISTAT and any irregularity in the records, such as omitting to report a birth or change of residence, was a punishable offence. Since most records of births, deaths and marriages were held in local parishes, the

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78 While these new policies were partially a reaction to international restrictions on migration, they cannot be seen solely in terms of a pragmatic response to external pressures, since the United States — the country with the highest intake of Italian emigrants — introduced its immigration quotas in 1921 and again in 1924, some years before the laws on passports and internal migration were enacted in Italy. Rather, as Ipsen states, placed in the broader context of Italy's 'demographic quintet', Italian migration policy 'came on the heels of — and as an integral part — of the general move towards totalitarian social control initiated in January 1925': Ipsen, *Dictating Demography*, op. cit., 50–65.
79 Ibid., 82, 88.

1929 law effectively made parish activities subject to state surveillance and control, which strictly speaking was a violation of the Lateran Accords regulating Church–State relations.[80]

The centralizing powers of ISTAT were constrained, however, by the fact that responsibility for data collection and collation still lay at the municipal level with the mayor. Nor did ISTAT have access to full data on clandestine migration to the cities, which Mussolini sought initially to discourage through the colonization projects and eventually banned in 1939. This limitation was a bone of contention for Italy's leading demographer in the fascist period and president of ISTAT, Corrado Gini, who wanted to give more power to his organization by employing state-trained statisticians, rather than local authorities, to collect data for the 1931 census.[81] Gini's proposal was rejected by the Interior Ministry, but that does not imply its lack of reception among fascist policy-makers. It simply indicates a lack of financial and human resources in Italy during the years of consolidating power.

More important for the trajectory of fascism elsewhere was the reception of Gini's ideas outside Italy. Poland and Hungary centralized their demographic systems in the 1930s, and we can assume that demographers in those countries were also following closely the legislative changes in 1929 in Italy.[82] Given that Gini was already renowned in international demographic circles for his cyclical theory of population growth, his proposal in 1931 for a more professional approach to census data would have been well received by his peers elsewhere.[83] It is these transfers and exchanges between regimes that characterized fascism in Europe. Despite its inability to achieve the kind of expansion of state powers that functionaries like Gini wished for, Italy was still a model of population management.

Italy's influence on Austrofascist policy-makers is evident in the legislation for a population index drafted by the Federal Council of Culture (*Bundeskulturrat*).[84] At the beginning of the *Bundeskulturrat* session which met to discuss the proposal in September 1935, the Speaker, Dr Lenz, referred directly to Italy's 1929 law and recommended, in line with Italy, that state inspectors be appointed to oversee the registration process and the various registry

80   Ibid., 92–100, 196.
81   Ibid., 64, 100, 118, 197.
82   On Poland and Hungary see Paul Weindling, 'Fascism and Population in Comparative European Perspective', *Population and Development Review* 14 (1988), 104.
83   Gini's theory, first presented at an international conference in Trieste in 1911, built on other pre-war demographic theories that emphasized environmental factors, rather than Social Darwinian ideas, in explaining the rise and fall of fertility. Gini developed the idea of differential fertility, by which different classes in a nation reproduce at different rates. See Ipsen, *Dictating Demography*, op. cit., 45–6, 221–8.
84   The *Bundeskulturrat* was one of four government legislative councils created under the May 1934 constitution, along with the Federal Councils for the State, Provinces and the Economy. Members of these four councils comprised the *Bundesrat*. See Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria: Empire to Republic* (Cambridge 1987), 203–4. See also Rath and Schum, 'Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime', op. cit., 251.

offices.[85] The parallels with Italy can also be seen from the Austrian proposal to include in addition to the population index a compulsory identification card (*Erkennungskarte*) to be issued to every person over the age of 18, modelled on the Italian *carta d'identità*. The Austrian card was to function as a domestic passport and would include the person's photograph, address, date of birth, nationality and occupation. As in Italy, the purpose of the identity cards was to help individuals to better identify with the state by reminding them of their social obligations to the state: work and loyalty to one's country of birth — and they were also intended for use for a range of other identification purposes still in process.[86] The new law was to take effect from 1 November 1935.[87]

However, there was one important difference between the Italian and the Austrian models that highlights the racial 'front' in Austria's demographic battle, one not witnessed in Italy until after the Axis pact between Mussolini and Hitler in 1935 and Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1936. Unlike in Italy, where individuals and families were registered separately, the Austrian population index was to include details about an individual's family on the same index card. As Lenz pointed out in the legislative discussions in the *Bundeskulturrat*, the inclusion of an individual's family details was intentionally designed to require Austrian citizens to declare any business and family links outside Austria.[88] The concern that some Austrian citizens were supporting family members who were not citizens was directed at former refugees who had arrived during the first world war. Many of these had been Jewish refugees from Galicia and had not been eligible for Austrian citizenship under the new laws created after the empire's collapse.[89] The proposal to include family members on the population index was thus intended to force registrants to declare their non-Austrian relations to the authorities.

The antisemitism of Austria's population index was further evident in the *Bundeskulturrat* discussions about administrative codes for non-permanent residents in Austria. Individuals who registered in a place where they did not have fixed residency were to have their identity cards stamped with a 'V' for vagabond. This category included not only 'tramps', one Council member observed, but also those performers and artists who stayed in one place only for two months, a comment which drew the mirth of other Council members.[90]

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85   ÖstA/AdR, 04R106/1, Protokolle der Bundeskulturrat, vol. 1, 18th Session, 18 September 1925.
86   Ibid.
87   *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 20 September 1935; *Reichspost*, 30 October 1935.
88   Ibid.
89   For a discussion of the 1918 citizenship law and amendments under the Treaty of St Germain, see Margarete Grandner, 'Staatsbürger und Ausländer: Zum Umgang Österreichs mit den jüdischen Flüchtlinge nach 1918', in Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (eds), *Asylland Wider Willen: Flüchtlinge im europäische Kontext seit 1914* (Vienna 1995), 60–85; and Edwards Timms, 'Citizenship and "*Heimatrecht*" after the Treaty of Saint-Germain', in Timms and Ritchie Robertson (eds), *The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective* (Edinburgh 1994), 158–68. The laws were designed specifically to exclude Galician Jews.
90   Protokolle der Bundeskulturrat, 18 September 1925, op. cit.

Apparently what struck the ministers as funny were the many prominent
Jewish theatre directors, actors and other performers who had come to Austria
from Germany since 1933, often staying only for the annual summer season of
the Salzburg Festival before emigrating to America, and who were the butt of
many antisemitic jibes during the Festival. The Festival season had just ended,
but now a more sinister joke was to be played on them as the Council moved
to stamp an 'ST' — abbreviated from *Stichtag* or 'expiration date' — on their
identification cards.[91]

Even if the government did not articulate its antisemitism directly, the impli-
cation was that certain foreigners in Austria were 'undesirable'. In his opening
remarks to the *Bundeskulturrat*, Lenz placed Austria's need for a population
index in the broader European context by claiming that industrial change and
the economic crisis had transformed Europe from a 'culture of settling' to a
'culture of migrating'. Austria was 'the state of least resistance against socially
undesirable elements', and for this reason it had been necessary to include
foreigners as well as Austrian citizens in the population index. The increased
numbers of stateless people had become an 'international affliction' on the
Austrian state, because of the reluctance or unwillingness of Austria's neigh-
bours to take in former Austrian citizens who were now stateless.[92] This was
also a view shared by the highest state functionaries: the Interior Minister, Emil
Fey, welcomed the new legislation as a way of centralizing the long-standing
practice of a municipal registration system, which Fey claimed had led to many
discrepancies between local records and also had allowed the 'non-Austrians'
to stay out of the authorities' clutches.[93]

Moreover, the government had its own press organs — and German-nation-
alist ones — to address the immigration debate publicly in more explicit
antisemitic language. In Graz, the Christian Social *Volksblatt* welcomed new
legislation to restrict foreigners living and working in Austria, claiming that
foreign workers in Austria were taking jobs from unemployed Austrians and
citing Carinthia as an example, with 11,000 foreign workers and 15,000
'native' Austrians out of work.[94] In Vienna, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*
ran six headline stories on the 'invasion' of Jews from Eastern Europe in a
two-month period alone.[95] The editors drew parallels with the wartime Jewish
refugees, one front-page editorial suggesting that Austria was an attractive
destination for German Jewish refugees because they had relatives in Vienna,
and that attempts by the Austrian authorities to restrict immigration would
be impossible because of the well-organized clandestine smuggling groups,
who allegedly provided false identity papers for the refugees. The newspaper

91   Ibid.
92   Ibid.
93   *Neue Freie Presse*, 25 September 1935, 4.
94   *Grazer Volksblatt*, 1 January 1938, 3; 27 January 1938, 6.
95   See *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 December 1937, 1–2; 31 December 1937, 1–2; 5
January 1938 (*Abendblatt*), 1; 7 January 1938, 1; 1 February 1938, 1; 8 February 1938, 1.

estimated that between 100 and 150 people arrived without passports each month and found lodging and black-market work in Austria, prompting the newspaper to sound a clarion call for tighter controls on Jewish immigration: 'Protect our borders and our country from a new flood of *Ostjüdische*!'[96] A notice in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* for a public lecture series on 'The Foreign Guest in Austria' suggests that there were more than a few anti-immigration activists among the newspaper's readers and editors alike.[97] Even outside observers like *The Times* correspondent in Vienna, Douglas Reed, noted the problem of taking in Jewish refugees. He reported that Austria had 'been flooded with immigrants from Germany and Poland, a fair proportion of whom have criminal records' and predicted that 'a closer scrutiny is inevitable sooner or later'. He defended these sentiments as having 'nothing to do with anti-Semitism' and that the 'bulk of opinion in Austria' agreed with the views expressed in the Christian Social and German-nationalist press.[98] Reed's broad brushstrokes painted a sympathetic picture abroad that the Austrian authorities could scarcely have hoped for as vindication for their brand of population politics. His observations also demonstrate the stronghold view of foreign observers (both then and now) that the 'authoritarian' Austrian state had a legitimate right to defend its sovereignty against whomever should threaten it, even if that right was also symptomatic of a fascistic ideology in Austria that penetrated public education, the press and legislative bodies in the state.

When the *Bundeskulturrat* met in February 1938 to discuss amendments to the original 1935 law, Minister Lenz made reference again to the problem of stateless people in Austria. He stated that while deporting stateless people from Austria would be possible in theory, in practice Austria's neighbouring countries were neither prepared to accept them nor obligated to under international law, if the deportees were not citizens of those countries. He also noted the ease with which these stateless people had so far been able to acquire identity cards stating their nationality without the information being thoroughly checked. Therefore he recommended to the Council that the identity cards be only a secondary identification of nationality, and that there be another more rigorous system to document a person's national status.[99]

At the same time that the *Bundeskulturrat* was legislating for a population index, the Austrian Migration Office was also drafting a new Alien Act to regulate foreign permits in Austria. The legislation underwent three revisions over an eighteen-month period but, like the legislation for a population index, was never fully implemented before the *Anschluss*. In the final stages of negotiation, in February 1938, the Interior Ministry conceded that a system of indexing all 290,000 foreigners in Austria was too costly an exercise and settled instead

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96 *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 December 1937, 1–2.
97 *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 March 1936, 4.
98 Cited in George Clare, *Last Waltz in Vienna: The Destruction of a Family 1842–1942* (London 1982), 158.
99 ÖstA/AdR, 04R106/4, Bundeskulturrat Protokolle, vol. 4, Session 47, 3 February 1938.

on a register for all those who had arrived in Austria since 1 January 1933.[100] Nonetheless, the Alien Act and the population index and card system are significant, because they reveal the full extent to which Austria's politicians were ready to mobilize the state's powers to curb what they perceived was a wave of uncontrolled immigration that, if left unchecked, could potentially open the floodgates to more desperate and destitute refugees, genuine or otherwise.

Population policies in Austria, as in Italy, were 'audacious in their aspirations but modest in their accomplishments', constrained as they were by the economic crisis in the 1930s.[101] But if we consider the extent and detail of Austrian legislation for a population index, we can see that what took more than seven years for the Italian fascists to put in place required less than three in Austria, and pre-dated by a few years nazi Germany's first population registration in 1938 and introduction of a national card index in 1939.[102] The system of identity codes and population registries were certainly not unique to fascist regimes in the interwar years: in France, Britain, Belgium and Holland — as well as further afield in the United States and Australia — attempts to regulate the entry and residency of foreigners was a feature of protectionist labour policies against foreign workers and, in some cases, was a racialized response to the 'problem' of minorities after the war.[103] But it was in fascist states that the legislation rapidly extended beyond economic protectionism and minority laws to encompass the wider political and social spheres of citizens' everyday lives — from one's own place of baptism and marriage, residency and position of employment, to that of one's relations. Even the act of registration was no longer just a parochial affair, with state-appointed inspectors poised to swoop on any inconsistencies in the paperwork and report back to the central authorities.

Therefore, an examination of Austrian population politics in the interwar years needs to be placed in a larger context of European right-wing efforts to remake states and citizens on multiple levels: in education, the press, on the borders, and in the creeping legislation that sought to restrict the movements of the population and declare them members of the nation on a stamped piece of paper. Placed within this broader comparative and transnational context, we are better equipped to resolve the process-versus-outcomes dichotomy of

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100   Oliver Rathkolb, 'Asyl- und Transitland 1933–193?', in Heiss and Rathkolb (eds), *Asylland Wider Willen*, op. cit., 117–19.
101   Ipsen, *Dictating Demography*, op. cit., 90.
102   Weindling, 'Fascism and Population', op. cit., 110.
103   In France, for example, where more than 1.5 million foreign workers had arrived by 1928, a law for the 'protection of national manpower' was introduced in 1926 to regulate the type and duration of work permits. The law had the immediate effect of reducing the number of foreign workers arriving annually in France from 162,000 in 1926 to 64,000 in 1927. See Jeanne Singer-Kérel, 'Foreign Workers in France, 1891–1936', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 14(3) (1991), 287. Moreover, France had also introduced its own system of identity cards, with codes for various degrees of 'Frenchness', in Alsace-Lorraine in 1919: see Tara Zahra, 'The "Minority Problem" and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands', *Contemporary European History* 17(2) (2008), 137–65.

fascism, and potentially also of other ideologies such as liberalism, because instead of measuring words against deeds in a vacuum, we can return both the visions and the actions of Austrian politicians to mainstream accounts of European projects for modernizing states and citizens.

At the time he wrote his article, Seton-Watson could not have known how right-wing populism would re-emerge across Europe in the late twentieth century. 'Has fascism a future?' he pondered in 1966, convinced that a better understanding of fascism would equip his and subsequent generations to understand and respond to other radical social and political movements.[104] Austria has shown recently that it is no stranger to the pull of New Right ideologies. In the light of what many interpreted as a marriage of convenience (or another 'reluctant alliance'?) between the 'conservative' Schüssel and the 'far right' Haider in the 2000 election, and the recent outpouring of emotion for Haider's untimely death in Austria, it is incumbent on historians to revisit the relationship between Austrofascism and pan-Germanism. Four decades on from Seton-Watson's article, much work still lies ahead for Austrian historians to develop a more sophisticated and complex understanding of fascism's power to control, homogenize and exclude.

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104   Hugh Seton-Watson, 'Fascism', op. cit., 195.