Europe will have to zip its lip over China’s abuses
In a fracturing world, trade and co-operation will come first
IN THESE VERTIGINOUS times, America’s allies are taking a new look at their relations with China. In recent years, politicians in Europe and elsewhere in the West have talked boldly and clearly about the economic, geopolitical and ethical risks posed by China, an autocratic giant with plans to reshape the world. Now, though, their willingness to speak out may become more selective.
Only months ago, agreeing on the China challenge was supposed to bind America to its friends. Western powers stood ready to please President Donald Trump by blocking sales of the most advanced technologies to China, or by excluding Chinese firms from sensitive industries. Alas, Mr Trump appears uninterested in agreeing with allies on anything much at all. He has treated partners more harshly than supposed foes, and hinted at ambitions to explore a trade deal with the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping.
Allies are duly hedging. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has for years led calls to “de-risk” relations with China. The aim is to engage and trade with China where it is safe, but to make the European Union depend less on China for hard-to-substitute technologies and commodities. The strategy also pushes European governments to scrutinise potentially dangerous Chinese investments, for instance in critical infrastructure. This approach is guided by a three-pillared model of relations, in which the EU calls China “a partner for co-operation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival”.
Since Mr Trump’s re-election, Ms von der Leyen has softened her tone. She now talks of an “era of hyper-competitive and hyper-transactional geopolitics”, in which Europe should “engage constructively with China—and find solutions in our mutual interest”.
When EU leaders adopted the three-pillared model in 2019, Chinese officials grumbled that the term “systemic rival” was an insult, casting doubt on the legitimacy of their political system. In truth, the EU was making a simple observation: that it is hard dealing with China, a rising power in global governance that is also an indispensable trade partner and an autocracy with alarming ambitions. That diplomatic puzzle became a crisis when Russia invaded Ukraine. Despite claims of neutrality, China blames the war on Ukraine and the West, and has sold Russia vast numbers of components to make drones, missiles and tanks.
Now, the EU is rebalancing. China can still expect to hear lots about that first, co-operative pillar, as Europe offers to work with it on slowing climate change, preserving biodiversity and other global public goods. Some of those invitations will have a note of rebuke to them. China has invested vast sums in renewable energy but it also burns lots of coal in the name of energy security and to provide cheap power to industry.
Some aspects of relations involve both partnership and competition. Climate change cannot be abated without China, a dominant producer of solar panels, wind turbines, advanced batteries and other green technologies. Yet that same dominance alarms other countries, which fear that their carmakers and other industries cannot compete. China’s overall manufacturing exports continue to grow. As a result, the second pillar, involving economic competition, is set to bear ever more weight.
These words are being written in Beijing. In China’s capital, foreign diplomats describe a “charm offensive” by Chinese officials, urging EU and other Western governments to deepen ties with their orderly, predictable country, as a hedge against Trumpian chaos. Some European officials and politicians want to revive talks with China about a long-frozen deal, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, not least to show America that Europe has options. The word among European diplomats in Beijing is that China wants warmer relations. “The problem is they want them for free,” says one. Chinese officials reportedly brush aside European complaints about a trade balance skewed hugely in their favour, saying their products are simply more competitive.
Then comes the third pillar, which identifies China as an ideological adversary. This pillar is losing importance, notably over Ukraine. That marks a big shift. In March 2022, weeks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, your columnist met Western envoys in Beijing who called it an “outrageous lie” that China was claiming to be neutral, when it clearly wanted a Russian victory. The same diplomats predicted that China would try to pose as a peacemaker at the war’s end. As one put it then, the dream of Chinese officials is to be asked to help rebuild a shattered Ukraine. They think that the end of the Ukraine war “will be a glorious moment for China, and we will forget what is happening now”, he growled.
That dream is coming true. Chinese firms are contacting Ukraine’s government, scouting for contracts. Western diplomats can see no reason to exclude China from peace talks, glumly noting that Mr Trump’s stance is far harsher on Ukraine than China’s.
If you don’t like our values, we have others
Behind closed doors, they admit that many Western governments now have little or no appetite for confronting China over repression in Tibet, Xinjiang or Hong Kong, claiming this is a time for pragmatism. Their governments will make strong statements about the rules-based order if China takes control of the democratic island of Taiwan, by war or blockade. But if America fails to use force, no other Western power will fight for Taiwan.
Playing down values and international law is not cost-free. Not so long ago European leaders talked of the need to challenge China when it bullied its neighbours, for instance in the South China Sea, in order to credibly condemn aggression by Russia in Europe. Arguments about consistency remain valid. Alas, America’s allies have a lot to worry about just now. As a result, many will feel that confronting China’s ruthless side is a luxury, not a necessity. ■