Ishiba stokes up diplomacy alongside deterrence in Japan’s relations with China
Published: 30 March 2025-
Rumi Aoyama
Waseda University
Since taking office in 2024, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has prioritised diplomacy to improve ties with China, while also maintaining deterrence. Progress has been made in economic, military and cultural exchanges — but challenges remain, including historical tensions, Taiwan, security concerns and public scepticism. While China welcomes Ishiba’s approach, uncertainties in trade, security and domestic politics could hinder long-term stability. Achieving tangible diplomatic results will be crucial for sustaining momentum and securing public and political support.
Deterrence and diplomacy are central to Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s approach to Japan’s China policy. Ishiba is making Japan–China relations a key diplomatic agenda for 2025.
Faced with a flattening domestic economy and the looming threat of US tariffs, China is also eager to improve relations with Japan. On the sidelines of the November 2024 APEC summit in Lima, Chinese President Xi Jinping acknowledged that ‘China–Japan relations are at a critical stage of improvement and development’. This could mean that Japan might be able to leverage China’s enthusiasm to resolve long-standing issues between the two countries.
Upcoming high-level diplomatic events include visits by top Chinese officials including Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Premier Li Qiang. Ishiba has also declared interest in visiting Beijing and discussions are underway about a potential state visit by Xi Jinping to Tokyo.
Ishiba and Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya have consistently stressed the importance of working with China to resolve current problems through constructive dialogue. According to Iwaya, ‘maintaining a conflict-free bilateral relationship’ is a top priority.
China’s response has largely aligned with Japan’s expectations. At the November 2024 Japan–China summit on the sidelines of APEC, China agreed to ‘steadily implement’ its commitments regarding the lifting of restrictions on Japanese seafood imports. In January 2025, China announced that no anomalies were found in seawater samples it had collected near the Fukushima nuclear power plant, paving the way for the re-importation of Japanese seafood. China removed a controversial maritime buoy from Japan’s exclusive economic zone near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in February 2025, potentially paving the way for a leaders’ summit this year.
The enhancement of China–Japan relations can be attributed to the shared will of both parties. In comparison to his predecessors, Ishiba has demonstrated a greater proactivity in his efforts to foster improved relations, which has been reciprocated by China.
On the political front, bilateral talks are being reinvigorated. The Japan–China High-Level People-to-People and Cultural Exchange Dialogue has taken place and the Japan–China High-Level Economic Dialogue is set to resume this year.
Military-to-military exchanges have also progressed. Exchanges between the Self-Defense Forces and the Chinese military began in 2001 but were suspended in 2012 due to tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and again in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The exchanges resumed and officials of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces visited an army unit in Beijing and a naval facility in Guangzhou in November 2024. A delegation from the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army visited the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo.
China has reinstated a visa-free regime for short-term Japanese visitors, allowing stays of up to 30 days. Reciprocally, Japan has announced the introduction of 10-year multiple-entry tourist visas for Chinese travellers. Both governments have agreed to promote mutual visits, deepen educational cooperation, enhance tourism exchanges and expand media collaboration.
Maintaining this momentum could still prove a challenge.
The Ishiba administration’s foreign policy aims to pursue equality and autonomy in the Japan–US alliance without distancing itself from the United States at the same time as seeking to improve China–Japan relations without weakening deterrence against China. China’s prevailing view that the Ishiba administration is deviating from Abe’s pro-US stance and reducing its hedging against China will prove to be a critical miscalculation. How China interprets and responds to this perceived ambiguity will play a crucial role in shaping the future of bilateral relations.
Another challenge to maintaining a positive dialogue is that the evolving China–Japan relationship is gradually developing into a new framework, characterised by decades of security mistrust, cooling economic ties and asymmetric people-to-people exchanges. Proposals for political dialogue, youth engagement and cooperation in education, culture and media were effective in the past, but may not now be enough to address the structural challenges in bilateral relations.
China’s coercive stance has led to growing criticism in Japan that diplomatic efforts are merely accepting Beijing’s strategy of driving a wedge between Japan and the United States.
The economic relationship has cooled considerably. Trade in 2023 fell by 10.4 per cent year-on-year to US$334.8 billion, the second consecutive year of decline from a record high in 2021. In 2024, Japan dropped to China’s third-largest trading partner, overtaken by South Korea, while Vietnam replaced the country as China’s third-largest export destination.
Major opinion polls show that 90 per cent of Japanese citizens hold an unfavourable view of China. In 2024, the number of Japanese nationals living in China dropped below 100,000 for the first time in 20 years.
The two countries may be waiting for the next major diplomatic event to announce the easing of Japanese seafood and beef import restrictions. Since China promised to lift restrictions on seafood imports in September 2024, addressing this issue soon could help ease growing impatience in Japan.
An increase in person-to-person exchanges may lead to negative outcomes. Japan’s decision to relax Chinese visa restrictions has not come without criticism. While an influx of Chinese visitors could boost tourism consumption and support Japan’s medical sector, it has also been blamed for driving up property prices, straining medical resources and fostering cultural tensions in local communities.
At a joint meeting of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Foreign Affairs Subcommittee and Foreign Affairs Research Committee in January 2025, members voiced concerns over the government’s decision to ease short-term visa rules for Chinese tourists. Critics accused the administration of prioritising Japan–China relations over Japan–US ties, advancing relations without party consensus and neglecting unresolved issues.
State-led diplomatic initiatives still need to address underlying structural issues. While Ishiba’s government may need to hone its diplomatic skills to get the China relationship on track, it certainly seems willing to try.
Rumi Aoyama is Professor in the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies and Director of the Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies at Waseda University.