Trump’s biggest fear in West Asia? China
As China strengthens its economic, technological, and diplomatic foothold across West Asia, many anticipate that a returning Trump administration will seek to counter Beijing’s ascent and obstruct its access to critical energy supplies.
Over the past decade, China has deepened its strategic presence in the Persian Gulf region, becoming a top trading partner, energy importer, investor, and infrastructure developer. West Asia, in general, represents a vital land and waterway connector between Asia and Europe – transit routes key to the success of China's sprawling, multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect the two continents.
But the ambitious West Asian projects launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping could hit some obstacles in a second Trump presidency.
Within just his first two months of office, US President Donald Trump has signed executive orders prioritizing domestic industry, floated tariffs on a vast array of foreign imports, and revived the “America First” doctrine. While China will aim to preserve and expand its diversified ties with the region, Washington and Beijing appear on course for intensifying rivalry in one of the world’s most geopolitically sensitive arenas.
A leaked classified document, the “Interim National Strategic Defense Guidance,” recently circulated among Pentagon officials, confirms the US’s increasingly hawkish posture. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has flagged potential conflict with China over Taiwan as the top priority, while outsourcing containment of Russia to European allies. Other risks are acknowledged – notably from North Korea, Iran, and Russia – but the strategic gaze is unmistakably fixed on China.
Targeting Tehran to undermine Beijing
In this context, the US is ramping up pressure on its allies to boost defense spending, particularly in Europe, West Asia, and East Asia. Its ongoing campaign of “maximum pressure” on Iran serves a dual purpose: containing Tehran and disrupting Iranian oil exports to China.
The logic is clear – by constraining Iran, Washington weakens a key Chinese energy partner and curtails Beijing’s influence in a region critical to its BRI plans.
Dr Naser al-Tamimi, a UK-based political economist specializing in Persian Gulf–China relations, explains to The Cradle that Washington will likely intensify pressure on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to distance themselves from Beijing – potentially using blunt, transactional tools to achieve this.
Yet Persian Gulf monarchies have proven adept at hedging against US manipulations, when viewed as necessary. Tamimi expects they will continue their strategy of diversified alignments to preserve autonomy and maximize benefits.
Indeed, by 2023, China had become the leading trading partner for most countries in West Asia and North Africa. Trade between China and the region nearly doubled from $262.5 billion in 2017 to over $507 billion by 2022. China now sources over half its crude oil imports from the Persian Gulf. Despite efforts to avoid over-reliance on any single supplier, Beijing remains tethered to the region’s energy lifeline.
While China holds limited sway over Riyadh’s strategic calculus, it is expected to use its economic toolkit to blunt the impact of any Saudi–US deals that threaten its interests, particularly in technology. Beijing has also bristled at US-led military frameworks like the proposed “Arab-Israeli NATO,” and while it cannot yet rival Washington’s security architecture, it is likely to seek creative alternatives to entrench its role.
The Gaza litmus test
Trump’s re-election, coupled with the ongoing Gaza war, has tested Beijing’s long-standing strategy of diplomatic balancing. For years, China maintained cordial ties with all key actors – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Qatar. But recent regional shifts have forced a recalibration.
Dr John Calabrese, China–West Asia specialist at the American University in Washington, DC, contends that regional developments, not great power competition, are the primary force shaping the new geopolitical reality. Nonetheless, a second Trump term would likely see Washington doubling down on efforts to deny China military footholds and pressuring allies to favor western technologies over Chinese alternatives as the Biden administration tried to do. As Calabrese tells The Cradle:
“The success of such efforts will largely depend on whether the US can work with the private sector to offer viable and competitive alternatives. Although China has made increasing inroads in the Middle East [West Asia] in recent years, its role — like that of the US — will be shaped as much by the strategic considerations of regional actors as by the overall rivalry between the US and China itself.
China’s regional clout was on full display in March 2023 when it brokered a diplomatic thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While Beijing has avoided taking sides, its balancing act is under strain. Renewed US sanctions under Trump and constant threats of attack may provoke Tehran, risking nuclear escalation or other destabilizing moves.
Calabrese warns that a Trump White House could seek to eliminate Iran’s ability to export oil – an aggressive posture that would upend regional calculations and push Beijing into closer coordination with Tehran:
“The Trump White House would likely aim to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, raising questions about Iran's response – whether through nuclear escalation or other means – which may complicate Gulf Arab and Chinese calculations alike.”
The brutal war in Gaza has added yet another stressor to China's efforts at balanced diplomacy. Despite no direct conflict of interests with Tel Aviv, Beijing’s refusal to condemn Hamas and its sharp criticism of Israeli war crimes have strained ties. Western analysts accuse China of sacrificing neutrality, but overlook their own governments’ blatant partiality.
Last year, China brought together 14 Palestinian factions in a rare display of shuttle diplomacy, resulting in the Beijing Declaration on Palestinian Unity. Analysts suggest this signals China’s ambition to shape a political resolution to the Palestinian cause and challenge Washington’s fading credibility as a broker.
With the US continuing to ignore the pressing issue of Palestinian statehood and supplying Israel with billions in indiscriminate weapons, it risks ceding further ground to Beijing, which is steadily embedding itself in Arab and Muslim consciousness as a more balanced actor.
Corridors of competition
The geopolitical rivalry is also manifesting in competing infrastructure projects. The US-backed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is being positioned as a counterweight to China’s BRI. West Asia is likely to become the central arena for these overlapping visions.
Dr Tamimi believes that despite the zero-sum framing, regional actors prefer pragmatic coexistence. GCC states are unlikely to choose sides outright. The success of either initiative depends on how Washington and Beijing accommodate regional aspirations for strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships.
Given the broader climate of volatility – including a possible US-China trade war, the Ukraine conflict, and the threat of a US war on Iran – it is unclear whether Trump can deliver on the corridor agenda. IMEC, like BRI, is a long-term project whose success will depend not only on US commitment but also sustained multilateral cooperation.
While China’s footprint in the region is robust, Trump’s return introduces deep uncertainty. Analysts fear his erratic policies could fuel instability, erode hard-won gains, and drive energy prices through the roof. Rather than paving a path to peace or prosperity, a renewed Trump doctrine may well accelerate West Asia’s descent into a new era of fragmentation and fierce great power competition.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.