If war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, should the United States intervene militarily?
For
Stephen Wertheim, a leading scholar of American grand strategy and a
senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the
answer is no—at least not automatically. The cost of war with China, he
argues, would be far too high.
Instead, the U.S. should prioritize helping Taiwan become a self-reliant “porcupine”—capable of resisting invasion on its own.
This
line of thinking, published in Foreign Affairs earlier this year in a
provocative essay co-authored with Jennifer Kavanagh, director of
military analysis at an American defense think tank, triggered intense
debate in Taiwan and among policy circles in Washington and beyond.
Titled “The Taiwan Fixation: American Strategy Shouldn’t Hinge on an
Unwinnable War,” the article questioned whether defending Taiwan by force should remain central to U.S. strategy in Asia.
For
many in Taiwan, the piece sounded alarmingly like a revival of
“abandonment” theory—raising fears that the United States might walk
away from its commitment to Taiwan.
But
when Wertheim sat down with CommonWealth Magazine during his first-ever
visit to Taipei in March, he was quick to clarify: “This is not about
abandoning Taiwan.”
Wertheim is no fringe voice. Once named one of the world’s top 50 thinkers by Prospect magazine, he has spent his career studying the evolution of American power and global commitments.
He
came of age in the unipolar moment—watching the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the slow erosion
of America’s strategic bandwidth. Today, he sees a generational shift
underway in Washington—one in which long-standing security guarantees to
allies are no longer taken for granted.
“We
are grappling with what are the vital interests of the United States,”
he said. “What we're seeing in Washington is not only a product of
Donald Trump's worldview.”
In
this exclusive interview, Wertheim explains why the U.S. must rethink
its approach to Taiwan, why rising defense budgets are a signal
Washington is watching closely, and what this shift in American grand
strategy means for the world.
CommonWealth: Why did you publish this article at this particular moment?
Stephen Wertheim: My
colleague Jennifer and I started to conceive of the article almost a
year ago. We did not write it with an intent for it to appear in the
early days of a Trump administration. That was a coincidence.
The
United States is facing a kind of a new situation where it has become
quite concerned about the possibility of a Chinese attack against
Taiwan. The first reaction is to try to prevent that from happening,
which I very much agree with. But the United States has limited
resources and needs to prioritize its foreign policy. We wanted to think
through what an overall concept for U.S. behavior in that situation
might be.
CW: Did the war in Ukraine accelerate discussions and concerns in the U.S. about the Taiwan issue?
Wertheim: I
think it played a role by increasing concern in Washington that China
might invade Taiwan. Although I think those concerns are often
exaggerated because China has its own calculus.
Nevertheless,
the war in Ukraine has amplified the specter of territorial aggression
and annexation. President Biden took the direct use of force off the
table, and domestic support for aiding Ukraine has diminished over
time.
But
honestly, I suspect that even if I had done this analysis prior to the
war in Ukraine, I probably would have come to the same conclusion.
CW: You’ve
argued the U.S. should avoid war with China over Taiwan. But as China
expands its influence—not just in the Taiwan Strait, but also in the
South China Sea and around Japan—how can the U.S. maintain its hegemony
in the region? Or is the goal to share power with China?
Wertheim: I'm
not sure that anyone has hegemony in this region today. The United
States and China are the two great powers in the Western Pacific. I
think when contemplating what should the United States be willing to
fight China over, the larger goal should be to prevent China from
gaining hegemony in the region. That doesn't mean the U.S. shouldn't
oppose China's coercive behavior—gray zone tactics, information warfare,
economic coercion.
CW: Taiwan is becoming strategically more important, but the U.S. can’t afford full defense—do you agree?
Wertheim: That's
right. Taiwan is very important to the United States, but not actually,
as [U.S. Under Secretary of Defense] Elbridge Colby recently said, an
existential one.
So,
that means the United States should do a lot to make Taiwan defensible
to prevent a Chinese invasion. The U.S. policy is strategic ambiguity.
That’s why in the essay, my co-author and I called for the creation of a
third option where the United States could potentially resupply Taiwan,
but Taiwan would be able to grind down China’s invasion and make it
costly.
CW: You
said the U.S. should help Taiwan strengthen its self-defense, but also
that Taiwan can’t defeat China alone if war breaks out. So how do you
see Taiwan’s future security situation?
Wertheim: Let
me clarify. I think Taiwan could potentially defeat a Chinese invasion
in a political sense. By adopting a strong asymmetric defense strategy,
Taiwan could slow down Chinese actions.
If
Taiwan were acting alone, PRC forces might be able to establish a
foothold. But war is a political act, and the goal of Beijing is
political control. A well-prepared Taiwan, assisted by international
partners, might defeat that goal. Defense has enormous advantages.
Taiwan is densely populated and mountainous—both helpful in mounting a
defense.
CW: Whenever
Taiwan increases its self-defense capability, China will use that as an
excuse for military drills. How should Taiwan or the U.S. balance
defense upgrades and China’s reactions?
Wertheim: There
are no risk-free options. My goal is not to make China happy—it is to
figure out the best path to security. I recommend combining stronger
defensive capabilities with a more accommodating political approach
toward Beijing.
Personally,
I think the PRC responds most directly to political provocation.
Pelosi’s visit is a counterproductive example. If new assurances [given
by Washington to Beijing regarding Taiwan were to] fail, it becomes
clear that China is to blame.
CW: Do the U.S. and Europe doubt Taiwan’s determination to defend itself?
Wertheim: Yes,
this is really important. The Trump administration has doubts. The key
factor is Taiwan’s defense preparations and spending. Trump and Elbridge
Colby said Taiwan should spend 10% of its GDP on defense. That’s
unrealistic, but the concern is that Taiwan spends a smaller percentage
than the U.S., creating the impression the U.S. cares more.
CW: As
a historian, how do you understand the changes in U.S. foreign policy
today? Is there something we in Taiwan might have missed about America’s
past that helps explain this shift?
Wertheim: I
grew up in the unipolar moment after the Cold War. In the 1990s, the
U.S. was unrivaled. It retained and expanded Cold War alliances,
especially NATO. It also engaged in a number of wars, especially after
9/11, which proved counterproductive.
Now
the U.S. is reassessing its commitments. Before making any commitment,
you must think seriously about whether you're willing to uphold it. The
U.S. is now trying to back away from its leadership role in European
defense.
CW: Would a change in U.S. Taiwan policy damage American credibility in the Asia-Pacific region?
Wertheim: That's an important consideration. The article suggests the U.S. make many changes privately, not publicly.
The
U.S. should maintain strategic ambiguity and assure China that the one
China policy remains intact. Biden’s statements about sending troops
were a mistake.
If
the U.S. maintains ambiguity, allies like Japan and South Korea should
be able to differentiate treaty from non-treaty commitments.