FM: John Whitbeck
Transmitted below is the link to a BBC report on
reality-reflective statements regarding a potential
peace agreement for Ukraine by President Trump's
all-purpose diplomatic envoy Steve Witkoff and the
reality-resistant response to his statements from
President Zelensky.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g7wdw9jvno
While noting, correctly, that "there's so much more to
it", Mr. Witkoff has stated that the territorial
dimension of any deal to end the war is "about the
so-called five territories" -- i.e., Crimea, annexed
by Russia in 2014, and the four eastern and southern
oblasts annexed by Russia in September 2022.
This appreciation of what should be a self-evident
truth, which is dismissed as espousing the "Russian
narrative" by those who view continuing the war as the
best way to save face for themselves, has no doubt
been absorbed by Mr. Witkoff from his recent five-hour
meeting with President Putin.
President Zelensky has responded to Mr. Witkoff: " The
territories are ours ... I don't understand what he's
talking about."
President Zelensky and many European "leaders" appear
to believe that the battlefield results of three years
of war should be irrelevant to the terms of any
eventual peace agreement -- an attitude for which, in
the real world, there are few if any historical
precedents.
I started my March 2023 article proposing a
"democratic solution" to the war (https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/03/17/a-democratic-end-to-ukraines-war)
with the following observation: "Notably absent until
now from the Western narrative regarding the current
war in Ukraine and how it might end has been any
suggestion that the wishes of the people who lived
prior to February 24, 2022 in the four eastern and
southern oblasts whose sovereignty has since September
2022 been formally contested between Russia and
Ukraine might be of any conceivable relevance."
Do President Zelensky and European "leaders" believe
that the wishes of the people of the contested
oblasts, those most directly concerned by the
territorial dimension of any deal to end the war,
should also be irrelevant to the terms of any eventual
peace agreement? Does President Trump?
Or might they be capable of recognizing that letting
these people decide their future democratically would
provide a face-saving off-ramp for all the
decision-makers involved in continuing or ending this
war, as well as being a merciful and moral option with
respect to those who lives would inevitably and
needlessly be sacrificed by continuing the war?
While it no doubt seems simple, satisfying and safe to
some decision-makers to proclaim the absolute and
universal applicability of the principle of the
territorial integrity of states while ignoring
instances in which they or their countries have
prioritized the self-determination of peoples (https://www.counterpunch.org/2022/02/24/the-territorial-integrity-of-states-vs-the-self-determination-of-peoples),
persisting in doing so can only delay or prevent peace
for Ukraine.
In this context, I am taking the liberty of
retransmitting below the "First Reflections on the
Shape of Peace for Ukraine" which I circulated on
February 13.
-------- Forwarded Message --------
TO: Distinguished Recipients
FM: John Whitbeck
After yesterday's statements by President
Trump and Secretary of Defense Hegseth, there
is genuine hope for peace in Ukraine for the
first time since April 2022, when Boris
Johnson descended upon Kyiv to prevent a peace
agreement (https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/na-peregovorah-iz-rosiyeyu-ukrayinska-delegaciya-oficijno-pr-73933)
which had been almost fully negotiated between
Russia and Ukraine but was deemed by Western
leaders to be contrary to their own interests.
While I have no claim to be an expert on
Russian or Ukrainian matters, I have read a
great deal written by people who do have such
a claim and am therefore taking the liberty of
sharing some preliminary thoughts on how, now
that the United States has opted for radical
"common sense" and a preference for imminent
peace over perpetual war, a durable peace
might take shape.
It is widely recognized that territorial
acquisitions have never been the primary
Russian objective in this conflict. Indeed,
Russia's formal annexation in September 2022
of the four Russophone-majority oblasts (two
of which it had recognized as independent
states three days before launching its
"special military operation") may well have
clarified, defined and constructively limited
its territorial ambitions.
As a practical matter, it would make no sense
for Russia to seek or attempt to rule over
Ukrainians who hate everything Russian (its
history, language, literature, music, religion
...), as the great majority of Ukrainians
outside those four oblasts and Crimea appear
to do, and one may legitimately wonder why
western Ukrainians have ever been eager to
fight to the last Ukrainian in order to rule
over people whom they clearly detest.
More important for Russia has been ruling out
NATO membership for Ukraine, something that
was never more than purely rhetorically on the
table -- never a genuinely realistic
possibility -- but that Trump has now taken
definitively off the table.
Having achieved that objective and
particularly if he achieves progress on the
overarching Russian goal cited below, it is
possible that President Putin, in order to
achieve a definitive and durable peace
agreement and not just a fragile ceasefire or
armistice, might show flexibility on the
borders of the four contested oblasts, three
of which are still not under full Russian
control, accepting the battlefield lines of
control, potentially subject to some
geographically rational adjustments, such as
the Dnipro River as a border, with a view to
producing "sensible" borders less likely to
give rise to any future dispute.
Of course, the overarching Russian goal has
always been to negotiate a new European mutual
security architecture, under which all
countries in Europe would feel secure and none
would feel threatened.
It was in this context that, in late 2021,
Russia presented to NATO a draft agreement
which was intended to serve and could have
served as the starting point for potentially
constructive negotiations.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration,
clearly preferring war to being perceived to
make any meaningful "concession" to Russia,
dismissed this Russian initiative with
contempt, refusing even to discuss it and
thereby leading President Putin, who could not
ignore the build-up of Ukrainian troops along
the lines of control in the two oblasts
partially controlled by secessionist forces
since 2014, to conclude that he had no
alternative but to recognize those two oblasts
as independent states and to launch his "SMO".
President Trump, notwithstanding his many
irrationalities in other areas, appears
genuinely to prefer peace to war and not to
view security for everyone as constituting a
threat to American "national security".
It would therefore not be surprising if
President Putin were now to resubmit Russia's
2021 draft agreement, subject only to any
essential updates, to the new American
president and if the new American president
were to agree to discuss it.
Two further thoughts:
(1) On March 30, 2022, just before Boris
Johnson's peace-prevention mission to Ukraine,
I wrote the following in one of my messages:
"Achieving a near-term ceasefire and an
eventual negotiated peace agreement will
require both the Russian and the Ukrainian
governments to be able to save face by
claiming 'victory' or at least some measure of
success. While this is not easy, I believe
that it may now be possible.
"An essential aspect of mutual 'victories' is
maintaining the two countries' distinct
narratives regarding Russia's objectives in
invading Ukraine.
"To its own people, Russia has always
presented its primary objective, in addition
to achieving neutral, non-NATO status for
Ukraine, as being the full 'liberation' of the
Donbass. It has presented any military action
elsewhere in Ukraine as being intended to
degrade the Ukrainian military's capacity to
resist the 'liberation' of the Donbass, which
would, indeed, have been a rational military
strategy. It has now announced the
'successful' completion of Phase 1 of its
'special military operation' and its intention
to focus henceforth on its 'primary
objective'. If it achieves both Ukrainian
neutrality and some measure of territorial
success in the Donbass, the Russian government
can present this result to its own people as a
victory.
"Ukraine and the West have asserted that
Russia has sought -- and expected -- to
conquer the entirety of Ukraine and effect a
regime change in a matter of days. Whether or
not this was ever the Russian intention, it is
clearly not a possibility now. The Ukrainians,
including those in portions of the Donbass not
previously controlled by Russian separatists,
have impressively resisted the Russian
invasion. If the fighting ends with only
relatively minor potential territorial losses
in the Donbass, the Ukrainian government can
present this result to its own people and the
world as a heroic victory.
"Both sides should and must be permitted to
maintain their own 'victory' narratives."
Thanks to Western intervention and insistence,
the fighting did not end, and Russia has
achieved some considerable additional measures
of territorial success in the two oblasts
connecting the Donbass to Crimea, but I still
believe that the cause of peace requires
permitting both sides to maintain their own
'victory' narratives.
(2) Since President Trump has wisely chosen
not to assume "ownership" of this war, moving
immediately to seek to end it, he has no need
to worry about saving face in the face of a
disappointing outcome. However, President
Zelensky and the European "leaders" who have
gone all-in behind President Biden,
particularly if they and their countries are
to be of limited relevance to the terms of any
peace agreement, must feel such a face-saving
need.
In this context and in light of the position
of the new U.S. administration, they might now
see at least personal benefits in proposing a
"democratic solution" to the conflicting
sovereignty claims along the lines outlined in
my article published in March 2023 (https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/03/17/a-democratic-end-to-ukraines-war).
Since Russia's position has improved
significantly over the past two years, it is
unlikely that it would now agree to permit
such democratic choices (except, perhaps, in
the portions of the four contested oblasts
over which it does not yet exercise full
control), but there should at least be
face-saving advantages in proposing such
democratic choices for those proposing them,
and saving face for anyone involved in this
unnecessary and misbegotten war can only help
to facilitate the decisions necessary to bring
it to a prompt end.
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