US should look before it leaps into South China Sea
Hegseth visit vowed more military support for Philippines against China, raising the ante for Manila’s involvement in a Taiwan war
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth took a trip across the Pacific recently and it came at an uncertain time.
This awkward situation is due to the Signal chat controversy that’s engulfed Washington but also as many allies in the Asia-Pacific are concerned about their relationship with the US. Following Hegseth’s trip, China launched large-scale military drills around Taiwan, underscoring the tensions which characterize this region.
Hegseth visited Hawaii, Guam and Japan, but his most significant stop was the Philippines, a country that has experienced very significant tensions with China in recent years.
That’s especially true of contested claims in the South China Sea, a domain of growing military rivalry that encompasses a variety of issues, including maritime law, crowded sea lanes, drilling for hydrocarbon resources, fisheries, large new Chinese “reef bases” and even the deployment of nuclear weapons.
The key to understanding this volatile issue is to comprehend the overlap between the South China Sea and the Taiwan question.
Taiwan is the world’s most dangerous powder keg, given Beijing’s avowed intention to achieve “unification.” Luzon, one of the main Philippines islands, is less than 200 miles (322 kilometers) from Taiwan. Basing in the Philippines would be essential in plans for an American intervention in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
On a recent trip to Manila, I was made aware of the increasing security linkages between the Philippines and Taiwan.
One strategist told me that many of his countrymen view Taiwan as a “strategic buffer” against China. He explained that Taiwan strategists were cheered by the recent deployment of US medium-range land-based Typhon missiles into the Philippines.
Another influential security thinker there explained to me that the Filipino “general public hates China,” though they have also deplored the “double-speak” from Washington on the matter of their bilateral security treaty.
I was told that former secretary of state Mike Pompeo is regarded as a hero in the Philippines for helping to clarify the Mutual Defense Treaty, which underscored the nation’s alliance with the United States.
A third Filipino defense strategist proclaimed confidently that his country could use the “Ukraine playbook” and that China would be defeated in the event of a military clash.
I hastened to point out that Pompeo’s approach was not welcome in the second Trump administration and that the “Ukraine playbook” of major US support against great power bullying might no longer be viewed as sound strategy.
Traveling to China on the same Asia trip this winter, I found Chinese strategists to be in a similarly bellicose frame of mind.
One Chinese expert explained that Washington has “crossed the line” with respect to both Taiwan and the South China Sea. Another dismissed the deterrent value of the Typhon missile deployment, stating that Manila has “revisionist ambitions” and is “gambling.”
Consistent with such a warning, a Chinese newspaper editorialized in early March, “Ukraine and Europe went from ‘diners’ at the table to ‘fish’ on the menu. Will Philippines [be] the next dish…?”
Unfortunately for Manila, the comparison has some logic. To be sure, the Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the US, whereas Ukraine is not. And the Philippines has no land border with China, while Ukraine has a front extending 2,600 miles (4,184 kilometers) with Russia.
Yet both are cases of a smaller country confronting a revisionist great power. Kyiv and Manila have witnessed significant internal turmoil. Substantial disagreement exists in Washington over how to approach the security of these two nations. It must also be noted that Chinese conventional firepower may far outstrip that of Russia.
For the Philippines, its proximity to Taiwan is simultaneously a blessing and a curse. Pentagon planners see an ideal staging area in the circumstances of a Taiwan scenario. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Philippines has seen a dramatic surge of US military forces rotating through in the last few years.
The rise in cross-Strait tensions is not simply coincidental. Nor has growing attention from the Pentagon necessarily brought Manila greater security.
On his visit to Manila, Hegseth promised new support to the Philippines, including an agreement to conduct “advanced” bilateral special forces training operations on Batanes, the Philippines’ northernmost island, which lies roughly halfway between Luzon island and Taiwan.
In keeping with the agenda of the so-called “prioritizers” in the Trump administration, such actions might assist Manila in order to balance against Chinese pressure, but this new initiative has substantial risks as well.
Hegseth should be mindful that many “America First” supporters are leery of showering resources on another foreign dispute with the propensity to develop into a forever war. Moreover, the close linkage between the Taiwan and Philippines issues suggests this situation could escalate into something far worse.
In April 2023, the US Army set up a demonstration test for Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos Jr of a vaunted HIMARS system to illustrate its ability to sink Chinese vessels. The system failed in six out of six test firings of the missiles against a ship target.
This incident implies that a few “wonder weapons” are not likely to change the overall situation of imbalance that requires skillful and flexible diplomacy rather than bombastic rhetoric and largely symbolic arms.
Before blundering into the cauldron of the South China Sea, Washington must “look before it leaps” and adopt a far more cautious approach. Pentagon leaders should also bear in mind that Trump is no more eager for World War III over the reefs of the South China Sea than he is over the beaches of Crimea.
Lyle Goldstein is director of Asia engagement at Defense Priorities.