|
|
||
|
The Huthis claim to have shot down 21 Reaper drones since October 2023 - each valued at around $30 million [photo credit: Ansar Allah]
This offensive has also led to considerable chatter about a renewal of the ground war, as various ‘militias’ [according to the Wall Street Journal, but actually some of the military factions of the internationally recognised government (IRG)] are hoping to gain US practical support for a renewed attack on the Red Sea coast, aiming to take Hodeida. Whether this is actually forthcoming is debatable: Trump has been clear that he is focused on maritime navigation rights, and has no interest in solving the Yemeni crisis as such. There is little doubt that the Saudi authorities are not enthusiastic at the prospect of an expanded war, but are keen to see the current Iranian-US ‘negotiations’ succeed. Both issues were certainly part of the exchanges when KSA Defence Minister visited Tehran last week.
US increasingly widespread and destructive air strikes against the Huthis are obviously the main immediate experience for Yemenis of Trump’s presidency, but two others deserve discussion, the designation of the Huthi movement as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) and the interruption of humanitarian aid. Both will cause serious additional suffering for Yemenis in different ways: the increased difficulty of transferring funds for international NGOs involved in humanitarian work, additional payment complexities for companies importing basic commodities, food and medical supplies among others. One element which is of direct and immediate concern for Yemeni households is remittances.
For millions of Yemenis, remittances play a vital role in their daily survival, ranging from those who rely almost entirely on them to others for whom they finance a few non-essentials. The war’s impact on the economy [more than 54% drop in GDP since 2015] has increased their importance given that these funds go directly to households, by-passing the overheads charged by government and international institutions. Available data are indicative, rather than statistically accurate as many transfers are informal. However, remittances have been estimated at USD 3bn annually for years and it must be remembered that they have historically contributed more to the economy than international development or humanitarian assistance. In 2023 remittances represented 20% of the country’s GDP.
The overwhelming majority of Yemenis abroad are in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, between them hosting about 2 million. Some are settled with their immediate families and send little to relatives at home, but the majority are short-term workers who transfer most of their income home through informal exchange offices, some of which have become recognised banks in recent years. Although the former may continue operating reasonably easily, the latter are likely to encounter administrative complications as a result of the FTO.
Many Yemenis have moved to Egypt, Jordan and Turkiye, most of those with assets chose these destinations for two reasons: an accessible cost of living and comparatively less difficult visa and residence regulations. There are about 32 000 in Jordan, 40 000 in Turkiye. and between 100 000 and 700 000 in Egypt, Yemenis who don’t have access to informal transfer mechanisms depend on banks which are likely to become inaccessible for fear of US retaliation.
The majority of Yemenis in the global north are in the US [about 90 000], Canada and Australia where there are a few thousand mostly highly qualified professionals and the UK where there are estimated to be between 70 000 and 80 000, including the majority who came in the 1950s and 1960s to work in heavy industries in the Midlands and north. Later arrivals, political migrants, arrived in recent decades and mostly settled in London and the south-east. They depend on the banking system for remittances when they don’t have personal routes.
Recent immigrants include highly educated people deeply involved in the current Yemeni crisis as commentators, representatives of political organisations, think tank experts, and the like. Some of them are involved in the UN’s ‘peace process’. Their ability to relay the needs, views, hopes and concerns of ordinary Yemenis is debatable despite the fact that they have far better access to international decision makers.
The FTO has enabled the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden to renew its demand for Sana’a-based banks to relocate their headquarters to Aden. Contrary to what happened in 2024 when a similar order was cancelled under Saudi pressure, most banks have agreed to comply, but both Huthi pressure and technical complications are delaying the process as most banking activities take place in Huthi controlled areas where 70% of the population and most businesses are based.
So, while the impact of the FTO designation will take time to be noticeable, the interruption of USAID funded development and humanitarian financing is already felt. By mid-April the overall UN Humanitarian plan had received a mere 8% of its appeal, and the World Food Programme (WFP) only 12% of its needs, including not one dollar from the US. By contrast, in 2024, the US provided 62% of WFP’s Yemen funding. Even then, WFP had more or less stopped providing assistance to the 70% of Yemenis surviving under Huthi rule.
In summary, the least that can be said about Trump’s Yemen policies is that they are systematically worsening survival conditions of Yemenis and further delaying a peaceful conclusion to the Yemeni crisis, now in its 11th year. Indeed, far from showing any compassion and humanity, one of Trump’s recent media interventions gloated over the killing of a group of tribesmen meeting outdoors to mark Eid, re-iterating his total disregard for human lives, and utter disinterest for Yemenis.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.