The territory seized by the IDF in Syria following the collapse of
the Assad regime is vital for Israeli security, IDF chiefs say
It is no longer far-fetched to imagine Washington demanding that
Sharaa recognise Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights — or even
accept the definition of Israel as a “Jewish state” — as a precondition
for limited sanctions relief. What may begin as a request for technical
waivers could quickly escalate into a requirement for formal
normalisation. These once unthinkable positions now sit comfortably
within the evolution of US foreign policy: from pragmatic disengagement
to active obstruction of any political process not tailored to Israel’s
ultra-Zionist agenda.
Among the more cynical proposals floated in the Trump-Netanyahu think
bubble is said to be the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza in
Syria. Even more plausible, and politically explosive, is the looming
push to bring Syria into the Abraham Accords. Sharaa would most likely
consider normalising ties with Israel if he believed it would de-list
him, help secure his hold on power, and aid in lifting US sanctions. But
unlike the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, or Sudan, Sharaa faces a uniquely
inconvenient obstacle: Israeli occupation of Syrian land. The Golan is
not a footnote; it is a core question of sovereignty. Sharaa cannot
simply accept open-ended Israeli occupation without devastating his
already fragile domestic legitimacy. To make it domestically palatable,
he would have to stage a performance of negotiation.
Ironically, the only potential silver lining lies in the chaos of
Trump’s broader foreign policy. His willingness to fundamentally
question the US security relationship with Europe, combined with his
erratic economic warfare, have already forced European and Arab states
to rethink their strategic dependencies on the US. What Trump described
as “liberation day” for the US could, in the long run, become liberation
day for Europe and regional actors long shackled to American policy in
the Middle East. Painful as the process may be, the breakdown of
transatlantic consensus could finally allow Europeans and Arabs to
reclaim foreign policy agency. Free from the weight of imposed
loyalties, they might finally chart a path rooted in local interests and
grounded in organic political realities. That’s to say: something other
than what is exclusively good for Israel.
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