Central Asia’s Mineral Magnet: Why China Is Doubling Down on Uzbekistan
By Yunis Sharifli April 25, 2025 https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/chinas-central-asia-play-china-and-uzbekistans-uneasy-mining-partnership/
As global competition for critical minerals heats up, Central Asia has become a strategic battleground, rich in resources and increasingly central to the ambitions of both regional and global powers. Within this context, China—already deeply engaged in the region’s energy and infrastructure sectors—has adopted a more proactive diplomatic and investment strategy to secure its position in the critical minerals sector. Among the countries attracting attention, Uzbekistan stands out. With substantial deposits of tungsten, molybdenum, copper, and rare earth elements, it has become a key focus of China’s expanding footprint in the region.
China has already signed multiple agreements with Uzbekistan, many of which are now being implemented. In 2024, the China’s Limaomaoli Metal Company began construction on the Syurenata mining complex in the Parkent district of the Tashkent region, which will eventually produce 2.4 million tons of ore annually and process 1 million tons of iron ore concentrate. Meanwhile, China Baoli Technologies is investing $200 million in a non-ferrous metal plant in the Ipak Yuli Free Economic Zone, with an annual production capacity between 18,000 and 45,000 tons and an export potential of $18 million.
Elsewhere, China Mining Energy Group is participating in a $200 million copper mining and processing project in the Chust district of Namangan region, which will have a production capacity of 30,000 tons of copper annually. New projects are also under negotiation—including a $2.7 billion Chinese proposal to develop copper and silver deposits in the Bobotog area and a copper processing plant by Boi Yi Da in Namangan.
For Uzbekistan, these projects promise meaningful economic gains. The mining ventures are expected to create hundreds of jobs—420 from China Mining Energy Group alone, and 400 more through Baoli Technologies. Just as important, technological localization through these ventures could help Uzbekistan transition from being a mere raw material exporter to a producer of value-added mineral products, aligning with the country’s long-term industrial ambitions.
Expanding domestic processing capacity also unlocks new trade potential, especially with China, which is one of the world’s largest consumers of refined critical minerals. These moves align with Tashkent’s broader industrial ambitions and efforts to attract foreign investment into downstream sectors.
For Beijing, involvement in Uzbekistan’s mineral sector supports its broader economic and strategic interests. Many of the current projects focus on copper and iron ore—two minerals where China is highly import-dependent. Partnering with Uzbekistan aids China’s strategy to diversify import sources and mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities. Additionally, Uzbekistan’s geographic proximity reduces China’s reliance on maritime trade routes, offering a more stable and sustainable overland supply channel.
But beyond economics, geopolitics are at play. China’s deepening role in Uzbekistan’s mineral sector can also be seen as a move to crowd out Western competitors. Uzbekistan currently exports copper primarily to the Netherlands and iron ore goes to Turkey. France has signed agreements with Uzbekistan for uranium development, signaling the West’s growing interest in Tashkent’s mineral resources. By accelerating its investments, Beijing may be trying to strengthen its global position in the critical minerals sector while also hampering Western efforts to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on Chinese sources.
However, this partnership is not without risks. Mining and processing critical minerals can have significant environmental impacts, including air and water pollution—issues that could fuel public dissatisfaction. Chinese companies have often faced criticism for having lower environmental standards compared to their Western counterparts. Although China introduced its first set of corporate sustainability standards in 2024, it remains to be seen how strictly these will be implemented in overseas projects.
Another concern is the growing unfavorable perception toward China in Uzbekistan, partly due to public skepticism around the transfer of mineral rights to Chinese firms. Misunderstandings or lack of transparency in these dealings may exacerbate public opposition, posing reputational risks for both governments.
Finally, there’s a structural risk. Most current projects focus on extraction and basic processing. Without deeper cooperation to support advanced processing and manufacturing, Uzbekistan risks remaining a mid-tier supplier rather than moving up the value chain. Aligning Chinese investment with Uzbekistan’s strategic goals for downstream development will be key to a sustainable and mutually beneficial partnership.
In the end, China’s growing presence in Uzbekistan’s critical minerals sector offers real opportunities—but also significant challenges. While both countries stand to benefit, the success of this partnership will ultimately depend on their ability to align interests, foster value-added collaboration, and ensure environmental and social sustainability. Without that, what could be a win-win may instead deepen dependencies and stir discontent.
Yunis Sharifli is CGSP’s Non-Resident Fellow for Central Asia.