Earlier this year, a Russian Su-57 fighter jet roared across Indian skies, capturing attention at the Aero India exhibition. The Kremlin’s aspirations for the showcase were transparent: Moscow offered to sell its fifth-generation fighter jet to New Delhi the next day.
This is nothing new. Defense ties between the two countries go back decades. For the Biden administration, those ties were both an irritant and a puzzle: an irritant because India’s purchases undercut U.S. sanctions after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and a puzzle because even as Moscow drew into a “no limits” friendship with Beijing and New Delhi took an obvious Westward-tilt, Russia never abandoned India to score points with China. Russia could have exacerbated India’s military vulnerabilities at a time of serious border tensions with China. It never did.
Fast forward to the present: The Trump administration now negotiates directly with Russia over Ukraine and a host of other issues and has softened its stance to the point of leaving Russia off its tariff target list. Clearly, weaning India off Russian arms purchases will be a lesser priority for the United States, even if the White House will undoubtedly seek more defense deals of its own with New Delhi. Does this mean that Russo-Indian defense ties are poised for takeoff, or will India continue to steer the relationship into “managed decline?”
Neither.
Instead, Russo-Indian defense ties are headed for a future of managed equilibrium. This is because the relationship is dictated mainly by the interests of these two countries themselves, which often lie beyond Washington’s influence. At its core, the relationship is resilient and durable. Foundational Russian and Indian interests set its floor and ceiling. The floor explains why India will not abandon Russia for the United States, as well as why Russia will not sell India out for China. The ceiling explains why certain types of bilateral defense cooperation are likely to be ruled out, even if a near-term uptick in defense ties is plausible.
The more U.S. policymakers appreciate both the floor and the ceiling of Russo-Indian defense ties, the better they will be at anticipating the likely trajectory of this geopolitical pairing that is only likely to become more important in the decades to come.
The Current Baseline in Russo-Indian Arms Ties
Moscow and New Delhi’s military relationship is primarily defined by arms sales, and to a lesser extent, by co-production arrangements. Over the past twenty years, India purchased $60 billion of Russian arms, amounting to 65 percent of its total weapons imports. Over that same period, Indian purchases declined in relative terms as it diversified its suppliers. Russia remains India’s largest single arms supplier, but over the past five years, the United States, France, and Israel together provided India with 55 percent of its total weapons imports.
Yet, Russian systems are not just a Cold War legacy for India. Over the past decade, India’s navy, army, and air force have made major investments in Russian-built platforms and munitions that play vital roles in defending against existential threats and are almost certain to be in service for decades to come.
For its navy, India has agreed to purchase four stealth frigates from Russia, two as imports and two to be built by India’s Goa Shipyard Limited with Russian support. India commissioned the first Russian frigate in December 2024, with the second expected in 2025. India will build the last two between 2026 and 2027. India expects to add a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine by 2028, under a ten-year lease of the INS Chakra III. And India’s indigenously built ballistic missile submarines, which it sees as an essential piece of its nuclear deterrent, reportedly also required extensive Russian technology and technical assistance.
To defend its skies, India took delivery of three highly capable Russian-made S-400 air defense squadrons in 2023 and expects two more by 2025. India’s air force currently operates 259 Russian-designed Su-30 MKIs, and in 2024, New Delhi awarded Hindustan Aeronautics Limited a contract to produce twelve more.
On land, India’s main tank fleet is comprised of 2,400 Russian-made T-72 tanks. In 2025, New Delhi and Moscow agreed to a $248 million contract for new 1,000 horsepower engines to boost mobility and lethality. Indian troops increasingly use the Russian AK-203 assault rifle, built in India through a joint-production deal. By July 2024, that deal delivered 35,000 new assault rifles to the Indian Army.
One of India’s most capable missile systems, the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, is the product of a joint venture with Russia. India equips its Su-30 MKI fighter jets with BrahMos missiles and deploys them along the disputed border with China. The missile is one of India’s few arms export success stories. In 2022, the Philippines signed a $375 million contract, with the first delivery taking place in 2024. Sales to Vietnam and Indonesia are also in the works.
Durable and Resilient Ties
Both India and Russia have clear interests in preserving bilateral defense ties. Their long history of cooperation engenders familiarity and trust. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided political, economic, and military aid to India. During the 1960s, Soviet arms accounted for about 70 percent of Indian weapons imports. In 1971, the two countries further strengthened their ties by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Historical memory and well-worn institutional ties are important foundations for the contemporary Russo-Indian relationship.
India’s immediate security concerns also keep it tethered to Russia. New Delhi faces a perpetually hostile Pakistan and an increasingly threatening China. India’s border tensions with China spiked in 2020, when forces clashed in the Galwan Valley, killing twenty Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers. Across India’s neighborhood, China’s military presence is growing. Since 2008, China’s navy has deployed to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy missions. In 2014, China’s navy sent its first submarines to the Indian Ocean, surfacing in Sri Lanka. A few years later, China established a military base in Djibouti. Indian strategists are concerned about Chinese access to ports throughout the region, including Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong in Bangladesh. China justifies its growing military presence in the region by declaring: “the Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean.”
Facing such immediate concerns, India does not have the luxury of time or resources to replace its Russian kit. Nor can it count on other suppliers for the most sensitive and technologically advanced platforms, such as nuclear submarines or missile defense systems. Moreover, India’s leaders pursue a “multi-alignment or multi-vector” strategy in which they build and maintain diverse relationships in an increasingly multipolar world order as a way to best preserve India’s autonomy and extract benefits. New Delhi anticipates that Russia will remain a great power in that order, so maintaining close ties with Moscow — while also strengthening cooperation with Washington — is a priority.
The Kremlin likewise recognizes its interests in preserving its relationship with India, especially after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Laboring under U.S. and European sanctions, Russia has turned to Chinese and Indian markets. In addition to India’s vastly increased oil purchases, Indian arms imports provide Russia with greater economic stability in the near term and a viable growth opportunity for the future. In that respect, Russia is also making a calculated bet on India’s rising power and wealth. “India should undoubtedly be added to the list of superpowers,” Putin said, “We are developing relations with India in all directions. India is a great country, now the largest in terms of population.”
At the same time, the Kremlin’s support for the Indian military reflects Russia’s firm determination to defend its autonomy even as it becomes more dependent on China. In the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the two revolutionary states declared a “friendship” with “no limits.” Both countries continue to share an interest in undermining U.S. influence, but as the war in Ukraine grinds on, Beijing and Moscow’s relationship has become increasingly asymmetrical. Western sanctions have made Russia dependent on trade with China for economic stability. Attritional warfare also forced the Russian defense industrial base to rely on Chinese dual-use technologies and machine tools. Moscow is undeniably the weaker player in the relationship but is unlikely to be satisfied living in Beijing’s shadow. It hopes to preserve its freedom of action and to maintain independent relations with other world powers. With this aim in mind, Russia likely perceives its ties with India as a vital alternative and counterbalance to China over the long haul.
Finally, the Kremlin’s current slate of arms sales to India does not pose a serious threat to China. They do not alter the overall military balance of power, which remains heavily tilted in China’s favor. This asymmetry is especially visible along the contested Line of Actual Control, where Chinese infrastructure outpaces India’s by an estimated 25 years. This advantage allows China to station troops and deploy weapons systems more effectively, ensuring rapid mobilization along the border. Russia, therefore, can profit off sales to India, bet on its future, and symbolically protect its autonomy without posing a real threat to its more important friend in Beijing.
Friends with Limits
Despite the robust military ties between Russia and India, there are clear limitations to their relationship, both from New Delhi’s side and Moscow’s. India’s ceiling is largely driven by its desire to diversify its weapons sources. India’s goal of strategic autonomy requires access to a broad range of military partners as well as a more capable indigenous defense industry. India, therefore, is hesitant to tie itself too closely to any single source, especially one as troubled as Russia.
The war in Ukraine has highlighted other risks of over-reliance on Russian arms as well. Some prominent Indian analysts voiced concerns about the performance of Russian weaponry in the conflict. “How come the Patriots took down the Kinzhal missiles that were touted as invincible? How come Russian ships are becoming such easy targets from a country that does not have a navy? Its spy planes such as A-50s, and fighter jets such as Sukhois have been downed so effectively,” one Indian defense analyst noted. Moreover, deliveries to India appear to have been delayed due to COVID-19 supply chain disruptions and the war in Ukraine. Russia delayed production and delivery of its stealth frigates, nuclear-power attack submarine, S-400 regiments, and AK-203 assault rifles to India. In the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion, fearing plodding production, India also backed out of deals to purchase Mi-17 V5 helicopters and Kamov Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters.
Additionally, assuming India continues to seek a stronger strategic partnership with the United States, it will need to weigh any new ties to Moscow against Washington’s likely response. Under the Biden administration, India ran the risk of antagonizing a White House eager to put the screws to Russia and to defend Ukraine. Under the Trump administration, India runs a greater risk of disappointing a president who prioritizes trade balances and is keen on selling more U.S.-made arms to the world. Either way, India faces a tough balancing act.
Finally, purchasing new Russian systems could exacerbate problems of interoperability across the Indian armed forces where U.S. and European systems are also used, given their incompatible communications and software protocols. Similarly, Washington — already somewhat wary about sharing certain types of technology and intelligence with New Delhi because of its close ties with Moscow — will likely continue to restrict cooperation, especially if India doubles down on buying new Russian arms.
For Russia, the ceiling of its sales to India is set by the Kremlin’s relationship with China. Today, Beijing is Moscow’s most important strategic partner and the second-largest purchaser of Russian arms, including advanced capabilities such as the Sukhoi Su-35 combat aircraft and S-400 air defense systems. Over the past 20 years, 30 percent of all Russian arms exports went to India, while 20 percent went to China. The story has remained fairly constant, even as China’s total arms imports have declined while its domestic arms industry has grown. Over the past five years, India’s share of total Russian arms exports rose to 34 percent, but China’s still amounted to 18 percent. Although Russia’s arms industry is most reliant on Indian purchases, it is also dependent on Chinese purchases. India is a significant buyer, but its resources are limited and cannot singlehandedly support Russia’s entire defense industry. This leaves Moscow vulnerable to Beijing’s pressure.
Russia will therefore likely remain cautious about entering into new defense deals with India that might antagonize China. So far, Beijing does not appear to have used its considerable leverage against Moscow to halt arms transfers to New Delhi. But Russia and India’s agreements for advanced capabilities all pre-date Beijing and Moscow’s “no limits” friendship (the frigate deal was inked in 2016, the S-400s in 2018).
China could conceivably warn Russia against transferring more state-of-the-art technology. For instance, the sale of fifth-generation aircraft to India and the jointly developed BrahMos missile to South China Sea claimants could cross a red line, as these moves could limit Chinese ambitions across the Indo-Pacific. Under such circumstances, Russia would likely trim its plans for new deals with India, particularly avoiding large transactions at politically sensitive moments for Beijing. Fully aware of all these dynamics, India is likely to pursue only those deals with Russia that it anticipates won’t run too far afoul of China. In sum, while Moscow will continue to sell arms to New Delhi, both sides also appreciate the limitations of their relationship.
U.S. Policy in a Multipolar World
Between the floor and ceiling of Russo-Indian defense ties is an important window for continued cooperation. India cannot afford to stop purchasing critical pieces of its arsenal from Russia, but neither can it afford to accentuate that dependence. Similarly, Russia has durable incentives to prove itself a reliable supplier, but neither can it risk crossing a line with Beijing.
U.S. policymakers need to appreciate both the floor and the ceiling of Russo-Indian relations. Their ties are complex and reflect specific bilateral dynamics. They also reflect the emerging reality of a multipolar world in which states need not be “with or against” each other but may well be “with and against.” That Russia continues arming India is evidence. After all, Moscow is arming New Delhi against its “no limits” friend in Beijing. China and Russia will continue to deepen their relationship for the foreseeable future. All the while, China and India will remain bitter competitors. Despite the apparent contradictions, this triangle is durable. The three powers have found an equilibrium.
In an increasingly multipolar world, U.S. policymakers should also learn to keep multiple opposing ideas in their minds at the same time. Managing such contradictions is not only possible — it will be necessary.
Daniel S. Markey is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He was, until March 28, a senior advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
David Brostoff was, until March 28, a South Asia research analyst at the U.S. Institute of Peace.