Can China’s security doctrine build trust with Asian neighbours and keep US out?
Analysts caution that there are still challenges to overcome in Beijing’s efforts to project itself as a benign partner in the region
But analysts cautioned that Beijing’s efforts to project itself as a benign security partner remain challenging, amid escalating territorial disputes with its neighbours, notably in the South China Sea, and the escalating rivalry with Washington.
Analysts said that the new framework aligned with Xi’s “Asian Security Concept”, articulated at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai.
“In the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia,” Xi declared then, in a subtle rebuke of then US president Barack Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy.
According to Wang Fan, president of the foreign ministry-affiliated China Foreign Affairs University, the new security concept aligns with Beijing’s doctrine of building a “community with a shared future” that addresses global security challenges with “Eastern wisdom”.
In an article published last month by party mouthpiece People’s Daily, Wang Fan noted that 17 countries had reached consensus with China, forming two major clusters in the Indochina peninsula and Central Asia and marking “a historic shift from traditional ‘security buffer zones’ to ‘hubs of development and prosperity’”.
China’s top diplomat Wang Yi has also said that an Asian security framework was “increasingly becoming a regional consensus”, citing the establishment during Xi’s trip of several 2+2 or 3+3 ministerial-level dialogue mechanisms between China and the three Southeast Asian nations.
A mainland-based expert, who declined to be named because of the issue’s sensitivity, said the regional security concept reflected Beijing’s ambition to exploit US withdrawal from its international commitments under Trump, along with his attacks on allies and disruptive tariffs.
“Of course this creates opportunities for China, but the question is whether China can seize this moment,” the analyst said. “It’s not just about strengthening economic ties. China needs a comprehensive peripheral strategy to prove that, despite its rise, it will remain a peaceful force. I think its overall strategy still lacks transparency.”
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China’s broader ambitions were signalled in 2022, when Xi launched the Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum for Asia, advocating “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security” as an alternative to US-led security frameworks.
Echoing Xi’s 2014 call to prevent any country from monopolising regional affairs, the GSI’s six principles critiqued hegemonic alliances that prioritised certain nations’ security over others and condemned “the wanton use of unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction”.
“China’s intentions are evident, but its strategy remains unclear,” said the analyst, noting Beijing’s “Asia for Asians” proposals were largely aimed at excluding external powers and sidelining US influence in the region.
“China says it has no intention of using military force, but its military activities around Taiwan have heightened anxiety among neighbouring countries, despite Beijing’s assurances of peaceful intentions,” the analyst said.
“To alleviate these concerns, China needs a more transparent peripheral strategy that combines security commitments and dialogues with deepened economic cooperation.”
According to the mainland expert, rising tensions between the US and Southeast Asia, driven by Trump’s tariffs and ambiguous Indo-Pacific policy, offered China a strategic opportunity to fill the void, but the window was fleeting.
“As the US will inevitably shift its focus back to the Indo-Pacific, both China and its neighbouring countries will face intensified pressure.”
The analyst also voiced concern that Beijing may be yet to fully grasp the security assurances that Southeast Asian nations were seeking amid the disputes and protracted negotiations for a maritime code of conduct in the South China Sea.
“The security concepts are a promising step, but overcoming the trust deficit with Southeast Asian countries remains a significant challenge,” the expert said.
“Economic pressure has limited effect, as security now takes precedence over economic priorities for most nations, rendering over-reliance on trade and economic cooperation insufficient to gain regional support,” the analyst observed.
“China is visibly more confident launching development initiatives while approaching security matters cautiously to avoid alarming its neighbours. I don’t think China has figured out how to address this effectively.”
Chen Xiangmiao, an associate research fellow at the Chinese government-backed National Institute for South China Sea Studies, also cautioned against overstating Beijing’s intent to rival Washington’s role as a security provider in the region.
“I don’t think there is such a strategic opportunity for China, because its strategy has been rather defensive all along, prioritising diplomacy over proactive security arrangements – a gap China has yet to address,” he said.
“Without forward-looking strategic planning, Beijing cannot meet Southeast Asia’s security needs.”
Unlike the US, which has mutual defence pacts and a global network of alliances, as well as offering substantial financial and military support during disputes, China has yet to propose comparable initiatives, according to Chen.
“Why escalate tensions when peace and economic focus outweigh security disputes? China’s approach seems designed to avoid a geopolitical competition trap, steering clear of confrontation through security aid or alliances, with no evident plans for such steps at the moment,” he said.
Many countries remain wary of China’s military build-up and leadership ambitions. For example, Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s defence minister, expressed concerns at the Munich Security Conference in February.
Ng compared Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea to the 19th-century US Monroe Doctrine, which declared that the world must remain divided into distinct systems and cemented American hegemony in the Western hemisphere.
Andrew Taffer, a research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the US National Defence University, said Ng’s remarks were a reasonable way to understand Beijing’s interests in the South China Sea and the region more broadly.
“It is no secret that Beijing doesn’t like that the United States has such a large military presence in the region and, if they had their druthers, Washington would leave,” he said.
“That’s obviously not a regional security environment that can accommodate the United States,” Taffer added, noting however that China had not articulated the equivalent of a Monroe Doctrine. “I don’t think that they will, because it would be dead on arrival.”
Nguyen Khac Giang, a visiting fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme of Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, also argued that there was “more than a grain of truth” to comparing Beijing’s South China Sea strategy to the Monroe Doctrine.
“Yet today’s complex interdependence and established legal frameworks demand not mere displays of power but adherence to a rules-based framework – a ‘just order’ if you will,” he said.
“It will not be easy for Beijing to force through their dominance by military might alone.”