Shifting Sands: Algeria's changing perspective on Russia's influence in North Africa
Summary: despite historically strong Algerian-Russian relations and Algeria's past reliance on Russian weaponry, current Algerian military leaders are increasingly concerned by Russia's growing influence in the Sahel and support for Khalifa Haftar in Libya, leading Algeria to explore closer military cooperation with the United States and potentially shift its arms procurement.
We thank Francis Ghilès for today’s newsletter. Francis is a specialist on security, energy, and political trends in North Africa and the Western Mediterranean. He is a senior associate research fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and a visiting fellow at King’s College, London.
Algerian-Russian relations have been good ever since Algeria won independence from France in 1962. By 2010, Algeria was Russia’s second largest weapons purchaser after India. However, today, Algerian military leaders are increasingly unhappy with Russia's increased military presence and support for eastern Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. Algeria is also concerned about and what it perceives to be the United Arab Emirates’ hostile attitude across northwest Africa.
Russia uses its five Algerian military bases to intervene in the Sahel, most notably in Mali, thus destabilising Algeria’s southern and eastern frontiers. In doing so, Russia has replaced France’s erstwhile military presence in the region with a form of neo-colonialism that is arguably more predatory and dangerous. Whereas Russia appears to be playing a spoiling game, Emirati behaviour seems more strategic, closely tied as it is to Israeli interests in Morocco.
Mali recently withdrew its ambassador from Algiers following Algeria’s downing of one of its drones using one of its home developed satellites which enable it to monitor its frontier closely. In response, Algeria closed its airspace to Malian planes. Last summer, Algeria warned Mali’s military junta and the newly minted Russian Africa Corps (the former Wagner Group) not to approach Mali’s border with Algeria while pursuing a rebel group involved in terrorist attacks in the Malian capital Bamako. Military chiefs in Algiers warned Khalifa Haftar that Algerian troops would prevent him implementing his threat of taking over the only Libyan oil field he does not control, that of Ghadames, close to Libya’s border with Algeria. Haftar backed off. Algeria is not about to forget the deadly attack in 2013 on its eastern gas field of Tiguentourine at the hands of Islamist terrorists who crossed from nearby Libya.
In this context, it is interesting to note Algerian president Abdelmajid Tebboune’s declaration in February that he would recognise Israel if and when a Palestinian state was established. His country’s arch enemy in North Africa, Morocco recognised Israel in exchange for Donald Trump’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara (in the last days of his first presidency) which the UN has listed as a non-self governing territory since 1963.
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The Algerian Air Force operates the Mil Mi-26 Russian heavy transport helicopter, the largest and most powerful helicopter in the world
Staff of Algeria’s National Popular Army (APN), which is designed to enhance cooperation between the two countries on maritime research and counterterrorism. Algeria has shown interest in buying a US radar defence system. Although President Donald Trump is keen to sell American weapons such a move would affect the strategic balance in north Africa, to the detriment of a long-standing American ally, Morocco.
In the Sahelian states, Algeria knows it must adjust its strategy as Morocco has progressed in recent years and built new economic and religious links with all five Sahelian countries. Russia is also now active in Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic. Algeria has built 2600 km of fibre optic cables to improve its links with Niger, Mauritania and other Sahel countries and nearly completed a 960 km railway line from Algiers to Tindouf which will allow the development of the nearby iron ore deposits of Gara Djebilet. Work on a motorway linking Tindouf with the Mauritanian town of Zouerate has started. Meanwhile a gas pipeline will soon allow gas from Niger to flow into Algeria. Algeria has rich deposits of a wide range of minerals and has indicated to Trump that it would welcome American investment which traditionally has concentrated on the oil and gas sector. It is worth remembering in this context that the US shared satellite surveillance of the oil and gas fields of Algeria during that country’s civil war in the 1990s at a time when Europe imposed a strict embargo on the sale of weapons to the APN.
Tebboune’s declaration must be seen in a wider diplomatic context in which Algeria hopes to capitalise on the fact that Trump knows full well that, apart from Saudi Arabia, the two countries whose eventual recognition of Israel would be the most prized in Washington are Algeria and Syria.
Like India, which for decades preferred Soviet and Russian weaponry, Algeria has drawn conclusions from Russia’s initial military setbacks in Ukraine in 2022. It is seeking to purchase sophisticated US weaponry for military and geopolitical reasons. Similarly, like India, Algeria knows that the US is technologically ahead of Russia despite Russian advances in hypersonic missiles. What better way to rebalance its relationship with Russia than by buying American weapons and offering US companies some lucrative mining contracts?
Historical context matters. After 1962 the Sécurité militaire, Algeria’s intelligence service and the KGB cooperated closely but these links never translated into an alliance. The USSR failed to convince Algeria to let it use the naval base at Mers el Kebir in western Algeria. Since 1962, the SM and its successor have cooperated with their peers across the world. Senior military officers have traditionally been trained in Russian military academies but large weapons purchases in the West since 2000 – tanks in Germany, surveillance ships and helicopters in Italy, radars, drones and other equipment in the US, China and Turkey have bred a generation of officers who have enjoyed training elsewhere.
With surging oil prices after 1999, Algerian military chiefs seized the opportunity to go on a massive arms buying spree. The main beneficiary was Russia following decades of good relations. Algeria refused to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and later Russia’s repression in Chechnya. It opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was critical of strong US and European support for Israel. Algeria supports the Palestinian cause and used its country’s membership of the UN Security Council to try and secure a ceasefire in Gaza, albeit with little success.
Since 1962, the sacred cow of Algerian diplomacy has been the absolute rejection of involvement in the internal affairs of sovereign states. This doctrine was breached when president Boumedienne sent troops and planes to defend Nasser’s regime in 1967 and in 1973. They intervened in Tunisia to combat Islamic groups after 2011 with the full agreement of successive Tunisian governments.
Algerian strategic doctrine traditionally sees NATO countries as the main enemy. However a younger generation of Algerian officers find it galling to see Russia use Libya to increase its presence in Africa and destabilise Algeria’s borders. They are unhappy at the strong UAE strategic support for Haftar and close ties with Morocco. The time may have come for Algeria to grow less dependent on Russia from whom it purchases 73% of its weapons. Such a shift would help Europe update its strategy towards Algeria and North Africa, a region with which its shares many links of trade, investment, security, not to mention millions of European citizens who are of Maghrebi descent. It might also encourage the EU to put some political capital into bringing Algeria and Morocco closer, something which it has never done to date.
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