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President
Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to the Gulf is a strategic move to lock
in high-stakes economic deals and deepen U.S. geopolitical influence
amid intensifying global competition. The outcome of the summit meetings
will help to indicate whether or not American can outmaneuver China,
resolve geopolitical hotpoints, and anchor itself in the next great
global race under the current administration. At the center of Trump’s
agenda are investment commitments, defense cooperation, and a push to
expand the U.S.-Gulf collaboration in artificial intelligence and
advanced technologies.
Trump’s
foreign policy has always been more deal than doctrine, and his second
term is proving no different. Arms sales, investment pledges, and AI
forums have replaced the lofty language of democracy and reform often
found in previous administrations. Trump is not trying to win hearts—he
is trying to lock in contracts.
The New Frontier of the U.S.-GCC Ties: Code and Capital
If
Trump’s first term was about fossil fuels and fighter jets, his second
is increasingly defined by artificial intelligence and semiconductor
supremacy. Gulf states understand the shift, and are moving quickly to
position themselves at the center of the AI race. On May 13, just ahead
of the summit, Riyadh will host the Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum,
sometimes colloquially dubbed “MAGA in the Desert.”
The event is expected to draw top U.S. tech and investment figures,
including Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Fink, and Sam Altman,
underscoring the growing convergence of Gulf capital and American
innovation.
For
Gulf states, AI is not just a buzzword—it is the linchpin of their
post-oil future. The scale of investment reflects the urgency. In March
2025, the UAE unveiled a
$1.4 trillion investment framework aimed at expanding its economic
footprint within the United States over the next decade. Backed by major
Emirati entities—ADQ, Group 42, Emirates Global Aluminum (EGA),
ADNOC/XRG, and MGX—the initiative will target AI infrastructure,
semiconductors, energy, and advanced manufacturing. For the United
States, maintaining global leadership in AI and advanced technology is a
matter of national security, driven by a strategic competition with
China. In this context, the Gulf states’ capital, ambition, and
willingness to partner with Washington on tech industries and innovation
play a pivotal role in shaping U.S.-Gulf relations under Trump.
A month earlier, in February, Saudi Arabia committed $40 billion to
AI development under Vision 2030, reinforcing its ambition to become a
global technology hub. During Trump’s first post-inauguration phone call
in January 2025, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also pledged $600
billion in investment into the U.S. economy. Yet there is still a lack
of clarity regarding what exactly this pledge entails. Further clarity
is expected during this week’s bilateral meetings.
In April, Qatar announced $2.4 billion in AI incentives and finalized a $5.5 billion luxury resort deal with
the Trump Organization, blending technological ambition with
high-profile economic diplomacy. Qatar Airways is also expected to
finalize a 100-aircraft purchase, likely involving Boeing—adding further commercial weight to Trump’s visit to Doha.
Chips, Rules, and Rivalries
To
further digital diplomacy and bring these deals to the next level, GCC
countries will likely push the Trump administration to reverse two
major regulatory hurdles that have long hindered deeper economic
integration with the United States: the 2022 “AI diffusion rule,” which
restricts exports of high-end semiconductors to the Gulf, and national security investment screening protocols,
which attempt to ensure that FDI does not compromise critical
infrastructure, emerging technologies, or other sensitive areas. These
two regulatory hurdles have complicated large-scale Gulf investments in
sensitive U.S. sectors. Both were persistent sources of friction under
the Biden administration—and now appear to be areas where the Trump team
could move the needle for both the Gulf and America’s other strategic
partners.
On investment screening, the Trump administration may be preparing to act on its America First Investment Policy,
first announced earlier this year, which includes proposals to
streamline approvals for trusted investors making substantial
investments in the United States. For Gulf sovereign wealth funds and
major industrial players, this would remove a key barrier to entry in
critical sectors like energy, manufacturing, and tech infrastructure.
The
primary challenge to expanding tech investment collaboration between
Washington and the GCC is the growing influence of China. For the United
States, loosening restrictions on chip exports will require a
coinciding policy that de-risks entanglement with Chinese-linked firms
and supply chains. How the Trump administration navigates this
trade-off—between safeguarding national security and deepening economic
ties with Gulf partners—will likely be a key concern raised by the Trump
administration.
Whatever
the particular results of Trump’s meetings are, it is clear that AI
cooperation is no longer aspirational for either side. It has become the
active frontier where capital, technology, and strategic alignment are
being negotiated in real time—with direct implications for global
influence in the years ahead.
Critical Minerals: An Area for U.S.-Saudi Cooperation?
As China increasingly weaponizes rare
earth exports in its economic standoff with the United States—most
recently suspending shipments under the pretext of regulatory
reviews—Washington faces growing pressure to secure alternative sources
for minerals critical to defense, energy, and high-tech manufacturing.
In this context, deepening investment in Saudi Arabia’s mineral sector
is no longer just an economic opportunity for Washington—it is a
national security imperative. The Kingdom’s ambition to become a global
mineral processing hub offers America a chance to diversify supply
chains, reduce reliance on China, and safeguard long-term industrial
resilience.
In a statement put out by
the Saudi cabinet, Riyadh is set to discuss a potential agreement with
the United States about cooperation in the fields of mining and mineral
resources. Saudi Arabia is now positioning itself as a global mineral
processing hub, capitalizing on abundant capital, low energy costs, and
direct access to vast, underexplored reserves. For the United
States—where mineral processing remains a critical bottleneck and China controls 60 to 90 percent of global capacity—a
deeper partnership with Riyadh offers a strategic opportunity to
diversify supply chains, reduce dependence on China, and bolster
long-term economic security in sectors vital to national defense and
emerging technologies.
Saudi
Arabia is emerging as an important destination for mineral exploration,
spearheaded by the Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma’aden). The
Kingdom’s accelerated exploration push has already yielded results; the estimated value of
its mineral reserves nearly doubled to $2.5 trillion, including
substantial rare earth deposits—resources critical to defense, energy,
and advanced technologies like semiconductors. Over the past five years,
Ma’aden’s share price has surged by 325 percent, and the company now ranks among the top 10 global mining consortiums by market capitalization. At its helm is CEO Bob Wilt, a U.S. Army veteran and West Point graduate, signaling both Ma’aden’s scale and its international ambitions.
Defense as Diplomacy, Again
Trump arrives only days after the United States approved a $3.5 billion arms package to Saudi Arabia, including 1,000 AIM-120C-8 air-to-air missiles. Trump will also propose a broader $100 billion mega-deal;
though the exact terms of this remain to be seen, it is said to include
C-130 transport aircraft, advanced radar systems, and missile
platforms. Executives from Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and RTX Corporation
will accompany the president—not as background actors, but as emissaries
of U.S. economic power.
Saudi
Arabia is not the only nation benefiting from Trump’s penchant for arms
deals. Shortly after taking office, the forty-seventh president also
inked a $2 billion deal with
Qatar, supplying the emirate with Hellfire missiles, advanced radars,
surveillance equipment—and, most importantly, eight MQ-9B Reaper drones.
Though the UAE has not made any high-profile arms deals with the Trump
administration yet, it is likely to do so as well; during Trump’s first
term, it notably attempted to purchase the F-35 fighter jet, only
relenting in 2022 under the Biden presidency. If past is prologue, Abu
Dhabi is likely to try again.
More
than transactional, these deals serve a strategic calculus: deterring
Iran, embedding U.S. technology into GCC militaries, and blunting
Russian and Chinese inroads into regional security architectures.
Syria and Iran Dominate the Agenda, while Normalization will Not
The
May 14 summit in Riyadh, which will bring together leaders from Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, will focus on
addressing key regional flashpoints and formalizing U.S. participation
in the Gulf’s evolving economic transformation. With Syria’s
reconstruction, Gaza under fire, and talks with Iran ongoing, the
meeting provides a timely platform for the U.S. to position itself as a
preferred partner—not just in security, but in shaping the region’s
future economy and technological infrastructure.
One
wildcard is Syria. Gulf leaders will press Trump to lift, or give
exemptions, on the U.S. sanctions still in place five months after
Assad’s fall, arguing that they now obstruct regional stabilization and
open the door to Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence. In a recent
meeting with American businessman Jonathan Bass, Syrian President Ahmad
Al-Sharaa revealed that
both China and Russia have been aggressively pursuing reconstruction
contracts in Syria—offering to develop oil and gas reserves and build
telecommunications infrastructure, including through Chinese tech giant
Huawei. Despite these overtures, Al-Sharaa expressed a clear preference
for partnering with the West. In this context, GCC states could play a
pivotal role in facilitating greater U.S. engagement in Syria,
especially as China and Russia, largely unbothered by U.S. sanctions,
expand their influence. A more proactive U.S.-GCC role in post-conflict
reconstruction would help counter this growing presence and reinforce
Western leverage in shaping Syria’s future.
Another
potential area for discussion is Iran. Trump may entertain the prospect
of a new nuclear deal with Tehran—not out of goodwill, but out of a
desire to diminish China’s economic leverage. With 90% of Iranian oil exports going
to China, an American-brokered re-entry of Iranian oil into global
markets would shift regional energy dynamics and potentially recalibrate
Gulf-China alignments.
Lastly,
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the most combustible issue.
Trump, who once boasted about the Abraham Accords, now finds himself
constrained by regional red lines and Netanyahu’s unyielding stance. It
is clear by now that further Gulf leaders will not normalize relations
with Israel unless the ongoing war in Gaza and annexation of the West
Bank halts. The ongoing war in Gaza and potential forced displacement
scenarios risk not only derailing normalization, but unraveling the
Gulf’s broader economic and diplomatic agenda. As of this writing, and
ahead of President Trump’s visit to the Gulf, normalization between
Saudi Arabia and Israel appears to be off the table. The Trump team
seems to recognize that this is a deeply intractable issue, particularly
as Riyadh continues to condition normalization on the establishment of a
Palestinian state. Given the current Israeli government’s stance, that
condition remains unattainable in the near term.
Moreover, as Saudi Arabia remains determined to develop its own nuclear program—and
with viable offers from both China and Russia—Washington appears to
have softened its previous stance linking civil nuclear cooperation to
normalization with Israel. In 2023, China’s National Nuclear Corporation
submitted a bid to build a nuclear plant in the Kingdom, while Russia’s
Rosatom, which constructed Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, signed
preliminary cooperation agreements with Riyadh the same year. Faced with
these alternatives, the U.S. seems increasingly willing to move forward
with nuclear collaboration independent of the normalization track. This
policy shift was signaled during the U.S. Energy Secretary Chris
Wright’s visit to the Kingdom in April, when he stated that Saudi Arabia and the United States are on a “pathway” to a civil nuclear agreement.
The
message from Gulf capitals will be unequivocal: progress is the cost of
normalization. But the expectations go further. Gulf leaders are not
simply seeking symbolic gestures—they want the United States to continue
ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran, mediated by Oman, avoid another
regional war, and ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, where a
U.S.-Houthi truce now hangs in the balance.
Tariffs, Oil, and the Dollar Dilemma
Trade
will also surface as a flashpoint. Trump is expected to push Gulf
allies to keep oil prices low to ease U.S. inflation. Accordingly, Saudi
Arabia’s OPEC+ leadership will likely be on the agenda. As in his first
term, Trump may seek Riyadh’s cooperation on production adjustments. For the time being, it seems as if OPEC+ has already increased production in accordance with Trump’s wishes, but this situation may not persist into the future.
Gulf
states will also likely warn Trump that tariff wars and trade
disruptions could suppress global demand and destabilize energy markets.
The GCC states are particularly concerned about U.S. financial policies
because all GCC currencies are pegged to the dollar;
consequently, any U.S. inflation cycle from tariffs immediately hits
Gulf economies. Meanwhile, Gulf states will probably warn Trump that
tariff wars and trade disruptions could suppress global demand and
destabilize energy markets.
Staking America’s Claim in the Next Chapter of Global Power Politics
Trump’s
return to the Gulf is not just about securing deals—it is about
preparing America for the future of global power politics. With
artificial intelligence, critical minerals, and defense supply chains at
the center of global competition, the Gulf has become a testing ground
for influence, alignment, and economic supremacy.
This
summit offers a rare convergence of urgency and opportunity. Gulf
capitals are ready to invest, cooperate, and compete. However, they
expect more than photo ops: they want policy shifts, strategic clarity,
and a partner willing to see the region as a co-architect of the future
order. Whether Trump delivers a cohesive framework or a flurry of
transactional wins will shape not only the next phase of U.S.-GCC
relations, but America’s broader ability to lead in a world defined by
chips, minerals, and geopolitical agility. |