The Arctic is not only the Arctic Ocean but also the northern tip of three continents: Europe, Asia, and America. It is the place where the Eurasian, North American, and Asian Pacific regions meet, where the frontiers come close to one another and the interests of states belonging to mutually opposed military blocs and nonaligned ones cross.”(Gorbachev,1987)
The Arctic region (66°32’N), once perceived as a peripheral and largely inaccessible frontier, has grabbed the attention of the world over the last few decades and become central to the foreign policy agendas of major powers, including Russia, the United States, etc. This strategic recalibration is primarily driven by the effects of global climate change, which has hastened the melting of the polar ice cap. As a result, previously inaccessible natural resources in the Arctic have become more readily available for exploration and exploitation.
This policy shift has intensified geopolitical interest and competition, not only among the Arctic eight states but also among the non-Arctic actors such as China and India, who seek to expand their influence in the region. China, despite being a non-Arctic state with no territorial claims, declared itself as a “near-Arctic state” in 2018. Furthermore, the dragon is maintaining its presence in the region through research and development collaboration and the construction of the Polar Silk Road. Similarly, India, too, demonstrated its strategic intent by releasing its Arctic Policy in 2022, focusing on the region’s economic potential and participating in developmental and scientific projects across the Far North and Far East.
Among the Arctic states, five—Russia, Canada, the US, Denmark, and Norway—have been particularly proactive in asserting their claims and advancing their strategic interests in the region. Geographically speaking, Russia stands out in this as it possesses approximately 40% of the total land area beyond the Arctic coastline and is home to nearly three-quarters of the Arctic population, thereby reinforcing its dominant position in the region.
The acceleration in the melting of glaciers due to climate change has rendered Arctic waters increasingly navigable and has facilitated access to the vast, previously untapped natural resources beneath the Arctic seabed. In response, the Russian Federation has made substantial investments in both infrastructure and military capabilities as part of its broader strategy to assert dominance in the region. In the wake of counterbalancing Russian influence, the US also enhanced its military posture by expanding its Arctic presence, e.g.,. The US Navy held its largest Arctic drill in decades in 2016, involving over 5,000 soldiers and a variety of military assets. Before that, the U.S. response had always been slow in articulating a comprehensive Arctic strategy.
The ice retreat in the Arctic region has earned it the title of “El Dorado of the world because of accessible natural wealth. It is estimated to contain approximately 90 billion barrels of oil (accounting for 16 percent of the global reserves), 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (roughly 30 percent), and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (around 38 percent), also positioning it as a critical repository of yet-to-be-exploited hydrocarbon resources. Nevertheless, the strategic significance of the Arctic extends beyond its resource endowments. Its geopolitical importance—shaped by emerging maritime routes, security considerations, and environmental concerns—has catalyzed intensified international competition among both Arctic and near-Arctic states seeking to assert their influence in the region.
Russia’s objectives in the Arctic:
Since the early imperial period, discourses surrounding Arctic exploration and nationalism have been integral to Russian statecraft and the construction of national identity. This engagement can be traced back to the reign of Peter the Great and has persisted through the Soviet era, during which the Arctic was consistently framed as a region of both strategic and symbolic importance. The enduring centrality of the Arctic in Russian political thought is evident in various historical junctures, most notably in the transformative policy shift initiated by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. In his seminal Murmansk speech, Gorbachev proposed the Arctic as a “zone of peace” and international cooperation, calling for the creation of a regional framework for environmental protection, the demilitarization of the region, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, and limitations on military naval operations. This marked a significant departure from the militarized posture of earlier Soviet Arctic policy, signaling a new alignment between geopolitical strategy and emergent environmental concerns.
In the post-Soviet era, the Arctic again became a focal point of Russian strategic thinking as President Vladimir Putin explicitly reaffirmed the region’s importance to Russia’s national security. Over the past two decades, Putin has consistently advanced a narrative that positions the Arctic as a fundamental component of Russian national identity and sovereignty. In a 2014 session of the National Security Council, he described the Arctic as embodying “practically all aspects of national security—military, political, economic, technological, environmental, and that of resources, thereby underscoring the comprehensive and multidimensional nature of its strategic value. In 2020, the Kremlin unveiled the ”Arctic 2035″ plan, which addresses infrastructure financing, economic expansion, and strategic importance for national security in the Arctic region considering increased economic strains and geopolitical threats.
Russia’s Arctic approach is influenced by Eurasianist ideology, which posits that Russia occupies a unique civilizational space distinct from Europe and should therefore pursue its developmental path independent of Western norms and values. One of the principal ideologues of this perspective is Aleksandr Dugin, also referred to as “Putin’s Rasputin.” He opined that there is a close relation between the Arctic and Eurasianism, as he considers the former as a northern frontier of the Eurasian heartland, which is integral to the creation of a cohesive Eurasian identity. This ideological grounding provides Russia with a powerful discursive and strategic tool for asserting influence in the Arctic, enabling it to negotiate from a position of strength in regional and international forums.
For the Russian Federation, the Arctic constitutes a region of profound geopolitical and strategic significance. Alexandr Dugin referred to the Siberian North as Russia’s “geopolitical reserve.” Moreover, the Russian state has reinterpreted the perceived isolation and underdevelopment of its Arctic territories (Murmansk, Yamal-Nenets region, etc.) as a form of “spiritual plus”—a metaphysical advantage that, when combined with cutting-edge technologies, is envisioned as the foundation for establishing Eurasian dominance over what is portrayed as the moral and spiritual vacuity of the West. This synthesis of traditionalism and technological modernity reflects a broader narrative of Russian exceptionalism within the Arctic discourse.
In a highly symbolic act intended to assert its sovereignty and geopolitical presence in the Arctic, Russia planted a national flag on the seabed beneath the North Pole in 2007, utilizing the MIR-1 submersible to carry out the operation. This gesture, while largely ceremonial, underscores the strategic importance the Arctic holds in the Kremlin’s broader pursuit of derzhavnost—the aspiration to re-establish Russia as a formidable global power. The restoration of great power status remains a cornerstone of Russia’s foreign policy doctrine, and the Arctic has emerged as a critical arena through which Moscow seeks to project this vision.
The Arctic is significant for the internal legitimization of Vladimir Putin’s leadership, as it provides a platform for the consolidation of national identity and the revival of patriotic sentiment, both of which contribute to the. Thus, the Arctic is being instrumentalized as a geopolitical and ideological frontier, where domestic narratives of pride and sovereignty intersect with Russia’s global ambitions. Contemporary Russian Arctic policy is characterized by a dual rhetorical approach. Domestically, the Kremlin adopts a more assertive and nationalistic discourse, emphasizing sovereignty and great power status. Conversely, in international forums, Russia often presents itself as a cooperative actor committed to multilateral engagement and peaceful regional governance. This bifurcated communication strategy enables Moscow to advance its national interests while simultaneously cultivating an image of responsible stewardship in the Arctic.
Resource Distribution in the Russian Arctic
Critical Energy Assets
Among the most critical energy assets is the Yamal Peninsula, which contains some of the world’s largest reserves of naturals (20%). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Yamal is exported to international markets through the Sabetta port on the Kara Sea, supported by a fleet of ice-class tankers capable of year-round navigation. Beyond its strategic economic role, the development of infrastructure such as the Sabetta LNG plant has increased the demographic growth from approximately 300 to 30,000 during the project’s construction and operation.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the imposition of wide-ranging international sanctions resulted in the dwindling of energy exports from 1000 million euros in January 2022 to 750 million euros in January 2025. European Union member states, particularly economic powerhouses such as Germany, have historically been heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. In recent years, Russian oil and gas accounted for approximately 25% of Germany’s total oil imports and 40% of its natural gas imports. Russia’s hydrocarbon wealth is concentrated in major basins such as Caspian-Volga, Yenisey-Khatanga, Western Siberia, Pechora, Vilyuy-Angara-Lena (Eastern Siberia), and Anadyr-Shakhlain (Far East), which have long supported its role as a major global energy supplier.
These resources are distributed via an extensive network of Soviet-era pipelines, including the Yamal-Europe pipeline—transiting through Belarus and Poland to Germany—and the Nord Stream 1 pipeline (Vyborg to Germany), which runs under the Baltic Sea. However, the imposition of sanctions has prompted EU member states to urgently seek alternative sources of hydrocarbons. Projects such as the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which connects Azerbaijani gas fields to Turkey, and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which facilitates gas imports from African suppliers via the Netherlands’ Groningen fields, exemplify this strategic pivot. Given this reconfiguration of global energy flows, the European Union’s dependency on Russian hydrocarbons is projected to diminish significantly by 2030. In this context, Russia is increasingly redirecting its energy strategy toward the emerging economic centers of East Asia. Major consumers such as India and China—both facing growing energy demands—are poised to become key markets. Their geographical proximity to the Russian Arctic makes them strategically advantageous partners, particularly for Arctic-sourced energy exports. Russian energy giants, including Gazprom and Novatek, are actively expanding exploration and extraction operations in the Arctic, positioning themselves to meet this anticipated shift in demand.
Rare Earth Minerals
Several other Arctic regions, including the Kola Peninsula, Taimyr, Chukotka, Yakutia, and Norilsk, are notable for their extensive deposits of key industrial minerals. These include over 90% of Russia’s apatite concentrate, approximately 85% of its nickel, about 60% of its copper, and more than 50% of its tungsten. Furthermore, the Arctic hosts the majority of the country’s known reserves of rare earth elements (over 95%), platinoids (more than 98%), and significant quantities of tin (notably over 75% in the Severo-Yanskoye field), mercury (predominantly in the Yano-Chukotka province), and gold and silver (with roughly 90% of reserves). Yakutia, alongside the Arkhangelsk Region and the Taimyr Autonomous Area, accounts for more than 99% of Russia’s diamond resources. Furthermore, the region contains the overwhelming majority of Russia’s mineral wealth, including 99% of primary and alluvial diamond deposits, 98% of platinum group elements, 90% of chromium and manganese, 80% of nickel, and approximately 40% of gold reserves.
Fisheries
The Russian Arctic is endowed with a diverse array of natural resources, encompassing both marine biodiversity and mineral wealth. The region supports various fisheries, including commercially valuable species such as herring, flounder, perch, and cod, as well as marine mammals like seals, whales, and walruses. Additionally, resources such as king crabs and kelp contribute to the area’s bioeconomic significance. The Arctic zone is also rich in strategic minerals and metals, including copper, nickel, and platinum.
NORTHERN SEA ROUTE:
Extending approximately 5,600 kilometers from the Kara Sea to the Bering Strait, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) constitutes a critical maritime corridor for the Russian Federation. Historically, the NSR was first utilized by the Pomors, an ethnographic group indigenous to the Russian North, who established early trade routes between Siberia and European Russia in the 11th century. Their maritime expertise facilitated the transport of Siberian goods from the trading hub of Mangazeya to Arkhangelsk and subsequently to broader domestic and European markets.
The fast pace of ice retreat in the Arctic region has increased the navigability of the NSR, enabling year-round maritime activity to a degree previously unattainable. Significantly shorter than traditional maritime routes (Suez Canal) connecting Europe and East Asia, NSR is approximately half the distance and offers substantial logistical and commercial advantages. As such, it represents a cornerstone of Russia’s evolving Arctic strategy, both in terms of economic diversification and geostrategic assertion. The Kremlin has set ambitious goals for the development of the NSR, aimed at increasing cargo traffic to 80 million tons by 2024. To achieve this, Russia has invested heavily in icebreaking capabilities, positioning itself as the global leader in Arctic maritime logistics.
In a landmark legal development in 2023, Russia prevailed in a protracted dispute over its claim to an expanded continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean—a process it initiated in 2001. The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) recognized the legitimacy of Russia’s submission, thereby granting it exclusive rights to explore and exploit natural resources on the seabed in the designated area. This decision further entrenches Russia’s legal and strategic claims in the region.
Russia asserts that the NSR falls under its national jurisdiction and maintains sovereign authority over transit along the route. Such exclusive rights are being claimed under Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows coastal states to regulate navigation in ice-covered waters within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). As per critics’ assessments, Russia’s decision to limit access to the Northern Sea Route is a clear breach of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Despite being a signatory to the convention and ratifying the commitments to UNCLOS in 1997, Russian officials proclaim that the terms are still not applicable to Russia’s maritime claims in the Arctic region.
In recent years, administrative and regulatory reforms have further consolidated Russia’s control over the NSR. Oversight of the route has been transferred to Rosatom, the state nuclear energy corporation, underscoring the strategic importance attributed to the corridor. Additionally, new regulations have been imposed on foreign military vessels, mandating a 45-day advance notice and prior authorization from Russian authorities before passage, thereby reinforcing Russia’s securitization of the route. The Bastion-P and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems are installed on Kotelny Island and Novaya Zemlya, which are on their way to NSR. These systems are useful for defending the area farther into the central Arctic by creating a complex and multi-layered coastal defense system. Additionally, certain Russian icebreakers are equipped with electronic warfare gear and Kalibr cruise missiles.
Challenges Facing the Northern Sea Route (NSR)
Transportation
One of the principal impediments to the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) lies in the inadequacy of its commercial transport infrastructure, encompassing both maritime and terrestrial components. Notably, the lack of progress in implementing several large-scale railway projects represents a major constraint on the efficient development and operation of the NSR. Despite the investment of one trillion Russian rubles in NSR, advancement remains sluggish and financially burdensome.
Tariffs
Another significant barrier pertains to the current tariff system, which renders the NSR comparatively less attractive for international stakeholders. The Russian Federation imposes icebreaker escort fees based on cargo volume, with rates ranging between $20 and $30 per ton, substantially higher than the Suez Canal’s benchmark of approximately $5 per ton. Although a tariff reduction in 2010 led to increased international shipping activity along the NSR, policy analysts have argued that this measure must be accompanied by a comprehensive restructuring of the tariff framework. Specifically, it has been proposed that tariffs should be calculated not solely on cargo volume but also incorporate a range of parameters such as the cost of icebreaker support, navigational distance, vessel speed, and the technical characteristics of ships. A key objective of this restructuring should be to ensure the tariff system is transparent and intelligible to Russia’s international partners.
Conclusion:
The expansion of Russia’s presence in the Arctic serves three principal objectives: first, to enhance national defense capabilities by establishing a forward line of deterrence against potential foreign incursions, particularly as the region witnesses growing international economic interest; second, to safeguard the long-term stability and security of Russia’s economic activities in the Arctic; and third, to establish a platform for projecting military power, particularly in the strategically significant North Atlantic region. Such relentless pursuit of Arctic strategy by the Kremlin has made other Arctic Council nations, including Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the United States, Sweden, Finland, and recent NATO members, hostile towards Moscow. In the end, it could be said that though Russia is in an advantageous position, the hectic competition that has started in this region and how it will affect the environment is a matter to be ascertained in the future.