Transnational Gangs Are Just a Prop in Trump’s ‘Deportation Theater’
Designating a group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, or FTO, was once an important and significant measure for the United States government. After more than 3,000 lives were lost in the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Washington’s most visible response was to send troops into Afghanistan and Iraq, while using drones to hunt terrorists throughout the Middle East and Africa, and providing military training, equipment and intelligence to other countries globally to target terrorists. More quietly, and perhaps more effectively, the Justice Department went after anyone who financed or assisted groups on a rapidly growing FTO list.
To some extent, and with plenty of disagreements along the way, that list was replicated by the European Union, the United Nations and others, and then used as a legal justification to target terrorists around the world. There are plenty of arguments that some or all of the strategies the U.S. employed in its so-called Global War on Terrorism were not ideal and even counterproductive. But nobody can deny that the U.S. spent significant time and resources as it focused on the terrorism threat.
In contrast, after his inauguration for a second nonconsecutive term in January, U.S. President Donald Trump’s counterterrorism strategy has consisted more of rhetoric than of action. Even as the administration has expanded the definition of terrorism to include transnational violent gangs, few resources have been expended to actually challenge those groups and treat them as a national security threat. Instead, the designations have been used as domestic political fodder to justify Trump’s mass deportation campaign, even as the U.S. has cut foreign aid and its overseas presence.
Since Trump took office, his administration has designated 11 new groups as FTOs, 10 of them in the Western Hemisphere. Implementing an executive order that Trump issued in the first week of his new presidency, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated six Mexican cartels as well as the Salvadoran gang MS-13 and the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, or TdA, as FTOs on Feb. 20. Last week, the administration added two Haitian gangs, Gran Grif and Viv Ansanm, to the list.
So far, Washington has not accompanied the designations with much international follow-up. Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have hinted at the possibility of U.S. military operations against the Mexican cartels within Mexico, but they have yet to act. While unilateral drone strikes may take out some high-value targets or several fentanyl labs, that would represent at best a symbolic victory rather than a real strategy. In the long-term, however, it would be counterproductive, as it would anger the Mexican government, which has rejected any possibility of U.S. forces operating in its territory, in a way that would likely reduce ongoing cooperation, while potentially provoking the cartels to retaliate and doing little to help improve security within Mexico.
Nor has Trump acted against MS-13. In fact, his administration has eagerly cooperated with Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, whose negotiations with MS-13 and other Salvadoran gangs have been part of his political strategy since the time he was mayor of San Salvador. Last week, for instance, the Salvadoran daily El Faro published interviews with gang members about Bukele’s negotiations with the leaders of Barrio 18—MS-13’s rival—from that time. Upon subsequently becoming president, Bukele, like his predecessors, continued to negotiate backchannel deals with MS-13. That resulted in the release of various gang leaders several years ago in return for pledges to reduce violence, even as Bukele began to launch his high-profile “war on gangs.” Trump did Bukele the favor of deporting those leaders back to El Salvador before they could testify in U.S. criminal proceedings against them about their relationship with the Salvadoran president.
This underscores one of the most important pieces that is missing in the Trump administration’s strategy of designating transnational gangs as terrorists: a consistent application of both the law and the broader policy.
Similarly, Trump hasn’t acted against Tren de Aragua. His administration has used the purported threat posed by TdA as a justification for invoking the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, which allows the government to expel citizens of a foreign power during times of war. Despite an assessment by the U.S. intelligence community to the contrary, Trump maintains that the TdA is launching an “invasion” of the U.S. under the direction of the Venezuelan government, and he is using that unsubstantiated accusation to claim increased authority to detain and deport Venezuelan migrants. But this “deportation theater” has not been accompanied by action against TdA’s actual leadership structures and finances around the hemisphere.
With regard to Haiti, the Trump administration has cut aid funding to the Haitian government and is looking to scale back its financial support for a multilateral security support mission currently deployed there. That is hardly an approach commensurate with the concern that Haitian gangs are terrorists representing serious security threats. As with MS-13, the Miami Herald reports that the designation of these Haitian gangs as terrorists is likely about supporting Trump’s deportation agenda, rather than a security-focused policy.
The only exception to the Trump administration’s record of inaction against FTO-listed groups has been with regard to Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who have been attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea and launching missiles at Israel since the beginning of the war in Gaza. For the past few months, the Trump administration has been engaged in a bombing campaign against the group in an effort to secure the busy maritime artery. However, just weeks after re-designating the Houthis as a terrorist organization, Trump announced a truce, bringing the airstrikes to an abrupt end.
This raises important strategic questions about whether the Trump administration is open to negotiating with terrorists now, and if so, whether the Mexican cartels and TdA might cut a similar deal. Trump’s recent pattern of flip-flopping on tariffs is a chaotic strategy that may improve or worsen the U.S. position in trade negotiations. But flip-flopping on defeating a terrorist group can put national security at risk.
So, what is the Trump administration’s counterterrorism strategy? Perhaps even engaging in this debate is a form of “sane-washing,” a term Trump’s critics use to describe the process whereby outside analysts seek to rationally evaluate what is likely just a stupid or cruel policy the U.S. president has not really thought through. The administration’s counterterrorism approach appears to be a policy designed for domestic consumption rather than international effect. Additionally, it’s likely a positive sign that Trump is not pursuing these groups with the level of effort of a full “global war on terrorism,” given all the negative second-order consequences of that kind of military involvement.
However, whether or not the terrorism designation is justified, these groups are a security threat. So the discussion of what should be done to counter them is worth having.
In theory, the designation of Mexican cartels and Haitian gangs as terrorist organizations should trigger investigations and actions to stop the massive flow of U.S. weapons overseas. Approximately 70 percent of firearms recovered at Mexican crime scenes originate in the United States, and the Caribbean is also awash in illegally trafficked U.S. weapons. If the cartels and gangs are terrorist organizations, then the U.S. firearms dealers, gun shops and straw purchasers who supply them are providing material support to terrorists. That’s a serious federal offense that carries lengthy prison sentences. And yet, for political reasons, the Trump administration is unlikely to do anything to prosecute these or any other groups that are part of its support base.
Beyond firearms, there would also be more intelligence-sharing with regional governments, accompanied by increased aid to address the root causes of instability and efforts to target the listed groups’ financial networks. While there has been some additional intelligence-sharing with Mexico, the rest of the potential support hasn’t increased. In fact, it’s been cut.
This underscores one of the most important pieces that is missing in the administration’s strategy of designating these groups as FTOs: a consistent application of both the law and the broader policy. In the past, one strength of the terrorist designation has been that private sector companies fear investigation and prosecution for working with the groups on the list. Unfortunately, given the politicized nature of the Trump administration’s actions, it’s less clear whether and how it will follow through on any of these designations. Worse, it is not clear if it will attack the terrorist groups or negotiate with them. And administration officials have given the impression they will remain friendly with leaders like Bukele and even shake hands with Maduro, despite evidence or credible claims of ties to the groups now designated as terrorists. Finally, designating the Haitian gangs as terrorists while abandoning support for the country and its security forces is illogical and exacerbates a growing risk of instability for the hemisphere.
Whether dealing with terrorism, drug trafficking, corruption or sanctions, simply putting names on a list is not a national security strategy. And in the fight against terrorists, it’s never a good idea to politicize the issue when it hurts political opponents and turn a blind eye when allies break the rules. Whether in counterterrorism or foreign policy more generally, those are the kinds of approaches that come back to haunt governments later.
As a result, when the next U.S. administration inherits Trump’s terrorism list, it will need to think deeply about what strategies are needed to combat these groups. It is possible that the list itself will need an overhaul after four years in which we will likely see many more flip-flops and domestically focused initiatives that leave real security challenges unaddressed.
James Bosworth is the founder of Hxagon, a firm that does political risk analysis and bespoke research in emerging and frontier markets, as well as a global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Latin America Program. He has two decades of experience analyzing politics, economics and security in Latin America and the Caribbean.