Ambulances, the UN vehicle, and fire truck had been crushed and partially buried [photo credit: @_jwhittall]
What does it mean?
However, there are numerous discrepancies in the GSFFM Executive
Summary and accompanying briefings which cast doubt on the
investigation’s credibility:
HAMAS or not?
Even in war, killing a civilian deliberately is murder, unless they
are an actual threat or proportionate collateral damage. (Medics, inter
alia, have additional protections under the 4th Geneva Convention.) Indeed, the GSFFM makes this clear: “[The IDF] says soldiers are told to distinguish between genuine emergency vehicles and those used by Hamas.”
However, in the first two contacts, there was no such genuine – or
even notional - threat at the time: “At 3:57 a.m., the troops spotted a
vehicle — later confirmed to be an ambulance — and mistakenly identified
it as a Hamas police vehicle. […] The suspect was identified as a Hamas operative during an initial interrogation.
But by the morning, he was released from custody after the IDF did
additional checks and came to the conclusion that he was not a terror
operative.” Similarly, of the second and main contact, ‘The IDF said
that six of those killed were identified “in a retrospective examination
as Hamas terrorists,”’. Ergo, at the time of shootings, the IDF had no
belief that the occupants of the vehicles were a threat, or even members
of HAMAS.
Emergency vehicles or not?
As noted above, medics and medical vehicles are specifically protected under the 4th Geneva Convention. The suggestion that post ipso facto the: “soldiers, from a special forces unit, had believed they were under threat
after firing on what they initially determined as a Hamas vehicle but
was in fact an ambulance” is clearly risible: a threat only has
potential before an encounter, not “after firing”. Similarly, “the
now-dismissed deputy commander […] mistakenly thought the ambulance
was being used by Hamas and opened fire first.” There is no explanation
as to why the deputy commander allegedly thought that the ambulance was
being used by HAMAS. [It is also notable that in this explanation, the
deputy commander could see and identified the vehicle as an ambulance.]
Clear field of view or not?
The fog of war hides much, yet in this case due to the terrain, short
engagement distances, white light and night vision devices, it is
difficult to believe that there was confusion. The GSFFM states ‘“the
incident took place in a "complex combat zone"’ yet the NYT investigation
shows that the killing zone was in an area of level, bare earth. The
only raised terrain appears to have been a berm over the top of which
the IDF fired.
‘Har-Even said the attack on the convoy stemmed from a series of
faulty assumptions that soldiers from the elite Golani Reconnaissance
Battalion made that day and from the deputy battalion commander’s poor line of sight to the convoy,
which he said was obstructed by a hillside.’ As noted above, there was
no hillside, merely a berm and no other obstructions visible. Further,
rifles are direct fire weapons: if the deputy commander could fire at
the target, he must have been able to see it.
“the deputy Golani commander opened fire first on the multiple medical vehicles but had a blocked vantage point and could not fully see the vehicles properly.”
As noted above, there seem to have been no blockages of view; the
deputy commander had identified the ambulances as being used by HAMAS;
and if the deputy commander could initiate the ambush by firing on the
vehicles, he could see them.
‘the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade’s reconnaissance unit —
was positioned in a way that he was unable to see the ambulances, but
only the fire engine, which he misidentified as a normal truck, the
investigation said. He also could not fully see the lights on the fire engine,
according to the probe.’ As noted above, the deputy commander had
identified the vehicle as an ambulance being used by HAMAS, not as a
fire engine. Further, while the light bulb of the engine may not have
been visible, the flashing orange light emitted would have been visible.
A further claim is that “The commander opened fire first,
thinking that the ambush’s cover had been blown and that Hamas
operatives were preparing to attack them.” It is difficult to understand
how someone who allegedly could not see the contact point could make
such an assessment.
Visibility or not?
In addition to the excuse of a hillside being in the way, a further
claim is that “in the second shooting the deputy commander did not
initially recognise the vehicles as ambulances due to what they said was
"poor night visibility"”. This statement stands in contrast to the extensive white light and emergency flashing lights of the vehicles, the 40% moon state
as well as the night vision devices which such an elite unit had. In an
effort to discount the latter, “The investigative report said soldiers
did not recognise the ambulances due to “poor night visibility” and
because flashing lights are less visible on night-vision drones and goggles.”
While such lights are marginally less visible, the difference is mostly
one of (lack of) colour; the headlights’ white light, and flashing
lights would both be eminently visible.
The ”poor night visibility” excuse is even less credible given the
short distance to the contact point: “the military presented drone
footage of the incident which showed the unit of about 20 soldiers
opening fire on a fire truck and ambulances from a distance of around 30 metres.” At that range, even a naked eye would be able to distinguish the vehicles clearly.
GSFFM also claimed that the UAV was unable to identify that the
vehicles were ambulances: ‘At 5:06 a.m., the Golani soldiers were
alerted by drone operators that a convoy of suspicious vehicles was
approaching them. The drone operators were unable to determine that the vehicles were ambulances,
the probe said.’ However, during the third contact, “In video filmed by
one of the military’s aerial surveillance assets, Israeli troops can be
seen opening fire on the clearly-marked United Nations vehicle,
minutes after they ended their attack on the convoy of emergency
response vehicles.” It is difficult to understand why the UAV was unable
to see the protective markings and flashing lights of the ambulances,
or recognise the layout of the fire engine, yet was able to recognise
the UN markings on the car.
UN vehicle a credible threat or not?
There has been no effort to excuse the killing of the UNRWA staff
member; indeed, even GSFFM states ‘“The third incident involved a breach of orders during a combat setting,"’ – or disobedience in the face of the enemy, a capital offence in some forces.
Rather, GSFFM describes ‘As the UN vehicle attempted to drive slowly
past the scene, individuals identified by the military as Israeli
soldiers opened fire on the UN vehicle from behind as it was driving away.’
To be clear: this vehicle was positively identified as a UN vehicle, it
drove slowly and unthreateningly past the scene, and the driver was
shot at as he drove peacefully away. It is difficult honestly to assess
this as other than the murder of a witness to the aftermath of a
massacre.
Lawful actions or not?
The post mortem stated that ‘Most had died from gunshot wounds, including what Dhair said was evidence of “explosive bullets”, otherwise known as “butterfly bullets”, which explode in the body upon impact, ripping apart flesh and bone.’ The use of exploding bullets and of expanding bullets were prohibited by the St Petersburg Declaration (1868) and the Hague Declaration (1899) respectively.
The post mortem also noted that ‘the shrapnel found in the bodies
also suggested they had been hit with some form of explosive devices.’
This statement suggests that the shrapnel was other than bullet
fragments. The most obvious source would be a hand-grenade, a very
short-range weapon the use of which would imply easy visibility of the
target as protected persons.
There has also been a suggestion of possible extrajudicial killing: despite initial reports, ‘“Only in one case, there were discoloration and bruising on the wrists that could possibly be due to restraints,”
he said. All the men were clearly in their work uniforms and their
bodies had begun to decompose.’ If one or more of the uniformed medics
had been bound before being killed, their identity as protected persons
would have been completely visible.
Genuine Investigation or not?
In addition to the concerns over the evidence given, there is concern over the integrity of the GSFFM investigation. The Executive Summary
states that “The examination included extensive data collection from
operational systems, the forces on the ground, and along the entire
chain of command. This included debriefings conducted by units in the
field, in the division, and in the Southern Command, as well as relevant
operational orders and directives, footage from various surveillance
systems active during the event, and radio recordings. Additionally, the
event was reconstructed in the field, and relevant operational
personnel were questioned.” The investigation appears only to have
collected Defence information. There seems to have been no effort to
interview Palestinian eye-witnesses, despite “One of the paramedics
survived the incident, and in the morning, he was discovered by troops
and taken for questioning. He was still being held by the IDF as of Sunday.”
Similarly, the GSFFM states that “The examination found no evidence
to support claims of execution or that any of the deceased were bound
before or after the shooting. Such claims are blood libels and false
accusations against IDF soldiers.” The GSFFM ‘found no evidence’ since
it appears not to have examined the corpses nor interviewed the
pathologist, who stated “there were discoloration and bruising on the
wrists that could possibly be due to restraints”.
Likewise, while the GSSFM found that ‘while the decision to crush their vehicles was wrong,
“there was no attempt to hide the incident”’. Internally, however, it
appears that “Among the other revelations in the Haaretz report is that soldiers were ordered to crush the medics' vehicles by their brigade commander.”
It is difficult honestly to explain such conduct as other than an
“attempt to hide the incident”, with which the GSFFM seems to concur in
its reprimand for his post incident actions.
There is also some suggestion that the conclusions which the GSFFM
drew were not justified by the evidence it had collected: “He also said he did not believe the deputy commander had lied about the incident, even as he acknowledged he gave false statements about the flashing lights on the emergency vehicles and the subsequent attack on a UN vehicle minutes later.”
Yet ‘“The new documents allegedly show that the IDF investigators were
"not convinced" by the deputy commander's claims that he misidentified
the rescue convoy as Hamas. "A scenario in which Hamas operatives travel
in marked rescue vehicles to a location where they know IDF troops are
present is one that the army had not encountered during the fighting in
Gaza," Haaretz reports. "As such, neither the investigation team
nor the brigade command accepted the deputy battalion commander's
version."’ Despite such doubts, the GSFFM report found “no evidence of
any unethical or immoral conduct by the forces”.
How does it effect us?
My Lai
was a 1968 war crime committed by US forces on Vietnamese civilians for
no apparent reason. The US Army initially claimed that armed enemy
insurgents had been present, and did their level best to cover it up.
The IDF reaction has been a similar cover up. In particular, the flawed
GSFFM has demonstrated a failure to meet the complementarity threshold
of genuinely prosecuting cases. That may also lead to challenges against the 2021 US-Israeli agreement
which asserted that Israel has a “robust, independent and effective
legal system, including its military justice system”. (That
determination has been further complicated as “Knesset passes law
greatly boosting political control over appointment of judges”.)
Only after media attention did the US finally put 23 servicemen on
trial, convicting one. Lt William Calley was sentenced to life in gaol
for the murder of 22 (of the 347+) civilians killed, but served only
three and a half years. Like the US, the Israelis seem reluctant to try –
let alone convict – their people for war crimes. Such trials are embarrassing, but important to maintain the Rule of Law: one of the purposes of Justice is deterrence. While this article refers to Israel’s My Lai in the singular, there have been many such over the years since 1948, in great part due to the failure of both domestic Israeli and international politicians to uphold the rule of law.
One enabling factor of My Lai was the ‘Mere Gook Rule’, “an unofficial policy under which soldiers would be prosecuted very leniently, if at all, for harming or killing "gooks"
[…] even if the victims turned out to be civilians with no connection
to the Viet Cong or to the North Vietnamese Army.” It seems fairly clear
- not least from public statements by commanders and politicians – that
a similar policy exists within Israel and the IDF, given additional
potency by rabbis, some uniformed. Notably, ‘In a video of Golani troops
being briefed before their redeployment to Gaza earlier this month,
aired by Israel’s Channel 14, a battalion commander appeared to endorse
an open-fire policy, telling the soldiers: “Anyone you encounter there is an enemy. You identify anyone, you eliminate him.”’
The Israelis and their supporters have attempted to brush this
incident off as a “misunderstanding”, or “one of those things that
happens in war”. They are doing the rest of humanity a grave disservice:
while not formally reciprocal, much of the Law of Armed Conflict /
International Humanitarian Law has been founded on that principle. It is
no co-incidence that Al Qaeda placed its hostages in the same orange
jump suits as the US had done to AQ detainees. Likewise,
“exceptionalism” tends to spread, to the point that the exception
becomes the rule.
Every time a war crime / crime against humanity goes unpunished, it weakens the absoluteness of the prohibition, inter alia rendering British and allied service personnel more vulnerable. That is why - with some handwringing - the UK and Australian
governments have investigated even their Special Forces’ actions in
Afghanistan, with criminal charges likely. No matter the honeyed words
spoken, nor the petulant demarches made, it is in British (US etc)
national interests to ensure that all such violations of the laws of war
are prosecuted rigorously. Otherwise, the next victim might be British
or American.
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