Trump’s decision to lift sanctions is a triumph for Syria’s president
But Ahmed al-Sharaa badly needs to reassure minorities at home
A beaming portrait of Donald Trump in central Damascus was a tribute to the Syrian revolution’s most unlikely hero. His face filled giant billboards. Fireworks painted the sky behind. Celebratory gunfire provided the soundtrack. It was reminiscent of the scenes five months ago, when rebels swept into the capital and toppled Bashar al-Assad. The revelries this time were to celebrate Mr Trump’s declaration on May 13th that he would lift sanctions against Syria. It would, Mr Trump said, give Syria “a chance at greatness”.
The American president then met Ahmed al-Sharaa on May 14th in Riyadh, the Saudi capital. He urged Syria’s leader to join the Abraham accords that establish diplomatic relations with Israel, to rid Syria of foreign terrorists and to deport Palestinian fighters. He made no mention of protecting minorities or building Syria’s democratic institutions. Mr Sharaa for his part said he accepted the 1974 disengagement deal that set up a buffer zone between Israel and Syria. And he invited American firms to invest in Syrian oil and gas.
Lifting sanctions will allow money, from the diaspora and from countries in the Gulf and elsewhere, to flow in. Rejoining swift, a financial-messaging system, will allow Syrian banks to do business with foreign financial institutions. Syria will be able to print banknotes and fix a chronic cash shortage. Foreign firms may start bidding to rebuild Syria’s infrastructure.
Still, dismantling the punishing sanctions regime will take some time. Repealing the most restrictive will take an act of Congress. And as Lindsey Graham, a Republican senator, pointed out, Congress will want to see evidence that Syria is no longer a state sponsor of terrorism.
Nonetheless the announcements are a triumph for Mr Sharaa. Securing sanctions relief and international legitimacy has been central to his strategy since the former jihadist declared himself president. As well as wooing Mr Trump, he has visited Emmanuel Macron, the French president, at the Elysée Palace. Yet while he has courted foreign leaders, Mr Sharaa’s administration has seemed unwilling to tackle Syria’s worsening problems at home.
Fears are growing over sectarian divisions. The Druze are increasingly wary of Mr Sharaa’s intentions. Calls from Syria’s Alawites for international protection have grown since sectarian violence broke out in March. In Homs, a mixed city often seen as one of the country’s faultlines, Alaa Ibrahim, an Alawite activist attempting to mediate between the government and local Alawite communities, says the authorities have been slow to embrace his efforts. In a single night earlier this month 14 people were kidnapped, probably by local groups. Many Alawites now avoid going out after dark in the city. Mr Sharaa’s wins abroad are little comfort: “You can’t afford to forget the internal,” warns Mr Ibrahim.
In Homs and in Alawite-majority coastal areas, vigilante justice persists, driven in part by Sunnis frustrated by the government’s reluctance to prosecute figures from the Assad era. Efforts to weld Syria’s myriad militias into a national army have foundered. The issuance of id documents has stalled. Civil registries outside Idlib have not reported births, deaths or marriages since Mr Assad’s fall. The government seems loth to recruit minorities, particularly Alawites, into its new security institutions. Power is held tightly by a few men in Damascus; perhaps half a dozen people are making any big decisions.
Hardliners close to Mr Sharaa are making matters worse. Religious zealots have harassed Christian-run bars in Damascus. Gunmen recently stormed a nightclub, killing a woman. In both cases, arrests were made. But many minorities worry such attacks are ominous signs of Islamist rule creeping in. This is not official policy, insist those in charge. But some Syrians wonder whether Mr Sharaa may be tacitly allowing it. The interim constitution that he signed in March, which leant heavily on Islamic law, has compounded such fears.
“Foreign legitimacy seems to matter more to [Syria’s leaders] than local grievances,” says Mazen Gharibah of the London School of Economics. Perhaps most troubling, says Mr Gharibah, is the absence of any real national dialogue about where the country is going.
Reviving the economy will ease some tensions. But even after the sanctions regime is unravelled, it will be some time before ordinary Syrians feel any benefit. Mr Sharaa is enjoying a string of foreign-policy advances. But stitching Syria back together will be a much harder task. ■