[Salon] A German nuclear capability independent of the United States?
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- Subject: [Salon] A German nuclear capability independent of the United States?
- From: Chas Freeman <cwfresidence@gmail.com>
- Date: Sat, 17 May 2025 11:54:53 -0400
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https://www.german-foreign-policy.com/news/detail/9976
"Nuclear independent of the United States"
France's President Macron is pushing forward the debate on the French nuclear umbrella for Europe – including Germany. Berlin is looking for options for co-decision on a French nuclear weapons deployment. AfD wants German bomb.
16 MAY 2025
"Loosening old shackles"
The debate over whether the previous US nuclear umbrella over Europe should be maintained or replaced by its own European nuclear umbrella first ignited on the occasion of the presidential election in the United States in November last year, then after President Donald Trump took office on November 20. January new. At times, demands were made that Germany should procure nuclear weapons on its own nationally. For example, a prominently placed plea in the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung stated with regard to the fact that the two-plus-four treaty does not allow a nuclear armament of the Federal Republic, there were "good reasons" to speak of a "displacement of the basis for the two-plus-four treaty"; Germany must "release old shackles". 1] At about the same time, results of opinion polls became known, according to which a nuclear weapon of the Federal Republic of Germany was not yet capable of majority, but was supported by a growing part of the population.[ 2] In addition, the construction of an atomic bomb is also being discussed in other countries, such as in South Korea or Poland. The Federal Republic is all technologically capable of enriching uranium to a suft extent to produce nuclear weapons.
The German bomb
More influential politicians have not yet joined the demand for a German bomb. Karl-Heinz Kamp, a former president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS), who is currently working for the German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP), recently said that the media has "develop its own nuclear weapons" option of "developing its own nuclear weapons" in international law". 3] There is currently "no politically serious voice in Berlin that wanted to change this". However, open pleas for a German bomb now come from the Alternative for Germany (AfD). For example, the defense policy spokesman of the AfD parliamentary group, Rüdiger Lucassen, was already quoted in March with the statement: "Germany needs its own nuclear weapons". The Federal Republic must "beconder nuclear deterrent itself" - "as part of a strategic autonomy for Europe". 4] Lucassen is a retired colonel of the Bundeswehr. The demand was joined by the AfD member of the Bundestag Hannes Gnauck, an ober sergeant who belongs to the working group defense of his party. Gnauck said: "Germany needs its own nuclear umbrella."[ 5]
The European option
The director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, Thorsten Benner, proposed a different approach some time ago - following old considerations. Although Benner advised that one should "keep the basic scientific and technological capabilities available just in case in order to pursue a German nuclear bomb project": "the so-called nuclear latency". 6] In political practice, however, one should strive for "a European option". This is also insisted on Kamp. He points out that the Trinity House Agreement between Great Britain and Germany of October 2024 [7] expressly provides for a bilateral "exchange on nuclear issues". French President Emmanuel Macron also pleaded "early on" for a dialogue on the use of the force de frappe for a lifting of a nuclear umbrella over the EU. 8] Kamp now proposes that Germany could contribute to the considerable cost of nuclear capacity for France and Great Britain. Of course, this presupposes that a "direct connection between the nuclear weapons potential of both countries and the security of Germany and Europe" is established - and that is "legally binding in bilateral treaties". This gave Berlin direct influence on French and British nuclear weapons.
Joint nuclear war maneuvers
In recent days, Macron has given the plan to put the EU states under the protection of French or French-British nuclear weapons a new boost. He has been promoting it for a long time – and justifies it with his view that France's core national interests, whose protection served the French nuclear weapons, today contained “a European dimension”. This makes it possible to extend France's nuclear deterrence to other European states without any disadvantage for its own country. 9] In Paris it has been registered with some attention that on the 21st In February, today's Chancellor Friedrich Merz declared that "Europe" may have to "become nuclearly more independent from the USA". He wanted to negotiate this with Paris and London. 10] At the end of February, during a visit to Portugal, Macron reaffirmed the "European dimension" of France's core interests that is central to an expansion of the nuclear umbrella. Experts quickly pushed the public debate forward. At the beginning of March, it was said that it would take years until enough new nuclear warheads were produced to station nuclear weapons in other European countries according to the US model of nuclear participation. However, joint nuclear war maneuvers, for example, can be realized in the short term. 11]
"Serious talks"
Since the end of last week, the plan has been taking shape. On Friday, France and Poland concluded a friendship and cooperation agreement (Traité de Nancy), which, among other things, provides for closer arms and military cooperation and contains an assistance clause. 12] It is considered a counterpart to the Traités de Londres with Great Britain from 2010, to the Traité d'Aix-la-Chapelle with Germany from 2019, to the Traité du Quirinal with Italy from 2021 and the Traité de Barcelone with Spain from 2023. The assistance clause opens up the option of discussing an extension of French nuclear deterrence to Poland, it is said. As Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed on Friday, his government is now conducting "serious talks" with Paris about this. 13] Macron, on the other hand, confirmed in an interview on Tuesday that he wanted to conduct the debate about participating in France's nuclear deterrence "with all partners" "who wish to do so". 14] He will intensify the talks in the coming weeks and months. However, three things are clear: France will not "pay for the safety of others"; it will not lay nuclear weapons that it itself needs; and the decision on the use of a French atomic bomb will remain solely with the French president.
Start of the debate
The fact that Berlin agrees to an extension of the French nuclear umbrella to Germany on the condition that it has no co-decision on any deployment – this is currently the case with the nuclear participation in US nuclear bombs – can currently be considered unlikely. The co-financing favoured by Kamp could offer a certain co-determination. Other options are being considered: the debate is open.
[1] Reinhard Müller: Germany must loosen old shackles. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 24.03.2025.
[2] S. to loosen old shackles.
[3] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Germany can co-finance nuclear weapons arsenals. faz.net 18.04.2025.
[4], [5] Annika Leister: AfD politicians demand nuclear weapons for Germany. t-online.de 06.03.2025.
[6] Majd El-Safadi, Mark Schieritz: Do we need the bomb? zeit.de 03.03.2025.
[7] S. The concentration of the European armament industry.
[8] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Germany can co-finance nuclear weapons arsenals. faz.net 18.04.2025.
[9] Cécile Ducourtieux, Philippe Ricard, Elise Vincent: L'extension du parapluie nucléaire français et britannique en Europe suscite un intérêt grandissant de la part des alliés. lemonde.fr 04.03.2025.
[10] Merz wants to talk to European nuclear powers about nuclear umbrella. zeit.de 21.02.2025.
[11] Cécile Ducourtieux, Philippe Ricard, Elise Vincent: L'extension du parapluie nucléaire français et britannique en Europe suscite un intérêt grandissant de la part des alliés. lemonde.fr 04.03.2025.
[12] Emmanuel Macron and Donald Tusk sign a treaty in Nancy to strengthen the military links between France and Poland. lemonde.fr 09.05.2025.
[13] Signal from Nancy. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10.05.2025.
[14] Nuclear dissuasion: on TF1, Macron said "ready to open a discussion" with other countries of the EU. tf1info.fr 05.13.25.
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