During his trip to the Middle East, President Donald Trump addressed one of the issues on the minds of his hosts: policy toward Iran. Certainly, the discussions went well beyond Iran’s nuclear program as Arab states, especially those in the Gulf region, worry at least as much about Iranian influence through proxies as they do about its nuclear program. As I argued a decade ago, while Arab states shared with Israel concerns about growing Iranian influence, their priorities differed as Israel focused on a perceived Iranian nuclear threat, while Arabs worried more about Iran’s conventional and political capabilities.
This time too, Trump likely heard concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the need to contain it, but also broad Arab opposition to massive strikes against Iran in an attempt to destroy its nuclear program. As a visiting Arab foreign minister told me just before Trump’s visit, the Arab states fear such a move could be highly destabilizing.
At the same time, it has been clear that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu prefers joint U.S.-Israeli, or at least U.S.-backed, military strikes against Iran’s military installations in an attempt to destroy its nuclear program entirely. Even as the United States continued its negotiations with Iran, led by Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, Israel worried about an agreement that aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear program to a peaceful one, preferring complete dismantlement.
Is a deal with Iran near?
Even before Trump’s trip, some reports suggested a possible emerging agreement outline that was close to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was negotiated by President Barack Obama’s administration and from which Trump withdrew in his first term, in that it would focus on limiting Iranian enrichment with stringent international monitoring. These reports were followed by Israeli statements of concern, which were in turn followed by Trump taking a seemingly tougher posture: the president announced that he would only accept “total dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program.
But U.S. policy may not be as inflexible as it appears; Trump has expressed openness to a peaceful Iranian nuclear program, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said the key principle is that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, creating some further ambiguity. It seems improbable that Iran would agree to complete dismantlement of its nuclear program, as Tehran has repeatedly ruled out. Setting this as a goal of U.S. policy could set Washington on course toward military confrontation with Tehran.
In his remarks in the Gulf region, Trump alluded to a possible outline of a deal: “Iran has sort of agreed to the terms: They’re not going to make, I call it, in a friendly way, nuclear dust. We’re not going to be making any nuclear dust in Iran.”
Public opinion and Trump’s options
How do the American people feel about U.S. policy choices toward Iran?
The latest round of the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, which I direct, probed this question. The poll was fielded with SSRS, on its Opinion Panel Omnibus platform. The survey was conducted from May 2 to May 5, 2025, among a sample of 1,008 respondents, with a margin of error of +/-3.7%.
Here are two key findings:
First, more than two-thirds of respondents, 69%, said that they preferred a negotiated agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program to peaceful ends, with stringent monitoring, while only 14% said they preferred taking military action in an attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear program; 18% said they didn’t know.
Most respondents prefer a deal limiting Iran to a peaceful nuclear program
Question: American policy aims to limit the likelihood of Iran developing nuclear weapons. Which path do you prefer the administration pursue to achieve that end?
One notable aspect of this finding is the narrow partisan gap. While 78% of Democrats supported the negotiated agreement path, so did 64% of Republicans and 67% of independents. At the same time, 24% of Republicans backed military action in an attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, as did 13% of independents and 5% of Democrats.
Second, we sought to probe American public opinion on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. We focused our question on two states: Israel, the only country assumed to have nuclear weapons, and Iran, the only country assumed to be close to developing one. We asked respondents to choose one of four options that would be the least dangerous for stability in the Middle East: only Israel having nuclear weapons; only Iran having nuclear weapons; neither having nuclear weapons; or both having nuclear weapons.
Over two-thirds of respondents, 69%, said they preferred that neither country possessed nuclear weapons, while 10% preferred Israel alone possessing nuclear weapons, 6% preferred both having nuclear weapons, and 1% preferred Iran only having nuclear weapons.
For stability in the Middle East, over two-thirds of respondents prefer neither Israel nor Iran to possess nuclear weapons
Question: In your opinion, which of the following would be the least dangerous for stability in the Middle East?
Once again, given the current deep partisan divide in American politics on most issues, the relatively narrow divide between Democrats and Republicans on this issue is notable. While 75% of Democrats said they preferred that neither country possessed nuclear weapons, 63% of Republicans and 70% of independents said the same. A much smaller portion of Republicans, 21%, said they preferred that only Israel has nuclear weapons, while 7% of independents and 5% of Democrats said the same. Only 7% of Republicans preferred that both countries have nuclear weapons, while 6% of both Democrats and independents said the same.
Where are U.S.-Iran relations headed?
It is, of course, assumed by experts that Israel has long possessed nuclear weapons while Iran does not. How this could play in American public thinking regarding policy options would need to be probed further, for example, by testing if providing respondents with information about who already possesses nuclear weapons would change the responses.
When President Barack Obama negotiated the JCPOA in 2015, it was in part due to his fear that this issue could draw Washington into a war with Iran. Netanyahu’s focus on making the nuclear issue the crux of Israel’s grievances with Iran contrasted with Arab opponents of Iran, who preferred focusing on Iran’s influence and conventional capabilities. At the time, some Arab states implicitly left it to Netanyahu, who was influential in Washington, to lead the way in containing Iran. They were disappointed by the JCPOA—though they publicly supported it—not because they had criticisms about its details, but because it was delinked from their larger concerns about Iran’s conventional capabilities and influence, especially through Tehran’s regional allies and proxies.
This time around, Trump’s presumed instinct for avoiding war with Iran while limiting its nuclear capabilities and containing its influence in the Middle East coincides more with the views of Gulf Arab states than the Israeli government. Moreover, Gulf states now have their own relationships with the White House, anchored around trade and investment deals worth hundreds of billions, even trillions, of dollars that were announced during Trump’s visit—a win the president badly needed to claim, given the unpopularity of his tariffs. Trump also seems attracted by the prospect of trade with Iran.
But where the administration is actually headed in its relations with Iran remains uncertain. The administration’s vow that Iran will not be allowed to have nuclear weapons is not a deal breaker, as Iran has always claimed it does not seek such weapons. In fact, Iran’s foreign minister recently signaled that such a focus would be welcome as a basis for a deal. However, after the president’s return from his Middle East trip, Witkoff, Trump’s chief negotiator, announced that Iran must give up the “capability” to enrich uranium altogether—something Iran has said it won’t accept.
What is clear is that if the president does make a deal with Iran that limits its nuclear capabilities to peaceful ends, with stringent monitoring, he will likely have the strong approval of the American public, as large majorities of Democrats and Republicans favor a negotiated agreement, while only 14% back the idea of American military action in attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.
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Trump made clear he wants a deal with Iran. Most Americans agree.
Commentary
Trump made clear he wants a deal with Iran. Most Americans agree.
Only 14% of Americans back military action to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.
May 19, 2025