UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg enjoying Yemeni coffee in a mall in Sana'a in May 2023
Grundberg only mentioned the 10 year old ‘peace process’ in the
context of ending US airstrikes. Alongside so many others, the Yemeni
peace process is increasingly just another one on a list of many
failures, the most disgraceful being the now notorious Palestinian one.
So why such failures?
There are a number of fundamental flaws to the UN-mediated peace
process some of which are country-specific, and others inherent to the
difficulties faced by the UN in general. In the Yemeni case, the main
flaws are clearly outlined in a recent analysis
by Richard Barltrop. The three references on which UN efforts are
based, are UNSC Resolution 2216 of 2015, the outcomes of the National
Dialogue Conference (completed in January 2015) and the Gulf Cooperation
Council Agreement of 2011. A superficial look at a map showing who
controls where in Yemen in 2025 combined with the dates of these
documents demonstrates their irrelevance.
Yemenis and others have been calling for the replacement of UNSC
Resolution 2216 as early as 2017. It demands that the Huthis abandon all
the gains they made since 2011 and return to their isolated
marginalised (and now bombed to smithereens) area in the far north of
the country. Given the situation on the ground and the fact that they
now control, govern and fully administer 70% of the country’s
population, let alone their international interventions over Gaza since
late 2023, such a demand is so unrealistic as to be farcical.
As early as 2018, the IRG was officially described by the UN’s Panel
of experts as having ‘eroded to the point that it is doubtful whether it
will ever be able to reunite Yemen as a single country’. Things have
not improved; the weaknesses of the IRG are discussed in a previous Arab Digest posting.
As Barltrop points out, reasons why western and Arab states have been
unable to address the problem appropriately include their refusal to
address different aspects of reality. They avoid calling the Huthi
movement by its official name, Ansar Allah, insisting on terms such as
‘militias, rebels, Iran-backed and terrorists.’ The most recent example
was at the GCC summit on14 May, when MBS reprimanded the Ruler of Kuwait
for referring to the ‘relevant authorities in Sana’a’ later corrected
to ‘the illegitimate authorities’. Meanwhile the Omani foreign minister
replaced his reference to the ‘relevant authorities’ by one using Ansar Allah. At the UNSC no statement uses the name Ansar Allah.
Another case is the international community’s refusal to acknowledge
the issues which divide the parties to the conflict: examples are the
air and sea blockades, public sector salaries, and the fragmentation of
the country over administration, currency and access to resources. For
years, the UN process ignored the fundamental role of Saudi Arabia.
Consequently, the UN was marginalised when Saudi-Huthi direct
negotiations started in 2022. In late 2023, they were close to reaching
an agreement which would have formally been one between the Yemeni
opponents, mainly to protect the Saudis from accusations of war crimes
as this would have cast them as witnesses to the agreement rather than
participants in the war, and to save face for the UN which would thus be
formally involved. This was interrupted by the Gaza war and Huthi
attacks on Red Sea navigation and Israel, and the subsequent air strikes
by the US, UK and now Israel on Huthi-controlled areas.
To improve future efforts, lessons from past misguided approaches
should be learned. As Barltrop points out, the UN process strengthened
the most intransigent hardcore elements in Ansar Allah at the expense of
the movement’s moderate wing, giving it time to ‘consolidate power and
become entrenched in uncompromising foreign and domestic policies’.
International decision makers should abandon the obsolete three
references, and address the actual situation on the ground. The
ritualised calls for a ‘Yemeni-led’ process have largely ignored most
Yemeni views and focused on the current leaderships which have brought
about the current disastrous situation.
Following the interruption of US (and presumably UK, as the latter
only acts to support the US) strikes, a new window may open for a
Huthi-Saudi deal, a priority for both. The original included significant
Saudi financial support for reconstruction and salary payments; while
these may be problematic given the Trump administration’s official
designation of the Huthis as a terrorist organisation, mechanisms to
circumvent it can be found, serving the interests of both Saudi Arabia
and Ansar Allah. This would lead to a modified version of the UN’s ‘road
map’ regarding which, as Grundberg recognises
‘the mediation environment has changed significantly since late 2023’.
It is worth remembering that this road map’s basic features are hardly
earth shattering: ‘a ceasefire, economic recovery, and an inclusive
political process in order to move forward.’
Millions of Yemenis are longing for the end of this war and the
opportunity to start rebuilding their country and improving their
disastrous living conditions.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.