---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Brenner, Michael via mbrenner <mbrenner@list.pitt.edu>
Thu, May 29, 2025
From: Brenner, Michael via mbrenner <mbrenner@list.pitt.edu>
Thu, May 29, 2025
Friends & Colleagues
I showed an early draft of the Russia piece that I sent out last week to a friend who suggested that I do something similar on Sino-American relations. I objected on grounds that I knew next to nothing about China; to which he retorted: "neither do 90%
of the people who pontificate on TV talk shows or in the NYT - not to speak of the White House." That still didn't embolden me. Now, however, sinister events have pushed me to abandon modesty good sense. Trump, once widely hailed as the Prince of Peace, is
jeopardizing his claim to a Nobel Peace Prize by an outburst of hostility not only toward China, but Russia as well. Putin personally has added to his demonology. So, duty calls.
cheers
Michael Brenner
SHARING CHOPSTICKS?
China is presented with the same fundamental dilemma as Russia. There are some noteworthy situational differences, though. Here is a summary denotation of both.
China is the principal obstacle to the United States’ retention of its dominant global position. In fashioning a strategy for dealing with Washington, it faces a singular dilemma. Put simply, it is how to deal with an America that remains blind in vision
and impervious in policy to the epochal changes reshaping the configuration of the world system. To the extent that Washington does feel the vibrations from this tectonic shift, political leaders are seen as reacting instinctively to deny its practical consequences
as they strive to affirm an endangered supremacy. That compulsion leads American policymakers to set themselves ever more arduous challenges to prove that nothing fundamental has changed. Hence, the drive to overturn a strategic commitment made half a century
ago by pressing by every means for Taiwan’s autonomy.
The Sino-American relationship exhibits a number of distinctive characteristics. Here is a summary denotation of them.
1. 1. China poses no security threat to the United States or its allies. Beijing leaders have not indicated by word or deed any intention to act militarily in an aggressive manner. The intense speculation about war between the United States and China is due
exclusively to the American provocation of rescinding the formal commitment it made in 1979 to recognize Taiwan as legally an integral part of China, and its multiform efforts to promote Taiwan independence – including significant arms deliveries and training
of its armed forces. China accepted extreme strategic nuclear inferiority to the United States for decades until its recent program of expanding and upgrading its nuclear forces in response to belligerent moves by Washington over Taiwan and its trillion dollar
plans to enhance its own missile capabilities. That was deemed necessary to retain a condition of Mutual Assured Destruction
2. 2. Unlike the situation with Russia, China does not abut an American partner, nor is there an ongoing conflict in the region, nor territorial disputes other than the minor Spratley Islands affair
3. 3. The United States never has been an Asian power in the sense of having institutional ties there approximating anything like its presence as a European power. It is a Pacific power
4. 4. Unlike Russia that has been a major player in continental European affairs for centuries, China’s sole historical intercourse with the West has been as a victim of Western imperialism. It did cross swords with the United States in Korea (in a war instigated
by Stalin) when it perceived a direct threat from American forces advancing toward the Yalu frontier. Also, the PLA had a large presence (300,000), albeit non-combat, in North Vietnam during the Indo-China war. For 50 years, though, the main relationships
with Western countries have been commercial
5. 5.The PRC’s nominal adhesion to Communism as its legitimizing doctrine is not a cause of concern since it today engages in no proselytization and, indeed, makes a point of dealing with all manner of governments on a strictly practical basis
6. 6. Trump’s disavowal of the long-standing American goals of promoting democracy and its penchant for nation-building, changes little in Beijing’s view of American aims or actions. China’s leaders have interpreted that dimension of American foreign policy
as a derivative of the country’s self-regard and cultivated by its leaders in order to make palatable – at home and abroad – its harsh realpolitik. The one troubling aspect of that cosmetic disguise is the use of a supposed human rights concern to blemish
China’s image. Beijing’s angry rejection of charges that it systematically abuses the Uigurs is accompanied by sharp retorts that America should take a close look at itself in the mirror. Now, it is easier for the Chinese simply to ignore American ‘slanders.’
On matters of human rights, Washington has lost any semblance of credibility thanks to its complicity in the Palestinian genocide, backing of despotic regimes elsewhere and abuses domestically
7. 7. Talk of an American retrenchment from its forward positions worldwide, of more discrimination where and how it will apply its power, likely are met with skepticism in Beijing. There surely is no sign of it in the Taiwan Strait. Is it credible that
the United States will abandon its active presence in all regions or its commitment to “full spectrum dominance” militarily? That is improbable short of a fundamental revision of Washington’s global perspective – of which there is no evidence. The loosening
of some formal ties along with the obligations they entail properly should be seen as a tactical move to gain greater flexibility and discretionary judgment in deciding how unchanging American goals best can be advanced. So, it is a reasonable expectation
that the United States’ assertive power moves will not be markedly reduced; they simply will become more erratic and even more arbitrary
8. 8. Beijing leaders are less attuned to the vicissitudes of the latest American presidency in its hostility toward China than they are to the progressive hardening of Washington’s policies over the span of 5 administrations beginning with Bill Clinton. This
is interpreted as evidence that the country’s political elites have made an historic implicit judgment to reject the idea of peaceful cooperation/rivalry for confrontation in a zero-sum game. It is a conclusion reinforced by the absence of any crisis point
in their dealings that could have provoked this turn toward hostility (compare to Ukraine as the trigger sparking the fierce Russo-phobia)
9. 9. Americans are frightened of China not because of anything China does; the United States is frightened of China because it exists. It's the purest example of existential anxiety - the word for which is
dread. In other words, it's China, by its very success and growing global presence challenges the foundational assumption of American collective identity: that we're superior, we are exceptional, we are born to be number one and always will be. The notion
of being ordinary in any sense – much less surpassed - is anathema.
10.10. Even if the U.S. manages to remain the strongest military power—an increasingly difficult objective, it has limited practical meaning these days as regards China. People bandy about plans for a conflict and run their war games, totally disregarding the
overriding reality that if you had a war with China, both countries would wind up using their nuclear arsenals and it would be all over for each of them. Even the Pentagon and the Rand Corporation would be ashes. However, that overwrought obsession emerges
from the escapist fantasy world people revert to when reality becomes too complicated to bear. In effect, without realizing it, what they're doing unconsciously is rerunning World War II. China is Imperial Japan and Russia is Nazi Germany. Of course, that
is totally ridiculous – as well as being dangerous. Moreover, the correlation of military forces has no bearing on the underlying dread that Americans experience in contemplating China’s rise
11.11. The Trump factor has intensified hostility between Washington and Beijing. This is due only secondarily to his unpredictability. Rather, it is the lifting of the already flimsy pretense intimating that the United States entertains the possibility of
a constructive working relationship with China. Everything that the White House has been doing since January has as its magnetic North Pole the impending titanic conflict with China over who will be global Supremo
12. China does not have the option of moderating the current hostility by lowering the stakes. They are embedded in the global reach of both sides economically and the United States’ dedication to keeping China bottled up in political and security terms
13. China’s capacity to deter aggressive American moves or to retaliate for those actually taken is greater, and more varied, than is Russia’s. Witness the Trump tariff war episode. China’s systemically rooted economic strengths provided Beijing with a readily
available, powerful retaliatory response to Trump’s hair-brained scheme. It simply declared an embargo on exports to the United States to match what was a
de facto American boycott. That drastic action was accompanied by a raising of tariffs on American imports, and the cancelling or suspending of contracts for delivery of agricultural products and a few other politically freighted exports. Silently, it
brandished China’s financial WMD: the threat to divest the remaining $785 million of its dollar denominated assets which peaked at close to 3 trillion when Beijing began its monetary diversification program. (This drastic diversification of central bank assets
can be interpreted as a move to reduce vulnerability to American induced monetary turbulence; or, a form of unilateral disarmament).
Trump, in his profound ignorance, evidently thought that the massive Chinese trade surpluses were based on the sale of cheap polo shirts and microwaves. The realities of modern-day supply chains for the manufacture of industrial and high-tech products eluded
him – and his huckster advisers. (It is estimated that 52 percent of U.S. manufactures contain Chinese components). It took only a few weeks for the shock-and-awe Chinese retaliation to register in the White House. The squeals from farmers, manufacturers,
merchants, and consumers were loud enough to penetrate Trump’s insular mind – drowning out the hoots of joy from currency speculators and insider traders. The capitulation quickly followed.
This instructive episode carries two lessons. First, strong leverage is required to deter or counter the aggressive moves by Washington. Two, it must be starkly brutal to get through the tangled underbrush and elaborate defensives of Trump’s narcissistic mind.
14. The United States and China think in very different timeframes. For Washington, the focus habitually is on the hot topics of the here-and-now. Long-term perspectives are 3-5 years, e.g. the repeated public statements by senior American officials and military
officers that a war with China can be expected before the end of the decade. President Xi and his associates concentrate on strengthening and extending the economic and social foundations of a stable, secure China into the foreseeable future. Since that naturally
is accompanied by a growing presence and interests worldwide, their engagements with other countries have become deeper and more varied. Their strong preference is the stabilization of those relations via mutually advantageous dealings, aid, and tolerance
for what other countries do in spheres that do not directly affect China. The emphasis on stability and predictability is the reason for China’s taking a key role in BRICS along with its support for regional multilateral organizations in Asia.
15. The United States figures in this picture as a spoiler – unwilling to accept the implications of these developments for its weakening hegemonic control over world affairs. American hostility is shifting that role from spoiler to outright enemy.
15. 16. The United States’ increasingly bellicose approach toward China is congenial to American policy elites for two distinct reasons: it plays to the country’s relative strengths – military prowess and residual control over international financial institutions
such as the IMF and SWIFT; and its spares them the need to do any serious strategic rethinking or to exercise sophisticated diplomatic skills – neither of which are an American forte.
16. The contrast with the American experience is stark in two critical respects. The United States readiness to use military force to expand its territorial control is a matter of record. Let’s remind ourselves of the seizure of Florida from Spain in 1819,
the war of conquest against Mexico that ended with the annexation of vast territories, the 1898 American instigated war with Spain that gave the U.S. possession of Puerto Rico, Cuba (de facto) and the Philippines. There is nothing remotely comparable
as regards China’s conduct in Asia – despite their having ample means and opportunities to take the imperial route.*
More recently, America invaded and occupied Iraq on the flimsiest of pretexts, invaded and occupied Afghanistan – among other military actions across the Greater Middle East and Africa. Those places are many thousands of miles away from the United States.
Compare to China’s garrisoning of the disputed uninhabited sandbars we call the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea.
17. Western policymakers, and most analysts, superimpose on China a great power template modeled on their own history. They ascribe to Beijing’s leaders a Realpolitik mentality that presumes an inevitable contest for dominance that is rooted in the nature
of interstate politics. Yet, China’s history indicates that its behavior does note neatly fit this model. The country has demonstrated little appetite for conquest, for the subjugation of other nations, for ruling foreign peoples (with the notable exception
of its dominion over Vietnam in the first millennium C.E.) China’s gradual expansion to the West and Southwest largely entailed the defeat and then assimilation of various ‘barbarian’ adversaries. Their characteristic approach to neighbors and trading partners
emphasized the desire that they demonstrate a degree of deference and/or accept tributary status.
18.This conclusion is substantiated by China’s extraordinary oceanic expeditions in the early 1400s - nearly a century before Europeans states embarked on their great era of exploration. From our Euro-centric view of world history, we ignore or slight events
that occurred in other parts of the world and/or do not fit our narrative. Too, we denigrate the accomplishments of other civilizations. This remarkable period of Chinese engagement with the wider world is an outstanding case in point.
The figure associated with this feat is admiral Zheng He – who was Muslim. His fleets were enormous, comprising up to 255 ships - Treasure ships and escort vessels - whose size, naval engineering, armament and complement of 28,000 sailors/soldiers dwarfed anything
that the Europeans were able to launch until the 18th century (in terms of size, the 19th century). Each Treasure ship was twice as big as the Nina/Pinta/Santa Maria combined. Seven voyages over twenty-five years traversed all of Southeast Asia (perhaps as
far as Australia’s north coast), the Indian Ocean up to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. and the Swahili coast of Africa. The Chinese built no forts, installed no garrisons, left no permanent trading posts and annihilated no native peoples. They returned
with an abundance of gifts, tribute and exotic animals.
This great enterprise was cut short suddenly by Imperial decree in 1435. It dictated that all existing ships be burnt, the shipyards disbanded, and the crews dispersed. The motive is obscure: the heavy cost, the limited benefits, preference for keeping China
insulated from foreign influences, an Emperor’s whim? Not at all the attitude of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, English or French monarchs. Westerners are uncomprehending of such bizarre self-denying behavior.
18. The United States and China do have one significant characteristic in common. Each esteems itself exceptional and superior. That conceit takes very different forms, though. Americans believe themselves born with a mission to lead other peoples along the
enlightened path they have blazed – whether as by model, mentor or midwife. The Chinese believe that their uniqueness cannot be matched or imitated by other nations – much less that they have cause to assist them in trying. The implications are profound.
20 .19. China is preparing itself for any eventually. Its preference is clearly for ‘peaceful coexistence’ albeit with elements of rivalry. If the United States, with its allies in the collective West in tow, insists on trying curbing China by aggressive means,
it will fight back. In effect, Xi et al are saying: “the choice is yours.”
Xi stated that in so many words at his meeting with Biden in San Francisco. The unspoken thought:
in any event, we will outlast you; China enjoys the Mandate of Heaven. Given the state of the American Republic and Europe’s terminal decay, that is not just an idle boast.
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