Russian Opposition and Russian Resistance: The Landscape Before the Battle for Power
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue:
The six aforementioned groups constitute the Russian political opposition. Three Russian units fighting on the frontlines as official autonomous parts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, however, should be added to this list.[25] First, the largest of them is the Freedom of Russia Legion, followed by the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Siberian Battalion. They were formed in different ways, have different military specialties, and include people of various types, but they are united by one thing—readiness to bear and use arms to defend their values against Putinism. Regarding the Freedom of Russia Legion, which this author had the honor of representing politically in 2022–2024, it includes representatives from the most diverse political tendencies, including former supporters of Navalny, nationalists, leftists, and liberals. The units at the front are complemented by a fairly large internal Russian urban resistance movement, which is currently five to seven times larger than the number of people at the front.
In general, resistance inside Russia is organized in the form of various loose networks. Some of them have grown at the completely grassroots level, while others have been created in coordination with the three units fighting at the front in Ukraine, thus resembling De Gaulle’s movement, which started under the name of Free France and evolved into Fighting France. Their activities can be seen constantly in news reports about acts of sabotage on railroad trains carrying military cargo, attacks on infrastructure facilities inside Russia that have military significance, and even attacks on military bases inside the country. This movement is growing, and its members are real heroes. Paradoxically, it is safer to participate in armed resistance than in nonviolent protest in Russia. Of the current over 1,500 political prisoners in Russia, only about two hundred are people who were associated with the resistance, while the rest were involved in nonviolent actions.[26] This fact is easy to explain: those who engage in armed attacks usually do everything to avoid being caught and remain anonymous, while “ordinary” political activists are in full view of everyone. Thus, the Russian security services come for them quickly and send them to camps.
Finally, there is a growing number of national liberation movements in the regions and republics of the Russian Federation, which the Free Nations League and the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum primarily coordinate.[27] Discussions about their views and actions in the Russian opposition are probably the toughest. The topic of a possible collapse of the Federation, actively sought by many Ukrainians, remains taboo for most Russians. Some believe that the country must be preserved within its internally recognized borders at all costs, regardless of anything, and quite aggressively attack anyone who disagrees, including physical threats to “deal with the separatists.” Others, while sympathetic to the struggle of national republics, believe that this topic is toxic for their relations with the West, which is obviously afraid of the collapse of the Russian Federation and nuclear proliferation, the People’s Republic of China’s strengthening position in Siberia, and chaos stemming from a possible internal war. Just as the West once did not support the collapse of the Soviet Union, its official circles now do not support even a hint of discussion about the self-determination of the peoples that comprise the Russian Federation.
The CPD, which has adopted a resolution that it will unconditionally respect the right of peoples to self-determination, is a special case in point, which is why Russian regionalists and representatives of national liberation movements regularly attend it. The position of the Congress is simple: there is no need to push anyone to secede from Russia, but it is a crime to hold anyone inside by force. Russia’s strength lies in its regions, particularly in grassroots self-government. Any actions aimed at suppressing diverse regional identities, cultures, languages, and overall regional self-determination will play a negative role and may lead not to the strengthening of the future Russian Republic but to its weakening.
Nevertheless, there is quite an active discussion on this topic, and the position of the international community plays an important role. Numerous questions regarding this position remain: What standards will be used to approach the future of Russia? Will it be treated like any other country, and will the rights of its people be treated like the rights of people living in other countries? Or will they encourage anti-democratic, imperialist tendencies in certain Russian opposition groups in the name of important geopolitical concerns, primarily related to Russia’s nuclear status, just as Putin was once encouraged to tame the people of Chechnya? At the same time, supporting Ukraine’s armed struggle can be considered correct not only from a moral perspective—in times of war, the defender always deserves support—but also from a pragmatic perspective. The likelihood that there will be a very significant number of former state, private, and criminal armed groups left on Russian territory after the collapse of Putin’s regime is extremely high. For this reason alone, the new government must have the ability to defend itself independently of the former compromised security apparatus.
Financial Crisis, Political Infighting, and Strategic Paralysis
By 2025, the Russian opposition had plunged into a deep financial crisis triggered by the collapse of USAID-backed funding.[28] The FRF and the ACF were among the hardest hit, launching an aggressive competition for dwindling European funds.[29] The FRF halted its meetings entirely. Many media projects were either downsized or shut down altogether. Only two structures remained financially resilient: the AWC and the CPD, led by Ilya Ponomarev. Unprecedented internal strife was also seen in 2024. ACF accused Nevzlin—Khodorkovsky’s lifelong business partner—of orchestrating an assassination attempt on Volkov, following the latter’s political attacks against Nevzlin’s ally.[30] Volkov himself came under scrutiny for failing to disclose receiving funds from sanctioned oligarch Mikhail Fridman, allegedly in exchange for lobbying efforts to remove him from sanctions lists.[31]
Katz, who received media backing from Khodorkovsky, accused ACF of collaborating with corrupt Russian bankers and providing false testimony in asylum cases.[32] In response, ACF denounced Katz for business dealings with Kremlin-linked tech firms and accused Khodorkovsky of participating in election fraud and suppressing democracy during the 1990s to secure business advantages. Further scandals erupted when Katz accused the Free Russia Foundation, the influential U.S.-based non-governmental organization, of using U.S. State Department funding to run ACF-linked internet troll farms, which allegedly targeted not only the Kremlin but also rival opposition figures. Nevzlin later attempted, unsuccessfully, to seize control of the CPD, igniting additional tension. The cumulative effect of these disputes was devastating for the opposition. Communications and support from the European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), U.S. officials, Poland, and Ukraine were effectively frozen, as cooperation with the Russian opposition became potentially toxic for mainstream Western politicians.
Most factions of the Russian opposition—excluding the CPD—chose to openly support the Democratic Party’s 2024 campaign in the United States, intensifying their criticism of U.S. President Donald Trump. This alignment further complicated formal contacts with U.S. institutions and other allied governments, limiting the opposition’s access to decision-makers across the West.
Meanwhile, the looming uncertainty of a potential Russia-Ukraine peace deal cast a paralyzing shadow across opposition planning. Moderates such as Khodorkovsky retreated from public engagement, uncertain of how to proceed if hostilities ended. Radicals such as Kasparov, in contrast, have vocally criticized U.S. efforts at diplomacy, which have triggered accusations that they represent a “party of war.” Opposition figures skeptical of the armed resistance and its association with Ukrainian partners seized the opportunity to question the legitimacy of structures such as the CPD and prematurely declared their “political bankruptcy.” All opposition groups now confront a common dilemma: none can convincingly offer their followers a coherent and viable future strategy. This is especially detrimental to the CPD, which had positioned itself as a provisional governing body in a post-Putin transition. Without a clear horizon, the Russian opposition movement must pivot from short-term wartime relevance to an indefinite, uncertain long game.
Importance of Consolidated Opposition
It can be argued that if Russian opposition leaders do not value unity above their personal ambitions, then why should anyone else? Should one wait until the Russian elite appoints a successor or wait for a new leader to emerge if the regime collapses, as happened in 1991?
Representatives of the armed wing of the Russian opposition—the Russian resistance—gave their answer to this by acting already. Making strategic decisions, however, is always about a risk-reward calculation. To wait and do nothing means more deaths in Ukraine, a risk of escalating the war beyond Ukraine to the territory of NATO states, and resigning to the idea that somebody from Putin’s inner circle will succeed him. Many say that to act means to risk a suicidal nuclear conflict and a bloody civil war inside Russia. Indecisiveness, however, should not be covered by describing such scenarios. Every day, one can already see conflicts in Russia with burning refineries and derailed trains. Putin is not a nuclear jihadist, judging by his long tables in the Kremlin to protect him from an unfiltered disease.
A strong opposition will create internal problems for Putin and help divert him from external escapades. A strong opposition taking over in Moscow can end the war against Ukraine and any wars inside Russia, de-occupy territories, reintegrate Russia with the West, restore trade and foreign investments, and repay the damages of the war, which otherwise would be financed by Western taxpayers. A strong and united opposition, in the sense of a single organization or party, however, is hardly possible because activists often hold divergent views on the future of the country and sometimes different values. Attempts to create a few joint structures in the past demonstrated this. The best example was the left-right coalition The Other Russia, which included both supporters of Kasparov’s neoliberal United Civil Front (UCF) and members of Eduard Limonov’s National Bolshevik Party (NBP).[33] As a result, both the UCF and the NBP were annihilated, and most of their networks were lost. The most recent failure was the Coordination Council of the Opposition, established during protests in 2012 and consisting of 45 prominent opposition figures, which failed to adopt even the rules of its own activities in a year of work, and most of whose members simply went home.
A coalition of various forces with different views, which would coordinate activities using various methods of struggle, is quite possible. The creation of a coalition shadow government of the Russian Republic, recognized by the international community, is also possible.
This government would include representatives of both resistance fighters and the opposition movements supporting them, each of which contains professionally accomplished individuals capable of taking responsibility for the country’s fate during the transition period. It can take all necessary steps, coordinated with the states of the Rammstein coalition, to encourage Russians to fight against aggression. It should be stressed, however, that any union that denies cooperation with the armed part of the opposition can never become the real power in Russia.
How the West Can Help Consolidation
Western political circles consistently call for Russian oppositionists to unite before talking about Russia’s future. This creates even more intense competition between different political groups. Everyone wants to be in charge, to be the most visible, to be heard by Western politicians, to become the center of unification, and to receive an exclusive mandate. This is especially the case since politicians in emigration are mostly intellectuals, not workers, with a lot of free time, who often direct their energy into a struggle with each other.
On the other hand, the West does not notice or pretends not to see those who are fighting against aggression in Ukraine and on the home front, and who have little time for blogging and political intrigues. Western officials consider such people dangerous and unpredictable and believe any ties with them may backfire. This is why they are not invited to various events and are not called to join coalitions. The part of the opposition that has taken on the heavy burden of organizing real resistance and hastening the end of the war and the fall of Putinism scares traditional politicians due to their desire to completely reset Russian statehood and the methods they employ.
As a result of these factors, there is little assistance, but rather sabotage, in creating truly inclusive opposition alliances. Ultimately, attempts to create such coalitions fail because they lack the core of freedom fighters to make the whole structure meaningful and aimed at political action. The reason for this lies in the lack of understanding of the challenges to global security and human values posed by Putinism and its policies, which is encouraged by the indecisiveness of the free world. The faster this realization comes, the sooner the focus of attention will shift toward the most decisive and capable segments of the Russian opposition—its resistance movement. The most meaningful policy aimed at ending the war and preventing another Putin or someone even worse from emerging in Russia is to create discussion platforms and venues that will be open to all representatives of the Russian opposition without exception. Both the methods of struggle and concrete projects aimed at building a new Russian state must be discussed. Such mechanisms can help ensure that Russia will become part of the Western world and cease to exist as a tyranny, an empire, and a prison for individual citizens and entire nations.
Endnotes
[1] Trudolyubov, Maxim, Evgeny Romanovsky, Izabella Tabarovsky, and Rashad Shirinov. “Opposition Divided over History Leading to Putin.” Wilson Center, April 23, 2025. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/opposition-divided-over-history-leading-putin.
[2] Furman, Dmitrii, Keith Gessen, and Tony Wood. 2022. Imitation Democracy: The Development of Russia’s Post-Soviet Political System. Translated by Ian Dreiblatt. English language edition. London: Verso. Verso Books. https://www.versobooks.com/products/354-imitation-democracy?srsltid=AfmBOopY15C4nlaKWrp42J1oJaTHPwZTA693gpdQfwP9JH2pFbHW4WyM.
[3] Golosov, Grigorii. “Russian Opposition: Inside or Outside the System?” OpenDemocracy. September 1, 2011. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russian-opposition-inside-or-outside-system/.
[4] Kostenko, Nika, Margarita Zavadskaya, Emil Kamalov and Ivetta Sergeeva. “The Russian Rhizome: A Social Portrait of New Immigrants.” Re:Russia. January 11, 2023. https://re-russia.net/en/expertise/045/.
[5] Fishman, Diana. “Compatriots 3. How Descendants of White Russian Emigres Became the Kremlin’s Key Agents of Influence in France.” The Insider. The Insider. February 21, 2023. https://theins.ru/en/politics/259554.
[6] RFE/RL’s Echo of the Caucasus. “Igor Girkin, Imprisoned Russian Nationalist, Plans to Join Troops Invading Ukraine.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. RFE/RL. April 10, 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-girkin-strelkov-ukraine-invasion-prison/32899197.html.
[7] Ingram, Alan. 2001. “Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia.” Political Geography. Volume 20, Issue 8, November 2001, Pages 1029-1051. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629801000439.
[8] Puglisi, Rosaria, Bertrand de Franqueville, Ivan Gomza, Mollie Saltskog, Kacper Rekawek, Taras Tarasiuk, Petro Burkovskiy, and Przemysław Witkowski. 2024. In the Eye of the Storm Origins, Ideology, and Controversies of the Azov Brigade, 2014-2023. Edited by Christian Kaunert, Alex MacKenzie, and Adrien Nonjon. 1. Auflage. Hannover: ibidem. https://elibrary.utb.de/doi/book/10.24216/9783838277509; and “U.S. Lifts Ban on Providing Weapons and Training for Ukraine’s Controversial Azov Brigade.” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service. June 11, 2024. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-lifts-ban-on-providing-weapons-and-training-for-ukraines-controversial-azov-brigade.
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[10] Matveev, Ilya. “How Russia’s Liberal Technocrats Became…Just Technocrats.” Jordan Russia Center. Accessed May 25, 2024. https://jordanrussiacenter.org/blog/how-russias-liberal-technocrats-becamejust-technocrats.
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[14] The Bell. “Team Navalny Film about 1990s Oligarchs Divides Russia’s Opposition.” The Bell. The Bell. April 23, 2024. https://en.thebell.io/team-navalny-film-about-1990s-oligarchs-divides-russias-opposition/.
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[19] Congress of People’s Deputies, https://rosdep.org/.
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[25] Kyiv Post. “‘Irpin Declaration’ on the Cooperation of the Russian Opposition against Putin’s Regime.” Kyiv Post. September 1, 2022. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/5321.
[26] Gozman, Leonid. “Russia’s Political Prisoners Must Not Be Forgotten.” Atlantic Council. October 1, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-political-prisoners-must-not-be-forgotten/.
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[28] Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-estimates-usaid-cuts.
[29] Free Russia Foundation. https://www.4freerussia.org/.
[30] “Poland Detains Two Men Suspected of Attack on Russian Opposition Figure in Lithuania.” Notes From Poland. April 19, 2024. https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/04/19/poland-detains-two-men-suspected-of-attack-on-russian-opposition-figure-in-lithuania/.
[31] “Mikhail Fridman – Putin’s Oligarchs.” Coda Story. February 5, 2024. https://www.codastory.com/instagarchs/mikhail-fridman/.
[32] The Bell. “Reputation Whitewashing’ Scandal Rocks Russian Opposition.” The Bell. October 9, 2024. https://en.thebell.io/reputation-whitewashing-scandal-rocks-russian-opposition/.
[33] The Other Russia. Accessed May 25. http://www.theotherrussia.org/; Manifesto of the United Civil Front, Wayback Machine. Accessed May 25, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20050610022403/http:/www.rufront.ru/; Yasmann, Victor. “Russia: National Bolsheviks, The Party of ‘Direct Action.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. RFE/RL. April 29, 2008. https://www.rferl.org/a/1058689.html.