Eroding What’s Left of Congressional Arms Transfer Oversight
By Elias Yousif
- June 4, 2025
Amidst an unprecedented disruption of governing norms, President Trump’s recent decision to break with longstanding practice to bypass congressional holds on arms transfers to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may seem like a relatively minor act of defiance. From the dismissal of inspector generals, to the shuttering of independent agencies, to the liberal use of wartime authorities to sidestep legal constraints, the White House is engaging in an extraordinary effort to emancipate itself of the oversight mechanisms that underpin the balance of power between the co-equal branches of government. However, given the already beleaguered state of the security cooperation oversight ecosystem, the disregard of the “tiered review process” for U.S. arms transfers represents a serious blow to a critical guardrail for a profoundly consequential aspect of U.S. foreign policy.
Why the Informal Notification Process Matters
Informal “holds” on arms sales represent one of the few practical instruments Congress has to meaningfully intercede in the arms sales process. These holds are part of the “tiered review process,” whereby the executive branch provides the relevant congressional committees advance notice of a proposed arms sale before formally submitting the transfer for congressional review. Though not required by law, the executive branch has traditionally refrained from formally notifying Congress of a proposed sale over the objections of the Chair or Ranking members of the Senate Foreign Affairs or House Foreign Relations committee – thereby creating a congressional “hold.”
The tiered review process provides an important mechanism for inter-branch dialogue on arms transfer decisions. It allows certain lawmakers to ask questions, raise concerns, and request modifications to the terms of a transfer while also providing the executive branch an opportunity to engage and address legislative criticism behind closed doors without risking the diplomatic sensitivities of a public rebuke.
The tiered review process is all the more important in the context of Congress’s limited ability to shape arms transfer decisions through its formal authorities. The statutory notification process required by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is meant to trigger a time-bound opportunity for lawmakers to consider the proposed sale and, if necessary, block the transfer with a Joint Resolution of Disapproval (JRD). While passing such a legislative measure in both the House and Senate is a notable barrier in and of itself, if the JRD is enacted, it goes to the President for signature, where it will almost certainly be subject to a veto. Unless Congress can marshal a two-thirds majority to override the presidential veto – an exceedingly rare phenomenon – the arms sale can proceed. Unsurprisingly, Congress has never successfully blocked an arms sale with a JRD, even on the rare occasion that it has managed to enact one.
Moreover, the AECA also provides the President an emergency authority to waive the notification process altogether. While the emergency waiver has historically been a sparingly used authority, its invocation is becoming more common, including with respect to emergencies of questionable validity.
What the Sidestepping of Informal Holds Means for Oversight
The President’s decision to defy the informal hold on arms transfers to the UAE placed by Congressman Gregory Meeks is troubling for a number of reasons. Most immediately, the transfers send a clear signal that the United States is willing to implicitly endorse the UAE’s intervention in Sudan’s devastating civil war and ensuing humanitarian crisis. Since at least 2024, Abu Dhabi has been accused of providing arms and military support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a paramilitary group accused of genocide by the U.S. government.
But as a matter of oversight, the dispensation of the informal hold speaks to the Trump administration’s broader approach to arms transfers and portends poorly for other checks and balances in the security cooperation enterprise. Indeed, this is the second time in President Trump’s current term that he has defied congressional holds to engage in arms transfers – in February, the administration bypassed a similar hold on an arms package to Israel despite specific congressional concerns about the weapons’ likely contributions to international humanitarian law violations in Gaza. And during his first term, President Trump used his emergency authority to circumvent bipartisan congressional opposition to send arms to a Saudi-led coalition waging a military campaign in Yemen that was contributing to what the UN labeled at the time “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”
The subjugation of these norms could offer a glimpse into the Trump administration’s vision for rewriting the arms transfer review process more broadly. In April, the White House signed an executive order intended to speed up the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process by, among other measures, reducing the “rules and regulations involved in the development, execution, and monitoring of foreign defense sales and of transfer cases.” That effort dovetails with a parallel effort led by HFAC Chairman Brian Mast to examine arms transfer processes and propose reforms. Though discussion of arms sales reform is not new, given the Trump administration’s apparent eagerness to consolidate authority within the executive as well as past legislative discussions on reducing the regulatory burden of security cooperation, there is a serious risk that any reforms will eliminate safeguards, reduce public and congressional reporting requirements, and further undermine the ability of Congress to intercede in arms transfer decision making.
Given the scale and scope of the Trump administration’s attacks on the guardrails of executive power, the disregard for an obscure, non-statutory practice for arms transfers might seem of only marginal significance. But arms sales are no trivial matter. Across the globe, U.S. weapons play a profound role in shaping international security, governance, and civilian protection environments. Without appropriate levels of oversight, the risk of short-sighted and irresponsible transfers only grows. In this context, the erosion of what little is left of Congress’s authority over arms transfers is all the more concerning.