Five months ago, alliances and grand strategy dominated defense discussions. That feels like a different era. Now, they've been replaced by contradictory and often unaligned U.S. policies that defy easy categorization.
Asian governments are struggling to understand the conflicting signals sent almost daily from the White House. Abandoning old notions about principled policies will ease the transition towards more transactional engagement. That increasingly means joining commercial interests with defense interests in light of an unpredictable and capricious U.S. administration.
A case in point is the development of the 2025 U.S. National Defense Strategy focused on "America First and Peace Through Strength," which, when published, will lay out the White House's global military agenda.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has tapped Elbridge Colby to lead the efforts as undersecretary of defense for policy. He's a seasoned, serious policymaker and a long-time defense hawk who understands the complicated security situation in the region very well. That could be good news for many countries in Asia, except for China, which will remain a chief U.S. rival.
Even so, high policy, along with every other international relations norm, is on shaky ground. There was the flip-flop on supporting Ukraine, then Russia, then Ukraine, and now maybe neither. President Donald Trump has backed Israel against Hamas while accepting a luxury jumbo jet from Hamas-backed Qatar. He talks about invading allies like Canada while threatening to end decades-old European partnerships.
Developing a long-term strategy to engage with the U.S. when what it now stands for is mainly itself, can defy usual defense policy making logic.
That's in part because historical Republicans no longer hold sway on the party. Even Trump's previous term does not provide much guidance. Trump's first administration still operated under the vague guidelines of traditional, neoconservative defense policy. The 2018 National Defense Strategy still mentioned the priorities like maintaining "favorable regional balances of power" in the Indo-Pacific, and to defend "allies from military aggression," including a now expired reference to "fortifying" the transatlantic NATO alliance.
"America First" was not the priority. Now it clearly is. Those two words are far more than political rhetoric. They are the defining character of a U.S. administration convinced that life was better when most goods were made in America -- even if that means global trade-destroying tariffs that make the country potentially less safe and prosperous in the process.
Foreign U.S. defense engagement is quickly being absorbed by three overarching goals -- more U.S. jobs, bigger markets for U.S. goods, and better terms on existing defense agreements. There isn't much grand policy beyond that. And the new strategy is likely to include more references to making other countries pay for their own defense than highlighting areas for cooperation, as Defense Secretary Hegseth made clear at his recent Shangri-La dialogue speech in Singapore. Asian nations that can't translate their military needs within this new framework will likely receive less consideration from the White House.
One strategy that may gain attention is the wedding of security concerns with commercial interests. Protecting and opening markets for U.S. goods is an incentive for the Trump administration to take regional defense seriously. Ukraine negotiated military support to protect itself from Russia's onslaught based on a commercial deal to share its critical mineral wealth. Regional balance of power and Russia's territorial expansionism never seemed to enter the discussion.
Vietnam also appears to see this very clearly. By fast-tracking $1.5 billion worth of Trump-connected real estate projects, the leadership has not only made a case for lower tariffs, but also gives the White House a reason to stay engaged in regional affairs. Potential conflict with China's aggressive claims in the South China Sea could now have economic implications for the Trump family. That's an interest the White House appreciates, along with countries that buy more U.S.-made defense technology, as India is now doing, or ones that increase their domestic defense budgets and carry more of the cost for U.S. troops -- a pay-as-you-go security model.
While this may contradict the broader aims of supporting regional and global institutions, it isn't much different to how other major powers currently operate. China has pursued very transactional foreign policies, many with military and defense implications using its Belt and Road Initiative and other foreign infrastructure projects.
Developing countries far and wide have accepted massive infrastructure investments that in turn favor of Chinese initiatives at the United Nations, open their ports to Chinese military vessels, and increasingly engage in joint military exercises.
As the new U.S. defense strategy takes shape, expect more expectations for quid-pro-quo arrangements. There may still be some semblance of grand strategy, but dealmaking and the confluence of personal gain with national interest is U.S. policy in all but name. There's little reason to think that will change once a defense policy strategy is formalized in writing.