Taiwan war game triggers US questions over island’s ‘will to fight’ if PLA attacks
The exercise simulating a 2030 assault by the PLA highlighted ‘systemic weaknesses’ that may make America more reluctant to intervene
Lawrence
Chung 14 Jun 2025
A high-level civilian war game held in Taipei this week has exposed serious vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s defences of its outer perimeter and eastern regions, prompting a retired US admiral to warn that Washington’s involvement depended on “Taiwan’s will to fight”.
In the exercise simulating a 2030 cross-strait conflict, Taiwan lost control of key outlying territories – most notably Penghu, a group of islands 50km (30 miles) east of the main island – as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched a multifront assault that quickly outpaced Taiwan’s initial response.
The two-day simulation, organised by three Taiwanese think tanks led by the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, is one of the most detailed publicly conducted strategic exercises modelling a full-scale assault by mainland Chinese forces.
It reflects mounting concerns among local strategists and retired military leaders that Taiwan’s eastern flank and offshore islands remain dangerously exposed amid intensifying PLA threats.
The result of the war game – whether the PLA seized Taiwan – or when the final outcome will be confirmed has not been made public, but the organisers said they would issue a full report.
Four teams represented Taiwan, the United States, Japan and mainland China, overseen by a control group.
Notable participants included Michael Mullen, a former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dennis Blair, a former US Pacific commander; and Shigeru Iwasaki, former chief of staff of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces. Nine retired Taiwanese generals and admirals, including Lee Hsi-min, former chief of the general staff; and eight lieutenant generals also took part.
The war game started in June 2030, with Beijing reeling from economic stagnation and domestic unrest. With US-Taiwan ties deepening – including frequent visits by US cabinet officials – Beijing decided to act decisively.
In the opening phase, the PLA sent state-affiliated vessels within 12 nautical miles (22km) of the island – the international limit for territorial waters.
The Taiwan team avoided direct engagement, instead deploying coastguard and navy ships to shadow the vessels and positioning submarines in “ambush zones” northeast and southwest of the island.
Tensions escalated in the second phase as Beijing deployed three PLA carrier strike groups across the South China Sea and the first and second island chains. Mainland coastguard ships also began inspecting and diverting energy tankers and US arms shipments bound for Taiwan.
The first and second island chains – strategic defence lines extending from mainland Japan, through Okinawa and Taiwan to the Philippines, and farther out to Guam – are key to the US strategy of containing PLA naval expansion. Their control is crucial for limiting PLA access to the Pacific.
By phase three, the PLA had seized the Taiwanese-controlled Pratas Island, or Dongsha, imposed a naval blockade, launched long-range missile and cyberattacks against Taiwan’s financial and energy infrastructure and even sunk two Taiwanese warships.
At this point, prices for flights leaving Taiwan surged thirtyfold, fuelling public outrage over perceptions that only the wealthy could flee.
When asked by the US team whether Taiwan would attempt to retake Dongsha, Team Taiwan declined. This inaction prompted sharp criticism from the control group, which extended the phase and warned Taiwan’s team to “go home tonight and seriously consider a response”.
The Taiwan players justified their restraint by citing the principle of not firing the first shot and the need to preserve their forces on the main island, but the US team said the PLA actions had gone far beyond grey-zone harassment.
The control team criticised Taiwan’s reluctance to respond, emphasising that the scenario was designed to test decision-making under pressure – particularly in the non-military phase, where mainland coastguard ships had already rammed Taiwanese vessels without military reprisal.
Michael Tsai Ming-hsien, a former Taiwanese defence minister who observed the drill, urged Taiwan to develop a clear doctrine for how it would respond to “first strikes”.
“While restraint is sometimes prudent, enduring repeated attacks without reprisal is unsustainable,” he said, noting that the US team had proposed more assertive actions, including seizing mainland Chinese vessels.
In the final phase, the PLA bypassed Taipei and launched simultaneous amphibious, helicopter and airborne assaults on Taiwan’s eastern counties and offshore islands.
Penghu and Pingtung, a county on the southern tip of Taiwan, fell quickly, followed by the capture of Hualien, Taitung, and Yilan – areas on the east coast of the island that house critical backup infrastructure, reserves and logistics stockpiles.
The PLA established forward operating bases at ports and airfields in eastern Taiwan, securing beachheads. Team Taiwan ordered the closure of the Hsuehshan Tunnel and mountain highways to block PLA movement towards Taipei.
Strategically, the loss of Penghu was a major blow. Its central location in the Taiwan Strait offered the PLA a forward base for staging sustained operations against Taiwan proper. Observers warned that the existing defences on Penghu were inadequate given its outsized importance.
During the simulated attack, the US team warned that a collapse in morale among the Taiwanese government or public would severely compromise the military’s will to resist.
To boost resolve, they proposed that Washington discreetly warn Beijing that an attack would trigger US “recognition of Taiwan as an independent state” – both as a political signal and a morale boost for Taiwan’s public and armed forces.
Several senior retired commanders took part in the exercise. Photo: CNABeijing – which views Taiwan as part of its territory and has vowed to bring the island under its control, by force if necessary – has intensified military pressure since Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te, who has described the Chinese mainland as a “foreign hostile force”, took office last year.
While most countries – including the United States – do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, Washington remains the island’s largest arms supplier and opposes any attempt to seize it by force.
At this point in the scenario, with Taiwan under blockade and already in wartime conditions, the US, Japan and other allies would mobilise to help defend the island, with US marines being sent to the coast.
The US players estimated Taiwan’s forces would need to hold out for two to three weeks until reinforcements could arrive. While threats from North Korea and Russia might complicate planning, the US team said these would not change Washington’s strategic objectives in the Taiwan Strait.
Lee Wen-chung, former director of the government-funded Institute for National Defence and Security Research, praised the simulation for its realism and political neutrality. “It didn’t sugar-coat anything,” he said. “It effectively revealed systemic weaknesses in our defence posture.”
Lee recommended that responsibility for Penghu’s defence be reassigned to the marine corps, which is better suited for island warfare than the army. He also warned that Taiwan’s energy supplies, food reserves, and communication nodes in outlying areas were “excessively fragile.”
He highlighted the PLA’s use of helicopter assaults and airborne drops – often overlooked in favour of amphibious scenarios – as a critical threat. However, Lee cautioned that the war game was modelled on current or expected 2030 hardware, which might not necessarily reflect the real situation by 2030.
The scenario assumed Taiwan had received all the US weapons it had paid for and had fully deployed asymmetric platforms by 2030. But Lee added that US intervention was not guaranteed, stressing that Taiwan must demonstrate the capacity and determination to defend itself long enough for outside help to arrive.
He echoed a warning issued during the game by Blair, who played on the US team, that US intervention would depend on the cause of the conflict and Taiwan’s own commitment to self-defence.
At a press conference following the simulation on Wednesday, Blair emphasised that “Taiwan’s will to fight will have a great deal of effect” on US decisions. If a conflict were triggered by Taiwanese moves towards formal independence, he added, US support would be far less certain.
Asked whether the game’s outcome meant the PLA would ultimately prevail, retired deputy army commander Wang Shao-hua – who played on the mainland China team – replied that the goal was not to declare winners or losers but to identify “weak points in our planning and policymaking”.
Huang Huang-hsiung, chairman of the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, said the exercise aimed to “help the government respond more comprehensively to a future crisis and ensure national security”.
Taiwanese Defence Minister Wellington Koo welcomed the civilian contribution, saying on Wednesday: “The military already conducts rolling updates to its contingency and operational plans based on likely PLA actions and tests them in both simulations and live-fire exercises.”