[Salon] Iran/Israel: Bits and Pieces



Iran/Israel: Bits and Pieces

Summary: Israel’s 13 June and subsequent strikes on Iran have thrown up more questions than they have answered. The signs are that both the conflict itself and the consequent heightened uncertainty are set to drag on for some time to come.

“Israel is not building a better tomorrow, it is destroying whatever could threaten it.”

Emile Hokayem, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 13 June 2025

For analysts such as myself, one of the worst things a journal editor can do is demand an assessment of a fast-moving and highly unpredictable ‘event’, such as the war between Iran and Israel, which is exactly what has been asked of me! Much as I would have liked to respond with a smooth and compelling account of how events will unfold, this is quite beyond my abilities. So, instead here are a few thoughts and pointers on five key issues.

First, as I have argued in several previous Newsletters, timing aside no-one should have been surprised by Israel’s attack on Iran. Indeed, in retrospect (and even putting to one side last week’s withdrawal of non-essential US personnel in the region) even the timing wasn’t so surprising. As Shashank Joshi wrote for The Economist on 13 June:

“…Israel saw a golden opportunity to act. Last year’s skirmishing had left Iran’s missile defences weakened, its missile stockpile depleted and its main regional ally, Hizbullah, on its knees. Israel might also have wanted to torpedo an America-Iran deal that they worried would be lenient on Iran.”

Thanks, in part, to the aforementioned US personnel withdrawal, markets were not as surprised as they might have been. An immediate ten percent spike in the price of oil quickly eased and by close of business on Friday Brent crude was back just below US$75 per barrel (pb), i.e. where it stood on 1 January. Looking  ahead, I can only reiterate what I have been saying for months, i.e. the market is awash with oil and can most likely compensate for the total loss of Iran’s exports of around 1m barrels per day (bpd) even without the additional 411,000bpd the Opec+ eight will pump as of 1 July. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz may fall away for a while (e.g. for insurance reasons). But it would be hard for Iran physically to block the Strait especially with the US navy standing offshore and prepared to counter any such attempt.

Above all, keep in mind that the consistent pattern since 7 October 2023 has been for conflict escalation to spur a price spike which has faded quickly once markets have absorbed the initial shock. As things stand, the balance of probabilities is that we shall see another re-run of this pattern over the coming days; and I can certainly see no reason to raise my forecast for Brent for 31 December of US$65pb.


Iran and Israel have exchanged missiles and air strikes, after Israel launched a sweeping air offensive, killing top generals and scientists.

Second, while Binyamin Netanyahu may be correct that Tehran is closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon than ever before, there are grounds for caution over his claim that its programme was “accelerating” towards that end (let alone that it was preparing to hand nukes to its proxies). Nevertheless, it is now clear that Washington not only knew about the attack in advance but had, at least tacitly, accepted that Israel should go ahead with it. What we do not know is the extent to which the US is providing active support (e.g. intelligence sharing, mid-air refuelling) beyond helping to intercept Iranian missiles and drones aimed at Israel. No matter — the risk that the US gets drawn in deeper (which may be both Mr Netanyahu’s dearest wish and Tehran’s greatest dread) remains a very real one. On the other hand, despite Iran’s pulling out of a further round of talks scheduled for 15 June, a resumption of negotiations cannot be ruled out completely, potentially causing friction between the US and Israel.

Third, how does this all end? Even among the ‘heavyweight’ media, opinions on this range from Armageddon to a more stable and peaceful Middle East. However, no-one can even predict with certainty whether we shall see the collapse of the regime in Tehran, which seems to be Mr Netanyahu’s goal, and what the consequences of this would be. This being said, since at least the turn of the century the history of regime change across the region — whether internally driven or otherwise — is hardly a happy one. Thus, as the BBC’s Amir Azimi has argued, the Israeli prime minister is taking a “big gamble” which could all too easily precipitate a “descent into chaos” in Iran to the detriment of the region as a whole. After all:

“…a major question here is who might be the alternative? Iranian opposition forces have been highly fragmented in recent years and there are no clear options here.”

Fourth, can Israel wipe out Iran’s nuclear programme? Writing in Foreign Affairs on 14 June Richard Nephew suggested that destroying nuclear installations and even killing nuclear scientists is important but not sufficient. The real issue is whether Israel can “destroy Iran’s will to move forward” with the programme. Without coming to a firm conclusion, Mr Nephew is clearly doubtful that Iran would “accept a deal at the barrel of a gun”…and then stick to it.

Fifth, what of the geopolitics? In a 13 June note — which argued that Mr Netanyahu is fulfilling what he, at least, sees as his “historic mission” — Niall Ferguson and Harry Halem theorised that Israel is helping reestablish Western deterrence against the ‘Axis of Authoritarians’ which blossomed during the Biden presidency, i.e. China, Iran, North Korea and Russia.  I disagree. Even if Mr Netanyahu is not pursuing a course intended to undermine any hope of an American-brokered peaceful defanging of Iran, his actions are surely based purely on his perception of Israel’s interests and his own self-interest, not the ‘greater good’ of the West. Furthermore, none of the other three members of this rather loose club is about to rush to Iran’s aid or be deterred in any way as far as their own intensions over, respectively, Taiwan, South Korea and Ukraine are concerned. At best, therefore, this latest escalation in the post-October 2023 conflict is geopolitically neutral; at worst, it is further accelerating the unwinding of the post-1945 rules-based international order.

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