Iran and Israel have exchanged missiles and air strikes, after
Israel launched a sweeping air offensive, killing top generals and
scientists.
Second, while Binyamin Netanyahu may be correct that Tehran is closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon than ever before, there are grounds for caution over his claim that its programme was “accelerating” towards that end (let alone that it was preparing to hand nukes to its proxies).
Nevertheless, it is now clear that Washington not only knew about the
attack in advance but had, at least tacitly, accepted that Israel should
go ahead with it. What we do not know is the extent to which the US is
providing active support (e.g. intelligence sharing, mid-air refuelling)
beyond helping to intercept Iranian missiles and drones aimed at Israel. No matter — the risk that the US gets drawn in deeper
(which may be both Mr Netanyahu’s dearest wish and Tehran’s greatest
dread) remains a very real one. On the other hand, despite Iran’s
pulling out of a further round of talks scheduled for 15 June, a resumption of negotiations cannot be ruled out completely, potentially causing friction between the US and Israel.
Third, how does this all end? Even among the ‘heavyweight’ media, opinions on this range from Armageddon
to a more stable and peaceful Middle East. However, no-one can even
predict with certainty whether we shall see the collapse of the regime
in Tehran, which seems to be Mr Netanyahu’s goal, and what the
consequences of this would be. This being said, since at least the turn
of the century the history of regime change across the region — whether
internally driven or otherwise — is hardly a happy one. Thus, as the BBC’s Amir Azimi has argued, the Israeli prime minister is taking a “big gamble” which could all too easily precipitate a “descent into chaos” in Iran to the detriment of the region as a whole. After all:
“…a major question here is who might be the alternative? Iranian
opposition forces have been highly fragmented in recent years and there
are no clear options here.”
Fourth, can Israel wipe out Iran’s nuclear programme? Writing in Foreign Affairs on 14 June Richard Nephew
suggested that destroying nuclear installations and even killing
nuclear scientists is important but not sufficient. The real issue is
whether Israel can “destroy Iran’s will to move forward” with the programme. Without coming to a firm conclusion, Mr Nephew is clearly doubtful that Iran would “accept a deal at the barrel of a gun”…and then stick to it.
Fifth, what of the geopolitics? In a 13 June note — which argued that
Mr Netanyahu is fulfilling what he, at least, sees as his “historic
mission” — Niall Ferguson and Harry Halem theorised that Israel is helping reestablish Western deterrence against the ‘Axis of Authoritarians’
which blossomed during the Biden presidency, i.e. China, Iran, North
Korea and Russia. I disagree. Even if Mr Netanyahu is not pursuing a
course intended to undermine any hope of an American-brokered peaceful
defanging of Iran, his actions are surely based purely on his perception
of Israel’s interests and his own self-interest, not the ‘greater good’
of the West. Furthermore, none of the other three members of this
rather loose club is about to rush to Iran’s aid or be deterred in any
way as far as their own intensions over, respectively, Taiwan, South
Korea and Ukraine are concerned. At best, therefore, this latest
escalation in the post-October 2023 conflict is geopolitically neutral;
at worst, it is further accelerating the unwinding of the post-1945
rules-based international order.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.