America is sleepwalking into another unnecessary war
Here we are, on the brink of another Middle East conflict with Iran – one that was entirely preventable
As the United States inches closer to direct military confrontation with Iran,
it is critical to recognize how avoidable this escalation has been. “We
knew everything [about Israel’s plans to strike Iran], and I tried to
save Iran humiliation and death,” said Donald Trump on Friday. “I tried to save them very hard because I would have loved to have seen a deal worked out.”
As two of the last analysts from an American thinktank to visit Iran,
just three weeks ago, we can report that Iran’s own foreign ministry
and members of the nuclear negotiating team were eager to work out a
deal with Steve Witkoff, the US special envoy to the Middle East, and
showed no indication they were interested in slow-walking talks.
Over the course of conversations held on the sidelines of the Tehran Dialogue Forum,
high-level foreign ministry officials expressed concern about the
potential for a spoiling effort by the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu,
and various staff and officials showed themselves open to considering a
variety of scenarios including a regional nuclear consortium for
uranium enrichment under international oversight and bilateral areas of
diplomatic and economic engagement with the United States.
What
we heard should have been cause for cautious optimism – yet instead,
Washington squandered a rare diplomatic opening, seemingly allowing Israel to start a disastrous war of choice that may soon drag in the US.
Contrary to the narrative that Iran was dragging its feet in
negotiations, we saw no evidence of deliberate stalling. In fact, Iran’s
worsening economic crisis had created a strong incentive for Tehran to
strike a deal – one that would provide sanctions relief in exchange for
limits on its nuclear program, with even the possibility of broader
normalization with the US on the horizon. Middle-class Iranians we spoke
with elsewhere in Tehran were frustrated with the economic situation
and, despite a highly developed sanctions-resistant economy, eager for
sanctions relief allowing them greater access to international travel
and trade.
Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, emphasized
flexibility on nearly every issue outside Iran’s red line on low-level
uranium enrichment. That was echoed in private conversations we held
with foreign ministry staff and members of the nuclear negotiating team.
Domestic enrichment is non-negotiable for Iran but they believed
they had front-loaded their concessions to Witkoff, offering up a 3.67%
limit on their enrichment with whatever monitoring and surveillance
mechanisms were necessary for the US to feel confident the deal was
being honored.
Enrichment, even at a low
level, is a matter of national pride, a symbol of scientific achievement
and a defiant response to decades of sanctions, the red line
consistently stated in our conversations and one which they thought was
agreeable to Witkoff. Iran claimed to be completely blindsided by
Witkoff’s 18 May statement
that zero enrichment was the only acceptable terms for a nuclear deal
but was open to returning to talks to discuss ways forward. After
weathering immense economic pain to develop this capability, no Iranian
government – reformist or hardline – could feasibly surrender to the
zero enrichment demand. The idea that Tehran would dismantle its
enrichment program in 60 days, as the Trump administration demanded, was
never realistic.
The Iranian government seemed empowered enough to make a deal – if the US had been willing to take yes for an answer
This
was not mere stubbornness – it was rooted in deep mistrust sown by
Trump. The US had already violated the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) by
unilaterally withdrawing during Trump’s first term, despite Iran’s
verified compliance. Why would Tehran now accept another agreement
requiring total denuclearization, with no guarantee Washington wouldn’t
renege again?
Iranian officials signaled openness to creative solutions, including shipping excess low-enriched uranium to Russia; forming a regional consortium for enrichment; allowing
US inspectors to join International Atomic Energy Agency teams – a
major shift from previous positions. Other ideas were also floated at
the Tehran forum, albeit not from official sources – temporary
suspension of enrichment and a pause on advanced IR-6 centrifuges as
confidence-building measures.
Araghchi’s expressed willingness to return to JCPOA-permitted
enrichment levels (below 4%) – was a concession so significant that it
drew criticism from Iranian hardliners for giving too much, too soon.
This was not the behavior of a regime trying to stall; it was the
posture of a government eager for a deal, engaged in an effort to avoid
spoilers in Jerusalem, Washington and at home in Tehran, and knowing
full well that long, drawn-out negotiations would offer more, not fewer,
opportunities for enemies of diplomacy to strike.
The
US team, led by Witkoff and mediated by Oman, seemed to share this
urgency. The Iranian government seemed empowered enough to make a deal –
if the US had been willing to take yes for an answer.
Yet here we are, on the brink of another Middle East conflict – one
that was entirely preventable. Instead of seizing this rare moment of
Iranian flexibility, the US chose escalation. The consequences may be
catastrophic: a wider regional war, soaring oil prices and the total
collapse of diplomacy with Iran for years to come.
It is still possible to step back from the brink. Tehran has signaled
willingness to re-engage in talks if Israeli ceases attack. Omani
channels remain open. Yet, after the start of the Israeli bombing
campaign, the political space for negotiations has shrunk.
The
US is sleepwalking into another Middle East quagmire, an open-ended war
with unclear goals, loose talk of regime change and the potential for a
regional conflagration if Iran attacks US military installations in the
Persian Gulf. And this war comes after Iran extended a real offer for
compromise. If Washington chooses bombs over diplomacy, history will
record this as a war not of necessity, but of tragic, reckless choice.
-
Eli Clifton is senior adviser at Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
-
Eldar Mamedov is non-resident fellow at Quincy
Institute for Responsible Statecraft and member of the Pugwash Council
on Science and World Affairs