About the time Thomas Friedman published his latest NYT column yesterday, I too had the thought: What if somehow, the current chaos could be manipulated in such a way that Iranian Ayatollahs were taken down a big notch, Netanyahu’s reign of terror ended, and a Palestinian state alongside a hostage release? Wouldn't that be nice.
As much as I’ve admired and agreed with some of Friedman’s other big-idea columns the last year (and his support for the 2020 Abraham Accords), this time I think he’s far surpassed my own efforts to find a golden ticket. What he proposes — the US threatens to destroy Iran's enrichment centers if Iran fails to submit to full IAEA inspections, while pressuring Netanyahu to accede to the lesser of his two evils, a Palestinian state alongside Israel — is now wholly unrealistic. Unless it occurs by total freak accident.
A former esteemed US diplomat colleague who happens understands Iran better than the vast majority of US diplomats, and understands other things as well — put his finger on it: The core problem is that in the last few years, and notably the last year, US diplomacy has completely lost its capacity for fine movements. Every tool is now a blunt instrument. And the kind of diplomatic virtuosity that would be required to pull off something like what Friedman proposes is now simply beyond US intentional capacity. The people with the requisite knowledge and skills to create flexibility are not in the building, nor making the decisions.
One might reasonably argue, as Trump has and does, that fine-tuning also comes with an efficiency cost — Biden, according to this view, may have had more resources at his disposal, but he was also incapable of using them. Indeed, the policy choice seems at times one between the pathologically cautious intellectual and the reckless schoolyard bully. And it’s not completely clear which is better, or worse.
CNN says Trump is 'leaning' towards assisting Israel with bunker-busting bombs that only the US possesses, to finish off the destruction of Iran's enrichment facilities. Trump has also just called for Iran's "unconditional surrender," which would seem to suggest that Trump has given up on a 'deal'. Or maybe he views this as a precondition for a deal. Several Democratic senators have said they're confused as to what Trump's policy actually is.
I'm guessing we will bomb, and that ultimately we'll have a very injured but still dangerous Revolutionary Government in Iran, or chaos. And I'm worried that the Iranian leader has given some thought to a 'poison pill' that he's saved up for such an outcome. The American Enterprise Institute published an op-ed two days ago in which it argued that Iran may try to use a dirty bomb — spreading enough lower-level enriched uranium around the Israeli atmosphere. This only makes sense if Supreme Leader Khamenei believes his time is up (Trump has signaled the US knows where he is…. and is waiting). I personally don't know much about what's required to manufacture such a device, and if Iran is able to deliver it.
If that outcome is dodged, and the Iranian government falls — in some form— the obvious question is: What next? I don’t think anyone knows. Iran's main instruments of control — the IRGC, the Basij, and the bonyads, e.g., may outlive the regime, and provide candidates for power that are as bad or even worse.
There is no unified Iranian opposition and no single charismatic figure waiting in the wings of exile. And Iranians, even if many hate their government, tend not to like to be told by outsiders what to do — which is why Iran's efforts to get a bomb are so widely approved domestically. Iran isn't Iraq — or Libya, but the possibility for anarchy still exists. And here's where blunt force on the US side will be no help at all, as blunt force doesn't rebuild states. As America has seen time and again in the Middle East.
Unfortunately, and counter to Friedman's generous hopefulness (he does say in the piece that he can't venture to guess what Trump will ultimately do) — Gaza and the Palestinians are unlikely to benefit from this latest ratcheting up of the stakes (Sinwar was rather short-sighted as his Iranian backers). Nor do things look great for the remaining, unimaginably long-suffering hostages.
It's no comfort to say that everything we've seen now has been predictable, with a short lag, after the Hamas 10/7 attack: Israel's invasion of Gaza, the large Gazan casualties, Israel's pivot to Hezbollah, etc. Anyone who has followed Netanyahu's career has seen the destruction of Iran's existential threat as the clearest theme. And once Netanyahu had a Gaza massacre on his hands, and knowing his own unpopularity, the only way he could redeem a 'legacy' was to be the hand that removed Iranian nukes — at least, the physical components. So we've seen all this play out in slow motion. And given the way the script has played out since October 2023, it seems very likely the US will intervene directly.
But getting rid of the Ayatollahs doesn't necessarily bring peace or security. And if it does, the question of whether all of this this was a sane risk to take will remain open. What's quite certain is that the Middle East is likely in for a long period of instability.
The fundamental problem remains: when diplomacy becomes a blunt instrument, surgery becomes demolition. And in the Middle East, the rubble has a way of burying everyone.
The Middle East-Told Slant offers a non-partisan, practitioner's perspective on Middle East politics, conflict, and culture. Written by a former US diplomat, Senior Middle East Analyst, and author of "Benghazi: A New History" (Hachette, 2022) and the forthcoming "Red Sea: A History of the World's Most Volatile Waterway." To receive weekly posts and support this project, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. I offer paid subscribers a complimentary copy of any of my books in print (equivalent to the cost of the subscription — DM me to redeem).