[Salon] ‘We Will Also Strike’: IRGC Alleges Pakistan Nuclear Threat to Israel in War Scenario

[Chas Freeman <cwfresidence@gmail.com>]

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‘We Will Also Strike’: IRGC Alleges Pakistan Nuclear Threat to Israel in War Scenario

Speaking on Iranian state television, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general Mohsen Rezaei declared, “Pakistan has told us that if Israel uses nuclear missiles, we will also attack it with nuclear weapons.”

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 Jun 16, 2025

Pakistan's ballistic missile

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — In an explosive and deeply consequential claim, a senior member of Iran’s National Security Council has stated that Pakistan would retaliate with nuclear weapons against Israel if the latter were to launch a nuclear strike on Iran.

Speaking on Iranian state television, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general Mohsen Rezaei declared, “Pakistan has told us that if Israel uses nuclear missiles, we will also attack it with nuclear weapons.”

Rezaei’s bold assertion, broadcast nationwide, follows Pakistan’s declaration of unwavering support for Iran in the aftermath of Israeli military actions that targeted critical sites within the Islamic Republic.

Although no official Pakistani military or civilian leader has confirmed any nuclear contingency against Israel, Islamabad has vocally backed Iran, framing the solidarity within the broader context of Muslim unity.

Rezaei further asserted that Iran possesses undisclosed capabilities and tactics not yet revealed to the public or adversaries, signaling a potentially broader scope of asymmetric or strategic retaliatory options.

Addressing Pakistan’s National Assembly on June 14, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif called for an immediate and unified response from the Islamic world to counter what he termed Israel’s unrestrained aggression.

“Israel has targeted Iran, Yemen, and Palestine. If Muslim nations don’t unite now, each will face the same fate,” he warned, directly appealing to those Muslim-majority states maintaining diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv to sever relations.

Asif also urged the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to convene an emergency summit to craft a collective strategic and diplomatic countermeasure to Israeli regional operations.

Mohsen Rezaie

“Pakistan has deep ties with Iran and Islamabad stands by Tehran in this difficult time,” he declared, further stating, “We stand behind Iran and will support them at every international forum to protect their interest.”

While the political rhetoric is powerful, the strategic question emerging from this confrontation is whether Pakistan has the capability—and willingness—to project nuclear power beyond South Asia in defence of an ally.

As of mid-2025, Pakistan is estimated to possess approximately 170 nuclear warheads, a figure expected to climb to around 200 by year’s end, according to multiple Western intelligence and nuclear proliferation monitoring agencies.

Unofficial projections extend the possible future arsenal size to between 220 and 250 warheads, potentially allowing Pakistan to overtake India and rise as the world’s fifth- or sixth-largest nuclear weapons state.

At the core of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is “Full-Spectrum Deterrence”—a flexible posture that enables the use of tactical, battlefield, and strategic nuclear weapons in response to threats ranging from conventional incursions to existential crises.

Unlike India and China, Pakistan categorically rejects a “No First Use” policy, which gives it strategic ambiguity but also invites scrutiny regarding escalation thresholds.

This doctrine is operationalized through an increasingly diversified arsenal that includes short-range systems like the Nasr (Hatf-9) for battlefield use, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles from the Shaheen series, and the Babur cruise missile family.

“Shaheen-III”

Most geopolitically significant among these is the Shaheen-III medium-range ballistic missile, which has a declared range of 2,750 kilometers.

This range not only covers all of India but also extends well into the Middle East, including Israel, should a launch originate from western or southern Pakistan.

While Islamabad has made no official statements indicating Israel is within its nuclear target list, the technical capability places Tel Aviv squarely within hypothetical reach—especially under extreme regional scenarios or wartime contingencies.

Given Pakistan’s longstanding alignment with several Arab and Islamic nations, coupled with its unwavering rhetorical and diplomatic support for the Palestinian cause, analysts are increasingly re-evaluating Pakistan’s role in any potential Israel-Iran escalation.

Operational characteristics of the Shaheen-III—solid-fuel propulsion, road mobility, and modern inertial guidance systems—enable rapid deployment and survivability, reinforcing Pakistan’s second-strike credibility.

Even more concerning for regional planners is Pakistan’s ongoing development of the Ababeel MRBM, which features Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability.

If successfully fielded, this system would allow Pakistan to launch a single missile carrying multiple warheads, each programmed for distinct targets, thereby overwhelming even advanced missile defence systems like India’s S-400 and Israel’s Arrow or Iron Dome.

Shaheen-III

Pakistan also continues to refine its Babur-1B and Babur-3 cruise missiles, enabling land- and sea-based launch platforms that provide flexibility and potential for future sea-based nuclear deterrent operations—though an operational SLBM has yet to be confirmed.

This rapid expansion of both quality and quantity in Pakistan’s nuclear triad introduces new complexity not just to South Asian deterrence dynamics, but also to the broader Middle Eastern strategic architecture—especially amid deteriorating Israel-Iran relations.

If Islamabad were to recalibrate its strategic orientation westward in future conflict scenarios—driven by ideological alliances, religious solidarity, or geopolitical realignment—the technical capacity to target Israel becomes a defence planning variable with profound implications.

Yet, it is important to emphasize that Pakistan’s official military doctrine remains India-centric, and no deployment patterns, military exercises, or policy statements have suggested any intent to project force toward Israel or the broader Levant.

Nevertheless, the fundamental rule of deterrence remains: capability often equals perceived intent, especially in times of high geopolitical tension.

As Pakistan’s nuclear architecture matures and its strategic calculus evolves, its deterrent posture—once purely focused on India—is transforming into a potential wildcard in both Asian and Middle Eastern security theatres.

Shaheen-III

With Israel remaining within the outer bounds of Pakistan’s missile envelope, and with Islamabad deepening ties with nations hostile to Tel Aviv, the convergence of ideological rhetoric, technical reach, and regional instability raises alarms that can no longer be ignored.

Pakistan’s emergence as a nuclear power capable of projecting force well beyond its borders marks a defining shift in the strategic geography of deterrence.

And in a world increasingly defined by overlapping theatres of conflict and rapidly shifting alliances, Pakistan’s arsenal may no longer be a purely South Asian affair—but a strategic factor in the volatile nexus of Middle Eastern security.