The
West’s “understanding of Iran’s strategic calculations is hopelessly
inadequate and dangerously out of date. The West still looks at Iran
through the prism of the 1979 Revolution, and the central role that
religion, and the clergy played in it.” The author of this timely book
reminds his readers that “the war in Gaza made it clear that Iran today
sees itself as the inspiration for a global movement of resistance to
the United States – a reinvocation of the familiar anti-imperialism and
anti-colonialism ideals of the latter part of the twentieth century.”
The methodical anti-imperialism of the New Left thinking of the latter
part of the 20th century undergirds Ayatollah Khamenei’s conviction that
genuine development cannot come from engaging the West but rather only
by decoupling from it. Contrary to many in the West, the author argues
that “the authoritarian nature of the Islamic Republic notwithstanding,
it is strategic considerations rather than managing dissent and domestic
stability that is front of mind for Iran’s rulers.”
This vision is rooted in the trauma of the war with Iraq which
started a few months after the birth of the new regime. The institutions
built up to fight the war became its backbone and were accompanied by a
narrative of “sacred defence” which led to the creation of alliances
through which Iran was able to contest the regional order. Iran was
never interested in exporting revolution but opposing American hegemony.
The new republic saw Israel through the prism of anti-imperialism and
the Palestinian struggle and adopted an uncompromising posture vis a vis
Israel as a means of gaining influence on Arab public opinion.
The book expertly dissects the creation and empowerment of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a “fateful decision” according
to Vali Nasr which would “have the most impact on Iran’s foreign
strategy down the decades.” A triumphant IRGC became the regime’s
Praetorian guard which anchored the country’s national security in a
“battlefield mentality that continues to privilege those in uniform at
the expense of diplomats in shaping the country’s foreign policy.” Its
“usurpation of political power” has been reflected ever since in Iran’s
regional policies. Vali Nasr faults Ayatollah Khomeini’s “consequential
strategic mistake” to continue the war with Iraq “with the aim of
removing Saddam from power.” In seeking to conquer and shape the
politics of an Arab country he “underestimated the resilience of Iraqi
nationalism and overestimated how much Shia identity could override that
fealty.” The war weakened pragmatic revolutionaries favouring rational
state building at home and the normalisation of foreign relations
abroad. Never did the dictum of sociologist Charles Tilly that “war made
the state” ring more true.
The author describes the three cold wars which have pitted Iran
against the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel since 1979. Iran and Israel have
been locked in a contest for dominance of the Middle East which
exploded into open warfare after Hamas attacked Israel on 7th
October 2023. Israel’s stated objection may be the elimination of
Iran’s nuclear programme but “its broader aim is to end Iran’s ability
as a regional rival.” Khomeini’s initial idea that Iran and its allies
must lead the Palestinian cause was viewed as their ticket to acceptance
in a Sunni world long hostile to Shiism. The idea was initially
successful but no longer is. Iranian proxies have been mauled.
Another factor which has shaped Khamenei’s world view is the collapse
of the Soviet Union. “He saw that unravelling as the consequence of the
dissipation of ideological vigilance and embrace of Western liberal
ideas in its stead.” He became determined that Iran’s revolution would
not go down that road. His constant disparaging of reform in Iran and
insistence on ideological fidelity have not served his country well.
On the fundamental point of nuclear weapons, the author argues
that Khamenei never saw them as an end in themselves but as a means of
securing technical deterrence. So important was retaining ambiguity and
leverage that he agreed to the Joint Compromise Plan of Action which, in
2015 “limited but did not eliminate Iran’s missile programme” in return
for the lifting of sanctions. This allowed Iran to “preserve its
strategic gains while reducing economic pressure.” Tactical flexibility,
which can take the guise of diplomatic openings, regional
rapprochements, disruptive opportunities and also calibrated restraint
remain the hallmark of the Islamic Republic and the author concludes
these are “all tools that reinforce a deeply held siege mentality.”
Iran’s modern history as Vali Nasr describes it is “one of the
interplay between the imperative of security and the task of state
building.” But as it (re)constructs its strategy after the Israeli-US
bombings, Khamenei or his successors can act either as a fox or a
hedgehog. The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big
thing. “The choice is between flexibility and adaptability versus
steadfast commitment to one big idea”. Khamenei has “showed flashes of
pragmatic suppleness” in signing a nuclear deal in 2015 and normalising
relations with Saudi Arabia in 2023 but “in his unwavering pursuit of
resistance as the answer to Iran’s security needs (he) has acted as a
hedgehog.” The question which concludes this enlightening book is
“whether the Islamic Republic understands that it must adopt the
malleability of a fox if it is to survive the contingencies to come.”
The twelve-day war has consolidated Israel’s position as the dominant
military power in the region but whether it will put an end to Iran’s
nuclear program is an open question. The more belligerent minds in the
West and Israel might also reflect that if Iran fails as a state, its
sheer size will pose a threat to stability in the Gulf, the Middle East,
Europe and, dare one say, the world.
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