War Now Indefinitely Sustainable, as New Reports Prove Russian Armor Production Has Finally Reached Equilibrium
Last week we learned that the US’ 155mm artillery munitions production had suffered a major setback, falling from the peak 50,000 per month milestone, back down to a measly 40,000.
Now we turn to new revelations surrounding Russia’s own production of key systems, which have been tracked and updated by various Western agencies and OSINT experts.
The most significant of which has been an update on Russian tank production, specifically the T-90M. This is the most important Russian production line for the simple fact that it remains the only purely new tank being built from scratch in Russia, rather than tanks assembled from old stockpile hulls. This means that to some extent, the future of Russian armor depends on the T-90M line because if the war were to continue for years to come, it is obviously conceivable that old hulls will at some point run out, and the T-90M is the only model that can continue to be produced indefinitely.
First, on the team that did the research: it was done by Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), which is a kind of open-source think tank formed by Russian dissident Ruslan Leviev back in the early part of the Donbass conflict and Syrian war of the 2014-2015 era. He is wanted by Russian authorities, and as such his team’s findings are obviously done through a pro-Western and pro-Ukrainian slant—which is what makes them all-the-more interesting, given the conclusions made.
Their main paper is found here.
I’ll post the full bullet points from the ‘key findings’ section, and comment on each in turn:
By the time serial production of the T-90M tank began in 2020, the Russian state-owned manufacturer Uralvagonzavod had produced between 120 and 150 original T-90 tanks for the Russian army (ed: this means total production), along with roughly 280 T-90A models.
In the post-Soviet period, Uralvagonzavod managed to preserve its production capacities, including its ability to manufacture armored hulls. At the peak of demand in the 2010s, the plant could produce up to 140 tanks annually, while also manufacturing tank assembly kits.
By the outset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Uralvagonzavod had launched serial production and modernization of the T-90M Proryv [Breakthrough] tank, delivering between 66 and 85 of these tanks to active units. An additional ten were sent to the Kazan Higher Tank Command School. As of late 2021, the company aimed to reach an annual output of around 60 tanks.
Thus, by February 2022, the Russian army possessed between 65 and 85 T-90M tanks, along with 370 to 380 older T-90 variants.
Here we see that Russia was producing a reported ~60 or so T-90Ms per year by the start of the SMO. Remember, this refers specifically to the most advanced T-90M Proryv line, as opposed to regular T-90 or T-90A mentioned earlier. They state that at the start of the SMO, Russia possessed a total of 65-85 T-90Ms and 370-380 other older T-90 varieties.
Following the start of mobilization, all stored T-90A tanks were withdrawn from reserves and assigned to several units within the Russian Armed Forces. The original T-90s remained in reserve but were subsequently sent back to Uralvagonzavod for modernization.
According to our estimates, Uralvagonzavod produced 60-70 T-90M tanks in 2022. In 2023, amid efforts to mobilize the defense industry, output may have increased to 140-180 tanks, and by 2024, it may have surpassed 200 units annually, possibly approaching a production rate of 250-300 tanks per year.
Here we see that while in 2022 Russia was producing 60-70 T-90Ms, by 2023 it had increased to 140-180, and by 2024 it may have reached 200+ per year, and possiblyeven as high as 300.
The availability of new armored hulls does not appear to be a limiting factor and has not impeded production. All T-90M tanks currently being produced are newly built.
This is the most significant of the statements: they confirm that all T-90Ms currently being built are completely new, and not mere refurbs of older hulls, like T-90As converted to T-90M standard, etc. Recall as I said, this is an anti-Russian analysis team, which means they have no incentive to make things up for Russia’s benefit—and in fact the opposite.
Since the war began, at least 540-630 T-90M tanks have been manufactured—this includes both newly built and modernized vehicles. Given that over 130 of them have been destroyed, an estimated 410-500 remain in service—approximately 15 percent of the tanks deployed on the front.
Uralvagonzavod is actively working to expand its production capacity. The company has issued tenders for the procurement and installation of welding stations and machining stands for tank hulls. This equipment is expected to operate 24/7. These steps suggest a likely further increase in production speed.
Here we learn that despite potentially reaching 300+ per year production numbers, UVZ is still expanding its production capacity.
And here is the biggest kicker which dovetails with my own analysis which I’ve been writing about for a long time:
With armored vehicle use—and therefore losses—expected to decline in 2025, current production levels will likely suffice to maintain the RuAF’s tank numbers for at least several more years of combat operations.
Q.E.D.
Read that again. Russian tank losses have shrunk to such a level, that Russia’s current and expanding production capacities for tanks at this point essentially reach an equilibrium—or will soon. That means predictions about Russia only being able to prosecute its war for another “year or two” are now defunct: Russia is reaching the ability to fully maintain its losses indefinitely.
This comes amidst recent reports from other OSINT analysts which highlight Russia’s dwindling armor losses.
Read carefully:
In short, Russian tank losses for 2025 are on track to hit an annualized 492, based on Oryx and other sources. However, they have been slowing down each month, so it’s possible even this track is overly optimistic toward Ukraine. It could end up being 400 or less.
Put the two trends together and you get the following: Russian tank losses are trending down toward 400 a year and less, while Russian tank production of brand new, non-refurbed, tanks is already at 300+ according to the CIT report, and is trending positively upward with the acquisition of major new equipment lines as proven by procurement tenders analyzed by the team.
That means—if it hasn’t already done so—Russian tank losses and production will soon converge to be a total net zero, which would balance out the tank production as infinitely sustainable from that point forward.
The CIT report notes that these aren’t even the most optimistic—for Russia—possible outcomes, given that the Russian T-80 Omsktransmash line has been in talks to be restarted since 2023 or so. If the line comes online sometime in the future to produce completely new T-80s—rather than refurbs and upgrades as it does now—then Russia will be gaining a large net positive in new tanks over losses.
Recall that the net zero equilibrium that may have already been reached only pertains to brand new tanks, i.e. T-90Ms. But in terms of total tank production, which includes all the refurbished and upgraded T-72B3Ms, T-80BVMs, T-62Ms still being sent to the front, Russia has now vastly surpassed losses. The total tank production when you count these amounts to 1200-1500 per year, and we just learned that Russia’s tank losses are now trending toward ~400+ per year total. That means Russia has already completely staunched the bleeding of its heavy armor—it’s simply that the above mentioned refurb hulls will eventually run out, since there is only a finite number of them. This is why the T-90M equilibrium with losses is more important, as those can be produced indefinitely.
Two other important mentions: Some on the pro-Ukrainian side claim Oryx data under-represents losses as it’s impossible to catch every single loss. In reality, Oryx data likely over-represents losses because it does not take into account the huge amount of Russian armor losses which are recovered after the fact, repaired and sent back to the front. Russia has a far more robust engineering corps than Ukraine which means a much larger portion of its “losses” are recovered. The Oryx team counts anything that is “hit” by a drone as a loss, no matter what happens to it afterwards. Particularly now that Russia is advancing everywhere, it has much greater ability to recover all vehicles hit from both sides along the line of contact.
For those interested, Le Figaro actually covered the CIT report about Russian T-90M production as well. The article touches on the above:
…the loss figures, which are steadily falling: in the first five months of 2025, “only” 200 Russian tanks were confirmed as lost, according to the CIT study, or some 480 if the figure is reported on a yearly basis. This would be half as many as in the first three years of the war.
Le Figaro’s own ‘strategic experts’ apparently corroborate some of the CIT’s analysis:
Fewer tanks, fewer losses, but their production in Russia is accelerating.This is also the rather alarming conclusion of the CIT note and of French military sources interviewed by Le Figaro. This trend gives rise to fears of the creation of a “strategic reserve” of tanks, which Russian forces would keep behind the front and which could be used when the time came to exploit a feared breakthrough in the event of even a localized collapse of the front.
As noted above, they believe Russia can create a huge ‘strategic reserve’ of tanks to pour through a major breakthrough on the front. We know for a fact Russia is creating such a reserve from previous reporting that virtually all new Russian T-90Ms are being sent to newly created brigades ‘in the rear’, of which I wrote about here:
Another Shocker: WSJ Reveals Russia Arming Massive New Rear Reserve Force
A new Wall Street Journal article has the conflict analysis world gibbering:
Which stated:
Unlike pea-brained OSINTers, the Le Figaro staff actually touch on what I mentioned about Russian tank recovery by way of advancement:
As the Russians advance on the battlefield, it is they who recover damaged vehicles from the battlefield. Not all are beyond repair, and many are sent back to the front for restoration: each tank can thus have several lives.
Le Figaro states that the data parallels other types of light armor and artillery, when it comes to Russian versus Ukrainian attrition:
Proof, here too, that the conflict in Ukraine, which has rapidly become a war of attrition, is turning to Russia's advantage, as it is undoubtedly wearing down, but not as quickly as Ukrainian forces.
“What's true of tanks is also true of armor and artillery,” notes the officer. As for drones, a field in which the Ukrainians were at the forefront at the start of the war, here too the curve is bending or even reversing: in June, the Russians are expected to fire over 5,000 Geran drones, the indigenous version of the Iranian Shahed that they now produce themselves, on a large scale.
Today, Ukrainian forces number less than 400,000 operational soldiers, whereas the Russians are fielding more than 650,000 in Ukraine, according to our information. In the autumn of 2022, however, the Ukrainians still had a numerical superiority in terms of manpower.
Read the last paragraph—one wonders how Russia gained such a ‘numerical superiority’ in manpower?
But what’s more is that several Ukrainian OSINT sources have reported that as of the last few months, Ukraine has been taking more armored losses even by their owncount. It started with the Kursk invasion, where for the first time in the war, according to them, Ukraine took vastly more armored losses. But it has continued, peaking in the last two months.
Here is one such report:
APC and IFV Losses of Russian and Ukrainian Forces from June 1 to June 30, 2025:
54 Losses for Ukraine
46 Losses for Russia
I have used Lostarmour and Ukrwarspotting for the confirmed losses because they follow strict rules. By that, I mean the vehicles must be recorded as being hit, burning, and geolocated, so you can find everything there.
I wasn’t actually expecting this; usually, Russian losses are 1.5 to 2.5 times higher in APCs and IFVs because Ukrainians use a lot more MRAPs and other armored vehicles for their advances, which generally results in similar losses for both sides monthly.
It’s interesting to see how both sides, especially the Russians, have significantly changed their tactics for conducting offensives, moving from large armored columns to 2-3 APCs/IFVs at most. Sometimes, Russia still conducts large columns, like the one this month where they lost around 9 BMP-3s (which is why there are fewer images in the post) in one attack, but it’s not that often anymore. Ukraine did something similar a month ago, wasting 9 vehicles in Toretsk city, but for the past few months, it’s mostly been Ukraine using up to 6 or more vehicles in their attacks. It’s also important to note that both Ukraine and Russia are using motorcycles and ATVs, and at the moment, it’s working pretty well for Russia, even though they’re sustaining some significant losses. This strategy allows them to push harder and faster.
Also, something I have noticed is that Ukrainian main APC losses at the moment are mostly M113 (all types), with about 30 losses per month, while BMP losses are much lower. A few months ago, both were equal in numbers, but Ukraine is likely running out of their BMP Soviet stock.
Others also believe Russia is now net positive in light armor losses vs. production.
The CIT report concludes:
However, from the second half of 2024 and especially in 2025, there has been a significant change in the scale and frequency of armored vehicle use. Using motorcycles and civilian passenger vehicles instead of tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles on the frontline, while leading to increased personnel losses, has significantly reduced armored vehicle losses.
Thus, the reduction in losses, combined with the current production pace and the ongoing modernization of older tanks, will allow the RuAF to maintain the current level of armored vehicle supply for at least several more years. Moreover, if the loss trend for this year remains unchanged, the size of the Russian tank fleet may even increase by several hundred units per year, despite ongoing combat operations.
It touches on the reason for why Russian armored losses have been so low: Russia has changed tactics to using civilian vehicles and motorcycle assaults, because armored columns were deemed to be sitting ducks in the modern drone-dominated environment. Heavily up-armored tanks turned, essentially, into moving ‘barns’ are still used for penetrations, and to ‘soak up’ damage from drones, but overall much fewer tanks are used in direct assaults.
Russia has been taking its moto-assaults very seriously, establishing entire training regimens, methodologies, and tactics toward their use, rather than merely allowing soldiers to ad hoc their way into enemy territory with a few donated bikes, as was perhaps the case in the beginning.
Recent demonstrations:
And from the Russian 40th Marines Brigade:
Ukrainian reserve officer-turned-analyst Tatarigami wrote up a special analysis of the coming of age of these Russian tactics:
He goes into detail about the structures and tactics, like each motorcycle assault team having a designated anti-drone EW unit, etc. The assault tactics themselves are covered as well, from flanking to pincer maneuvers:
Common Tactical Maneuvers Used by Motorcycle Assault Groups:
- Single Flank: Motorcycles maneuver around the enemy’s position from a flank to strike
- Pincer Movement: Coordinated flanking from both sides aimed at overwhelming or encircling the target.
Deep Penetration: Rapid advance beyond the first line of defense to disrupt rear-area logistics, rotations etc
Diversionary Maneuver: Aimed at drawing enemy attention and fire away from the main assault force
Reconnaissance-in-Force: Probing enemy positions while mobile
Beyond direct combat, motorcycle units fulfill other support roles. They conduct limited medical evacuation - extracting wounded personnel one at a time due to space and weight constraints, and carry critical supplies such as food, water, or ammunition within their load limits
From another source:
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The second update deals with Russian strategic bombers. Recall weeks ago when Ukraine carried out strikes against Russian Tu-95s, I had written about the fact that Russia had begun restarting its Tu-160 production line several years ago. This flew in the face of Western claims that any losses of the ‘priceless’ Tu-95s were absolutely critical for Russia, as it no longer had any capability of building long range strategic ‘bombers’ of any kind; I put bombers in quotes owing to the fact that neither the Tu-95 nor Tu-160 are actually used in bomber roles, but rather missile platforms.
Now, after several years, we finally have an update on this. This week new satellite photos revealed that the Russian Kazan Aviation Plant which builds the Tu-160s has seen massive expansion just in the past year alone:
Planet Labs has released satellite imagery showing significant expansion at the Kazan Aviation Plant, where Russia produces its heavy strategic bombers. New buildings have appeared on the factory grounds. The largest of them is roughly 320 meters long with an area of about 19,000 square meters—equivalent to three football fields.
Reportedly, some of the expansion is to increase production rates of Tu-214s, a variant of the Russian Tu-204 airliner. Interestingly, this particular airliner model has already been adapted by the military for several purposes, including as observation plane for the now-defunct Open Skies Treaty, as radar platform, and airborne command center:
Tu-214R
Special-mission versions of the Tu-214 commercial transport aircraft, developed under the codename 'Project 141', to replace the Il-20 ELINT platform. The aircraft are configured to carry the MRC-411 multi-intelligence payload, to include electronic intelligence (ELINT) sensors, side-looking Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and other Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).
Most interestingly, there were recent unsourced rumors that Russia was considering utilizing the Tu-214 as missile platform to augment the existing Tu-95 and Tu-160 fleets:
This could be akin to the US’ Rapid Dragon program, which strove to provide a ‘low cost’ method to deploy cruise missiles out the back of C-17s and C-130 transport planes.
Either way, given the slow pace of Tu-160 production, even the vast expansion of the Kazan Aviation Plant premises is unlikely to boost numbers by an overly dramatic amount. The pace for both newly constructed and upgraded Tu-160s has been something akin to one per year over the past four or so years. Though Kazan has hired over 2,000 new workers, the expansion cannot realistically add more than perhaps another plane or two produced per year at most—at least any time soon.
But we’ll have to wait and see, because the original tenders for the expansion noted it was only 40% complete in late 2024, and that the plant’s completion would take until sometime in 2026. That means there may be a large amount of capacity yet to be constructed, though it appears it will be shared with the Tu-214 line expansion.
Military Watch Magazine’s latest likewise notes that Russian S-400 production outpaces Ukraine’s ability to attrit the systems:
What all the findings reveal is that the Russian military is solving the equation of stabilizing its losses in the SMO. We already know from recruitment numbers previously discussed that Russia has long stabilized manpower regeneration into the positive. Now we can see that key systems are also on their way, or have already been stabilized—like tanks and IFVs.
This means that any talk of a Russian ‘collapse’ due to shortages of weapons any time soon can be dismissed outright. It is now Ukraine that is in danger of this, given the halt to the supply of various Western systems. The pro-Ukraine crowd admits that Ukraine is betting the entire house on its drone program, which means virtually all other weapon systems have been written off.
At this point, I believe that Russian leadership is no longer even preoccupied with Ukraine as much as with regenerating reserves for a future clash with NATO. Ukraine is already a preordained given—it’s only a matter of time before the numbers simply work themselves out. There is no way for Ukraine to get ‘above water’ here; these things are meticulously gamed and calculated out by the Russian MOD via standard military expenditure equations: they likely know the general time line for Ukraine’s depletion and capitulation.
That is why the real focus is now likely on future escalations, particularly given that Europe and NATO continue to both saber-rattle and earmark vast military expansions, as Germany reportedly just did with its announcement for plans to purchase over 1,000 new battle tanks. Russia knows that as the Ukrainian war gets closer and closer to its end, NATO script-writers will chafe at the bit to get Russia involved in a new war, likely with the sacrificial lambs of the Baltics next, and eventually Poland and Germany, with the UK ‘leading from the rear’.
That’s not to say the remainder of the Ukrainian conflict will be ‘easy’—there are still many difficult tasks to solve, and Ukraine is continuing to innovate in drone tech, at the behest of its sponsors. But mathematically speaking, the conflict is a foregone conclusion, as Russia has established a pace that suits its military algorithms of attrition, and everything from this point on proceeds methodically, like clockwork.