Picture: Mil.ru via Wikimedia Commons
Europe’s position in the missile domain is becoming increasingly precarious. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Russian missile production has surged.
Rather than closing the missile gap, Europe — by relying on a missile defense-centric strategy — is falling further behind. In this post, I detail Russian missile production numbers and compare them to European and U.S. output of missile defense interceptors.
To keep this post manageable, I’ll focus on ballistic missile production and ballistic missile defense. A future post may address cruise missiles and drones.
Russian conventional ballistic missile production
Russia currently produces two types of conventional ballistic missiles relevant to NATO-Russia conventional warfighting scenarios:
9M723 short-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched via the Iskander-M system, and
Kh-47M2 Kinzhal medium-range ballistic missiles, air-launched from bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft.
According to the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (HUR), Russia currently produces a combined total of 840 to 1,020 ground-launched 9M723 and air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- to medium-range ballistic missiles annually.
This marks a rather substantial increase compared to the previous estimates shared by the HUR in December 2024. Production of the 9M723 short-range ballistic missile, for instance, appears to have risen by approximately 15 to 40 percent.
Importantly, it is not possible to independently verify these numbers at this point. However, outside Russia, the HUR is arguably the best-positioned actor to assess Russia’s missile programs, given its extensive human intelligence network inside the country. Moreover, the observed expansion of missile production facilities in Russia, along with the rising number of ballistic missiles used per month, lends credibility to the HUR’s figures.
In light of ballistic missile output, what has been the response of European NATO states?
European ballistic missile defense
Europe’s response to Russia’s growing ballistic missile threat has focused almost exclusively on ballistic missile defense.
Since February 2022, a large and growing number of European states have placed orders for ballistic missile defense systems and interceptors. The two most widely procured systems are the American MIM-104 Patriot and the French-Italian SAMP/T.
The following sections outline the current and projected production capacities for PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors, used in the Patriot system, as well as Aster 30 interceptors, used in the SAMP/T system. These sections indicate that Western interceptor production cannot keep pace with Russian ballistic missile production, neither today nor in the foreseeable future.
Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T/PAC-3 MSE production
In 2024, Lockheed Martin announced that it had produced over 500 Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, marking a production increase of more than 30 percent since 2023. Production capacity is likely around 550 interceptors today, with plans to raise output to 650 interceptors annually by 2027.
In addition to Lockheed Martin, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is currently license-producing around 30 PAC-3 MSE interceptors per year in Japan. However, until late 2023, these interceptors were legally confined to the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.
Tokyo’s December 2023 export-rule revision opened a narrow channel, and a small, undisclosed lot is now being sold back to the United States to help replenish stocks depleted by transfers to Ukraine. Plans exist to increase Japanese production to 60 interceptors annually, though this effort has so far been hampered by supply chain bottlenecks.
Recently, German manufacturer Rheinmetall has announced that it will be able to add 250 to 300 PAC-3 interceptors to the global supply, if plans for a licensed production of the interceptor in Germany are finalized. Presumably, this implies a licensed production of PAC-3 MSE interceptors, though this has not yet been confirmed.
Raytheon’s production of PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors reached around 240 per year in 2024, with a target of increasing output to 420 interceptors annually by the end of 2027. This will partially be facilitated by contributions from MBDA Germany’s new licensed production facility, expected to come online in 2026. Production today likely sits slightly above the 2024 figure, at around 270 to 300 interceptors annually.
Overall, this means that, at present, the global PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE interceptor supply likely stands at around 850 to 880 per year. By 2027, production capacity is expected to reach 1,130 interceptors annually, and by 2029, it could rise to as many as 1,470.
These numbers are not bad — actually, not bad at all, at least compared to pre-war years. However, the current annual production of around 850 to 880 Patriot interceptors barely exceeds the lower-end estimate for annual 9M723 and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile production, which stands at 840 missiles.
In the coming years, Patriot interceptor production is expected to outpace Russian short- and medium-range ballistic missile production, unless Russia continues to increase its output. This is not impossible, though it will be challenging for Russia given workforce and financial constraints. However, even if overall interceptor production exceeds Russian conventional ballistic missile production, this will not solve Europe’s problems.
First, Patriot is a product with a truly global customer base, including the U.S. Army as well as multiple clients in the Middle East and Asia, alongside Europe. This means Europe will not receive all available Patriot interceptors. Far from it.
Stronger global competition for the more capable — but also more expensive — PAC-3 MSE likely results in a lower European share compared to the PAC-2 GEM-T interceptor, where order intake is dominated by the 1,000-unit joint NATO order from 2024. Overall, a reasonable estimate is that around 45 to 55 percent of all Patriot interceptors are destined for Europe, significantly reducing the annual interceptor-to-ballistic missile ratio between European NATO states and Russia.
Second, European arsenals are currently empty — especially after the transfer of hundreds of interceptors to Ukraine — and lead times for new interceptor production are long. For example, first deliveries from the PAC-2 GEM-T NATO order are expected in 2027, three years after the order was placed, with completion scheduled for 2033. Lead times may shorten as supply chains stabilize, but they will remain a limiting factor.
Third, Ukraine has repeatedly emphasized that Patriot interceptors have performed well, though not flawlessly. To achieve very high intercept probabilities — above 90 percent — at least two, and in some cases three, interceptors may have to be allocated per target. This significantly reduces the overall number of projectiles that can be intercepted with high certainty.
For example, if European NATO states receive 400 to 500 Patriot interceptors on average in the coming years but allocate two per ballistic missile target, only 200 to 250 ballistic missiles can be engaged annually using Patriot interceptors. And this assumes, of course, that Patriot interceptors are not used for any other types of non-ballistic missile targets, for example in self defense, which has happened repeatedly in Ukraine.
Aster 30B1/B1NT production
Patriot is not the only ballistic missile defense system available to European states. Some rely on the French-Italian SAMP/T ballistic missile defense system, which employs Aster 30 interceptors. Estimating annual production numbers for Aster 30B1 and the more modern Aster 30B1NT interceptors, which are capable of defending against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, is more difficult, though a reasonable estimate is possible.
According to a 2012 news report, MBDA’s Aster interceptor output had risen to more than 20 missiles per month in 2011, indicating an annual production capacity of at least 240 interceptors. A budget report from the French Senate dated 17 November 2011 roughly confirms these figures, noting that approximately 194 Aster interceptors had been produced by that time within that year. Extrapolating from this suggests an annual production capacity of around 220 interceptors.
The budget report also provides data on the split between Aster 15 interceptors — used for short- and medium-range missile defense against air-breathing threats —, and Aster 30 interceptors — used for long-range missile defense, including tactical ballistic missiles. According to the report, 60 Aster 15 and 134 Aster 30 missiles had been delivered at that point in 2011, suggesting a 70/30 split in favor of Aster 30. Assuming an overall Aster production of 220 to 240 interceptors annually, this points to an annual production capacity for Aster 30 of approximately 152 to 166 interceptors and 68 to 74 Aster 15 interceptors in 2011.
According to missile manufacturer MBDA, the Eurosam Consortium will increase Aster interceptor output by 50 percent by 2026. Assuming no additional peacetime production ramp-up has occurred prior to the war in Ukraine (for which I find no confirmation), this suggests that Aster production will reach 330 to 360 interceptors annually. Applying the 70/30 split from 2011, this would indicate an annual Aster 30 production rate of around 230 to 250 interceptors.
However, order intake from the three participating Eurosam nations — France, Italy, and the United Kingdom — since February 2022, amounting to 918 Aster interceptors, has likely favored Aster 30. As a result, Aster 30 output is likely closer to 270 to 300 interceptors annually by 2026, and around 220 to 250 in 2025 while the ramp-up is still underway.
Importantly, not all of these are Aster 30B1 and Aster 30B1NT interceptors capable of defending against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. A relatively small share of production, likely no more than 10 to 15 percent, is allocated to naval Aster 30 variants that lack ballistic missile defense capability. This leaves an estimated annual Aster 30B1/B1NT production of around 190 to 225 interceptors in 2025 and approximately 230 to 270 by 2026.
Unlike Patriot, almost all Aster 30B1/B1NT interceptors produced in the coming years will stay in Europe. Outside Europe, the only active customer drawing from the same production line is Qatar. Its four Doha-class corvettes and new LPD require Aster 30 Block 1 naval rounds, with deliveries scheduled through 2025-26.
However, similar to Patriot, more than one interceptor may need to be expended to achieve very high intercept probabilities of 90 percent or higher. Ukrainian reports have at various times indicated that Aster 30 interceptors have underperformed compared to Patriot PAC-2 and especially PAC-3 interceptors, potentially requiring even more interceptors to be allocated in many-on-one targeting scenarios. This reduces the annualized number of ballistic missile targets that can be effectively engaged to around 95 to 110, or even fewer.
Implications for Europe’s deterrence posture
U.S. and European interceptor production for ballistic missile defense has risen sharply since February 2022. In many ways, this growth is impressive. Had Russian ballistic missile production remained at prewar levels, current production figures might have been sufficient to support a relatively effective denial strategy against Russia’s conventional ballistic missile arsenal. But that is not the case.
Instead, Russia has managed to increase its ballistic missile production faster — in both absolute and relative terms — than the United States and Europe have expanded ballistic missile defense interceptor production. As the table below shows, Russia’s advantage in the missile domain, measured by the ratio of available interceptors to conventional ballistic missiles, is not expected to disappear shortly.
Europe’s annualized ballistic missile defense capacity, assuming a 2-on-1 targeting approach, lies at approximately 235 to 299 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in 2025. This stands in stark contrast to the 840 to 1,020 9M723 and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles Russia currently produces annually. The math just doesn’t add up. Even under 1-on-1 targeting assumptions, Europe would still fall short of covering the lower-end estimate of Russian production.
Keep in mind also that these calculations do not account for Russia’s substantial production capacity for cruise missiles and, in particular, long-range drones. These additional threats would further complicate missile defense and could potentially drain large numbers of Patriot and Aster interceptors in wartime if European states fail to layer their missile defense systems effectively.
In addition, these numbers say nothing about the cost balance between missile defense and offensive strike capabilities. Aster 30 and Patriot interceptors cost between $2–4 million USD each, significantly more than what Russia pays for its conventional ballistic missiles. Any strategy that relies entirely on missile defense to counter large missile arsenals is therefore inherently cost-inefficient.
Does this mean Europe’s missile defense efforts are futile? No, of course not. Missile defense — especially ballistic missile defense — remains essential. Europe must be able to defend individual high-value targets, whether civilian or military, against Russian missile strikes. However, Europe will not be able to fully deny Russia’s ballistic missile arsenal.
Pretending otherwise, as several European political decision-makers seem to do, is not only disingenuous toward their populations but also weakens Europe’s deterrence posture. Russia is well aware that it currently holds superiority in the conventional missile domain and that Europe’s missile defense arsenals and production capacity cannot keep pace with Russia’s offensive strike capabilities.
This means Europe must urgently reconsider its missile strategy and shift from a denial to a punishment posture. If European NATO states cannot credibly deter Russia by signaling they will successfully defend against an attack, they must deter by signaling that any attack will come at an unacceptable cost.
The clearest way to do this is by fielding a counterstrike capability capable of rapid and equivalent response should Russia choose to strike European targets first, including by holding at risk Russian critical infrastructure and economic assets. That said, the priority in this countervalue approach must be to destroy economic and industrial value, not lives. The deliberate targeting of population centers for the express purpose of killing civilians, as practiced by Russia in Ukraine, must be firmly rejected.
For the European continent, moving towards such a punishment-oriented countervalue posture will be challenging both industrially and politically. Europe’s conventional long-range strike arsenals are depleted, and production figures lag even further behind those for missile defense. At the same time, punishment-based strategies are not part of the strategic culture and military DNA of European states, which have traditionally focused on denial, at least in the conventional domain.
However, unless Russia’s conventional long-range strike capability declines significantly for some reason, I see no alternative.