In 2008, Brownfield helped orchestrate a successful rescue of the American hostages.
From 2006 to 2008, I spent time in Africa pursuing Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). None of this work could have been done without the support of U.S. ambassadors in Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Algeria and Nigeria.
In Iraq, it was the phenomenal work of Ambassadors John Negroponte, Zal Khalilzad, Ryan Crocker, Chris Hill and Jim Jeffrey that allowed both the Special Operations forces and the conventional units to do their jobs despite the constant political turmoil on the ground. In Afghanistan, it was the same. Without the likes of Ambassadors Khalilzad, Wood, Crocker, Ron Neumann and Karl Eikenberry, it would have been impossible for our Special Operations forces to keep our troops safe and pursue the Taliban and al-Qaeda. And yes, Crocker and Khalilzad served in both war zones.
In 2005, after Pakistan was devastated by an earthquake in Kashmir that killed more than 73,000 people. Ambassador Crocker immediately requested support from USAID and the Navy. For the next year USAID was on the ground supporting relief efforts. Beyond just the humanitarian nature of this undertaking, the goodwill it generated with the Pakistani government gave our military and interagency forces greater latitude to work against terrorist targets in the country.
In 2009, it was the U.S. ambassador to Yemen, Steve Seche, who negotiated with a mercurial President Ali Abdullah Saleh to allow U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen that eventually resulted in the elimination of two of al-Qaeda’s biggest threats in the region.
During our Special Operations pursuit of the terrorist group al-Shabab in East Africa, it was Ambassador Don Yamamoto, who served as our point man. Yamamoto, a Japanese American who was ambassador in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia, had more talent, courage, determination and grit than any 10 people I served with.
In Pakistan, after the Osama bin Laden raid, it was Ambassador Cameron Munter who kept the Pakistanis from shutting down the Ground Lines of Communications, the main logistics route supporting our soldiers in Afghanistan.
Later, while I was the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, I worked closely with USAID Director Rajiv Shah to develop plans to reduce poverty and disease in sub-Saharan Africa. I knew that extremist organizations such as Boko Haram and AQIM recruited from the disenfranchised. I believed American aid would help reduce that threat.
Every right-minded person I know agrees that the State Department needs to establish clear priorities, reduce waste and have an organizational structure that supports our national goals. However, because the State Department budget is less than half a percent of federal spending and USAID is less than one percent, I would offer that these expenditures of American dollars are well worth the investment.
Eliminating USAID and the Voice of America and underfunding the State Department will put every American, both at home and abroad, at risk. George C. Marshall, who as Army chief of staff led American forces during World War II and later served as the 50th secretary of state, once said: “Diplomacy is not a sign of weakness. It is a sign of strength, of a confident nation ready to lead with wisdom, not just weapons.”
If we want the world to see us as strong, confident and having the wisdom to lead on the global stage, then this administration, and this Congress, must find a way to reinvigorate and reinvest in the State Department and USAID. Our national security depends on it.