In the southwestern Syrian town of Sweida recent bloody clashes between Bedouin Arabs and the Druze have left at least 200 dead. Syria’s military was dispatched to stop the fighting, but it struggled to quell the violence and some reported that government forces escalated the carnage. Many Syrian Druze believe that the central government, led by former rebel-turned-president Ahmed al-Sharaa, is tied to the very groups attacking them.
Israel agrees: it has accused the Syrian government of attacking the Druze and using Arab militias as cover. The Israeli Air Force has spent the last two days striking Syrian military positions in Syria’s southwest, with the Jerusalem Post reporting that 160 “aerial attacks” had been conducted as of midday on 16 July. Israel also bombed the Syrian Defense Ministry headquarters and areas near the presidential palace in Damascus.
If this sounds familiar, that’s because Israel conducted a similar operation in May following another round of violence between Druze and Arabs in Jaramana and Sahnaya (both Damascus suburbs) as well as in Sweida, which left 100 dead. On that occasion, Israel conducted 20 airstrikes across Syria and hit multiple targets, including sites close to the presidential palace.
The Trump administration will welcome reports of a ceasefire. The US president remains fixated on expanding the 2020 Abraham Accords – aimed at advancing the normalisation of relations between Israel and Arab states – by making Syria a signatory. After Sharaa helped to bring down the Assad regime in December, this has become a distinct possibility. In May, during a trip to Saudi Arabia, Donald Trump met with Sharaa and praised him as a “young, attractive guy”. The following month, Trump issued an executive order that rescinded some US sanctions against Syria and waived others. His administration even served as a go-between for backchannel talks between Syria and Israel, decades-long enemies. Seen alongside Trump’s 2019 decision to partially withdraw American troops from Kurdish-majority northeastern Syria, where they were shielding the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces from Turkey, these steps represent a big shift in US policy toward Syria, a country convulsed by nearly a decade and a half of civil war.
Israel has a different strategy. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu portrays Syria’s post-Assad government as dominated by jihadists. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz described Sharaa as no better than the masked men of Isis who beheaded prisoners in the middle of the desert. Another Israeli minister was even more harsh: “Anyone who thinks Ahmad al-Sharaa is a legitimate leader is gravely mistaken – he is a terrorist, a barbaric murderer who should be eliminated without delay.”
Israel may justify the latest incursion into Syria as a humanitarian operation. Israel itself is home to around 150,000 Druze, concentrated in the country’s north: the Galilee, Carmel, and the Golan Heights. Druze make up roughly 1.6 per cent of the total population and are considered loyal citizens, whose young men are subject to the military draft. For his part, Sharaa said he is making protecting Syria’s Druze population a “priority” in a televised address after the strikes had stopped.
But Israel’s larger strategic objective is evident: exploit the weakness of Syria’s new government to create a demilitarised security zone across southern Syria from which the Syrian armed forces are excluded so that Israel has a free hand. The clashes in Sweida enable Netanyahu to advance that agenda, even as he presents himself as the protector of the Druze.
Israel’s hard-nosed strategy can be traced back to the Assad regime’s collapse. With the Syrians in disarray, Israel was quick to strike hundreds of Syrian military targets, including airfields, missile bases, munitions depots, and air defence sites across the country. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) soon crossed the 1974 UN-demarcated border line with Syria, entered the buffer zone and pushed it deeper into Syrian territory. Israeli troops also occupied the Syrian side of Mount Hermon. Israeli officials asked the Trump administration to keep Syria weak by maintaining sanctions and even proposed allowing Russia to retain its bases to keep Turkey in check.
Israel believes that the regional context favours its strategy. Iran is on the backfoot. Hezbollah, Tehran’s ally in Lebanon, has been decapitated. Iran-aligned Assad is gone. And Syria’s new rulers face myriad problems as they struggle to extend governance to the entire country, a task made even harder because the military and security forces remain weak. Syria’s economy is in a dismal state: GDP has fallen by more than 50 per cent since the civil war started in 2011. Sectarian violence, including violence against the Alawites – who dominated Assad’s government – and the Druze continues.
Seen against this backdrop, Israel’s latest intervention isn’t driven solely by humanitarianism; it’s part of a realpolitik-driven strategy aimed at dominating its northern neighbours.
But this is not the only feasible strategy available to Israel. Sharaa, for all his faults, has made it clear that he has no interest in confrontation with Israel (he couldn’t possibly come out ahead, militarily or politically). He is committed to coexistence and will abide by the terms of the 1974 agreement. He knows that conflict with Israel would alienate the US and Europe and deprive Syria of the foreign investment it desperately needs to help the long process of economic reconstruction.
Israel could therefore chart a different course by engaging in talks with Sharaa’s government toward a comprehensive security agreement that includes pulling back their military forces and creating a weapons and troop-free zone on either side of the border. (As part of this accord, Israel would recommit to the 1974 agreement.) They could create political forums to foster cooperation on shared problems. Israel could help forge an agreement between the Druze and the central government based on local autonomy. Alternatively, Israel, trusting in its military superiority, could let Syrians sort out their own affairs.
A debilitated, conflict-ridden Syria may well give Israel a stronger hand. But it could also enable hostile forces to sink roots and pose a long-term security threat from a neighbouring country. After the latest strikes, it’s hard to see Israel doing anything other than sticking to its current strategy – one in which diplomacy plays no role.