Targeted, One by One: Inside Israel's Years-long War on Iran's Atomic Architects
Ever since the 12-day campaign in Iran ended, media reports – as well as debates among experts – have been focused on Israeli and U.S. strikes on Tehran's main nuclear facilities. The main preoccupation is the extent of the damage sustained by the three facilities that came under attack: The large uranium enrichment facility at Natnaz, the smaller but even more important facility at Fordow, and the uranium research and conversion compound at Isfahan.
These three facilities, as well as the extensive equipment in them – centrifuges, computers, production rooms and many tons of uranium enriched to various levels – all sustained very heavy damage. This is beyond doubt. But experts are debating whether Iran will require just a few months or several years to rebuild these facilities. I personally believe rebuilding will take two or three years, perhaps more. This strict assessment is also based on additional damage sustained by Iran's nuclear project, one which the media does not extensively discuss – assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.
The person who is bringing attention to this issue is David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C. Albright has been studying nuclear weapons, proliferation and missiles for decades, and is considered one of the leading researchers in the field. This week, he published an illuminating article about the assassination of nuclear scientists.
"When discussing the attack of the Iranian nuclear program, many cite the phrase 'knowledge cannot be destroyed.' But it is well-known through history that it can be forgotten, lost or suppressed," writes Albright.
This is particularly true of such secret programs as Iran's nuclear program, which took pains to keep details secret even from people within the project's inner circle. Therefore, Albright estimates that "… it is likely that full knowledge of the most sensitive, most current developments of the program and how individual parts were intended to work together existed only in the heads of a few."
Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, in Syria in 2017. Bagheri was assassinated during the 12-Day War.Credit: AP
Israel released the names of 11 nuclear scientists who were assassinated in its war in Iran, most on the first night. They were doctors, professors and lecturers of physics, chemistry or engineering at some of Iran's leading universities. They also had parallel lives, working on the "weapons group."
The "weapons group" is the name given to a group of scientists who have been involved in the final, most crucial stage of constructing a nuclear weapon, where fissile material – in Iran's case, uranium enriched to 90 percent – is integrated: Its installment in the bomb's hemispheres, its explosion chain and optical lenses, and its placement as warhead on a missile.
Former Mossad head Meir Dagan.Credit: Avi Ohayon/GPO
A history of assassinations
Between 2009–2013, Israel assassinated five Iranian nuclear scientists in operations attributed to the Mossad. This happened at the initiative of former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, and continued for a short while under his successor, Tamir Pardo. But these were isolated operations with only a tactical effect; they disrupted the nuclear program for awhile, but their strategic significance was small, and they did not prevent the program from continuing.
This was true even when Israel carried out the creative assassination of Iran's senior scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, in November 2020. Fakhrizadeh was a general in the Revolutionary Guards, and for three decades, he headed his country military program, then called AMAD. American intelligence determined that, in light of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent fear in Tehran that Iran could've been next, the program was stopped. However, Israeli intelligence questioned this assessment, and Jerusalem believed that Tehran went on nurturing a military program through alternative secret channels. This program was called SPND, a Farsi acronym for "the Organization for Research and Defense Innovation," in an attempt to conceal its real purpose: a military nuclear program.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors Iran's nuclear program, exercised its authority and demanded time and again to interview Fakhrizadeh, but Iran's atomic energy committee refused to allow this. Tehran was concerned that talk with the senior scientist could unveil contradictions, lies and deceptions about the true nature of the program.
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated by Mossad while driving in his car in November 2020.Credit: Wana News Agency/Reuters
This Iranian refusal only served to increase Israel's suspicions about Fakhrizadeh actually serving as head of the weapons group. Accordingly, he was placed at the top of Israel's wanted list – but he was aware of the Mossad's intentions and took precautions. Several plans to assassinate him formulated by Mossad did not reach fruition until November 2020, when Farkhrizadeh was assassinated in a daring and creative operation commanded by then-Mossad chief Yossi Cohen (formerly the head of the Mossad's "Iran Project" under Dagan).
Cohen's deputy and eventual successor, David Barnea, was involved in formulating the assassination plan. It occurred on a weekend, as Fakhrizadeh was driving to his countryside home outside Tehran. Foreign agents recruited by Mossad installed a machinegun on a truck parked along Fakhrizadeh's route, and it was remotely operated by AI.
Strategic turning point
In retrospect, it turned out that Fakhirzadeh's assassination too did not have any long-term significance. However, five years later, Israel succeeded in reaching a strategic turning point, as last month's assassination of 11 key scientists had a "critical mass" effect. Most assassinated scientists were graduates of the AMAD program and had also taken part in SPND. Three of them attended Russian universities, while the rest earned their degrees in Iran, where the level of research and instruction, particularly in science, is high. Iranian media reported the assassinations of eight additional, less well-known nuclear scientists.
Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani was the most prominent scientist killed last month, in an assassination that encapsulates the Mossad's long memory, which would put an old elephant to shame. The Mossad attempted to assassinate the scientist in 2010, but Abbasi-Davani demonstrated quick instincts: He noticed the two scooter-riding would-be assassins and opened his car door. The bomb exploded; he was wounded but survived.
After recuperating, he was provocatively appointed head of the regime's atomic energy agency by former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In interviews he gave on Iranian media, Abbasi-Davani boasted that he and his fellow scientists have the know-how and the equipment required to assemble a nuclear weapon, ready for the moment the regime gives the order to do so.
In addition to his secret work, Abbasi-Davani also taught at Imam Hussein University. Some university departments cooperated with the Revolutionary Guard, as some of its researchers were involved in studies intended to advance the military nuclear program. This is the reason for Israel's decision to strike the academic institution in the recent war.
Photos of senior Iranian officials killed by Israeli airstrikes during the 12-day war displayed at a cemetery in Tehran.Credit: Majid Asgaripour/Reuters
The bombing of the university in Tehran may also explain why Iran chose to fire ballistic missiles at the neighborhood of Ramat Aviv, home of Tel Aviv University. Two missiles fell in the neighborhood, causing extensive damage to dozens of buildings and homes. The Iranian missile that hit the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, destroying buildings and labs, may also be ascribed to Iran's attempt to create a tit-for-tat equilibrium. This may also explain attempts by Iranian intelligence, over the past year and a half, to recruit spies who were ordered to collect information about the Weizmann Institute.
The puzzle is complete
The assassination of the nuclear scientists in the 12-Day War was made possible thanks to a slow, painstaking process of information-gathering over many years. It was a lot like making up a jigsaw puzzle, attaching one piece after another until one could see the big picture. In the first stage, this information gathering was given to the Mossad's Blue and White unit – Israelis working undercover, risking their lives by infiltrating Iran.
About 15 years ago, Israel decided to change its methods of operation and infiltration in Iran, due to the realization that innovative technologies at border crossings – including AI, cameras and biometric software that can recognize faces and even gait – made entry into any country, and enemy countries in particular, extremely dangerous. The Mossad decided to minimize use of Israeli operatives in countries like Iran and began to recruit foreigners instead.
Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, the most prominent scientist killed last month, pictured in 2011.Credit: AP
Information gathered about the scientists was passed to the Military Intelligence Directorate's research department, which assembled up-to-date files on each scientist. These files were passed on to Air Force Intelligence and were added to its "target bank." Using these information files, pilots could identify the exact apartment and room that each scientist was in, killing them with bombs and precise guided missiles.
Iranian media was quick to respond to the assassinations by claiming that hundreds of scientists will replace those killed by Israel. But scouting and recruiting replacements will be no simple task. First, the average age of the assassinated scientists is 60, indicating the experience and know-how they have accumulated over years of trial and error. This is a matter of more than passing importance.
A strike on Imam Hussein University in Tehran on June 18.
Even more crucially, one should consider the psychological aspect of these "beheading" operations. According to media reports during the war, the Mossad initiated influence operations in which messages were sent to selected targets, warning them that death awaits those who are considering joining Iran's nuclear program. It may be cautiously conjectured that such operations have not concluded.
At the end of the day, it can be assumed that the scientists' assassinations, plus Israel's strikes on large and lesser-known nuclear facilities alike, struck a heavy blow to Iran's nuclear program – much worse than the Tehran leadership is willing to admit, and perhaps even worse that estimated by Israeli and international media reports. All of these factors, Albright says, have "weakened Iran's base for building nuclear weapons."