Since the International Court of Justice and UN General Assembly
have affirmed that all states are obliged to cut off all military and
economic support both for the Israeli regime’s occupation of Gaza and
the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and for its genocidal assault on the
people of occupied Gaza, the Huthis' Red Sea blockade is squarely
supported by international law.
What are the prospects for meaningful change and unlocking of the
stalemate? Politically, neither Ansar Allah nor the IRG indicates any
willingness to compromise, the former sustaining its repressive rule and
ongoing small-scale offensives on all Yemeni fronts, largely thanks to
the recruitment of thousands of youth wanting to support the
Palestinians but ending up on local fronts. Local weapons production is
increasingly replacing imports from Iran some of which are intercepted. Despite
the threat and increasing likelihood of far more violent and
destructive Israeli retaliation, AA’s leadership is still riding high on
its improved image as supporter of Palestine. It is also watching with
glee the ongoing chaos of the IRG and anticipating its collapse, a
strong disincentive to engaging in negotiations. Its strengths are
considerable: control over the capital’s administrative structures and
two-thirds of the country’s population residing in the most viable
regions for agriculture and rainfall, hence renewable water resources.
It has an explicit theocratic ideology and also influence on Saudi
Arabia, whose regime is unwilling to risk further Huthi missile attacks
on its territory while focused on seeking funds for its grandiose
projects.
The IRG continues to insist that the solution to the crisis has to
adhere to UNSC Resolution 2216 of 2015, a 10-year-old document which
fails to reflect reality. Its mantra ‘three references’ include the
demand that the Huthi withdraw to their original heartland in the far
north of Yemen, a fantasy given the situation on the ground. Why is the
IRG failing to seriously strive for a solution? It is largely because
the leadership’s internal divisions and rivalries supersede concern to
bring about an end to the crisis. Riven by internal rivalries between
supporters of different factions, including those between southern
separatists [themselves divided] and supporters of Yemeni unity,
interaction between PLC and government leaders focus on personal
benefits and issues of military control and funding, particularly
blatantly in Hadhramaut but also less visibly elsewhere. In recent
months, it had hoped for significant international support to renew its
military offensive against the Huthis, which did not materialise due to
its divisions and unreliability. Whether a likely major Israeli attack
on Huthi controlled areas would change this situation is debatable.
If there is any debate about the country’s major issues, they are
held with such secrecy that nothing has emerged publicly. Just to
mention the most obvious ones: Yemen’s future administrative and
political structures, the role of political parties and tribes, regional
cultural issues, natural resources including water, decentralisation or
federalism, economic and social policies, health and education.
Moreover, the rivalry between the two main external sponsors, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE sustains this internal stalemate leaving observers to
wonder about their fundamental objectives in Yemen and beyond.
UN Special Envoy Grundberg was in Sana’a in January this year and in
Aden in July. But there is no sign of any progress on the ‘road map’
announced in late 2023 when an agreement between the Saudis and the
Huthis seemed imminent. His monthly briefings to the UN Security Council
have focused on the international situation and Huthi detention for
more than a year of dozens of UN and NGO staff. Failure to achieve any
progress on their release has further undermined his credibility
alongside the lack of progress with any negotiations. Grundberg hopes to
influence both AA and the IRG by engaging their international
supporters, through visits to Iran as well as Riyadh. As is customary
for mediators, he is systematically accused by each side or favouring
the other, and leaders of both sides are shunning him. There is little
doubt that his actions are constrained by his UN mandate
which objectively favours the IRG, an additional difficulty. In the
current context, it is unclear what kind of negotiations could take
place towards a ‘sustainable’ peace as none of the relevant leaders
manifests any commitment to ending the crisis, leaving millions of
Yemenis in deeper suffering and despair. Millions of desperate Yemenis
are left to suffer an escalating humanitarian catastrophe, which is a
direct consequence of their leaders' callousness and serves as a stark
testament to their moral failing.
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