Former U.S. Ambassador Freeman: "Italy should recognize Palestine." Europe? "A leadership void"
"If Italy believes in self-determination for European Jews (Israelis), it should logically also support self-determination for Palestinians." This was stated in an exclusive interview with InsideOver by U.S. diplomat Chas W. Freeman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1993 to 1994 and former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Freeman is well-known in diplomatic circles for having served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the historic U.S. mediation for Namibia's independence from South Africa and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. He also served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. embassies in both Bangkok (1984-1986) and Beijing (1981-1984). From 1979 to 1981, he was Director for Chinese Affairs at the U.S. State Department and served as the principal American interpreter during President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972. We reached out to him to ask some questions about the war in Ukraine and the genocide in Gaza.
1. What is your perspective on the recent protests in Ukraine against President Zelensky? Is there a risk that the Ukrainian leader could lose power?
President Zelensky has remained in office well beyond the term specified by the Ukrainian constitution. He now faces strong domestic opposition to his recent actions to eliminate checks on corruption based on the widespread belief that he himself is corrupt. Some in the Ukrainian military and security services recognize that Ukraine is losing the war and faces even greater territorial losses. They therefore oppose Zelensky’s war policies. But the greatest threat to Zelensky may be President Trump and his administration, who seem to have concluded that he is an obstacle to peace who must be replaced to pave the way for a negotiated solution to the war.
2. On the military front, Russia appears to be advancing, while Ukraine seems to be facing significant challenges. How do you envision this war concluding? Is a diplomatic agreement likely, or are other scenarios possible?
All wars must end either in a negotiated acceptance of the results on the battlefield or, less commonly, in the utter defeat of one side or the other. Inasmuch as Russian ambitions seem to be limited to the incorporation of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking regions, Ukraine’s neutrality, and Ukraine’s abandonment of ethnolinguistic hostility to Russians and Russia, a diplomatic solution is there to be had, as the March 2022 negotiations at Istanbul demonstrated.
But to end the war, the West and Ukraine must be prepared to address Russian interests and demands. Given the realities on the battlefield, this means that there must be a willingness on the part of the United States, major European powers, and Ukraine to make painful compromises. So far there is not only no common position in NATO but no European peace plan. There is therefore no basis for negotiations with Russia. It is not helpful that the United States remains unrealistically focused on the achievement of a ceasefire that Russia has no incentive to agree to.
3. What are your thoughts on the European Union’s €800 billion rearmament policy? Many European leaders appear to frame it in the context of potential conflict with Russia.
European policies are self-contradictory and feckless.
On the one hand, it is clearly in Europe’s interest to develop the capacity to conduct foreign and national security policies that are more independent of the United States than those of the past eighty years. European rearmament is a prerequisite for this. It is also an antidote to fiscal austerity and a potential boost to European employment through so-called ‘military Keynesianism.’
On the other hand, Europe has declared a commitment to buy American weapons for Ukraine. This is inconsistent with a drive for European military-industrial self-reliance. It is also problematic in that the United States does not have a military industrial base that can produce sufficient weaponry to satisfy both domestic American and foreign demands. In any event, additional weapons will not save Ukraine. Its military weakness is its lack of manpower and a diplomatic strategy for long-term coexistence with its Russian neighbor, not weaponry.
Finally, the rearmament policy rests on paranoid assumptions about a Russian military threat to the rest of Europe. After all, the Russian armed forces have been unable to advance very far in Ukraine. What is the evidence that they have either the ambition or the capability to attack Central or Western Europe? In any event, a purely military response to the putative Russian threat makes far less sense than one that seeks to reduce that threat through diplomatic as well as military means. The great powers in Europe have the political and economic strength to conduct a more balanced policy. What they lack is imagination, unity, and resolve. There is a vacuum of leadership in Europe.