Trump Is Single-Handedly Torpedoing the U.S.-India Partnership
Last week was a grim reckoning for U.S.-India relations. On July 30, U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally announced that despite the two sides being close to a new trade deal, he would only decrease the tariff rate he had threatened to apply to Indian imports back in April from 26 percent to 25 percent. To add insult to injury, Trump threatened to slap New Delhi with a 100 percent tariff penalty if it continues to import cheap Russian oil amid Washington’s attempts to compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to end his invasion of Ukraine.
Trump further insulted New Delhi by wondering aloud on his Truth Social account whether India might one day purchase oil from archrival Pakistan that the U.S., of all countries, would help extract. In yet another offensive remark to New Delhi’s ears, Trump said, “I don’t care what India does with Russia. They can take their dead economies down together, for all I care.” Most recently, on Aug. 5, Trump proclaimed that if India does not stop “fueling the Russian war machine,” he would “very substantially” raise sanctions on India “over the next 24 hours.”
The Indian government swiftly and strongly pushed back. In a speech on Aug. 2, Prime Minister Narendra Modi argued, though without mentioning the U.S., that India, like all countries, would look out for its own interests. Modi further endorsed the “Make in India” movement, encouraging buyers to avoid other national brands. And although India has been increasing the volume of energy it imports from the U.S. since Trump returned to the White House, Indian officials privately confirmed that New Delhi would not halt purchases of Russian oil altogether. Rather, “price, grade of crude, inventories, logistics, and other economic factors” would remain paramount drivers of New Delhi’s decision-making calculus. And on Aug. 4, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs summed up the situation by saying that, from its perspective “the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable. Like any major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security.”
From one perspective, this bilateral mess is quite surprising. After all, up until recently, the U.S.-India strategic partnership had reached unprecedented heights. In February, when Modi became just the fourth foreign leader to visit the White House since Trump’s return in January, Trump referred to him as “a great friend,” and the two reviewed a long list of areas in which India and the U.S. engage in deep and substantive policy cooperation.
But from another perspective, the relationship had already been on a downward turn in recent months, and the tariff spat is simply the latest example of a troubled relationship that could unravel even more if not properly addressed by both New Delhi and Washington.
Frictions in the U.S.-India strategic partnership had been growing since even before Modi’s warm visit. For example, in early February, reports surfaced that the U.S. had deported 104 Indian migrants back to India in shackles, enraging domestic opinion there and causing headaches for Modi. On April 2, Trump’s initial tariff announcements included a 26 percent rate for India, making it one of 57 nations hit with levies above the universal baseline of 10 percent imposed on nearly every country. Trump caused more economic heartburn in New Delhi by criticizing Apple’s decision to manufacture approximately 20 percent of its iPhones in India, potentially threatening roughly 200,000 manufacturing jobs there.
The current imbroglio over trade and the threat of sanctions to stop New Delhi from importing cheap Russian oil is just the latest in a series of irritants to U.S.-India ties. But it might be more damaging.
Then in May came the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan—and, more importantly for U.S.-India ties, Trump’s responses to it. New Delhi launched Operation Sindoor to retaliate against what the Modi government called “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan, which it blamed for carrying out the April 22 terrorist attack at Pahalgam in Indian-controlled Kashmir. When the two sides agreed to a ceasefire after trading airstrikes for four days, Trump immediately took credit for brokering it, a claim he has since repeated publicly on many occasions but which New Delhi categorically rejects.
Trump also volunteered to mediate New Delhi and Islamabad’s dispute over Kashmir, which has been the cause of hostilities on multiple occasions over the past several decades. In doing so, whether wittingly or unwittingly, he adopted Islamabad’s longstanding approach to the issue, as Pakistan has always sought international mediation efforts on Kashmir, while India has argued that it is a matter that must be resolved bilaterally. Additionally, Trump has treated what is an extremely sensitive, nuanced and core dispute between the two nuclear-armed powers in a flippant manner, saying shortly after the ceasefire, “Maybe we could even get them together a little bit … where they go out and have a nice dinner together. Wouldn’t that be nice?”
The Trump administration added insult to injury in the aftermath of the fighting in May by bolstering ties with Pakistan, which India characterizes as a terrorist state. In an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee in early June, the current commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Michael Kurilla, called Pakistan a “phenomenal partner in the counter-terrorism world,” causing displeasure in New Delhi. A week later, Trump sat down for a private two-hour lunch at the White House with the chief of staff of the Pakistani military, Field Marshal Asim Munir, who functions as a shadow leader in Islamabad. Although there was no photo op or readout from the meeting, it was seen as a clear indication that the U.S. and Pakistan are in the process of resetting their strategic partnership. Trump later remarked, “I love Pakistan,” while Islamabad announced it had formally nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize—something he has coveted for many years—for his alleged role in brokering the May ceasefire.
All of this is to say that the current imbroglio over trade and the threat of sanctions to stop New Delhi from importing cheap Russian oil, which Trump repeated earlier this week, is just the latest in a series of irritants to U.S.-India ties. But it might be more damaging. If the 25 percent tariff sticks, the impact on India’s economy could be severe. Among other effects, reduced access to the U.S. market would curb Indian exports, with implications for the agricultural sector in particular as well as for the value of the rupee. A sustained trade war with the U.S. could also spell greater political risk for Modi, who has already been criticized by both the left and right for his government’s extremely close ties to Washington as he seemingly drifts away from New Delhi’s longstanding policy of non-alignment.
Tensions with the U.S. over Pakistan and trade could therefore have an impact on New Delhi’s foreign policy orientation, as well. In recent months, India has been exploring a reset in its relations with China, which could intensify if the U.S. proves to be an unreliable strategic partner moving forward. Bilateral ties with Beijing bottomed out in June 2020, when Chinese military forces launched a limited border incursion into the Indian-controlled Galwan Valley in the Himalayas, resulting in a skirmish that killed dozens of Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese forces. However, following years of negotiations, in October 2024, China finally withdrew from the last of its military encampments in the region, setting the stage for improved India-China ties.
Most recently, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Beijing-hosted foreign ministers’ meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO. And last month, Russia—a longstanding partner of India’s, particularly with regard to arms sales and energy—proposed reviving the Russia-India-China cooperative mechanism. While New Delhi has denied that there has been any progress on this front, it is indisputable that India is now more open to better ties with China than at any time since 2020.
However, it is important to note that for India, all of these outcomes are suboptimal, as New Delhi would strongly prefer to get back to business as usual in its bilateral relations with the United States. That would entail Trump walking back his bombastic rhetoric and essentially returning to the India policy of his first presidential administration from 2017 to 2021, when ties flourished, especially between Trump and Modi. But as the past six months have made clear, Trump’s second administration is very different from his first one—on multiple fronts.
For one thing, the second Trump administration is far more realist and imperial in its foreign policy, treating both friends and foes alike, with virtually no understanding or care about the history or special nature of any particular bilateral relationship or security alliance. In other words, India is now just another country to the U.S., rather than a fellow democracy, the world’s fifth-largest economy and an integral part of Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy designed to counter China across the region. The second Trump administration also doesn’t seem to consider or care about the potential negative consequences of trade tariffs on other parts of the relationship with India.
For example, the Trump administration’s objectives for the U.S.-China relationship remain uncertain and confused. On one hand, Trump slapped 130 percent tariffs on Chinese imports, though those were suspended while the two sides negotiate a trade deal. On the other, Trump clearly wants to have a better relationship with Xi himself, even if Beijing remains Washington’s most significant geostrategic foe. Trump invited Xi to his inauguration, though Xi declined, and he has publicly expressed his desire to visit China to meet with Xi later this year. As a result, New Delhi cannot exclude from its own calculations an improved U.S.-China relationship, which could leave India out in the cold if India does not also hedge with China.
Trump’s reset with Pakistan is also driven by pragmatic concerns, designed to achieve cooperation on what can be thought of as the “new three C’s” in the bilateral relationship: counterterrorism, cryptocurrency and critical minerals. This compares to Washington’s traditional approach to Islamabad, which focused on the old “three C’s” of counterterrorism, counterproliferation and China. Even so, New Delhi will be offended by Washington’s renewed strategic partnership with its longtime adversary, which was already an irritant when the U.S. war in Afghanistan made closer ties with Islamabad a strategic necessity. As a result, it will likely look to other options, such as deepening and expanding ties with Russia, to balance against these U.S. policies. Indeed, Moscow has already pledged to help New Delhi resist Washington’s “unlawful unilateral actions” and counter its “neocolonial agenda.”
Additionally, the international context of the U.S.-India partnership have clearly changed since the first Trump administration, most prominently with Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, India has been mostly passive in its response to the war, trying to avoid taking sides in the conflict to continue benefiting from discounted Russian oil, even though doing so has undermined U.S.-led diplomacy and sanctions. Trump may have been fine with this had he made progress with Russia on peace talks, as he promised to do while campaigning for the 2024 U.S. presidential election. But in recent weeks, Trump has had a change of heart on Putin, who he now believes has not been negotiating in good faith. Trump therefore wants to put the screws to Moscow, and as part of this approach, he may be willing to penalize any country, to include India, that indirectly supports the Kremlin’s war machine.
Up until now, India has been quiet and patient in dealing with its increasingly unpredictable strategic partner in Washington. But given the high stakes, especially on the economic front, this is unlikely to last much longer. The U.S. should realize that it is needlessly pushing a geostrategically important friend away, just as the threat from China rises, and at a time when the world would benefit from less chaos, not more. Unfortunately, however, none of these concerns seem to matter to Trump, which means we are likely to see further deterioration in U.S.-India ties moving forward, with wide-ranging implications beyond.
Derek Grossman is professor of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California, and founder and chief analyst of Indo-Pacific Solutions, LLC. He was previously at RAND and served as daily intelligence briefer to the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs.