Trump continues to take a hard line against the Kremlin, weeks after approving a new weapons package for Ukraine and threatening to impose new sanctions on Russia. Over the past week, Trump ordered the tactical repositioning of two nuclear submarines in response to inflammatory statements by former Russian president Medvedev on social media and imposed new tariffs on India as punishment for their trade ties to Moscow.
On the submarine fracas, DEFP Director of Military Analysis Jennifer Kavanagh writes:
- "[T]he online nuclear scuffle underscores why the U.S. must end its entanglement in Ukraine—and soon. The conflict, at the heart of Trump and Medvedev's dispute, is not of existential importance for the United States and is certainly not worth a nuclear confrontation with Russia. But as long as the U.S. stays engaged, the risk of escalation remains." [UnHerd / Kavanagh]
On the history of U.S.-Russian naval relations, DEFP Asia Director Lyle Goldstein writes:
- "Washington's national security interests in the Black Sea are rather minimal, but it has substantial, concrete interests in a pragmatic relationship with Russia across all the world’s oceans and beyond." [Proceedings / Goldstein]
On the tariffs placed on India, DEFP Fellow Daniel DePetris says:
- "Trump's desire to forge a successful policy against Russia also increases the risk of undermining his China policy, as India, an important counter-balancer to Beijing's influence in the region, is forced into reassessing its own relations with the United States. Modi has even less of an incentive to do Trump any favors on China if he's also getting hit over the head with the tariff stick. The White House is, in essence, in danger of cutting off its nose to spite its face." [MSNBC / DePetris]
Meanwhile, Russia continues to advance on the battlefield even as Trump threatens new sanctions. DEFP Senior Fellow Lt. Col. Daniel Davis states:
- "The Russian economy, which was never very intertwined with the U.S. economy, adapted to bypass Western pressures, becoming more resilient to outside pressure—and the Russian army is definitely stronger now than it was in 2022. Why worsen our situation further in pursuit of the militarily and economically unattainable?" [Real Clear World / Davis]
. . . and wagging the dog
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled his intention to "conquer" and permanently occupy Gaza as mass starvation spreads and U.S. public support for Israeli actions plummets. The Trump administration remains firmly committed to backing Netanyahu, however.
On whether Trump is willing to restrain Netanyahu, DEFP Director of Military Analysis Jennifer Kavanagh tells the Financial Times:
- "I think there are constraints on Netanyahu, and there are red lines... But I think it's hard to say exactly where they lie, because it's based on how [Trump] defines U.S. interests in the moment." [Financial Times / Abigail Hauslohner]
On distinguishing U.S. and Israeli interests, DEFP Fellow Daniel DePetris writes:
- "The last thing Washington should be doing is plunging deeper into the Gaza muck. Yet time and again, Trump is content with following Netanyahu's lead on this issue, to the point where one genuinely wonders whether he understands that American and Israeli interests aren't completely aligned." [The Spectator / DePetris]
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"You have to make choices. The Biden administration also should have thought about these trade-offs, but they were able to shrug them off because it was early in these wars
. . . stockpiles were still deep enough that they could turn a blind eye to it. But the Trump administration now is getting to a point where they're not going to be able to ignore the trade-offs."
– DEFP Director of Military Analysis Jennifer Kavanagh, quoted in "U.S. used about a quarter of its high-end missile interceptors in Israel-Iran war, exposing supply gap." [CNN / Gianluca Mezzofiore, et al.]
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Territorial control of Ukraine as of February 2025
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While Trump tries to pressure Putin to make a deal, DEFP Senior Fellow Lt. Col. Daniel Davis writes that the truth is Russia is in the dominant position in its war with Ukraine and does not have to make concessions to give Trump the 30-day ceasefire he continues to demand. Davis assesses it's very unlikely that Ukraine could reverse the territorial losses they have suffered to Russia since 2022.
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"America First" cannot mean that this little island with a complex history and serious identity issues becomes the sine qua non of American strategy in the vast Asia-Pacific region and even globally. There are vital matters, not least the U.S.-China trading relationship exceeding $600 billion annually, that should be prioritized over Taiwan . . .
For years, the U.S. has been building up military forces in the western Pacific that include common warship transits of the Taiwan Strait. On the diplomatic side, Washington has regularly dispatched high-level official delegations to the island, engaged in rhetoric that suggests it has the right and will to intervene in a Taiwan conflict, encouraged allies to become involved in the dispute, built a thoroughly modern facility that functions as a de facto embassy at the cost of hundreds of millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars, and even deployed American troops to the island.
A major course correction is now overdue. To preserve peace in the Asia-Pacific, Washington must act to restrain Taiwan's growing push toward formal nationhood and independence.
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