“They are very good hosts and can be really charming when they want
to be,” Ingeneri, now in the private sector, said, adding that the US
State Department budgets were far smaller and corruption concerns
greater. “We had a hot dog on a Ritz cracker.”
But Chinese officials also mixed their soft power with unbending deportment when espousing Beijing’s red lines, he added.
“It’s all fun and games – until you want to keep your claim to the South China Sea.”
The US effort to counter China’s growing global footprint is
difficult enough. President Donald Trump’s radical State Department
overhaul is not making it any easier and could play into Beijing’s hands
for
decades, according to lawmakers and past and current department
officials.
“Our competition with China requires all hands on deck. It’s global
in nature. It affects virtually every issue, every topic that crosses
borders,” said Mark Lambert, a 35-year State Department veteran and
former head of its China House overseeing Beijing-focused diplomacy.
“We just gutted [development programmes] ourselves, a huge win for China.”
Most US administrations reshape their foreign policy and diplomatic
outreach. Few, however, have revamped government as completely as Trump
has.
To date, the State
Department has shed more than 3,000 employees, shuttered the US Agency
for International Development and merged or eliminated over 300 bureaus
and offices, including those handling human and labour
rights, economics and climate change.
It has also boarded up its Voice of America and Radio Free Asia
broadcasts – even as China Global Television Network spreads to 160
countries. And State is halving its budget as China expands its
2025 diplomatic spending by 8.4 per cent.
These measures leave Beijing with the world’s
largest diplomatic corps, with 274 embassies and consulates in 176
countries, amid reports that the State Department plans to close 30 of
its 272 missions – closures Secretary of State Marco Rubio has denied.
Few dispute the administration’s stated objectives: prioritise foreign
representation over US-based agency bureaucracy; remove or reorganise
outdated departments; restructure China-focused diplomacy to better
address the strained bilateral ties.
“Our goal is to have a State Department that is accountable to the
American people,” Michael Rigas, the agency’s deputy secretary for
management and resources, told Congress last month. “We must move at the
speed of relevance.”
But critics disparage the administration’s ruthless approach, leaving
fired diplomats stranded overseas, entire areas of “woke” expertise
slashed and lay-offs determined by quotas.
As sacked employees loaded up boxes on July 11, lawmakers, activists and
former ambassadors waved signs outside the Washington headquarters that
read “Thank you to America’s diplomats”.
“Slashing this department in half in the middle of a critical
competition globally, at the same time we walk away from aid, is a
horrible idea,” said Senator Chris Coons, a Democrat of Delaware and
member of the Foreign Relations Committee. “We don’t seem to
have a clear and consistent strategy.”
The intent is to centralise control and reduce autonomy, analysts said,
to let Trump and Rubio more directly dictate China policy – and others –
without pushback.
But the administration’s plan to restructure its China diplomacy – never
easy given China’s size and complexity – remains unclear.
“They need to have a sharper tool in the shed,” said one former US
diplomat with extensive China experience over several decades in foreign
service. “How do you herd the cats … It’s been a problem my entire
career.”
In the State Department downsizing, analysts see several potential
China-related risks, some potentially not obvious until a crisis erupts.
Alienating allies and partners with aggressive tariff and military
contribution demands will complicate international coalition building
and raise doubts about Washington’s long-term commitment to
Taiwan, they said.
Beijing regards Taiwan, a self-governing island, as part of China, to be
reunited eventually, by force if necessary. Most countries, including
the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state. But Washington
has opposed any attempt to take it by force
and is committed to supplying it with weapons to defend itself.
The loss of foreign language and diplomatic expertise – combined with
staff reductions at the CIA and other intelligence agencies – risks a
shortfall in information and analysis that undercuts Washington’s
ability to anticipate, understand and effectively counter
Beijing.
“The tragedy is, that capacity is just walking out the door,” said
Jeffrey Moon, a former US consul general in Chengdu who now heads the
China Moon Strategies consultancy.
The willingness of US diplomats to temper questionable policies is also
diminished as the agency increasingly reflects Trump’s transactional
approach and intolerance of criticism. A foreign service officer who
requested anonymity, fearful of losing his job,
said he was told not to report any visa or illegal immigration data
that undercuts the administration’s deportation agenda.
Another potentially costly loss are long-standing personal ties with Chinese diplomats. After the US accidentally bombed China’s
Belgrade embassy in 1999; after the US
EP-3 spy plane went down over Hainan in 2000; after China’s
spy balloon transited across the US in 2023 – these helped quietly nudge relations back on track.
“If the Defence Department has to deploy, we’ll win. But it’s going to be devastating,” said Lambert, who retired in January.
“The competition with China is real and it’s multifaceted. But we have
to find a way to compete and to win that competition without violence.”
Also problematic is record low morale in the State Department, current and ex-foreign service officers said.
“Everyone has been forced to be paranoid,” said the current foreign service officer. “Everyone is thinking, am I next?”
The administration’s focus on rooting out “radical political ideology”
at State, some said, reflects Trump’s distrust of multilateralism and
bid to reshape the department’s internal culture in support of his
America First agenda.
Reports of a leaked April draft order indicated the department was
considering dropping the foreign service examination in favor of hiring
based on a candidate’s alignment with Trump’s agenda.
“He is not looking for a well-oiled inter-agency process to be coming up
with deep strategic and policy proposals,” Ingeneri said of Trump. “He
is looking for people to go do what he says.”
The purges and implicit nod to personal loyalty echo China’s Cultural Revolution under Chairman
Mao Zedong, said the current foreign service officer with China postings.
“You definitely see those parallels,” he said. “And with Mao getting rid
of the intellectual class, you see that de-emphasis on individual
thought that doesn’t align with Trump.”
If you’re Chinese, you’re looking at your competitor who, for whatever reason, just fired half the team
Mark Lambert, former US State Department official
Beijing, analysts note, is happy to stand aside and watch what it sees as self-destructive US missteps.
“If you’re Chinese, you’re looking at your competitor who, for whatever
reason, just fired half the team,” Lambert said. “‘Can you believe what
the Americans have done to themselves.’”
The changes have called attention to the strengths and weaknesses of the two foreign services.
Current and former US diplomats give China’s foreign ministry high marks
for consistency, planning and effectively conveying Beijing’s message,
epitomised by its years-long campaign to promote the
Belt and Road Initiative.
But like most authoritarian systems, they add, the one-party state does not always course-correct well.
Beijing tends to identify promising diplomatic candidates early in a
system that encourages a relatively narrow focus of specialists who
build up expertise over decades.
Ambassador
Xie Feng is on his third US posting, for instance, after holding four US-centred positions in Beijing.
The US system, in contrast, has favoured generalists, seen as a way to
encourage creativity. Such individuals often cycle in and out of
government, though, while US election cycles and changing
administrations often lead to policy shifts – as well as politically
appointed ambassadors with limited diplomatic experience.
These relative strengths tend to favour the more flexible US side during
significant policy shifts, the Chinese side with its deep institutional
knowledge during detailed negotiations, analysts said.
“The upside is that there can be sharp changes in policy that the
Chinese are not capable of adapting to. Whereas the pitfall is that the
US is not aware of the nuance” or history of bilateral consultations,
Moon said. “That’s always been a fundamental weakness
of the American system.”
China’s one-party state can also move quickly on trade packages and
other foreign initiatives, even if the outcome is not always as
substantive as the US version.
“China was able to outmanoeuvre us with trade deals that often didn’t
have a lot of meat to them but were good for quick wins diplomatically,”
said Ingeneri, who left the State Department in 2024.
“Whereas the US models were excruciating to negotiate and get through Congress. But their usage tended to be much higher.”
The Chinese are also better at connecting with top leaders in emerging
markets than Americans are, Ingeneri added: “Minister so-and-so wants a
soccer stadium – often at a fraction of the cost of what we were doing
with USAID on health and education.”
But a significant US strategic advantage has been its deep alliances
with Nato, Japan, the Philippines and others, compared with China’s
relatively limited ties with Russia, Iran and North Korea.
China’s foreign ministry, established in 1949 as “the People’s
Liberation Army in civilian clothing”, has also had its share of
messaging and organisational problems.
Its aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy after around 2017 alienated many
countries and fuelled impressions of China as a bully, analysts said.
And the sudden departure in 2023 of
foreign minister Qin Gang, the former ambassador to Washington,
resulted in significant reshuffling within the ministry’s North American
Affairs department.
“It is very Byzantine,” said Lambert. “You have your patrons. And if
your patron is taken down, there’s a strong likelihood that is going to
affect you too.”
Chinese diplomats also tend to be on a tight leash, making it difficult
to tell whether they’re speaking honestly or repeating the party line,
some said, while Beijing’s foreign policy and development assistance
often appear blatantly self-serving.
“They’re bullies,” said a former US ambassador, who asked not to be
identified given continuing government contacts. “The US is too, but
they’re more so.”
But China has an appealing story – consistent, stable, lifting its
people out of poverty – to tell in tumultuous times, delivered by
increasingly polished, well-educated diplomats.
“I have tremendous respect for the intellect, the capabilities, the
strengths of Chinese diplomats,” said Lambert. “To underestimate that is
foolish.”