Trump’s overhaul of State Department may play into Beijing’s hands for decades
US foreign service has lost more than 3,000 employees and dozens of bureaus, leaving China with largest diplomatic corps
During nearly three decades as a US diplomat in China, Southeast Asia and Africa, Matt Ingeneri watched his Chinese counterparts dispense prestigious scholarships, hold lavish banquets and conduct expensive national day celebrations.
“They are very good hosts and can be really charming when they want to be,” Ingeneri, now in the private sector, said, adding that the US State Department budgets were far smaller and corruption concerns greater. “We had a hot dog on a Ritz cracker.”
But Chinese officials also mixed their soft power with unbending deportment when espousing Beijing’s red lines, he added.
“It’s all fun and games – until you want to keep your claim to the South China Sea.”
The US effort to counter China’s growing global footprint is difficult enough. President Donald Trump’s radical State Department overhaul is not making it any easier and could play into Beijing’s hands for decades, according to lawmakers and past and current department officials.
“Our competition with China requires all hands on deck. It’s global in nature. It affects virtually every issue, every topic that crosses borders,” said Mark Lambert, a 35-year State Department veteran and former head of its China House overseeing Beijing-focused diplomacy.
“We just gutted [development programmes] ourselves, a huge win for China.”
Most US administrations reshape their foreign policy and diplomatic outreach. Few, however, have revamped government as completely as Trump has.
To date, the State Department has shed more than 3,000 employees, shuttered the US Agency for International Development and merged or eliminated over 300 bureaus and offices, including those handling human and labour rights, economics and climate change.
Few dispute the administration’s stated objectives: prioritise foreign representation over US-based agency bureaucracy; remove or reorganise outdated departments; restructure China-focused diplomacy to better address the strained bilateral ties.
“Our goal is to have a State Department that is accountable to the American people,” Michael Rigas, the agency’s deputy secretary for management and resources, told Congress last month. “We must move at the speed of relevance.”
But critics disparage the administration’s ruthless approach, leaving fired diplomats stranded overseas, entire areas of “woke” expertise slashed and lay-offs determined by quotas.
As sacked employees loaded up boxes on July 11, lawmakers, activists and former ambassadors waved signs outside the Washington headquarters that read “Thank you to America’s diplomats”.
“Slashing this department in half in the middle of a critical competition globally, at the same time we walk away from aid, is a horrible idea,” said Senator Chris Coons, a Democrat of Delaware and member of the Foreign Relations Committee. “We don’t seem to have a clear and consistent strategy.”
The intent is to centralise control and reduce autonomy, analysts said, to let Trump and Rubio more directly dictate China policy – and others – without pushback.
But the administration’s plan to restructure its China diplomacy – never easy given China’s size and complexity – remains unclear.
“They need to have a sharper tool in the shed,” said one former US diplomat with extensive China experience over several decades in foreign service. “How do you herd the cats … It’s been a problem my entire career.”
In the State Department downsizing, analysts see several potential China-related risks, some potentially not obvious until a crisis erupts.
Beijing regards Taiwan, a self-governing island, as part of China, to be reunited eventually, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state. But Washington has opposed any attempt to take it by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons to defend itself.
The loss of foreign language and diplomatic expertise – combined with staff reductions at the CIA and other intelligence agencies – risks a shortfall in information and analysis that undercuts Washington’s ability to anticipate, understand and effectively counter Beijing.
“The tragedy is, that capacity is just walking out the door,” said Jeffrey Moon, a former US consul general in Chengdu who now heads the China Moon Strategies consultancy.
The willingness of US diplomats to temper questionable policies is also diminished as the agency increasingly reflects Trump’s transactional approach and intolerance of criticism. A foreign service officer who requested anonymity, fearful of losing his job, said he was told not to report any visa or illegal immigration data that undercuts the administration’s deportation agenda.
“If the Defence Department has to deploy, we’ll win. But it’s going to be devastating,” said Lambert, who retired in January.
“The competition with China is real and it’s multifaceted. But we have to find a way to compete and to win that competition without violence.”
Also problematic is record low morale in the State Department, current and ex-foreign service officers said.
“Everyone has been forced to be paranoid,” said the current foreign service officer. “Everyone is thinking, am I next?”
The administration’s focus on rooting out “radical political ideology” at State, some said, reflects Trump’s distrust of multilateralism and bid to reshape the department’s internal culture in support of his America First agenda.
Reports of a leaked April draft order indicated the department was considering dropping the foreign service examination in favor of hiring based on a candidate’s alignment with Trump’s agenda.
“He is not looking for a well-oiled inter-agency process to be coming up with deep strategic and policy proposals,” Ingeneri said of Trump. “He is look for people to go do what he says.”
“You definitely see those parallels,” he said. “And with Mao getting rid of the intellectual class, you see that de-emphasis on individual thought that doesn’t align with Trump.”
If you’re Chinese, you’re looking at your competitor who, for whatever reason, just fired half the team
Beijing, analysts note, is happy to stand aside and watch what it sees as self-destructive US missteps.
“If you’re Chinese, you’re looking at your competitor who, for whatever reason, just fired half the team,” Lambert said. “‘Can you believe what the Americans have done to themselves.’”
The changes have called attention to the strengths and weaknesses of the two foreign services.
But like most authoritarian systems, they add, the one-party state does not always course-correct well.
Beijing tends to identify promising diplomatic candidates early in a system that encourages a relatively narrow focus of specialists who build up expertise over decades.
The US system, in contrast, has favoured generalists, seen as a way to encourage creativity. Such individuals often cycle in and out of government, though, while US election cycles and changing administrations often lead to policy shifts – as well as politically appointed ambassadors with limited diplomatic experience.
These relative strengths tend to favour the more flexible US side during significant policy shifts, the Chinese side with its deep institutional knowledge during detailed negotiations, analysts said.
“The upside is that there can be sharp changes in policy that the Chinese are not capable of adapting to. Whereas the pitfall is that the US is not aware of the nuance” or history of bilateral consultations, Moon said. “That’s always been a fundamental weakness of the American system.”
China’s one-party state can also move quickly on trade packages and other foreign initiatives, even if the outcome is not always as substantive as the US version.
“China was able to outmanoeuvre us with trade deals that often didn’t have a lot of meat to them but were good for quick wins diplomatically,” said Ingeneri, who left the State Department in 2024.
“Whereas the US models were excruciating to negotiate and get through Congress. But their usage tended to be much higher.”
The Chinese are also better at connecting with top leaders in emerging markets than Americans are, Ingeneri added: “Minister so-and-so wants a soccer stadium – often at a fraction of the cost of what we were doing with USAID on health and education.”
But a significant US strategic advantage has been its deep alliances with Nato, Japan, the Philippines and others, compared with China’s relatively limited ties with Russia, Iran and North Korea.
China’s foreign ministry, established in 1949 as “the People’s Liberation Army in civilian clothing”, has also had its share of messaging and organisational problems.
Its aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy after around 2017 alienated many countries and fuelled impressions of China as a bully, analysts said.
“It is very Byzantine,” said Lambert. “You have your patrons. And if your patron is taken down, there’s a strong likelihood that is going to affect you too.”
Chinese diplomats also tend to be on a tight leash, making it difficult to tell whether they’re speaking honestly or repeating the party line, some said, while Beijing’s foreign policy and development assistance often appear blatantly self-serving.
“They’re bullies,” said a former US ambassador, who asked not to be identified given continuing government contacts. “The US is too, but they’re more so.”
But China has an appealing story – consistent, stable, lifting its people out of poverty – to tell in tumultuous times, delivered by increasingly polished, well-educated diplomats.
“I have tremendous respect for the intellect, the capabilities, the strengths of Chinese diplomats,” said Lambert. “To underestimate that is foolish.”