A Sigh of Relief in Iraqi Kurdistan
The peace process between Türkiye and the PKK will stabilize areas where they had been fighting, as well as the wider region.
Diwan
Diwan, a blog from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program and the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, draws on Carnegie scholars to provide insight into and analysis of the region.
A group of 30 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters ceremonially threw
their weapons into a fire on July 11 in the Jasana cave of Sulaymaniya
in Iraqi Kurdistan as part of a new peace process between the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. In the 1920s, the cave was
used by the Kurdish leader Sheikh Mahmoud to resist
British forces. The fact that the ceremony took place in Iraqi
Kurdistan showed the potential repercussions the peace process may have
for the area, since the PKK has been based
in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1982, after a deal with the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP). In 2015, the last peace process that took place failed.
Both the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
have expressed support for the peace process. Furthermore, a delegation
from the Turkish pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party also
visited the leadership of both parties, including PUK leader Bafel Talabani and KDP President Massoud Barzani. The delegation conveyed a message from the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Oçalan asking Barzani to visit him.
“The
Kurdistan Regional Government [or KRG] has consistently supported a
peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue in [Türkiye],” Treefa Aziz, the
KRG representative in the United States, declared. “We believe dialogue
is the only viable path to long-term stability, and we encourage all
parties to return to negotiations in good faith.”
Indeed, the two ruling parties have supported peace efforts between the PKK and Türkiye since 1993. However, the situation is now different from the previous peace efforts because starting in 2019 most of the fighting between the PKK and the Turkish army has taken place in Iraqi Kurdistan, affecting and displacing local civilians. In July 2022, Turkish strikes killed nine Iraqi tourists in Zakho.
Türkiye
has in recent years developed a military edge over the PKK, following
the Turkish army’s crackdown on an urban insurgency led by PKK militants
in the Kurdish majority southeast of Türkiye after the failure of the
2015 peace process. Since 2019, the Turks have also established over 35 military points, entering 15 kilometers into Iraqi Kurdistan and driving the PKK out from parts of Duhok Governorate along the border. Last year, Türkiye was also planning an operation in the Gara mountains further inland.
The Turks have also developed drones
that have targeted PKK fighters, driving them underground into a
complex of tunnel systems built by the party. The PKK this year said
they had developed countermeasures against the drones, and have shot down several of them. On July 6, twelve Turkish soldiers died from exposure to methane gas while searching one cave.
According to a report
by the Community Peacemaker Teams, following the disarmament ceremony
Turkish military strikes decreased by 97 percent compared to the
previous month. Apart from this, tensions have also significantly
decreased between the KDP and PKK. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
recently reported
that “PKK disarmament, if completed, is likely to have a positive
effect on stability in northern Iraq, assuming it is accompanied by a
withdrawal of Turkish military forces.” The Iraqi government also
welcomed the process and called for a Turkish withdrawal from Iraq, although Türkiye is still reportedly establishing new bases inside the country.
The KDP, which controls Erbil and Duhok, has built a strong relationship with Türkiye since the Turks opened
a consulate in Erbil in 2010. Most of the Turkish ground operations
have also taken place against PKK positions near KDP territories in
Duhok. The KDP, traditionally a rival of the PKK, has also opposed the
PKK’s territorial expansion since the 1990s from Qandil into many
traditional KDP areas. Both sides also fought each other during the
Kurdish civil war of the mid 1990s. In 2020, the KDP called on the PKK to take their fight inside Türkiye, while the PKK accused the KDP of preparing a war against the PKK in cooperation with Ankara.
Furthermore,
the PKK has also established a presence in Sinjar after the Islamic
State attacked the area in 2014. Six years later, Erbil signed
an agreement with Baghdad, the aim of which was to remove the PKK from
Sinjar, though it was never implemented. The KRG in 2021 also blamed
the problems related with the PKK presence for a rise in the number of
migrants to Europe, with many young Kurds seeking to escape the ambient
instability through Belarus. According to the KRG,
more than 800 villages were evacuated due to clashes between Türkiye
and the PKK, displacing countless civilians and devastating local
communities.
There has also been friction
between the KDP and PKK over the thousands of Kurdish refugees in
Makhmour camp who fled Türkiye during the 1990s, from which the PKK has
recruited fighters. Since October 2017, Iraq has controlled Makhmour and
has put pressure on the camp. Oçalan recently implied
that the refugees in Makhmour could return to Türkiye. In light of
this, Noreldin Waisy, press secretary and media adviser to KRG Prime
Minister Masrour Barzani, underlined that the KRG fully supported any
peace talks with Türkiye that “aim to bring an end to the violence and
pave the way for lasting stability in the region.”
“These areas,
located in some of the most beautiful and promising parts of the
Kurdistan Region—particularly in terms of tourism and natural
resources—have suffered tremendously. In addition to the economic and
environmental toll, many innocent lives have been lost as a result of
the continued confrontations,” Waisy added.
While Türkiye hasn’t
been able to carry out ground operations in PUK-controlled territories
far from the Turkish border, it has carried out drone strikes against
the PKK in PUK areas, even inside Sulaymaniyah city. The PUK, which rules over Sulaymaniyah, has traditionally had better relations with the PKK, although it also briefly fought the party in 2000.
Since April 3, 2023, Ankara has on multiple occasions extended its flight ban on Sulaymaniyah International Airport. Türkiye has also directly called on the PUK to end its relationship with the PKK. As early as 2017, two Turkish agents were captured in Sulaymaniyah by the PKK, exacerbating Turkish-PUK relations, and Türkiye targeted
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi at Sulaymaniyah
airport in 2023. The SDF is led militarily by the People’s Protection
Units, which Türkiye considers an extension of the PKK, an accusation
the SDF denies. On March 15, 2023, a helicopter carrying SDF members to Sulaymaniya crashed in Iraqi Kurdistan, killing nine people. This highlighted the links between the PUK’s security forces and the SDF.
Therefore, it was interesting that the recent disarmament ceremony was held in Sulaymaniyah, which was also attended
by officials from the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT).
One of the two MIT officers captured by the PKK in 2017 was recently brought back
to Türkiye, as was the body of the other, who had died in captivity. A
PUK official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the PUK was asked
officially by mediators to organize the disarmament ceremony.
“Initially some sides had suggested a location in Erbil [Governorate]
for the ceremony, but the PKK rejected the proposal and opted for a
location in [Sulaymaniyah]. The security apparatus of the KRG and PUK
took part in ensuring the security and safety of the process.”
However,
the PUK source said that in return, there is no expectation that the
Turks will reward the PUK for their role. “However, since the PUK
genuinely wished success for this process, and for peace to finally be
achieved in [Türkiye] through this process, it is only natural to be
optimistic about a restoration of relations between the PUK and
[Türkiye] as a byproduct of the peace process.”
Devlet Bahceli, the leader of Türkiye’s far-right Nationalist Movement Party, who launched the peace process last year, recently said that he expects the process to be completed by the end of 2025. According to Mohammed A. Salih of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program, if “the PKK lays down arms and the Turkish state reciprocates by granting some recognition of Kurdish rights within a legal framework, that would certainly be a welcome step for the KDP and PUK, and Iraqi Kurds in general.” He added, “It would especially rid the border areas of conflict and the negative impact this has had on the lives of civilians in those areas. It would also help strengthen the relationship between Iraqi Kurds and Türkiye, given Türkiye’s major role in regional affairs and its status as an ally of the West.
Therefore, the peace process with Türkiye, if successful, could have a major impact on the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, including its economy, tourism industry, and stability. It could also further improve relations between Iraq and Türkiye, and between the Iraqi Kurdish parties and Türkiye, and lead to the return of refugees from the Makhmour camp. A successful process would end the Turkish flight ban on Sulaymaniyah and restore Turkish-PUK relations. Furthermore, for the KDP, the peace process could remove what it sees as territorial encroachment from a Turkish Kurdish party into Iraqi Kurdistan. Time will tell how much light there is at the end of this tunnel.