Well, it’s finally happened. Ukrainian lines have seen possibly their first major breach down to the operational depth, or nearly so, as Russian forces struck out as much as 20km north of Pokrovsk. But the real story is much more nuanced than that.
Russian troops had been accumulating there in small pockets since late July, shaping the ground. A fierce debate has erupted over whether these are “DRGs” or regulars as Ukrainian accounts have lazily resorted to labeling anything penetrating the first line of defense as “DRGs”, but in reality these are mostly regular troops which simply accumulated in a weakened portion of the front.
Hotspots on the front, where main assaults are expected, act as a kind of gravitational force, pulling everything toward them, and sucking resources and reinforcements in the sector away from neighboring lower-priority fronts.
You can see below, the yellow lines represent active Russian advancing operations, and the blue lines represent Ukrainian resources being pulled to plug the gaps and staunch the flow. But these resources are pulled away from a de-prioritized area which then “bursts” forward (red line), provided that Russian intelligence is aware enough of Ukrainian operational deficits there:
Thanks to increasing Russian capability, they have been well aware. Note the below for later:
But let’s start from the beginning and break this report down into two sections, first the basic straightforward SitRep, and then a more analytical breakdown of the actual tactics involved, as well as the situation’s prognosis and future outlook.
First, what we do know, or at least strongly suspect:
The areas circled in red are the newly verified Russian advances. The ones going westward toward Pokrovsk itself are obviously aimed at cutting the main Dobropillya-Pokrovsk road which is one of the last two remaining MSRs (Main Supply Route) there. The other E50 route heading northwestward toward Pavlograd is virtually already under fire control, or at least partially so.
Of course, there are many fields and small unofficial dirt roads in between those, but they are never as usable, particularly for heavy equipment. We’ve gone through this drill before many times, from Bakhmut to Avdeevka, if you’ll recall. During Rasputitsa those fields and backroads are a much bigger nightmare for logistics, but we’re not there yet.
Ukrainian reports indicate that several “elite” units were immediately dispatched as emergency measure to stop the breakthrough. This reportedly includes the 92nd Assault Brigade, 4th National Guard Brigade, and 12th “Azov” Special Forces Brigade as part of the 1st “Azov” Corps led by the infamous Prokopenko:
For those wondering, Azov was restructured into a much larger Corps unit of the National Guard, but the core brigade from this unit is what’s being sent to man the Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway area, just north and northwest of the Zoloti Kolodyaz breakthrough.
There are so many varied implications of this ongoing breakthrough that they could take up several articles worth of material. But to summarize, not only is the Pokrovsk area threatened, but even the larger Kramatorsk agglomerate is under major threat with the cutting of the Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway:
This is particularly the case given that the Lyman front north of Slavyansk is facing major pressure as well, with lots of recent gains there which are beginning to approach old pre-Slavyansk lines.
For instance, Torske was reportedly just finally sealed up and Russian forces are already heading further west:
And north of Torske, Russian forces have been moving even much faster in the area south of Ridkodub.
The other major implication is one of operational breakthrough, with reports claiming Russia has breached the rear of Ukraine’s last major fortifications line of the Donetsk region:
Keep in mind, the above map is much more optimistic than others and Russia may not have actually cut this highway just yet, as can be seen by the earlier Suriyak maps—but we’ll find out soon. Further, Ukrainian sources claim that much of Russia’s advances are now being beaten back by the ‘elite’ reinforcements dispatched to the zone.
It should also be mentioned that during all this time, Russian forces have likewise been digging deeper into Pokrovsk city itself, already in the process of sectioning it off. The same goes for the eastern side near Mirnograd, where Russian forces were geolocated breaking into the first blocks of Rodinske, as well as capturing a portion of Chervoni Lyman just below it:
It’s almost certain that the next objective will be to partition Mirnograd away from Pokrovsk entirely by cutting the main road, after which Mirnograd will collapse:
Also, though Russian forces have reportedly captured Nova Shakhove—though it’s not completely verified yet, and these may be advanced units that will pull back—there is also rumor that Russian “DRGs” are already operating on the outskirts of the critical town of Dobropillya:
Panicked Ukrainian internal sources have claimed the town has “two days left”:
A battlefield update would not be complete without the obligatory Jihad Julian post:
Lastly, Ukrainian analyst Myroshnykov fills in the details of what happened—with some deluded hope as garnishment—read particular his corroboration of the ‘DRG’ semantics:
The operational-tactical situation on the Pokrovsk direction is gradually approaching a point where Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad will no longer be saveable.
So far, the situation is not yet at that point. The critical moment has not yet come. But unfortunately, everything is heading that way at the moment.
The agglomeration can still be saved.
But this is not done by frontal assaults, attempts of which have already been made on our side! The enemy has long since adapted to that.
I send a huge "greeting" to those who are grinding down the best units in senseless frontal attacks.
Plus, there is chaos in command due to the transfer of responsibility zones on the direction from the OTU to the corps.
Because some cannot agree on the assignment of attached units to the corps, cannot agree on the exact boundaries of responsibility zones, and many other bureaucratic issues.
And often attached units carry out tasks from the command of two corps.
And the enemy strikes at the junctions of the corps, and both corps rush to "put out the fire" simultaneously. But resources are not unlimited, and the occupier gladly takes advantage of this.
This is what happened on the Pokrovsko-Dobropilskyi direction.
The occupier struck at the junction of the corps. And now we have such "results".
While everyone was busy eliminating "DRG" in Pokrovsk (including the military command), operational-tactical problems are emerging northeast of the city.
Why did I put DRG in quotes? Because these were (and still are) not DRG, but small enemy infantry groups that, under the close escort of their drones, successfully infiltrated deep into our lines.
And when there are several dozen of these small groups, they can crawl 10-15 km in the same way.
Letting them through is one thing, but driving them out is blood, sweat, the lives and health of our fighters. And exhaustion of reserves.
Therefore, even if that breakthrough at the junction of the corps towards Dobropillia and Druzhkivka is localized and it is possible to push the occupiers back a little - know that our losses stand behind this.
That's the situation.