Pacific sovereignty maintains the same malleability down China’s belt and road
In Brief
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is expanding into the Pacific through infrastructure projects and concessional loans, continuing a long history of flexible sovereignty influenced by external powers. While concerns about Chinese debt traps exist, Pacific states should be seen as leveraging geopolitical competition between China, the United States and others to gain economic benefits. Balancing relationships with foreign aid and military presence reflects a malleable sovereignty rather than a loss of independence.
The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ further extends China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), significantly expanding the program into the Pacific. Part geopolitical strategy, part aid and part soft power, the BRI offers Pacific states infrastructure projects, loans and other investment. Despite talk that BRI ‘debt traps’ pose a unique challenge to sovereignty in the Pacific, sovereignty has always been a malleable concept in the region.
From 2016–19, 11 Pacific nations signed BRI Memoranda of Understanding, opening themselves to trade and investment discussions with China. Pacific nations have been offered grants, concessional loans from state-owned policy banks like the Export–Import Bank of China, foreign direct investment by Chinese companies — though Pacific nations have not received any such investments since 2020 — and commercial loans from private Chinese banks.
Lending is an established practice in development aid. Between 2011–17, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Japan and Canada collectively provided over 60 per cent of loans to the Pacific. China provided 37 per cent.
Loan conditions are critical — no one wants to return to intrusive IMF-style structural adjustment programs that prioritise returns over public interests. China’s popularity in the Pacific is partly related to lending conditions. In 2019, 97 per cent of China’s official loans to the Pacific were concessional, with low interest rates of 2 per cent and up to 20-year maturities.
The issue is repayment affordability. In 2023, Samoa’s public debt was 35.4 per cent of GDP, Tonga’s was 43.3 per cent and Fiji’s was 83.3 per cent. These are all relatively low compared to the United States’ 123 per cent and Japan’s 240 per cent, though large diverse economies can generally service more debt.
In 2024, BRI construction in the Pacific increased 228 per cent. China provides labour and materials for projects like a US$9 million upgrade and extension of Samoa’s Faleolo airport and a 10,000-seat sports stadium for Solomon Islands costing US$71 million.
Pacific states have learned that geopolitical contest equals opportunity and are leveraging donors to extract the best deals.
While critics in New Zealand have concerns that Chinese investment will compromise their sovereignty and values, Pacific sovereignty has always been a malleable concept, compromised by aid and defence relationships. China is building support through grants and concessional loans — not debt traps. Owing money or favours to China is no different to hosting US or French bases or voting for Australia to hold a United Nations Security Council seat.
States can be ‘fully independent’ while inviting another state to manage defence, security, health or education through ‘free association’. Cook Islands and Niue have free association with New Zealand while Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands have it with the United States. It can be seen as a form of low-cost independence.
While Cook Islands is meant to discuss foreign policy plans with Wellington, it skipped that step in seeking BRI funding for a new airport in Rarotonga. New Zealand froze some aid in response. In October 2024, Niue received BRI highway upgrades among other investments. In May 2025, China hosted officials from Niue to discuss ‘sustainable development, regional cooperation and global connectivity’.
There are also Pacific territories that are neither free nor states. Tokelau rejected statehood and is part of New Zealand’s ‘realm’ and American Samoa, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands are US territories. There are three French territories in the Pacific. While New Caledonia’s Congress has aspects of sovereignty and can — with French consent — decide its own Pacific foreign policy, a BRI deal is unlikely as France’s offer of ‘statehood within France’ ties future nickel production to France rather than China — New Caledonia’s existing market. ‘Unfree association’ is perhaps a better descriptor.
The BRI seeks to advance China’s great power aspirations and Pacific influence, evade US containment strategies and remove Taiwanese statehood claims by depriving it of recognition. BRI investments can induce recipients to change their recognition of states. For ceasing recognition of Taiwanese statehood, Kiribati reportedly received aircraft and ferries, Solomon Islands obtained US$500 million in funding while Nauru received a new Beijing embassy and an invitation to join the BRI.
In 2000, Taiwan had seven Pacific diplomatic partners. By 2025, it only had Palau, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu. While Palau and the Marshall Islands have free association with the United States, so does the Federated States of Micronesia, and it is a BRI partner.
In 2024, Solomon Islands — having signed an unprecedented and secretly negotiated bilateral security pact with China in 2022 — led the anti-Taiwan charge. Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele understood that ‘gifts’ like sporting stadiums carry obligations. In May 2025, there were suggestions China pressured a Solomon Islands minister to quit the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China — a group seen as critical of Beijing and pro-Taiwan.
Solomon Islands is hosting the 2025 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in September. At the time of writing it was still unclear if Taiwan will be invited after China’s protests over the 2024 Tonga communique’s — subsequently removed — reference to Taiwan as a ‘development partner’.
In 1882, Egypt defaulted on its debts and was occupied by the United Kingdom and France. Pacific states that owe money will not be occupied, but favours may be asked. Hugh White has argued that a Pacific naval base is likely Beijing’s long-term objective — though not all agree.
With US bases across Micronesia and French bases in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, if a state or territory can host a US base and retain its sovereignty, the same logic should apply to a Chinese base. Any future ‘debt-forgiveness for naval access’ deal would be a sovereign act by an independent Pacific state exercising its agency and leveraging geopolitical competition.
Charles Hawksley is Associate Professor in the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry at the University of Wollongong.